Imago pulcra Est picta sculptoris manu
At pulcrioem dat libris Auton suus
Hic Corpus Illis ipsa Mens depingitur
Ima Vniuersi Mens & Ipsius simul

THE DARKNES of ATHEISM Diſpelled by the LIGHT of NATURE.

A PHYSICO-THEOLOGICALL *TREATISE,*

Written by

WALTER CHARLETON

D^r. in Phyſic, and Phyſician to the late KING.

Heu primæ Scelerum cauſſa Mortalibus ægris,
Naturam neſcire DEUM.——Sil. Italic 4. p. 56.

DEUS aliquis juſſit & primum ſcribere, & declarationem
ejus, ille ipſe novit, me ſcire. Galen. 10. de uſu part.

LONDON,
Printed by *J. F.* for *William Lee*, and are to be ſold at the ſigne of the Great *Turks* Head over againſt *Fetter-Lane* in *Fleetſtreet.* 1652.

299.
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Epistola Dedicatoria.

CLARISSIMO,
QUIA
ORNATISSIMO VIRO,
Inclytissimi Medicorum Londinensium
Collegii Præsidi longè dignissimo,
FAUTORI SUO,
Omni officiorum genere æternùm
Colendissimo, *D. D.*

FRANC. PRUJEAN,

GUALT. CHARLETON S.P.D.

Decretum fuisse olim, accepi, à Consultissimis æquè ac Amplissimis celeberrimi nostri Collegii *(quod omnes, quibus cum Literis ac Humanitate aliquod commercium, summa, uti decet,*

decet, veneratione colu Fundatoribus; *quòd nullus, tantæ fa .... adſcitus, Librum quemlibet in dias luminis oras effundere audeat, quem* Præſes, *adplaudentibus ſimul* Cenſoribus, *indignum prius non judicaverit, qui diutiùs in Veſtæ penetralibus abditus lateret. Et graviſſimo ſanè conſilio; tametſi enim paucorum admodum, nullorum rectiùs dixerim, nomina veſtris adſcribi* Tabulis *ſolent, qui ſolennia & Eruditionis & ingenii ſui ſpecimina, vel ſcriptis, vel conſiliis medicis, vel diſputationibus, abſtruſiora circa* Phyſices *Theoremata, in Comitiis publicè habitis, priùs non exhibuerint; ideóque ſit ſperandum, neminem ex iis aut meditaturum, aut in publicum daturum aliquid, quod aut Philoſophum recta ratione utentem, aut piùm atque Chriſtianiſmo imbutum non deceat: veruntamen, cum quiſque fermè infatuantibus peſſimæ iſtius Sirenum,* φιλαυτίας, *blanditiis ſit nimium obnoxius, Scriptorúmq; plurimis innatum ſit iſtiuſmodi vitium, quòd ſui cerebri Mi-*

nervas

nervas flagrantiùs, quàm modeſtia ferat, ament; quid magis videatur conſultum, quàm ut uniuſcujuſque Collegarum ſcripta, quàm prælo Typographico, priùs ſubjiciantur examini eorum, quibus id muneris ſociorum ſuffragiis demandatum; quo ſit perſpectum magis, an ex iis utilitatis aliquid Artium ſcientiarúmque latifundiis ſuccreſcat, & genti Hippocraticæ honoris? Huic proinde majorum Senatus-conſulto, nedum Philoſophiæ, ejúſve ſobolis Medicinæ, aſt etiam ſacris Religionis Principiis quadantenus ſartis tectiſque conſervandis (ſaltem quoad veſtræ Ditionis extenſionem) utiliſſimo, liberrima voluntatis meæ Συγκαταθέσει *ipſemet obtemperans; En, in manus tuas,* Apollineæ Artis inſigne Deus ac Columen, *haſce meas Philoſophiæ* Primitias *trado: eo duntaxat nomine, quòd ſi oculatiori tuo, quod mihi ſit inſtar omnium, judicio lucis hujus uſura videantur dignæ; & majori, adverſus virulenta* Semicriticorum Zoilorúmque

Συει-

Συείγμασα, *Auctoritate foras prodeant præmunitæ, & Bonorum favori, pleniori cum gratia, commendentur. Cæteroqui, ſi vel verbulum in eis aut ſaniori Phyſiologiæ, aut Fidei Chriſtianæ, aut bonis denique moribus diſſonum & incongruum reperiatur: vel Tineis Blattiſque perrodendæ mox exponantur; vel fato illi ſubjaceant acerbiſſimo, quod exuſcitatum impiis Artibus ab* Erichthone *cadaver olim, ad rogum quàm citiſſimè reduxit, de quo* ἐυγλωτος *ille Poeta* Lucanus,

Vadit defunctus ad ignes.

Non eſt verò, quamobrem tam infauſtè ominer. Omnes etenim, dum huncce Atheiſmi Tumulum *eſſem meditatus, ingenioli mei nervos, mediusfidius, eò ſemper intendebam; ut recto, & ſuis genuinis filiis ab Matre Sancta Eccleſia in Canonicis præſcripto, Veritatis tramiti inſiſterem: ne ab opinione quavis inſana, ſplendidiſſima tametſi veriſimilitudinis ſpecie larvata, aut Mens, aut Calamus unquam ullibi deflecte-*

deflecteretur, salebrosa versùs Hæreseôs, Erroriſve *diverticula; quæ omnia* (Cardiognoſten *humillimè conteſtor*) *ab incunabulis uſque ex animo faſtidivi.*

Nec meo, ad lapſus nimis prono, unicè ſuper hac re, confiſus ſum arbitrio: ſed & labili minùs quorundam etiam Theologorum, *ingenio ſupra vulgus literatorum multùm perſpicaci, & queis nihil ſit magis cordi quàm ipſamet veritas; quibus ſingulas hujuſce Tractatus* Phyſico-theologici *ſchedulas, dum atramento ſcriptorio adhuc diffluerent, tradidi, ſeriò & ſeverè examinandas, imò ubicunq; iis opus viſum fuerit caſtigandas.*

Horum itaq; æquabili judicio ſi tuum etiam, Eruditorum Dictator, *omni ex parte conſenſerit; Librum huncce, ter ſacroſanctiſſimæ* Divini Numinis, *ab execranda Atheorum impietate* (*tremendum cogitatu*) *palàm impetitæ, Majeſtatis* vindicem, *magno tuo* Nomini *à me inſcribi conſecrarique patiatur, Candorem tuum, cæteras tuas virtutes undiquaque illu-*

ſtrantem,

ſtrantem, obnixè ac cum debita Dignitati tuæ obſervantia rogo. Fabrica eſt, cujus Fundamenta præclarum iſtud Matheſeôs lumen, CARTESIUM *dico (cui ſi Fata diuturniorem in terris indulſiſſent incolatum; dubio procul, tam diu anxiéque ab omnibus* Sophiæ *cultoribus exoptatum, Phyſiologiæ ſanioris compendium Reſp. Literaria ab illo ſolo expectaſſet, imò forſan excepiſſet) non ita pridem in* Metaphyſicis *ſuis* Meditationibus *poſuiſſe; certè vix me deceret pluribus tibi inſinuare: qui omnia ejus & perluſtraſti volumina, &, quod ſolertiſſimi pathognomonicon eſt ingenii, perlucidè jamdudum intellexiſti Ænigmata. Fabrica eſt, cujus ſtamina* LUDOVICUS VIVES, PHILIPPUS MORNÆUS, MARINUS MERSENNUS, & PETRUS GASSENDUS *(Heroës publico Humanæ gentis commodo, & nobiliorum Diſciplinarum incremento nati) ex denſiſſimis confertiſſimiſque ſais ſapientiæ ſylvis profluentèr nobis contulêre. Fabrica, ut uno omnia abſolvam, cujus conſtructionem epidemicus*

micus fermè ſceleratiſsimi hujus ſeculi Atheiſmus ab omni Erudito efflagitaſſe videatur, omnes apud rectos rerum æſtimatores: & quam nulli, niſi ſacrilegi Libertini *noſtri, quos apud* Dei, *&* Religionis *cauſa Aſſertore prorſus indigna habetur, inutilem cenſebunt vel ſupervacaneam.*

Memini, Vir Excellentiſsime, *te eſſe illum, qui me, poſt præmaturam ſereniſſimi mei quondam Domini,* Caroli, *feræ hujus Britanniæ noſtræ Monarchæ, Apotheoſin, non limis & invidiæ vipereo veneno turgentibus, aſt ipſiusmet inſtar Charitatis benignè ridentibus oculis aſpexiſti; in illuſtrem* Collegii *veſtri ſocietatem invitaſti ſæpius; tandemque, quum inaugurali meo munere defunctus eſſem, candidè exporrectaque (quod aiunt) fronte excepiſti. Deinceps verò, toties quoties* Te, *tanquam Æſculapium redivivum, ægrorum levandorum ergô, adivi; me, circa ſtochaſmum, prognôſin, medendi methodum, præſidiorumq; materiam, ſat prolixè, de more meo, differen-*

tem patienter & ſine maligno iſto medicaſtris innato Contradicendi *cacoëthe audiviſti ; & aut meam, ubi rationi aſſentiret, comprobaſti ſententiam, aut rectiorem commonſtraſti. Memini etiam (& magnum* Hippocratis *noſtri Genium ſemper habeam mihi iratum, ſi tanti beneficii fuero unquam oblitus) quàm paterno amore me, epidemica ſuperioris anni Dyſenteria graviſſimè & tantùm non lethaliter infectum, viſitaſti; quanta induſtria ſaluti meæ invigilaſti; quàm admiranda tandem Arte (favente* Archiatro Cœleſti) *animam meam abuſque Charontis cymbula reduxiſti : ita ut dignè canam,*

Auxiliis Pruian, anima hæc moribunda revixit;
Ut vigil, infusâ Pallade, flamma ſolet.

Hæc omnia manent alta mente repoſta, nec in Mortis etiam erit tyrannide, viva inſignia tuæ me erga Humanitatis Charagmata, cordis mei meditullio profundiſſimè inſculpta, penitus deradere. Quid verò retribuam tibi Fau-

tor Ampliſsime, *pro tot tantiſque favoribus, præter Animum Gratitudinis & Amoris pleniſsimum, ignoro prorſus: quem tibi* πάντως καὶ ὅλως *addictum, pro conſueta tua Benignitate agnoſcere digneris, etiam atq; etiam te obteſtor. Cæterum ut mundo etiam univerſo clariùs innoteſcat hæc mea* εὐχαριστία; *En, in ipſius teſtimonium levidenſe hoc* τεκμήριον *tibi offero: tot inter volumina, quibus inſtructiſsimos habes Bibliothecæ tuæ forulos, infima verò claſſe reponendum. Reſtant adhuc mihi complurima, in gratæ mentis* μνημόσυνον, *inſuper dicenda: ſed* Amphora jam exiit, currente rota. Deum Opt. Max. *tibi longos, & benefico ſyderum aſpectu proſperos indulgeat annos, in Morborum fœcunda nimis ſobole, in Humani generis excidium, quotidie naſcentium exantlationem fœlicem, ſimul ac Artis noſtræ compendium; ex animo precor.*

Ἐῤῥῶσθαι εὐσεβέσατε, καὶ ἐμοὶ πολὺ φίλτατε *Præſes.*

Ex muſæo meo Londini, Kal. Auguſt. anno ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἐνσαρκώσεως, 1651. ¶.

EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA.

A PREPARATORY Advertiſement TO THE READER.

READER,

BEfore you ſet foot within the door of this our *Phyſico-theologicall Labyrinth* (ſo the ſeemingly intricate and obſcure method, wherein the *Rowes* of our own and others *Cogitations* are here ſet, may warrant you to call it) providence enjoyn's, that we tender you a *Præparatory Advertiſement* of ſome things, whoſe prægnition is requiſite, as well to your calm, unprejudiciall and ſatisfactory *Lecture*, as to the *Præmunition* of this well-intended *Enterpriſe* of our Pen, againſt both thoſe implacable, though

though always foyled Enemies to learned *Induſtry*, impertinent and parcel *Contradiction*, and malevolent *Cenſure*.

The Cardinall points, or *Heads*, under whoſe comprehenſion, *All*, whereof we hope a prævious conſideration, as your homely, but wholeſom Entertainment, during your ſhort Detention in this *Portall*, doth genuinely and regularly fall; are onely theſe *Four*: viz. (1.) The *Occaſion* and *Incitements* to this *Exerciſe*, (2.) The *Neceſsity and Juſtification of Naturall Theology*, in generall; and of this in particular, and therein principally of the *Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God*, by beams univerſally deradiated from that Catholick *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*: (3.) The gratefull commemoration of thoſe venerable *Authors*, from whoſe repleniſh't Treaſuries, the richeſt Contributions toward this *Hoſpitall* for the cure of miſerable *Infidels*, were derived: (4.) Our due Confeſsion of thoſe *Defects* and *Impediments*, which rendred us inſufficient to the worthy *Adminiſtration* of a *Province* ſo difficult, ſo ſublime, ſo ſacred, ſo diffuſive.

As

As for the *First* Præconsiderable, *viz.* the *Occasion*; it is a *Truth*, not more deplorable, then manifest, that this our *Island*, which may justly contend with most parts of the Earth, for the Priority of Conversion to *Christianisme*, and might (Ah! that the righteous Anger of *Divinity* hath left us no other Tense to speak in!) not many yeares since, have challenged the Garland from the whole, for the orthodox, zealous, and sincere *Profession* thereof: hath of late produced, and doth at this unhappy day foster more swarms of *Atheisticall monsters* (such at least, whose licentious Practises, and insolent Discourses in Publick, do equally declare their wild Ambition to be so accounted; as if the only way to acquire the reputation of being *Transcendent Wits*, were to seem able, with bold and specious Arguments, to impugne the greatest and most sacred *Verities*; nay such, upon whose Admission, the Certitude of all other Notions doth individually depend) then any *Age*, then any *Nation* hath been infested withall. Nor, indeed, can this *Assertion* sound harsh in the ears of any æquitable person, who

shall but have observed, that *Religion* (the *vitall spirits* of all Commonweals, and the *Sanction* of all Human Laws) and the sacred *Authority of the Church* (the onely *Brasen Wall* of defence against those *Legions* of *Errors*, and *Illusions*, which the common *Adversary* of mankind, by his subtle workings upon the *Deceptibility* of our frail Nature, hath advanced) are both so shatter'd and undermined by our Fatall *Civill Warre*; that there yet remain many and wide *Breaches*, at which whole *Hosts* of the most execrable *Heresies*, blasphemous *Enthusiasms*, nay even profes't *Atheism* have enter'd upon us, without any considerable *Opposition* from those, who are, by the duty of their *Place* and *Function*, obliged to bee the publick *Champions* of all sacred *Truths*. This when wee had frequently, and not without due sorrow considered, and upon a profound and reiterated *Examen* of all those bloody *Sophisms*, which are usually urged by Atheists, to indubitate either the *Existence* of God, or those his Two Cardinal *Attributes*, the *Creation* of the Universe, and the constant *Conservation* and *Moderation* of the same, by his *Providence*,

Providence; found them to be derived from one of thoſe two poyſonous *Fountains*; either *that Humane Affections are imagined to be in God, or that man doth vainly arrogate ſo great Sagacity and perfection of Prudence to his owne Minde, as he thereupon præſumes to be able to comprehend what God can, and determine what he ought to do*: we immediately diſcovered, that the direct way to a full and durable *Solution* of them all, was onely to advertiſe men in the generall, that they ought to ſpeculate their own Mindes, as *Finite ſubſtances*, and the *Supreme Eſſence*, as an *Infinite*, and therefore *Incomprehenſible* one. For, this immenſe *Diſproportion* being once abſtractedly cogitated, and in the cloſeſt preſſures of *Infidelity* always reflected upon: all thoſe Mountainous *Difficulties*, which ſeem to eclipſe the *Light of Nature*, when converted toward *Divinity*, will ſoon leſſen, and vaniſh, like rorid Clouds before the Orient Sun.

The way toward the facile *Redargution* of all, either downright, or oblique and inferrible *Atheiſticall Miſapprehenſions*, appearing thus plain; the reſentment of our *Duty*, both

to *God*, and our *Fellowes* in Humanity; to God in the *vindication* of his injured *Majeſty*, to Man, in the *Rectification* of perverted *Judgments*, according to the capacity of our *Talent*; engaged us to attempt a ſhort progreſſe therein. And to the incitement of this forcible *Motive* we the more readily conformed our Aſſent, becauſe, having not long before propoſed to our ſelves to erect an intire *Fabrick* of *Phyſicall Science* upon *Principles* which ſeem to our judgement to be the moſt ſolid and permanent, becauſe moſt Demonſtrable, at leaſt, moſt Veriſimilous, as to the *Solution* of all Natures *Phænomena*; and firmly embraced that *Axiom* of the Schoolmen, *Nulla res, qualiſcunque eſt, intelligi poteſt, niſi Deus priùs intelligatur*, that no one thing in Nature can be known, unleſſe the Authour of Nature be firſt knowne: we conceived it not only no Apoſtaſie from our Firſt Reſolutions, but a more opportune and advantageous proſecution of them, to beginne at the Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of the onely *Perfect Ens*, and ſo many of his *Proprieties*, or *Attributes*, as relate to the *Univerſe* in generall,

generall, and *Humane nature* in ſpeciall; and this, as a *Foundation*, that muſt not only ſupport, but ennoble and facilitate our future *ſuperſtructions*.

Nor could our often and penſive reflexions upon the vaſt *Diſtance* betwixt the utmoſt Extenſibility of our *Underſtanding*, and the loweſt part of this the moſt ſublime and excellent *Subject*, alter or refract this our *Determination*: for, to counterpoyſe that *Diſcouragement*, we remembred, that to offend of *Zeal*, is more venial then to offend of *Neglect*.

Now, albeit this was the *Series*, or ſubalternate ſyntax of our *Thoughts*, to which our *Deſignation* of this *Work*, as the loweſt link, was connected; yet dare we not ſay, that this *Argument* was wholly of our own *Election*: for we have long inclined to that opinion of *Socrates* *, *Eam mentem Dii ſingulis dant, ut communes utilitates in medium afferant*; That every man's Province is impoſed upon him by the tacite conſignation of *Providence Divine*, and that it is the ſoft and ſecret Touch of that *Univerſall Spirit*, which maintains the common *Harmony* of the World, that *Tunes* the

* *In Oration. ad Philip.*

thoughts of every *Individuall* to this or that particular key: and therefore apprehended it as criminall, to ſtifle or extinguiſh thoſe *ſparks*, which we could not but perceive to be kindled, and glow within our breaſt.

Concerning the *Second*, viz. the *Neceſsity of Naturall Theology*, we are not ſingular in our perſuaſion, that theſe two Poſitions, *That there is a God*, and that *the Soul of man is a ſubſtance perfectly diſtinct from his body, and endowed with Immortality, by the Charter of its Eſſence*; are the Principall among thoſe *Verities*, which are to be demonſtrated by *Philoſophers*, rather then *Divines*. For, though to us whoſe *Mindes* are deeply imbued with the ſacred tincture of *Chriſtianiſme*, it ſufficeth to aſſume upon the evidence of meer *Faith*, that God is, and that the Human Soule, being conſtituted ſuperior to Corruptibility, doth eternally ſurvive the Funerall of the Body: yet, aſſuredly can the meer *Naturall* man, perſiſting in the ſtate of *Infidelity*, never be adduced to embrace either any *Religion*, or any *Morall Virtue*, unleſſe both thoſe *Propoſitions* fundamentall be firſt evicted to him, by *Reaſons*

Apodi-

Apodictical, desumed from that infallible *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*; from whose Judicature there can be no appeal.

And, since in this life of *Sensuality*, the Encouragements and Invitations to *vice*, are both more and stronger, then those to *virtue*: most certain it is, that very few men would prefer the harsh dictates of *Honesty* and *Right*, to those more complacent ones of *Pleasure* and *Profit*; if they neither feared the just vindiction of an *All-observant Deity*, nor expected a future *Subsistence* after Death. Now, however it be indubitable, that the Existence of God ought firmly to be beleeved, because it is commonstrated in *Sacred Writ*; And, by conversion, that Sacred Writ ought to be beleeved, because it is desumed from God: for, since *Faith* is the Gift of God, he that gives Grace sufficient for the stable Apprehension of other things contained therein, can also give Grace sufficient to the admission of his Existence. yet cannot this kind of *Argumentation*, with probable hopes of his Conviction, be proposed to an *Infidell*; who looks upon *Reason* onely,

as

as the chief inducement of *Beleef*: becauſe it is a manifeſt *Circle*, whoſe parts reciprocally depend upon each other for probation, and therefore he may lawfully except againſt it.

Again, as it is indiſpenſably *Neceſſary*, in reſpect of *Infidels*; ſo is it not *Unneceſsary*, in reſpect to *Beleevers*, to prove the *Certitude* of theſe two main Pillars of all Religion, and Morality: ſince the Evidence of *Reaſon*, ſuperannexed to that of *Faith*, muſt of neceſsity if not augment, yet *Corroborate* it: and that happy ſoul muſt, doubtleſſe, have much a clearer perception of the *verity* of *ſupernaturall Objects*, who ſpeculates them both by the *Light* of *Nature*, and of *Grace*.

And therefore, though we ſhould be ſo largely Charitable, as to grant, that there are no Atheiſts to be found among Chriſtians: which is more then the obſervation of the good *Juſtin Martyr* would give him leave to allow, when he ſaid, *dici quidem nonnullos Chriſtianos, eſse verò nullius Numinis cultores* *: and that the Principles of Religion are ſteadily beleeved by All, who make an externall Profeſsion of them: yet notwithſtanding would

* *In Dialog. cum Trypbon.*

it

it not genuinely follow, that therefore it is a *Pleonasm*, or *Parergy* to ratify those Principles to Beleevers, by the concurrent Testimony of that Oracle, *Reason*, to whose *Dictates* all Nations, all Ages, all Interests have unanimously submitted their Assent. For, as it must conduce to the *Information* of *Unbeleevers*: So also, proportionately, to the *Confirmation* of *Beleevers*.

Thirdly, as it hath been the positive and setled judgement of most *Divines*, both Ancient and Recent, not-onely that the *Existence* of God may be demonstrated, or irresistibly enforced upon the most prævaricate understanding, by the pressure of *Reasons purely Naturall*; but also, that the Cognition of the *Non-principiate* and *Self-dependent Being*, is farre more easily acquired, then the Cognition of any *Created Nature* whatsoever: insomuch as every man brings into the world with him a certain *Proleptical*, or anticipated *Notion* of the *Deity*, indelebly impressed upon the very substance of his minde; but the *Science* of all other *Entities* doth emerge from the Ideas of their natures, *Extradvenient* or *Adventitious* to the *Cognoscent Fa-*

culty, by the mediation of the *Senſes*: So alſo was it the expreſſe Aſſertion of the wiſeſt of men (*Wiſdom* 13. v.8, 9.) and of the greateſt of Apoſtles (*Rom.* 1. v. 20.) that the *Creator* was ſo viſibly repreſented in the mirrour of the *Creature*, as no excuſe could remain to thoſe unhappy *Ethnicks*, who making more then ſuperficiall inſpection into the one, did yet prætend an Indiſcovery of the other. *Quid enim aliud conſpicuum hujus mundi theatrum, quàm παιδευτήριον τῆς θεογνωσίας, καὶ ψυχῶν λογικῶν διδασκαλεῖον?* As that not long ſince Vitall Library, Biſhop *Prideaux* (whoſe memory, next that of our *Royall Maſter*, is and ſhall ever be the moſt precious of all others, in our eſteem: not onely in reſpect of his inſatiable native Capacity, ſtupendious Acquiſitions, and ineſtimable Benefits to the Republick of Learning; but alſo of his ſingular Favours to us in particular) hath in a magnificent elegance expreſſed, *in concione ad Artium Baccalaureos, in die Cinerum, de ſcala viſibilium ad inviſibilia.* To which accompliſh't *Paraphraſe* upon that freſhly quoted Text of S^t. *Paul*, we refer our Reader; in order to his own more ample ſatisfaction, and our Juſtification, concerning

cerning the poſſibility, nay facility of the mindes mounting up to a graduable Intellection of the *Supreme Ens*, by the roundles, or ſteps in the *Scale* of ſubordinate and *Created Natures*.

And *Fourthly*, leſt this our charitable Deſign, to ſubvert the chief Citadel of *Atheiſme*, by a Countermine of Arguments purely *Phyſicall* (entruſting the managery of that ſacred Engine, the Teſtimony of *Canonicall Scripture*, to the more expert hands of thoſe, whoſe *Function* entituleth them to the proper uſe thereof) ſhould want any one of the inducements of perſwaſion, requiſite to the accompletion of of its *Defence*; to the Reaſons, and Præcedents now introduced, we may ſuperadd alſo the *Authority* of no leſſe then the *Lateran Councell*, held under Pope *Leo* the tenth. Which, having with exceeding prudence decreed the *Anathematization* of all ſuch *Atheiſts*, who dare queſtion either the *Being* of God, or any of his *Attributes* (whether Abſolute and Incommunicable; ſuch as his *Eternity*, *Immenſity*, *Simplicity*, *Immutability*, *Independence*, &c. perfections concentred in his moſt glorious Eſ-

ſence: or Reſpective, ſuch as his *Omnipræſence*, *Omnipotence*, *Omniſcience*, *Juſtice*, *Mercy*, *Goodneſſe*, *Verity*, *Liberality*, &c. which by effuſion relate to the Creature) or the other Baſis of Religion, the *Immortality* of the *Humane ſoul*: doth, in the cloſe of the *Canon*, not only adhort, but expreſſely command all *Chriſtian Philoſophers*, that they ſharpen their *Style s* for the totall Eraſion of their circumventing *Sophiſmes*, and the deep Engravement of thoſe *Magiſteriall Truths*.

To conclude therefore, inſomuch as not onely multiplyed *Reaſons*, but alſo *Authority* both *Divine* and *Human* conjunctively, both warrant and enjoyne this kinde of *Naturall proceſs* for the convicton of Atheiſme: as wee can perceive no weight in their opinion, who think any *Principle* of *Religion* either prophanely diſparaged and debaſed, or implicitely convelled and ſtaggered, when brought to the Teſt of *Naturall Reaſon*, though only for *Confirmation*; ſo neither have we any cauſe to fear, that the upper Form of *Theologiſts* will contract their browes, and frown upon this our Benevolent

lent and opportune, though imperfect *Treatiſe*.¶

Concerning our *Third* Poſtulate, *viz.* the *Nomination* of thoſe venerable *Writers*, from whoſe large magazines of Knowledge, no ſmall part of our Ammunition for the Battery of the ſtrongeſt hold of the Common Adverſary to Humanity, hath been furniſhed; to this your ſelf will acknowledge us adliged as well by the bond of *Gratitude*, as *Honour*: the firſt adviſing us to return them the due tribute of *Commemoration*, and an open profeſsion of our beholdingneſſe to them; the other impelling us thereupon, in order to the prævention of being reputed *Plagiary*. Bee pleaſed, then, Candid Reader, to know from us, firſt that the Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God (being the argument of the ſecond Section in the 1. chap.) together with the enſuing Explanation of the ſundry *Scholaſtick Terms*, therein unavoidably uſed, and the *Reſponſes* to the ſeverall *Objections* (whereof ſome were made by the glorious *Marinus Merſennus*, and others by our eminent, M^r. *Hobbs*) was wholly collected out of the incomparable *Metaphyſicks* of that he-

roicall Wit, *Renatus De's Chartes*. Whose *Meditations* on that as necessary as excellent subject, having both frequently and with the most abstracted attention of our mind, read over; and with all possible equity of judgement put them into the scales against the *Cogitations* of *Cornelius ab Hogelande*, the Arguments of *Philippus Mornæus du Plessis*, *Hugo Grotius*, and *Petrus Gassendus*, concerning the same *Theorem*: we found them, by vast excesses, to overbalance all the others, in the points of comprehension, perspicuity, profundity, conviction. (1.) *Comprehension*; because their importance is of so great extent, as to take in the substance of whatever hath, or can be said by the whole world, on that particular. (*Consule ipsum Cartesium, in Epist. dedicat. ad Doct. Sorbon.*) (2.) *Perspicuity*; because, though they are not accommodated to *junior* or illiterate Capacities; as himself prudently intimateth (*in præfat. ad medit. de prima philosoph.*) yet to those Heads, which study and contemplation have prepared for the entertainment of Notions supernatural, must they appear as distinct, clear, and bright, as all the *Light of Nature* could make them; nor can he, who doth not,

after

after serious lecture, apprehend their *Extraction*, mutual *Connexion*, and genuine, nay indeclinable *Illation*, justly pretend to any considerable reflexions upon his own Nature. (3.) *Profundity*, because they are their own *Criterion*, being desumed from the very *Essence* of the mind, and proleptical *Impresses*, which are the radix, or Foot of all Cognition. (4.) *Conviction*, because they are of the number, and perhaps the principall of those *Verities*, which, like *Geometricall Demonstrations*, storm the most obstinate judgements, enforce them to a plenary assent, and having once gained possession of the mind, for ever after exclude all *Dubitation*, and *Apostasie*. So that what *Cicero* (5. *de Finibus.*) said of the Stoicks Philosophy; *mirabilis est apud Stoicos rerum contextus, respondent extrema primis, media utrisque, omnia omnibus; quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident, & ut in Geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt omnia*: we may worthily transfer upon the *Metaphysicall meditations* of *Cartesius*; nay more worthily, for no one *Principle* of his, there proposed, is precarious, but *Necessary*. This perpended, we perceived our selves not onely encouraged, bu straightly concerned, to transcribe,

ſcribe and accommodate to our præſent ſcope, the ſummary of his 3d. *Meditation.* And, *Secondly*, that many of our Apodictical Reaſons, alleaged for the comprobation of *Providence Divine*, both General and Special, were gleaned from thoſe more fertil Fields of *Lactantius* (de opific. Dei) *Raymundus de Sabunde* (Theologia Natural.) *Aquinas* (contra Gentes) *Ludovicus Vives* (de verit. fidei Chriſtianæ) *Bradwardinus* (de cauſa Dei) *Valeſius* (de ſacra Philoſophia) and chiefly of *Gaſſendus* (in Animadverſ. in phyſ. Epicuri:) the leaves of whoſe moſt learned Works, we bluſh not to confeſſe our ſelves to have been ſo converſant in, that we have ſullyed them by often revolution.

Nor can we expect the Perverſion of this our ingenuous Acknowledgement, by any, but the *Malevolent*, or *Illiterate*, to a *Diminution* of the credit due to this our induſtrious *Spicilegium*; while thoſe *Bookmen*, whoſe vigilant noſtrills are acquainted with the odour of the *Lamp*, need not bee informed, how many anxious hours have been ſpent on the ſedulous *Extraction* of this *Vial* of precious Truths, from the choyceſt *Flowers* of ſo many excellent

Gardens

Gardens (wherein onely to have had ſome recreative and private *Walks*, to many hath been juſtly accounted no obſcure Specimen of both *Literature*, and *Ingenuity*.) eſpecially when we are not deſtitute of grounds for our hopes, that they will ſoon find thoſe Flowers, not to have loſt much of their native *Fragrancy* and *Virtue*, by paſſing the *Alembic* of our Pen; as alſo, that it hath been no ſmall part of our care, to *Refuſe*, as well as *Elect*.

Beſides, there are many *Stars*, and thoſe of the greateſt magnitude, now ſhining with full ſplendor, in the ſphere of *Learned Authors*, whoſe beams were in great part derived from others, whom the revolution of Time had made leſſe vertical, and declined toward the Weſt of Oblivion. Who can blaſt the verdant Laurel on *Virgils* front, by ſaying, though truly, that *He* converted more then 1000. of *Homers* verſes to his own uſe? Who leſſen the ſound of *Homers* Fame, by exclaiming, that his Muſe was a Drone, and lived upon the Hony ſhe ſo largely ſuck't from the elder Hives of *Theocritus*, *Apollonius*, and *Heſiod*? Who detract from the full glory of

Cicero, by objecting that moſt of his ſtrong and limpid ſtreams of Eloquence flowed from thoſe two nobleſt ſprings of Greece, *Plato* and *Demoſthenes*? Or, who will diminiſh one grain of incenſe, in his ſacrifice to the memory of that *Alcides* (for the conqueſt of monſtrous Difficulties) the mighty *Stagirite*; becauſe *Clearchus* hath a tradition, that he ſaw and diſcourſed with that knowing *Jew*, from whoſe oraculous mouth all his Philoſophical Maxims were delivered to him? To come neerer home; who hath thought the leſſe of *Gratius* his Tract of the verity of Chriſtian Religion; becauſe it ſeems a Compendium of *Mornæus*, of the ſame Subject and Inſcription? Or, who undervalued *Mornæus*, in regard of the abundant Contributions he received from *Lactantius*, *Raymundus de Sabunde*, *Aquinas*, & *Ludovicus Vives*? And therefore, though we we are ſufficiently conſcious of the great diſparity betwixt thoſe Giant Wits, and our Pygmie Acquiſitions; and therefore gladly place our ſelves more then one ſphere below them: yet ſhall wee conceive our ſelves not a little injured, if any ſhall deny our

Book

Book a room in their Libraries, only becauſe it præſents, in Epitome, and entire, what many moneths reading of the *Schoolmen* would have exhibited at large, and in fractures. *Aphranius*, an eminent *Poet*, for anſwer to thoſe *Semi-Criticks*, who accuſed him of ſtealing many remarkable paſſages from *Menander*, returns thus; *Fateor, accepi non modò ab illo, ſed ut quiſque habuit quod conveniret mihi, & à Latino quoque quodcunque me non poſſe facere melius credidi.*

Moreover, every Brain is not conſtellated for new *Diſcoveries*; nor can every Age boaſt the production of a *Copernicus*, *Gilbert*, *Galileo*, *Merſennus*, *Carteſius*, or a *Harvy*: Providence introducing ſuch, as Time doth *New Stars*, ſingle and ſeldom. ¶.

And as concerning our *laſt Requiſite*, *viz.* an æquitable conſideration of our *Defects* and *Impediments*; to this alſo are we conſtrained to court our Reader, in order to our refraction of the *Rigor* of Cenſure. For though we need not advertiſe, that the Nerves of our *Intellect* are too ſlender and feeble to ſuſtain ſo great a weight; and our *Pencill* too rude and groſſe, to expreſſe ſuch fine *Metaphyſical* and *Theoſo-*

pbical Notions, in draughts reſpondent to the life of their Importance; in regard the frequent *ſtooping* of our *Cogitations* below the dignity and due height of the ſubject, muſt ſoon diſcover the one, and the *Roughneſſe* of our *Style* through the whole Piece, as ſoon confeſſe the other: yet can it not be ſupervacaneous for us here to intimate, that we had more then one *Diſadvantage* to encounter.

Firſt, the often Fermentations and Ebullitions of our *Melancholy*; to the tyranny of which fæculent and Saturnine humor both our native Temperament, and ſedentary contemplative condition of life have æqually ſubjected us; could not but as often obnubilate the region of our Mind, and darken the proſpect of our ſoul, by infecting the requiſite purity and lucidity of our ſpirits, with thick clouds of opac and fuliginous Exhalations.

Secondly, the courſe of our *Profeſſion*, rendring us obnoxious to many more *Diſtractions*, *Interturbations*, and *Avocations*, by the intruſion and importunity of the *Sick*, then

then we could obtain minutes of retirement for *Lecture* and *Meditation*; will, wee hope, be conſeſt to have had more then a finger in the cauſation of thoſe *Chaſms, Inæqualities, Omiſsions*, &c. Lapſes, which occurre to the obſervation of the *Auſtere* and *Curious*.

And, Thirdly, it cannot but deſerve ſome favour, to give notice; that the Clue of our ſtudies was broken off in the midſt, by the rough hand of the late *Epidemick Dyſentery*, which arreſting us even then, when the contexture of this Web required the moſt confirmed vigour of body, and ſerenity of minde; confined us to the dungeon of a ſick bed ſo long and cloſely, that it hath left ſenſible impreſsions of its Malignity, not only upon our Conſtitution, but alſo upon more then halfe of theſe our *Lucrubrations*.

To theſe Mitigatory Arguments, may rightly be added, the *Narrowneſs* of our præſent *Fortunes*, the *Thinneſs* of our *Library*, our tædious attendance on *Commitees* (all the ſad effects of our late *Inteſtine Warres*) together with ſome other private *Remora's*, the

least whereof may serve to the *Judicious* and *Benigne*, as a sufficient incitement to look upon our *Imperfections*, through the diminishing Telescope of *Charity*.

Now, this humble *Apology* we address only to the *Erudite* and *Candid*, experience having confirmed, that none the strongest Charme of Reason, can binde the virulent tongue of that livid Viper, *Envy*, the spirit of whose venom doth wholly consist in *Detraction*.

UPON

UPON
DOCTOR CHARLTON'S
NATURAL THEOLOGY.

SO, our poor Cotſwold Springs, that have no names,
Render their Tribute to your mighty Thames.
But your Book's perfect in it ſelf. We do
Only acknowledge, not encreaſe, what You
Have ſent forth, ſtreaming through the Land agen,
Out of your Generous, purely-flowing Pen.
To give more Elogy, with my ſoft Quil,
To Yours from Eagle's wing, were even as ill,
As threaden lace on cloth of Gold to pin,
Or o'rlay Gold it ſelf with baſer Tin.
Yet may I venture thus: though not to praiſe:
To anſwer OB's, *Envy perhaps will raiſe.*
Tis fit that Cenſure wait on All that's done;
« Wits are made great by Emulation.
Some places are obſcure. *The Book's not Good,*
By every vulgar Head it underſtood.
What you don't underſtand, read o'r again;
Compare, Conferr, and Meditate: 'Tis plain.
Th' Engliſh is Latin. *Know, that th' Engliſh Tongue*
Hath from each Language Conſummation:
And He, that will our Learneſt Writers ſcan,
Muſt be both Latiniſt and Grecian.
The Stile's too High. *Fear not the Critick's Rod:*
« High Phraſe is born of your High Thoughts of GOD.
Forward, Dear Brother: « GIFTS *for uſe are lent:*
« To do moſt good, brings in the moſt * *Content.* p. 120
Your Phyſick has done Miracles: But ſure,
TH' ATHEIST CONVERTED', *s your Divineſt Cure.*

C. B.

ALIUD.
IN EJUSDEM OPERA.

CHarltonus is, qui Helmontium pridem dedit,
Nuperque nobis reddidit Helmontium;
Hunc pulveris miranda ſympathetici,
Hunc eruditis exprimentem paginis
Medentium, De Fluxibus, Lapſus graves;
Nuperriméque Calculum, fœtum Suum,
(O abditâ præclarior Gemmâ Liber!)
Donaſſe luce publicum gaudet bonum;
Jam nunc ad altiora ſurgit. Numinis
Aſſertor eſt, Vindexque providentiæ.
Fortuna, Fati vis, Voluntas Libera,
Summi docentur obſequi Dictis Dei.
Deo favente, Cuncta. Vocum Copiam
Lectiſſimarum mirer, an Rerum magis?
Utramque miror, pariter atque exoſculor:
Utramque pronus veneror, & longè ſequor.
O Autor annumerande *Charltonus* Tuis!
Gaſſende, Chartes, Magne Sennerte Angliæ!
Et ipſe vivas, & Libri vivant diu!
Et Artium, de Te, optimæ certent diu!
Homines priori Opere devinctos habes;
Nunc Maximum Tibi obligaviſti DEUM.

Clemens Barkſdallus.

THE

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THE

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED.

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SECT. I.

Section 1. Article 1.

Aristotle, the most knowing and curious Ethnick, did yet by his silence in the cardinal point of *Theology*, proclaim the impossibility of mans full understanding the simple and perfect *Essence* of *God*.

ARistotle, though an *Ethnick*, poysoned with the *Macedonian* and *Grecian Idolatry*, nay so given over to that sottish impiety, *Polytheisme*, that he could be content to make a *Goddesse* of his *Wench*, and offer solemn sacrifices to her as a *Deity*, whom his own obscene luxury had degraded from the native dignity of *Humanity*, to devote his orisons to her for *good*, whom his own temptations had frequently subdued to *evill*, as *Gassendus* (*Exercitat.* 3.) out of *Diogenes Laert.* hath accused him; had yet a strong and noble sense of the *supreme Being*, as may, even by his adversaries, be collected from hence, that he never durst adventure on a *Definition*, nay not so much as a *Description* of its *Nature*. For

 though

though he spun out his speculations of *Immateriall Substances*, (the onely and proper theme of a *Metaphysitian*) into a long (but knotty and unequall) thread of 14 Books: yet in the 13 first of all those, he seems little better then wholly silent in all things that immediately concern *Theology*; and in some few Chapters onely of the last affords us a sparing and timerous discourse of the *Proprieties*, or *Attributes* of the *First Mover*. Now the pride and ambition of his wit would never have suffered his pen to have skip't over that subject, which being the most abstruse, sublime, and excellent, must by consequence, have adferred the most of glory and renown unto his memory: had he not been fully convicted, from within, of the immense chasme or gulph, that lay between the utmost extent of his own *finite reason*, and the incomprehensibility of the *Essence of God*. This his evasion, or rather supersession, some have been pleased to urge against his honour, as an argument of his *Ignorance* in notions *supernaturall*: but, in my construction, tis the clearest demonstration of the *Modesty* and *strength* of his *Judgment*. For whoever shall duely consider, how impossible it must be for *humanity*, dull, grosse, and narrow humanity, to behold *Invisibility*, derive *Independency*, calculate *Eternity*, circumscribe *Incircumscription*, limit *Omnipotence*, understand *Omniscience*, &c. and how dangerous a phrensie that brain must be disordered withall, that attempts to describe what he doth not, cannot know: will soon be satisfied, that *Amazement*, and pious *silence* is the best Lecture man can read on that immense *subject*, of which when we have said all we can, we have said nothing, if we look forward upon that inexhaustible abyss of *excellencies*, which must remain unspoken of, and indeed uncomprehended; that a professed *Nescience* in this particular, is the compliment, or zenith of all other *Science*, which the minde of man is capable of in this life; and that *Aristotle* may better pretend to the title of the *divine Philosopher*, for writing so little of the *Deity*, then *Plato* for writing so much to no purpose, the latter speaking little in much, the former all that can be thought in saying nothing.

And

And how far the ancient *Hebrews* (whose frequent *visions* of *Gods* reflexive glories, transmitted to them in the necessary allay of *sensible* natures; as of the pillar of a *Cloud*, by day, the pillar of *Fire*, by night, of *Smoak*, *Thunder* and *Lightning* on mount *Sinai*, at the promulgation of the decalogue, &c. might have encouraged them to pretend a nearer acquaintance with *Divinity*, then any other nation of the World) were from daring to conceive any positive *Adumbration* of his *Essence*: sufficiently appears from that high veneration their law enjoyned towards his very *Name*, *Jehovah*. Which was never to be pronounced by any, but the *High Priest*; in any place, but the *Sanctum Sanctorum*; at any time, but on the *Festival of annual expiation*; and in any case, but that of generall *benediction*, when the *Mercy* and goodness of God were to be derived down upon the people by the holy mediation of the anointed successors of *Aaron*; under penalty of no lesse then *death*, and particularly that cruel kinde of death appointed for the punishment of *Blasphemy*: as stands recorded in their *Talmud*, in the sad case of *Teradions* son.

Article 2. The *Hebrews* intimated so much, in the immoderate veneration enjoyned toward his Name, *Jehovah*.

Nor can the more illuminated *Christian*, though the supereminence of his faith justly entitle him to this dignity, above all other darker Religions; that he hath the *true knowledge of God*, (*i. e.*) that he apprehends him under that *Idea*, which he hath been pleased to afford of himself, in the sacred mysteries of the *Gospell*, as of a *Trinity of Persons in an Unity of Substance*, &c. most judiciously and piously collected and knit together in that admirable Anacephalæosis or summary of the Christian doctrine, called the *Creed of Athanasius*; raise the eye of his understanding so high, as to look directly upon the *Quiddity*, or pure *Essence* of him whose dwelling is in light inaccessible, and invisible: but must think it happiness great enough for the entrancement of his soul, humbly and awefully to speculate him in the shadow of his *Attributes*, and those onely which mortality is qualified to understand.

Article 3. The clearer sighted *Christian* also can perceive no more of the *Divine nature* then what is shadowed in its *Attributes*.

Article 4. And therefore the Author restrains the readers expectation onely to a demonstration of the *Existence of God*, in this Chapter subnecting a short scheme of his present *designe* and *Method*.

This being duly perpended, our *Reader* needs no other advertisement, that in this *Demonstration of the existence of God, from the Idea of him engraven by his own hand on the minde of man*, he is not to expect any bold and vain attempt of the *description* of the *Formality* or *simple Quiddity* of that *supreme Being*, (which is the *Fountain* of all other *Essences*, and *Soul* of all other *Causes*:) and it remains onely on our part, that we tender him an account both of our *designe*, or scope, and of the *method* our pen observes in the pursuance thereof.

Though we are fully perswaded, with *Plato* (*Lib.* 10. *de legib. p.* 871.) upon the conviction of those innate *dictates*, which the reason of every man whispers in the eares of his conscience (which proved the louder thunder of the two, and spoke more terror to the miscreant Emperor) that time never produced such a prodigy, as an *Absolute Atheist*, *i.e.* such a fool, as durst indubitate the existence of a *Grand-father Principle*, or *first Intelligence*, from whom, as from the main spring in a Watch, or other Automatous Engine, all motion is derived, and which constantly animates the great machine of the World: yet have we too much ground to suspect, that the accursed sperme of the *Giants* is not yet extinct, that every age can furnish us with a precedent of *Thromachy*, nor need we look beyond our own *Annals* for a second to *Caligula*, or want a parallel for *Epicurus*. Who, though they profest the necessity of a *Deity*, yet sottishly ran into delusions equivalent to the downright denyall thereof, and sinned as high as blasphemy; in their endevours to cut off those two cardinall and inseparable *Attributes* of the *supreme Essence*, *viz. Omnipotence*, and *Omniscient-omnipresence*, or *Active-ubiquity*; not allowing the *Creation* of the *World*, out of nothing, to the one, nor the *conservation*, or *Government* of the same to the other. And having made reflexions upon the unsuccessfull progress many have made, in their enterprises of confuting this sort of implicite *Atheisme*, by the perswasion of *Scripture* only; we became of opinion that to enter the lists with a *Lucian*, or *Lucretius*, and there contend with him concerning the extent of *Gods Providence* even to every single and individuall nature, urging no other proof of the *Affirmation* but

but the bare *authority of Canonicall Writ* (though to us *Christians* of undoubted truth and more fiduciary then demonstration) is the ready way to confirm him in his impiety, and stiffen his infidelity, in regard a plain and just exception lies against the *Circle*. Not have we any probable way left to break his objections, but a sober reception of them in the shield of reason, and a smart retort of arguments defumed from the proper magazine of all temporall knowledge, the *Light of Nature*. Hereupon, when we had determined with our selves to erect a building of *Physicall science*, upon those pillars, or principles, which to our judgment appear most solid, firm and permanent, because most sensible in all the operations or effects of *Nature*, that can any way occurre to the disquisition of *Philosophy*; as shall be amply commonstrated in the future application of them to particulars: and submitted our assent to that excellent *Rule* of the *School-men*, *Nulla res qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur prius*, revived into an *Axiome* by the incomparable *Des Cartes*, in these words; *Omnem omnis scientiæ certitudinem & veritatem, ab una veri Dei cognitione pendere; adeo ut dum ignoramus Deũ esse, & verum esse, nihil omnino de ulla alia re perfecte scire possimus*: we conceived it necessary to begin as high as the *First Cause*, *God*; and endevour the demonstration first of his *Existence*, and consequently (for strict reason will never endure their separation) of those two generall operations of his *Wisdome*, *Power*, and *Goodness*, *viz.* (1.) the *Creation* of the world *ex nihilo*, and and (2.) the continuall *Conservation* of the same, in its primitive harmony, by his *Providence*; and this by *Arguments* so purely extracted from the chief inducements of belief, that no Atheist, how acute, or refractary soever, can justly except against them.

Sect. II.

Article 1: The mind of man can have no cognition of the nature of its objects, but by the mediation of their proper Ideas.

THis an Assertion, which bids defiance to a whole host of Scepticks; that the *Soul* of man, while she animates this admirable engine, the *Body*, can apprehend no more of the *Formes* of *Entities*, then what she reads in those reflex *Characters*, *Images* or *Ideas*, which she findes represented to her in the mirrour of *Cogitation*.

Article 2. Those Ideas are 1 Innate. 2 Adventitious.

Now of those *Ideas*, or *Representations* exhibited to the understanding, there are three distinct orders 1. Some are *Innate*, or *Congenial*; for that I may understand, what a *Thing* is, what *Truth* is, what the act of *Cogitation* is: I need the assistance or information of no other nature, but my own. 2. Others are *Adventitious*, or emergent from external objects; for that I actually hear sounds, see the light of the Sun, feel the heat of fire, and become sensible of all other qualities of bodies: I have ever hitherto adjudged these acts of sensation to belong to my essence onely at second hand, as being derivative from other causes, foreign and alien to my nature. 3 Imaginary. 3. And finally others are *Created*, modelled, or coyned in the mint of the *Imagination*; for the *Phansie* of the most stupid Ideot is naturally empowerd to forge, or paint to it self, and represent to the mind what images it pleases, as *Chimaras*, *Sirens*, *Harpies*, *Goblins*, &c.

Article 3. A strict enquiry, whether the Ideas of objects existent without our selves, hold an exact similitude to their natures.

As for those *Ideas*, on which I look as proceeding from things existent without the circle of my self; I make this enquiry: whether there be any reason sufficient to perswade me to conceive, that such *Ideas* are exactly like to those *things*; whether they *Copies* or transcripts are drawn to the life, so as in all particulars to resemble their *originals*? And the determination, wherewith all I satisfie my self, is this; that the *Affirmative* is taught me by nature, as being hitherto instructed, that those *Ideas* have no dependence at all on my *Will*: and so, by consequence, proceed not from my self, but are obtruded upon my cognition even against my Will. For instance, whether I will, or nill, I am sensible of the heat of *Fire*: and therefore think this perception, or Idea of heat, to proceed from something distinct from my self, *viz.* from the heat of that fire, by which I stand, and obvious it is, beyond all hesitancy, that I may judge that this fire doth immit into me rather the *similitude* of it self, then any thing else. The stability of which reasons, I shall now strictly examine. When I here say, *I am thus instructed by Nature*; I intend only that I am rapt on, by a certain spontaneous violence, or native propensity, to submit my assent thereunto; not that it is declared unto

unto me to be a firm and uncontrollable truth, by the *light of Nature*. For I discover a vast and irreconcileable disparity between the *Dictates* of these two *Informers*: and the *Difference* may be stated thus. Whatever things are declared unto me, by the *light of Nature*; as this, that *I am, because I doubt*, that 2 *and* 3 *make* 5, *&c.* can never, on any pretence, be doubted of, in regard there can be no other *faculty*, or *Criterion*, to whose judgement or decision, I can afford so ample and firme credit, as to that of the *light of Nature*, which onely can teach me, whether those things are true or false. But as for those *Inclinations*, or *Propensions naturall*; I have long since found, by deplorable experience, that by them I have been frequently hurried unto, and in a sort impelled upon this *evill*, in my solitary disputes with my self concerning my judicature and election of the *Good*: and therefore am not in any measure convinced, why I should depend upon their information, pursue their conduct, or resigne my assent to their testimony, in other cases. Again, though these *Extradvenient Ideas* depend not on my *Will*; yet is that no valid Argument, that therefore of necessity they must proceed from things without my self: for as those strong *Propensities*, though seated in me, and as it were annexed to my very being, doe yet seem clearly distinct from my *Will*; so also perchance there may be another third *Faculty* within me, which I doe not yet sufficiently understand, that coyns those Ideas, as hitherto my conceptions have ever been, that in my *dreams* such *Ideas* are created in my brain, without the assistance of any forreign *Objects* invading my *senses*. And, lastly, should I grant those *Counterfeits*, or *Ideas*, to be deriued from things distinct from my selfe; yet could it be no justifiable inference, that therefore they must in all points resemble those things, or *prototypes*, from which they were transmitted: yea, in many particulars, I apprehend them to be disproportionate and dissimilar, *toto cœlo*, by inequalities never to be parallels. To instance; I finde within my self two divers *Ideas* of the *Sun*, the one taken from my *sense*, (which I therefore think fit to refer to that classis of Ideas, called *Adventitious*) representing the Sun in a very small round, of less diameter then a Coach wheel: the other

from

from the reasons or *maximes of Astronomy*, *i. e.* extracted by way of induction, from certain *Notions* implantate in me, or by any other way whatever composed or modelled; which represents the Sun in a vast circumference, much larger then the Terraqueous Globe. Now both these cannot exactly respond in magnitude to their *Originall*, the *Sun*, existent without me: and reason offers me invincible evidence to assure that image to be the most unlike, which seems to have most neerly streamed from the Sun it self. All which considerations to ample satisfaction evince; that hitherto I have, not upon any *scientificall* and *authentick judgement*, but onely upon a certain *obscure and blind impulse* from within, beleived, that there are a sort of *Entities* existent without the sphear of my nature, which, by subtle transfusion through the organs of my senses, convey the *Ideas*, or *Idols* of themselves into my mind.

Article 4. A second disquisition, whether any of those things whose Ideas are found in the mind of man, have any reall existence without it?

But I have found out another certain way, for the more happy progress of my enquiry, *Whether any of those entities whose Ideas sojurn within me, have any reall existence without me*; and this is it. These *Ideas*, considered in this relation, that they are certain *modi cogitandi*, or means which the soul makes use of, in order to her act of *Cogitation*; have indeed no *dissimilitude*, *Alogy*, or inequality amongst themselves, and all seem to flow from me, in one and the same chanel, after one and the same manner: but considered in this interest, that one represents one thing, a second another, a third another quite different from both; manifest it is, that they hugely differ each from other, as to the degrees of more or lesse *objective reality*. For doubtlesse, those *Ideas*, which represent *substances*, are more something, or (to speak more intelligibly, though more scholastically) contain in them more of *objective reality*; then those which represent only certain *modifications* of *substances*, or meer *Accidents*: and again, that *Idea*, by which I speculate some *supreme Essence*, or *Deity eternall, omniscient, omnipotent, creator* and *conservator* of this great All, &c. seems in severe truth, to comprehend more of *objective Reality*, or *Formall Verity*, then such poor Ideas that carry onely the shadowes of some subordinate, dependent and

and finite substances. Now evident it is, by the *light of Nature*, that there must be so much at least, (if not more) in the *Cause efficient* and *Total*, as is in the *effect* of the same Cause. For, I demand, from what can the *effect* derive its reality, but from the *Cause*? and how can the *Cause* bequeath that to the *effect*, which it self is destitute of? Out of which root spring two branches of ever flourishing truth. (1.) *Nihil à nihilo fieri*, nothing can be made by nothing. (2.) *Id quod magis perfectum est, hoc est, quod plus realitatis in se continet, fieri non posse ab eo, quod minus perfectum est*, A more perfect something, *i.e.* which imports more of objective reality, cannot be produced by a lesse perfect something. So that I may safely infer, that this position hath not its verity restrained to those effects onely, whose *Reality* is *Actual*, or *Formal*; but extended also to those *Ideas*, in which is considered only their *Reality objective*. For example; a stone, that never was before, cannot only not now begin to be, unless it be produced by some other thing, which in it self hath formally and eminently what ever is included in the perfect or full nature of the stone; nor can heat be introduced into any subject, that was not formerly hot, unless by something of equal perfection, or at least equivalent to heat: but, besides all this, there cannot be in me the Idea of a stone, unless that Idea be first inserted into me by some cause, wherein there is so much, at least, of reality, as I conceive to be in the stone, or in the heat. For though that *Cause* transfuse nothing of its *Actual*, or *Formal* reality into my Idea; yet am not I therefore to apprehend my Idea to be the lesse real, but that the nature of it is such, that it can require no more reality formal *ex se*, then what it borrowes from my *cogitation*, whose manner of apprehension it is. But that this my Idea, comprehends this or that objective reality, rather then another: this must of necessity inevitable arise unto it from some other *Cause*, wherein is so much at least of reality *Formal*, as the *Idea* contains of *objective*. For if I grant any thing to be found in the Idea, which was not in the Cause thereof; that something it must derive from nothing: but how imperfect soever that *Modus essendi*, or manner of being, whereby a thing is *objectively* in the *Intellect*, by an *Idea*, or representative, be; yet is it not

wholy nothing, and cannot therefore proceed from nothing. Nor have I any cause to suspect, that since the reality, which I consider in my Ideas, is onely objective; that therefore the same reality cannot be formally inherent in the causes of them: but that it is sufficient to their nature, that it be in them only objectively. For as that *Modus essendi objectivus* belongs to those *Ideas*, by the charter of their own peculiar nature; so doth that *Modus essendi formalis* properly belong to their causes, (at least to the principal and grand cause) by the law of their essence.

Article 5. A firme induction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or comprehend more of perfection, then its prototype, or cause.

Further, though I allow it possible for one *Idea* to produce another; yet I can never heer admit a possibility of a progress *in infinitum*, of unravelling the pedigree to a length so immense, as never to goe so high as the *Adam*, or Grandfather Idea, but must at length arrive at the *Ne ultra*, or first Idea, whose cause is the *Archetype* or *Protoplast*, wherein all that reality is inherent *Formally*, which is in the Idea only *objectively*. So that by the light of Nature, I read this unalterable Axiome; *that those Ideas or Images of other natures, or entities, which are in my understanding, are certain Counter-parts, or resemblances, which, in truth, come short of the perfection of those objects, from which they were derived, and cannot be conceived to contain any thing greater, or of more perfection then their Causes.*

Article 6. And therefore, if any Idea contain more of perfection then can be found in our minds: certainly our minds cannot be the efficient of that transcendent Idea.

From hence my thoughts advance to this conclusion, If the reality *objective* of any Idea be so great and excellent, that I may be assured the same cannot be in me, either *Formaliter*, or *Eminenter*; and therefore I cannot be the *Cause* of that *Idea*: by direct and genuine inference I determine, that *I am not alone in the World, but that there is existent in the universe some other Being, which is the father of this Idea.* For if I finde no such Idea occur to my minde, in earnest I know no argument, that may make me confident of the existence of any one thing distinct from my self.

Article 7. The diversity of Ideas, respective to the diversity of Entities.

Now among these *Ideas* (that I may range them into a distinct order respective to the severall *Degrees* of *Entities* from which they result, or are derived) there is one which holds forth to my self (concerning which no difficulty can be started,

to the concernment of the present *Demonstration*) another which represents *God*; others which portray things meerly *Corporeal* and *Inanimate*; others which describe *Angels*; others resemble *Animals*; and finally others that shew me other *men* like my self.

Article 8. The possible originals of each sort severely examined, and all found to be desumable from our selves; the Idea of God only excepted.

As for those *Ideas*, which represent *Men*, *Animals*, or *Angels*; I easily understand, that such may be composed and made up of other Ideas, which I usually conceive of my self, and other corporeall Entities, and of God: though there were neither Men, nor Animals, nor Angels, in the whole World beside my self. And as for those of *Corporeal Entities*; in them I meet with nothing so great, noble, or excellent, which seems not to have its fountain or origin in my self. For when I make a deep and strict inquisition into them, I discover, that of those things, which they comprehend, there are only very few, which I clearly and distinctly understand; such are *Magnitude*, or *Quantity* extended into its three dimensions of *Longitude*, *Latitude*, *Profundity*; *Figure* arising from the termination of that extension; *Situation* of parts, or that position, which parts variously figurated obtain and hold among themselves; and *Motion*, or the change of situation in the whole, or parts composing the whole: to which may be superadded *Substance*, *Duration*, and *Number*. But as for other things, as *Light*, *Sounds*, *Odors*, *Sapors*, *Heat*, *Cold*, and other *tactile qualities*; these fall not under the comprehension of my thoughts, but darkly and with as much obscurity as confusion: insomuch that when I have summ'd up all I know of them, it amounts to no more then this; that I am even ignorant whether they be true or false, (*i. e.*) whether such Ideas, as I conceive of them, be the *Ideas* of things *really existent*, or of *Non-entities*. For though I have faithfully observed, that *Falsity*, properly and most emphatically so called, or *Formal falsity*, can be no where found in the world, but in our *judgments*, or *determinations*: yet is there another *Material falsity* in our Ideas, when they represent a *Non-entity* for a real *Entity*, a nothing in stead of a something. Thus, to exemplifie, the representations which I have of *Heat* and *Cold* appear so narrow, dim, and confused; that my most intense and acute speculations cannot atquire from them

any plenary and stable satisfaction, Whether *cold be only a privation of Heat*, or *Heat no more but the privation of Cold*; Whether both be *real* and *positive qualities*, or neither? and since there can be no *Ideas*, but as of *real* entities; in regard it is a truth apparent, that cold is nothing else but a privation of heat, that same Idea, which exhibits cold as something real and positive, may justly be reputed false: and so likewise may others of the same series. To such Ideas therefore it is not necessary, that I assigne any other original besides my self; for since they may be *materially false*, (*i. e.*) represent nothing under the disguise of something: it is declared unto me by the *Light* of *Nature*, that they proceed from nothing, (*i. e.*) that no other reason can be given, why they are in me, but only this; *that something is wanting to my nature, which is requisite to make it absolutely perfect and compleat*: and if they were true, yet in respect they exhibit so little of reality, that I cannot, in the most abstracted contemplation, clearly distinguish that *little* from *nothing*; I see no reason, why they may not worthily be counted the Minervas of my own brain, or the productions of my own thoughts. Now as concerning those things, which are clear and distinct in the *Ideas* of *Corporeal Natures*; I have discovered, that some of them also be derived from the Idea of my self: such are *Substance*, *Duration*, *Number*, &c. of the same classis. For when I consider a stone to be a substance, or an entity constituted in a capacity of subsisting *per se*; and at the same time consider my self also to be a substance (although I conceive my self to be *Res cogitans*, a thinking ens, and look not upon my self as *Res extensa*, a quantative or extensive; but upon a stone, as *Res extensa*, and not *cogitans*, and that therefore there must be a great dissimilitude between these two conceptions: yet they seem to be reconciled and shake hands *in termino substantialitatis*) and also when I consider, that I now am, and formerly have been; and when I have various cogitations, whose number I comprehend: I then acquire the Ideas of *Duration* and *Number*, which I can after transfer and apply to what other things I please. But for the residue of particular things, whereof the Ideas of *Corporeal Natures* are compoled: as *Extension*, *Figure*, *Situation*, and *Motion*:

tion: these have not their residence in me (since I am nothing else, in propriety of essence, but *Res cogitans*) *formaliter*: and yet, in relation that they are only certain *Modi substantiæ*, modificated substance, and I also am a *substance*; they seem to be comprehended in me *eminenter*, by way of *transcendency*. And so there remains unexamined only the *Idea* of *God*; in which I am to consider, whether it include any thing, which cannot be derivative from my self.

Article 9. The Idea of God, here described, cannot be either formally, or materially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others.

By the name *God*, I understand a *certain substance, infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, from which as well my own, as all other dependent natures were derived; by whose incomprehensible Wisdome, Power, and Goodness, the universe was created, according to the admirable Idea formed in his own eternall intellect; and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order, and exquisite harmony, which in the beginning he was pleased to institute.*

Now so divine, excellent, and perfect are all these *Attributes*, that when with deep, yet humble and reverentiall thoughts I contemplate them, either conjunctively, or distinctly, I become fully informed, that they are too great and noble, to be derived from so mean, frail, and imperfect a being as my self: and upon this firm foundation I erect to my self this verity; *That God doth exist*. For though the Idea of a substance be included in me for this cause, that I am a substance: yet it doth not necessarily follow, that therefore I can have the Idea of an *infinite* substance, since I am my self but *finite*, unless that Idea first proceed from some *substance really infinite*. Nor am I obliged to think, that I doe not conceive an *infinite*, by a *true Idea*, but, as most schoolmen will have it, by the *Negation of a finite*, as I understand *Rest* and *Darkness* by the *negation* of *Motion* and *Light*: for, on the contrarie, I perspicuously understand, that there is more of *Reality* in an infinite substance, then in a finite; and by consequence that the perception of an infinite essence, the *Deity*, is elder then, and so precedent unto, the perception of a finite essence, *my self*. For I demand of the whole world, by what means possible I should come to understand, that I doubt, desire, &c. (*i.e.*) that

thing is wanting to my nature, which I finde requisite to make it perfect; if there were in me no Idea of a more perfect being, by comparing whose perfections to my own deficiencies, I am brought to an assured knowledge of the imperfection, and so the subordination and dependence of my own being.

Nor can it be objected that the *Idea* which I conceive of God is *materially false*, and therefore possible to be desumed from nothing, as those Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold* formerly examined: for on the contrary, in this interest, that tis transcendently *clear* and *distinct*, and comprehends more of *objective reality*, then any other Idea, which the minde of man can either conceive, or create, no one is more *true per se*, nor in which less suspicion of falshood can be detected. This Idea, I say, of the supreme Being, perfect and infinite, is most true; for though it might be imagined possible, that there is no such entity existent, as my Idea represents; yet cannot it be imagined, that the Idea of this *Ens summum* can exhibit unto me nothing real, as may the Ideas of Heat, Cold, &c. Moreover, I am confirmed, that this Idea of *God*, is of all others the most *clear* and *distinct*; for whatever of reality, verity and perfection, I clearly and distinctly perceive in all other Ideas, is radically contained in this one, as in the Archetype, or universal fountain. Nor can this my belief be staggered by this weak objection, that I cannot comprehend an infinite, or that, besides these Attributes mentioned in the description of this super-excellent Idea, there are myriads of other *Excellencies* in God, which are too resplendent and remote to be gazed upon by the weak and purblind eye of mans understanding, and too numerous to fall under the short Arithmetick of reason, much less to be epitomized or decyphered in the unequall landskip of my cogitations: for I know full well, that it is of the nature of an Infinite, not to be comprehended by me, that am finite; that it is sufficient for me to understand only so much, and to judge all those things, which I perceive to contain, or import any perfection, and perchance innumerable other dignities, of which I am yet ignorant, to be in God either formally, or eminently. So the Idea, which I conceive of him, is of all others, to which my intellect can extend its power of apprehension, the most *perspicuous* and *distinct*.

Nor

Article 10. A declarement of the impossibility of the divine Ideas desumption either from our selves:

Notwithstanding, that I may leave no doubt to eclipse the splendor of this assertion, I permit my thoughts to run into this supposition. Perhaps I have not the just dimensions of my own essence; that I am a far greater and more perfect something, than hitherto I have perceived my self to be; and that all those excellencies, which I speculate in the *Idea* of *God*, are in some measure *potentially* in my nature, though hitherto they have lain dormant, in *Capacity* only, and have not been deduced into *act*: for I already finde my *Cognition* much encreased, nor can I discover any impediment, wherefore it may not be every day more and more enlarged even to infinity; not also, my cognition being so advanced, why I may not at length, by the benefit and advantage thereof, aspire and arise to all those perfections of God; nor, finally, why this capacity of arriving at all those perfections, may not suffice, upon the stock of its own single power, to the production of their true and adequate Idea. And I am answered from my domestick oracle, the *Light of Nature*; that not one of those illations can stand. For, first, though it be true, that my knowledge may by degrees be very much multiplyed; and that many things are in *potentia* in me, which are not yet awaked into their proper operations: yet not one of all those properly belong to the *Idea* of God, in which there is nothing at all *Potential*; for this very condition, to be capable of augmentation by degrees, is an undeniable argument of imperfection. Secondly, though my cognition should be more and more augmented; nevertheless I understand, that it could never be actually infinite, because it could never be raised to such an Ἄκμη, or zenith as to be above all possibility of farther access: but my Idea of the divine nature represents him actually infinite; so that nothing is wanting, nothing can be added to the perfection of his nature. And lastly, I perceive that the *objective esse* of an Idea cannot be be produced by a bare *potential esse*, which (to speak like a metaphysician, and properly) is a mere nothing: but only by an *Actual*, or *Formal*.

Now albeit there is not one among all these notions, which to my united and circumspect consideration, doth not appear a most

serene

serene, noble, and illustrious truth, demonstrable by the *light of Nature*: yet since, when with more loose and unattentive thought I examine them, and when the grosser images of corporeal and sensible natures benight the opticks of my reason; I cannot so easily make it out, why the Idea of a being more noble and perfect then my own, must of necessity proceed from some such other being, which is really more perfect; for this respect, I say, I lead on my mind to a further enquiry, *viz. Whether or no I, who have this Idea, could have an existence, if there were no such Ens as my Idea adumbrates, really existent?* To particulars, from what original should my being descend? either from *my selfe*, or my *Parents*, or some other essences of perfection infinitely inferior to that of God; for no phansie can be so wild, as to feigne any thing more perfect then, nay not equally perfect with him. Now had I received my being from my selfe, undoubtedly I should not then have been subject to those frailties of *Dubitation* and *Desideration*, nor would any thing have been wanting to my nature: for at the same instant, when I gave to my self a being, assuredly I should have given unto my self also all those perfections, whereof I have the Idea in my mind, and so I my self should have been God. Nor am I bound to conceive, that those *excellencies*, wanting to the accomplishment of my nature, can be more difficult to acquire, then those graduall abilities, of which I am already master: for on the contrary, tis manifest, that it must import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being, (*i. e.*) for a *Cogitant something* to be deduced from *nothing*, then for me being once constituted in a *Capacity*, to attain to the cognition of many things, whereof I am now actually ignorant, which can be esteemed no more but the *Accidents* of that *substance*. And assuredly, had I borrowed the greater, my *substantiality*, from my own stock of power; I should not have denied unto my self the less, those *Accumulations*, or accidentall additions, nor any other of those divine accomplishments, which I understand to be included in the Idea of God: why? because no one of those seem more difficult to be acquired; and if any were more difficult for me to aspire unto, tis more then probable I should understand that difficulty,

if

if I had those *Faculties*, of which my nature stands possessed, from my own donation, in respect I should find my power to be terminated in them. Nor doe I evade the convictive rigor of these reasons, if I adventure on this supposition; that I have been ever heretofore, as I now am: as if the induction of this hypothesis would be, that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my essence no higher then my self, or seek out no other cause of my Existence; for in respect that all *time* may be divided into innumerable parts, each whereof hath no necessary dependence on the rest, either precedent, or subsequent; from hence, that I have formerly been, is no valid consequence that therefore I must now be, unlesse some other cause be admitted, which doth freshly create me in each of those particles, or atoms of time, and particularly in this instant moment, (*i. e.*) doth constantly conserve me in being. For manifest it must be to any that looks attentively into the nature of *Duration*; that to the *Conservation* of any thing through all those several minutes, in which its existence endureth, is required no less then the same power and act, which is necessary to the *Creation* of the same thing anew, if it were not already existent: and consequently, that the act of *Conservation doth not at all, but in the cloudy reason of man, differ from the act of Creation.* These things thus stated, I am concerned to propose to my self this interrogation; Whether there be any power inherent in my nature, whereby I may be enabled to conserve my self the same in the future that I am now in the present? for since I am nothing but a meer *res cogitans* (for here I precisely regard only that part of my self, which is properly and distinctly a *Cogitant substance*) if there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence, doubtless I should be conscious of it; but I am convicted, there is none such, and therefore from this one evidence, that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being, for the shortest moment imaginable: I judge, *that I am subordinate unto, and dependent upon some other Entity distinct from my self.* But (to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation, in order to the exclusion of all doubts from the intended result or conclusion) put the case, that this Entitie, to whose sufficiency I owe my Conservation (pardon ô! thou incomprehensible *Essence*, thou

great and sole *Preserver of men*, pardon this supposition, [illegible] modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy *Supremacy*) is not God; and that I deduce my production from [illegible] *Parents*, or some other cause less perfect then God. For determination; as an *Axiome*, to which every Scepick will readily condescend, *Tantundem ad minimum esse debere in causa, quantum est in effectu*, there must be so much at least in the cause, as is found in the effect: and therefore since I am *res cogitans*, a substance thinking, and having a certain Idea of God in me, what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or fountain of my being, that cause also must be *Ens cogitans*, and must possess the Idea of all those perfections, which I ascribe unto God. Now of that cause it may be again enquired, whether it were derived from it self, or from some other Cause; for if from it self, then may it bee naturally collected, from what hath preceded in this disquisition, that such a *Cause* is *God*. For as it hath the power (or act) of *self-existence*, or *self-conservation*: so also undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections, the Idea whereof it comprehends in it self (*viz.*) all such accomplishments, as I conceive to be conteined in God.

Article 11. Or from some other cause less perfect then God.

But if from some other cause; then I repeat my questions again concerning this other cause, whether that had its being from it self, or from another, until I arrive successively at the *first Cause* or highest linke in the chain; which also will be God. For no melancholy can be so absurd, as to dream of a progress *in infinitum* in the series of Causes; especially, since I doe not here intend that Cause only, which did in *time past produce* me, but principally that, which doth *conserve* me in the *present*. Nor can it be imagined, that a *plurality* of Causes met, concurred and conspired to the making up of my being, and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God; from a second the Idea of another; from a third the Idea of another &c. so that all those perfections may indeed be found *scatterly* in the distinct and scattered pieces of the universe, but no where *conjoyned* and assembled together in one single

single Essence, which might be God. For on the contrary, the *Unity, Simplicity, Inseparability*, or *Identity* of all those excellencies in God, is one of the chiefest of those perfections, which I understand to be in him: nor, assuredly, could the Idea of the *Unity* of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfections also; nor could he have effected, that I should understand them *conjoyned* and married together by an indissoluble union; unless he had also effected, that I should know what they are, in their *distinction*.

Article 12. Or from our Parents.

To expunge the last scruple, and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God, fair and immaculate; have not my *Progenitors* devolved a being to my *Parents*, and they devolved the like to me? and may not this Idea of those perfections, which I attribute to God, be implanted radically in this my being so derived down to me by propagation, without the necessary insertion of it, by the immediate hand of any such *Supreme nature* really existent, in which all those *Attributes* are *Formally* inherent, and coessential? By no means. For though I may, in some latitude, allow my Parents to be the causes of my generation; yet cannot I think them to be the cause of my Conservation, since they cannot conserve themselves: nor have they made me what I am, (*i. e.*) constituted me to be *Res cogitans*, an Entitie whose nature is to think; but onely as subordinate and instrumental causes, have contributed certain requisite dispositions, or qualifications to that matter, in which I understand my self, (*i. e.*) my mind or rational soul (which in this discourse, I constantly take for the whole of my self) to be enshrined. And upon the credit of this consideration, there can be no difficulty taken up to countermand the certitude of my assertion; but I may safely conclude; that from this position, *I am existent, and my minde contains a certain Idea of a most perfect being, (i. e.) of God; it is most genuinely, and most evidently demonstrated, that God is also Existent.*

Article 13. The concernment of all for a conclusion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man.

Having sufficiently assured my self, that this Idea, which I have of the *Supreme Being*, or most and only *perfect Ens*, is too excellent to be assumed from *my self*, from my *Parents*, or from *other Causes*, which import not so much of *Reality Formal* and *Eminent*, as the Idea imports of *objective*: it remains only, that I explore *how and when I received this Idea from God*. For I never drew it in through the windowes of my *senses*; nor was it ever obtruded upon me without either my expectation, or notice, as frequently the Ideas of sensible objects are, when those objects offer themselves to the external organs of the senses; nor was it ever *modelled*, or coyned by me, in the laboratory of my *Imagination*, since it is not in my power either to detract any thing from, or superadd any thing unto it: Wherefore it must be primitively *implanted* in, and *congenial* to my very *Essence*, no otherwise then as the Idea of my self is implanted, or essentially impressed upon my self. And surely, to a sober and well ordered consideration, it can seem no wonder, that God, when he was pleased to create me, hath imprinted this Idea of himself upon my *Soul*, that it might remain as an indelible *Mark* or *Signature*, whereupon when I reflect my cogitations, I should instantly know and acknowledge my self to be the work of his almighty hand. Nor is it necessary, that this *Mark* or *Impress* should be a thing plainly distinct from the *work* it self, from my *Essence*, but upon this one ground, that God hath created me; tis very credible, that he created me, in some degree, or respect, after the *Similitude* and image of himself, and that this *Similitude*, wherein the Idea of God is included, may be understood by me by the operation or information of the same *Faculty*, by which I am impower'd to understand my self: (*i. e.*) that when I convert the eye of my Soul, my reason, inwards upon my self, I doe not only clearly perceive my self to be an *Entity incomplete*, *dependent* on some *Superior principle*, and *indefinitely aspiring to greater and better things*: but at the same instant, I understand also that *Superior Principle*, upon which I depend, to possess all those greater accomplishments, not *indefinitely* and *in potentia* only, but even *infinitely* and *actually*, and so to be God.

And

And so all the nerves of the Argument may be twisted together into this short (though never-to-be-broken) Cord; that I cannot but acknowledge it an absolute impossibility that I should exist, being of such a nature as I am, (*i.e.*) having the Idea of God imprinted upon my mind, unless God also did really exist: that very God, I mean, whose Idea is in me, (*i. e.*) an *infinite essence actually possessing all perfections*, which though I cannot *comprehend*, yet in some degree I can, with humility and veneration, *speculate*, through the perspective of profound and abstracted *Cogitation*.

Article 14. An abstract, or Anacephalæosis of the whole demonstration.

Sect. III.

NOw in consideration that many of those *Metaphysical Terms*, and *singular expressions*, which I have been forced to make use of in the precedent demonstration of the *Existence of God*, may be conceived either too *difficult* for the unriper sort of heads, or at least *ambiguous*, and therefore subject to perversion, as not being sufficiently adequate and restrained to those notions, to which I have applied them; I have thought it requisite to subjoyn the particular *Explanation*, or proper *definition* of each, that I could beleive subject to obscurity, or exception.

In the word *Cogitation*, I comprehend whatsoever is so contained in us, that we are immediately conscious thereof. Thus all the operations of the Will, Intellect, Imagination, and Senses fall under this one notion of Cogitations: and the particle *immediately*, I have annexed to exclude all those things, that are consequent to these operations, as motion voluntary hath Cogitation for its original, but is it self plainly distinct from cogitation.

Article 1. The importance of the term, Cogitation.

By an *Idea*, I understand that forme of any Cogitation, by the immediate perception whereof I come to be fully conscious of that particular cogitation; so that I can express no one thing in words, when I understand what I speak, but from thence it is made evident unto me, that I have in me the particular Idea of

Article 2. Of an Idea.

that thing, which I signifie by those words. And so I doe not call only those *Images* depicted or engraven on my *Phansie*, Ideas: yea, in this discourse, I doe not allow them to be Ideas as they are depicted in my *Phansy corporeal*, *i. e.* in any parcel of my brain; but only as they serve, as certain characters, to informe my *minde*, when converted upon that part of my brain, where my phansie is seated.

Article 3. Of the objective reality of an Idea.

By the *objective reality* of an Idea, I intend the *Entity* of that thing represented by that Idea. And according to the same intention, we may say, the *Perfection objective*, or *Artifice objective*, &c. For whatever things we perceive as in the objects of Ideas, the same things in every particular are objectively included in the Ideas of those objects.

Article 4. Of the Formal, and eminent being of Attributes in the objects of of Ideas.

The same things are said to be *Formally* in the objects of Ideas, when they are truly such in them, as we perceive them to be, or when our Ideas expressly respond to their nature: and *Eminently*, when they are not indeed *Talia*, but *Tanta*, equivalent, insomuch that they may be their convenient substitutes, or serve in their rooms.

Article 5. Of a substance.

A *Substance* signifies any thing wherein, as in *subjecto*, is immediately inherent any *Quality*, or *Attribute*, whose Idea is in us; or upon which any thing, that we perceive, immediately depends for its existence. For we can have no other Idea of a substance, precisely so taken, more then this; that it is a thing wherein either *Formally*, or *Eminently* that something which we perceive, or which is objectively in any of our Ideas, hath its necessary existence: why? because the light of Nature makes authentick that *Axiome*, *Nullum esse nihili reale attributum*; or, as *Aristotle*, *Non-entis non sunt Accidentia*.

Article 6. Of the word, Mind.

By the terme *Mens*, the *Mind*, I import a substance, whose prime Attribute is Cogitation; for in this place I speak rather of the *Mind*, then of the *Soul*, in regard the word Soul is equivocal, and frequently used to express something corporeal.

By a *Body* is implied that *Substance* which is the immediate subject of *extension local*, and other accidents, which presuppose extension, as Figure, Situation, local Motion, &c.

Article 7. Of a Body.

Two substances are said to be *really distinguish't*, when each of them can realy subsist without the assistance of the other.

Article 8. Of the real distinction of two substances.

That *substance*, which we understand to be *supremely perfect*, and wherein we perceive no defect, or limitation of perfection to be involved, is that we call *God*.

Article 9. Of the substance supremely perfect.

Sect. IV.

THe Achilles, or most potent *objection*, which not only the fence Militia of the Pulpit; but even such more temperate heads, as have not been refined to a height sufficient to admit the tincture of abstracted and immaterial notions, may send to encounter my Assertion, *That I have a clear, distinct, and true Idea of God in my mind*, is this: *Infinitum, qua infinitum, est ignotum*, that God being infinite, and therefore incomprehensible, is impossible for man, while his intellect is muffled up in flesh, to have a clear and distinct Idea of his Being. To instance in a thing, betwixt which and the infinity of God is a vast disparity; let the most Geometrical wit in the World think with the most serious midnight and fixt attention upon a *Chiliagon*, or figure with a 1000 Angles: yet shall he acquire in his mind, but a dark and confused representation or modell thereof, and cannot distinctly either adumbrate or conceive that chiliagonicall figure; because he doth not particularly and totally speculate each one of the 1000 sides, or *lineal lines*, of which it doth consist. And if so, well may it be doubted, how I can conceive the Idea of an *Infinite*, distinctly and without confusion; when I cannot exalt my thoughts to survey all those innumerable perfections, which meet together to the constitution of an infinite.

Article 1. *Object.* 1. That the mind of man, being *finite*, cannot extend to the clear and distinct intellection of an *Infinite*, *quatenus* an *Infinite*: and the

This doubt I must welcome, and honour, as the laudable effect of this due veneration, or noble zeal, which ought to be kindled

Solution thereof by three distinctions.

kindled in every breſt, upon the ſenſe of that immenſe diſproportion betwixt the invisibility, infinity, and incomprehensibility of the Creator; and the narrow extent, or, indeed, the comparative nothing of the Creature; nor can I think the debaſement of our own limited nature, other then a pious and worthy cognizance of the majeſty and incircumſcription of his: yet to ſatisfie, that none can have a more lively apprehenſion of his own frailties, infirmities and defects, nor a greater eſteem of the excellencies and accompliſhments of God, then my ſelf; and that I more then once look't upon, and throughly examined the weight of this ſcruple, long before I thought it ſafe to acquieſce in the Affirmative, I thus anſwer.

1. An *Infinite, quatenus an infinite,* can, in troth, by no means be *comprehended*; and yet nevertheleſs it may be *underſtood*: inſomuch as clearly and diſtinctly to underſtand the nature of any thing to be ſuch, as that no limits, terminations, or circumſcriptions can be found therein; is clearly and diſtinctly to underſtand the ſame to be infinite. And heer I diſtinguiſh betwixt *Indefinitum* and *Infinitum*; calling, properly and preciſely, that an *infinite*, in which no limits, terms, or ends can be, on any part, diſcovered; in which acceptation, God is only infinite: but ſuch things, wherein, under ſome latitude of reaſon only, I acknowledge no end or termination; ſuch are the extenſions of the imaginary ſpace without *Triſmegiſtus* his circle, or on the outſide of the world; the multitude of Numbers; the diviſibility of the parts of quantity, &c. ſuch I call *Indefinite*, and not infinite, becauſe on ſome part they muſt confeſs a finality, or termination.

2. Again, I put a difference between the *Formal Reaſon*, or *Infinity* of an infinite; and the *ſubject* of that infinity, or *thing* which is infinite. Now, as for the *Infinity*; though we underſtand that to be moſt *Poſitive*; yet we cannot underſtand it but only by a kind of *Negation*, *viz.* from hence, that we can diſcover no limitation in the thing: but as for the *ſubject* of this infinity, or *infinite thing*, we underſtand it *Poſitively*, but not *adequately* (*i. e.*) we doe not comprehend all that is intelligible in that thing. Thus when we caſt our eyes upon the Sea, though our

sight cannot extend to all and every part thereof, nor measure every inch of its immense vastity; yet may we be properly said to behold the sea. And if we look upon it at a great distance, so that our eyes seem to take it in all at once, we doe not see it but dimly and confusedly, as it were in a thin, blew landskip; as also we doe not imagine a Chiliagon but obscurely and in fractures, when we comprehend all the lateral lines thereof at once: yet if we approach the sea at a very vicine distance, and earnestly fixe our eyes upon any one part thereof, such a vision may be clear and distinct, as also may the imagination of a Chiliagon, if our Phansie extend to no more, then one or two of the sides thereof at once. By the same reason, that God cannot be comprehended by the narrow mind of man, I willingly grant with all the schoolmen; nor can he be distinctly understood by those, who unadvisedly endevour to comprehend him all at once, and as it were to gaze upon him a far off; in which laudable sense, the most subtile Dr *Thom. Aquin.* affirmed, *Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, in quantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, id naturaliter nobis insertum est*, that the cognition of the Being of God, is implanted in our minds, under a certain confusion, or cloudy representation: but whoever, with a prævious awe, and becoming reverence, shall endevour to single out his perfections, contemplate each successively, not so much to comprehend them, as to be comprehended by them, and imploy all the nerves of their intellect (sequestred from the contagion of *sensibility* and *Corporeity*) in the long and wary speculation of them: such happy persons shall assuredly find in him more satisfactory, ample, and easie matter of clear and distinct cognition, then in all the world beside.

Thirdly, I discriminate an Intellection *Adequate*, from an Intellection *Gradual*, or conforme to the slender capacity of man. For the *First*, twere madness beyond the power of *Hellebor* for any man to dream, that he could understand an Infinite, *Conceptu adæquato*, by a comprehension fully as large, and exactly proportionate unto that Infinite; nay it may be a very hard question, whether the armes of our understanding be long enough to commensurate the full nature of any Finite object, though here so 3.

ſmall, by an Idea exactly reſpondent, and equal in all points: for the *other*, every ſober man is able to find within himſelf, that the wings of his mind are not ſo clipt, as that it cannot aſpire to the *Gradual* cognition of an Infinite, *finita & ad modulum humani ingenii accommodata cognitione*. If any ſhall pervert this *Diſtinction* to ſo ſiniſter a latitude, as to retort; that when I confeſs my underſtanding too ſhallow and dark to comprehend an infinite, *Conceptu adæquato*, I doe at the ſame time implicitely concede, that I can know no more then a *part* of an infinite, and indeed the leaſt part which can be ſaid to carry the repreſentation of an infinite no more then the effigies of one ſingle hair to repreſent the whole body of a man: I ſhall ſmoothly rejoyne, that to affirme, that if we fully comprehend any thing, that thing muſt be infinite, is a plain and obvious contradiction *in terminis*; ſince the Idea of an infinite, if true, cannot be comprehended, *Incomprehenſibility being the formal attribute of an infinite*; and yet nevertheleſs it is evident, that the Idea, which we have of an infinite, doth reſemble not only ſome one particular part, but even really and truly the *whole* thereof, *eo modo, quo repræſentari debet per humanam ideam*, though doubtleſs a far more accurate and diſtinct, (*i. e.*) perfect Idea may be allowed to be in the more luminous and clear intellect of *God*, of *Angels*, or other *natures* more *intelligent* then man. Thus we doubt not, but a *Clown*, who never heard of *Euclid*, or learned one Axiome in *Geometry*, may notwithſtanding have in his mind the Idea of a whole *Triangle*, when he is once inſtructed, that a *Triangle* is a *Figure comprehended in three lines*, though he remain ignorant of many other things, which a learned Geometrician knowes intelligible in that Figure, and inſatiately ſpeculates in the Idea thereof: for, as to underſtand a figure included in three lines, is ſufficient to acquire the Idea of a whole Triangle; ſo alſo to underſtand a thing not to be comprehended or terminated by any limits or ends, is ſufficient to the acquiſition of a true and entire Idea of the whole infinite.

This

This Idea you have of God, is no more then *Ens rationis*, a meer figment, or Chimæra, that hath no existence at all but in your intellect; and therefore hath no more of perfection, or reality objective then your own mind that framed it.

Article 2. *Object.* 2. That the Idea of the divine nature, resident in the mind of man, is a meer *Ens rationis*: and the

Ens rationis hath a double signification; (1.) it imports a meer abstracted *Notion*, devoid of all reality, or a pure *Non-entity*; (2.) it signifies every *operation of the intellect*, or, more plainly, *Ens a ratione profectum*: in which acceptation, the whole World may be properly styled *Ens rationis divinæ*, or an entity created by a simple and pure act of the divine intellect. Now in this last sense only can I allow that transcendent Idea of God to be *Ens rationis*, a clear and distinct representation of the most perfect Being, engraven by his own finger upon my understanding: and to that unprevaricate judgment, that shall maturely perpend the contents, and logical connexion of our precedent meditation, it will plainly appear, that we intend such a *Perfection*, or *reality objective* in this Idea, which (no less then that *Artifice objective*, which is in the Idea of any engine most ingeniously fabricated) requires a *Cause*, wherein all that is *really* and *formally* contained, which is included in the Idea only *objectively*, and at second hand, or by reflexion. *Solut.*

Though we grant your *Thesis*, that this Idea hath more of *Perfection*, or *objective reality*, then your *Mind*: yet cannot your *Assumption* stand, that therefore your *Mind* cannot be the *Author* of this Idea; since an *Effect* may have a degree of *Perfection*, or reality, which neither is, nor ever was in the *Cause* thereof. To instance, common observation teacheth, that Flies, Frogs, &c. insects, as also some Plants are generated by the Sun, rain, and earth mutually cooperating by a kind of seminal confermentation, or fertile putrefaction; and yet in neither of those causes will any man allow to high a *Perfection*, as that of *Vitality*. *Ergo*, &c.

Article 3. *Object.* 3. That an *effect* may have more of reality, or perfection then its *Cause*: and the

My *Inference* is founded on the rock of reason, and therefore too impregnable to be demolished by so feeble a battery. For first it is indubitate, that there can be no *Perfection* in *Animals* de- *Solut.*

voyd of *reason*, which is not also in *bodies* devoyd of *Animation*; or if there were, that *Perfection* must be *extradvenient*, or derived unto them from some forreign principle: nor are the Sun, rain, and earth the *Adequate Causes* of *Insects*, or *Animals* whose production is spontaneous and without other seminalitie, then that analogous sperme of corruption; and it sounds discordant in the harmonious ears of logick for any man, only because he is ignorant of any other Cause that may conduce to the generation of an insect, (*i.e.*) hath so many degrees of perfection, as as an Insect hath, therefore to stagger the truth of an Axiome ratified by the *Light of Nature*. For, *Quod nihil sit in effectu, quod non vel simili, vel eminentiori aliquo modo præextiterit in causa*, is a *First notion*, at which no man can quarel, but he must implicitely abjure his own reason: nor doth the ancient and vulgar maxime, *à nihilo nihil fieri*, differ from it, but only in terminis; because if it be conceded, that any thing is found in the effect, which cannot be found in its cause, it must also be conceded, that this something was made by nothing; nor am I convinced why nothing may not be the cause of something, but only from this evidence to the contrary, that in such a cause there would not be the same, nor any thing equivalent unto that, which is in the effect. *Secondly*, that my *Mind* cannot be the *Efficient cause* of this transcendent *Idea*, needs neither declarement, nor support, other then this canonical position; that *whatsoever reality or perfection is only objectively in our Ideas, must be either formally, or at least eminently in their prototypes, or originals*: and upon this one pin hangs all the certification, or assurance, that any man can have of the real existence of any other thing in the world (the *Supreme Being* only excepted) besides himself; for from what hint could we have suspected, that such or such things are existent, without the orb of our own nature, but only from this: that their Idea, or representations have been conveyed into our minds, by the organs of our senses? And that we have a certain Idea, or umbrage of the most potent and most perfect Being; as also, that the *Reality objective* of this Idea is so excellent, as that it cannot be discovered to be in us either *Formally*, or *Eminently*: will be so clear, serene, and orthodox a truth, as to be sworne to

by

by any, who with thoughts ſufficiently conſtant and attentive (for it is a chief *Poſtulate*, or requiſite condition on the behalfe of any man, that intends his own ſatisfaction in this abſtruſe particular, *ut diu multumque in natura Entis ſummè perfecti contemplanda immoretur*) ſhall be pleaſed to conſort their meditations with mine upon this excellent and moſt neceſſary ſubject. For tis not in the power of my pen to obtrude that notion upon any man, the admiſſion and retention whereof immediately depend upon his own cogitation; I mean an aſſurance of the certitude of this demonſtration, when he is reſolved not to be divorced from that uncomely grandmother of Error, *Prejudice*; nor to open the ears of his beleif to the moſt prevalent charms of argument, or taſte thoſe limpid ſtreams, which flow from the fount of all our knowledge, the *Light of Nature*.

Whereas, upon a profound and calme conſideration of all and each of thoſe Attributes enumerated in your deſcription of that excellent Idea, which you pretend to have of God; as that he is a ſubſtance, infinite, independent, ſuperlatively both intelligent and potent, by which your ſelf and all the world was created, &c. we find it not demonſtratively neceſſary, that the Idea of ſuch an Ens, wherein all thoſe perfections are concentred and united, ſhould be implanted in your mind immediately by that Ens: we conclude that it may be framed and compoſed of your ſeverall *Collections* from other *external* objects. To deſcend to particulars. (1.) When by the word, *God*, you underſtand a *Subſtance*, *Reaſon* not any Idea, aſſures you, that God doth *exiſt*: *Subſtance* and *Exiſtence* being twins, that cannot live but conjoyned hand in hand. (2.) From the notion *Infinite*, (*i.e.*) ſomething that you cannot comprehend nor imagine any limits, or extremes thereof, ſo as that your thoughts can ever arrive at a *Ne ultra*: there ariſeth unto your mind an Idea not of an *Infinity divine*; but of the termination or circumſcription of your finite nature. (3.) *Independent* ſounds no more then this, that you cannot conceive, or imagine any cauſe or original of God: from whence tis manifeſt, that from the terme Independent, you can collect no other Idea, but the memory of your own Ideas, which had their ſeverall

Article 4. *Object.* 4. That the exiſtence of ſuch an excellent Idea, as hath been deſcribed of the *Divine Nature*, doth not neceſſitate the exiſtence of an *Entity*, in all points reſpondens, or ſuperior thereto: becauſe of the poſſible compoſing ſuch an Idea, out of our collections from *ſenſible objects*: and the ample.

originations at such and such times, and therefore are dependent. Wherefore, to say that God is independent, is nothing more than that God is in the number of those things, of which you can imagine no original, or Cause: as also, to say that God is infinite, is all one, in the import, with this, that God is in the catalogue of those things, wherein your thoughts can discover no end, limitation, or circumscription. And thus every Idea of God is excluded; for what Idea can there be, without either original, or termination? (4.) *Supralatively Intelligent*; here we desire to be informed, by what kind of Idea you understand the Intellection of God? (5.) *Most potent*; here also we require by what Idea you can understand potency, which imports things in *futuro* only, and therefore not existent? undoubtedly we ascend to the cognition of power, by the steps of Memory, and reflexion upon former actions, progressing by the conduct of Ratiocination, thus; thus he hath done, ergo he had power thus to do, ergo being still the same, he hath power to do the like again in the future. Now all these are Ideas, which may be extracted from external objects. (6.) *Creator* of all things; we can pourtray to our selves a certain resemblance of a *Creation*, by drawing the reflexions of those things we have seen with our eyes; as when we imagine a man beginning and growing as it were from a point in that figure and magnitude, which he hath in his full stature or virility: nor are we persuaded that any man can have other Idea then this, at the word Creator; but yet that we can imagine the world to be created, is no obliging argument to prove the creation. And therefore, though it had been demonstrated by you, that something *Infinite, Independent*, &c. doth *exist*; yet could it be no genuine inference, that therefore a *Creator* doth *exist*, unless you shall adventure to undertake the justification of this argument; something is existent, which we believe to have created all things beside it self; ergo the world was once created by that something. In fine, when you affirme that the Idea of God, as also of your own Soul, is *implantate* in and *congenial* to your *Essence*, we desire to be instructed, whether the souls of men, when they sleep most profoundly and without dreams, exercise their faculty of *Cogitation*; or more plainly, whether they *think*

if

if no, then at such times they have no Ideas: and therefore no Idea can be innate, or congenial, for what ever is *innate*, is always *present*.

To the *first part* of this *objection* I answer in general; that no one of those Attributes, which belong to my Idea of the *supreme Being*, can possibly be desumed from *External objects*, as from an original or primitive exemplar: because in God we can find nothing which holds any analogy, or similitude to those things that are in *Corporeal Entities*; but whatsoever we contemplate in our Ideas that is dissimilar or disproportionate to corporeal natures, that must proceed not from them, but from the caste of that diversity in our cogitation. And here I demand, how any man can deduce the Idea of the *Intellection* of God from corporeal objects? but what kind of Idea I have thereof, I fully explain, when I say, that by an Idea I intimate *all that, which is the forme of any perception*: and who is there, that doth not perceive (that *Philosopher* calls it a *reflex act of the intellect*) that he doth understand the nature of this or that object, upon which his cogitation is acting; and by consequence, who hath not an Idea of his own Intellection, which by indefinite extending of it, he forms to an Idea of the divine Intellection, and so of all other of his Attributes? *Solut.*

To the *other part* I return, in brief, that wherein I have made use of the Idea of God, which is impressed upon the mind of man, as an invincible argument to demonstrate the existence of God; and that in this Idea so immense a *Potency* is included, that we may understand it to be repugnant to reason, if God doth not exist, that any thing besides him in the world can exist unless it be created by him, and dependant upon him: it cannot but appear a direct and just induction, that the whole world, or all things also which are in being besides God, were *created* by him. To untie the last knot concerning the *eclipse* of this Idea of God in our midnight sleeps, when all our Faculties disappear; it is requisite only that I advertise the Reader, that when I affirm, that there is a certain Idea of God *innate* and *congenial* to us, I do not mean that this Idea is *always observant*, or constantly held forth to the eyes of our mind; for in that sense no Idea can be innate: but only that we have within us a certain *Faculty* or Power *istam ideam*

ideam eliciendi, of *extracting* it; or that by the dignity of our Essence, we are empower'd to speculate that *Impress* or *Signatur* of the *Deity*, when we convert our cogitations attentively upon it.

Article 5. *Object.* 5. That the Idea conceived of God, is capable of *Augmentation* and *diminution*: and the clear

Though we should applaud your *superstructure*, that the Idea of God is not to be deriuned from any other cause but himself; yet can we not but suspect the stability of your *Corner-stone*, or capital reason thereof, *viz. that nothing can be superadded unto, nothing detracted from that Idea.* And toward the subversion of it, we need adterre no greater an engine, then our friendly advice, that you would consider how smal a garden-plot of science, well manured, may in process of time be enlarged into a spacious campania; that tis not impossible for you to be informed, either by men more learned then your self, or by the extraordinary revelation of Angels, or some other communication from other natures more intelligent then man, of many more perfections or Attributes in God, then you have hitherto discovered: that God himself may be pleased, by the irradiations of his sacred Spirit, so to illuminate your intellect even in this life of ignorance, as to afford you a brighter reflex of his glories, and so augment your knowledge of his excellencies: that your Soul, when she shall have the dark curtain of flesh withdrawn by the rough hand of death, and be advanced to the *Beatifical vision*, shall know so much more of *Divinity*, then what you can apprehend now, that in comparison thereof your present Idea of it, may well be accompted imperfect, and therefore capable of addition: that in your infancy you perceived no such Idea at all; at least it was not so accurate and perfect as at this day, when it hath received the accesses of your more learned speculations: in short, that as you have not attained a full cognition of the perfections of *inferior essences*, nor can ever hope for it, at once, but must ascend by the successive gradations of new discoveries; so can you not acquire a full cognition of the *Perfections* of the *supreme Ens*, at once, but may have your Idea of him made more and more perfect every day, by new additions.

Solut. When you reprehend this tenent of mine, that the Idea of God engraven on the mind of man, is uncapable either of *Addition*,

or *Substraction*, you seem to have no regard to that Rule amongst Philosophers, *Essentias rerum esse indivisibiles.* For an Idea represents the *Essence* of a thing; to which, if ought be added, or from which, if ought be substracted, instantly it becomes the Idea of another thing. And by reason of their ignorance of this truth, the Heathen, not conceiving aright of the *true God*, fell into the wofull delusion of framing to themselves the Ideas of *false ones*, and chiefly that of *Pandora*, ὃν πάντες ὀλύμπια δῶρα᾽ ἔχοντες δῶρον Πάνδωρα, in whom all the endowments, or excellencies of all other gods were concentred. But when once we have conceived the Idea of the true God, however more and more perfections may be revealed unto us, which were not formerly known to be in him, yet nevertheless is not the Idea of him therefore *Augmented*, but onely made more *distinct* and *express*: in regard all those Accomplishments ought to be comprised in the same Idea first conceived, insomuch as it is supposed to have been *true* from the very first conception. Thus the Idea of a *Triangle* receives no inlargement, when severall proprieties are discovered to be therein, which were at first unknown. Nor is our Idea of the Divine Nature formed by us in parcels, or by sensible additions, out of the various perfections or endowments of the Creatures, amassed together, and multiplyed up to the rate of supernaturall: but springs up to us in a moment, perfect and entire, from this one root; that we understand him to be *an infinite Ens, so perfect as to be above all amplification, or accesse of more perfection.*

Article 6. Many scruples, concerning the finality, manner, and form of the Idea impress; as also concerning the seeming Heterogeneity, or Alterity between the essence of the mind and that of the Idea: particularly satisfied.

Hitherto you have well calmed all those tumults of *Doubts*, which arose within us upon the Lecture of your Demonstration of the Existence of God: but yet there remain some few, though considerable scruples, the full and clear solution whereof is required from you, before you can with reason expect to bring us over to your side.

If the Idea of God be impress upon you, as a *mark* or *signature* set by an *Artificer* upon the *work* of his hands; what is the *Modus* of that impression? What the *Form* of that mark? by what means can you discern it? if it be not a thing distinct from

the work it self, from your rational *Soul*, or *Mind*; is your *Soul* then the Idea? is your *Mind* nought else, but *Modus cogitandi*, a certain manner of thinking? can your mind be both the *signature impressed*, and the *subjectum impressionis*, or matter upon which it is impre'st? Credible it is, say you, that you are made after the *similitude* of *God*; True, by a *religious Faith* elemented in us by the doctrine of Holy Writ; but how can you make it out from *Natural Reason*, unlesse you adventure to make God *Homini-forme*, like to man? And wherein can that *similitude*, or *typicall analogie* consist? Dare you, being a grosse *Corporeal Ens*, poor despicable Dust and Ashes, presume to resemble your self to that *Eternal*, *Incorporeal*, *Immense*, most *Perfect*, most *Glorious*, and (what is of most weight in this particular) *Invisible* and *Incomprehensible Essence*? Have you beheld him face to face? Nay, with *Moses* in the cleft of the rock, have you seen so much as his back parts; so that you are able to describe his aspect, and make good the Comparison? But you averre, that tis credible for this reason, *Quia creavit*; now we retort upon you, that tis therefore incredible: since there is no necessity that the Work should be like its Maker, unlesse in the point of *Generation*, where the *Production* receives a communication of the same nature, that is in the *Productor*: but you were not Generated by God, nor because he was your Efficient, can you safely inferre, that therefore you are participant of his Nature; but you were onely created, fashioned by him, according to the exemplar or Idea, which was in the *Divine Intellect* from all eternity. So it remains, that you have no more justifiable pretence, to affirm that you are like him; then an *Engine* hath to be thought to bear the image of the *Engineer*, then a *house* hath to be conceived like to the *Mason*, or *Carpenter* that built it.

Further, (not to supersede a jot of your own sense, which may conduce to the illustration of your Position) you subjoyn, that you plainly perceive the *similitude* twixt God and Man, when you understand your self to be an *Ens incompleat*, *dependent* upon some superiour Principle, and indefinitely aspiring to *greater* and *better* things: now in our judgement, this is an undeniable argument of a vast disparity and *Dissimilitude*, since God, on the

contrary is most *complete*, most *independent*, most *self-sufficient*, as being *Maximus & Optimus*. In very sooth, a *Comparison* 'twixt *Light* and *Darkness*, 'twixt *Heaven* and *Hell*, 'twixt *Good* and *Evil*, 'twixt a *Spirit* and a *Body*, 'twixt *Something* and *Nothing*, may be better endured; as importing infinitely less of *Absurdity*, infinitely less of *Impossibility*. In fine, it cannot sound lesse then a Miracle, that other men should not understand the same that you doe; and chiefly when there is no reason alleadged, why we may not beleive, that God hath impressed the Effigies of his Essence upon others, as well as upon you. We profess, this one argument convinceth us, that the Idea of God is not impresst upon the mind of man, immediately by himself, as a *signature*, or *Characterism* to confesse our Creation; *viz.* that if it were, the *Impress* would be one and the same in all men; that all men would then conceive God under the same *Form* and Idea; would allow him the same *Attributes*; would have the same thoughts of him in all points. But that all Nations, Ages, Religions, nay and Persons have had various and distinct Ideas of the Divine Nature: is so manifest upon the oath of Experience, that we may well here be silent, as to any other attestation.

When you require me to prove, that the Idea of God is impresst upon the mind of man, as a *Mark* or *Signature* set by the *Maker* upon the *Work* of his hands; and what is the *Manner* of that *Impression*; or what the *Form* of that *Mark*: I appeal to the decision of any sober Arbiter, whether it be not the same thing, as if, when I had surveyed an excellent *Picture*, and deprehended so much rare art and exquisite skill therein, that I could not judge it to be drawn by any hand but that incomparable one of *Apelles*; I should affirm that this *inimitable Artifice*, or *perfection* never to be paralleled, was a certain *Mark*, or note of Distinction, set by *Apelles* to all his pieces, whereby they may be discerned from the ruder draughts of other pencils: and you should notwithstanding press me to tell you, what's the Form of that Mark, or Manner of that Signal? Doubtless, such a Question deserves no other answer but a smile.

Again, to pursue the same adequate *Simile*; put the case, that

I should averre, that the singular *Art*, and unrivald skill, whereby as an infallible sign, the *Pictures* of *Apelles* are distinct from the courser paintings of all others in the World; is nothing really distinct from the Pictures themselves; and that you should cavill at my assertion, and by irregular Logick inferre, that therefore those *Pictures* are nought else but the *Artifice* or *Skill*, in an *abstracted acception*, and so are composed of no matter: *Ergo* they are onely *Modi pingendi*, certain manners of painting, &c. Would not your argument be equally both as just and acute, as when you shall thus reason; If there be no distinction betwen the Idea of God engraven on your *Mind*, and your mind the *subject*, or *recipient* of this engravement; then is your Mind the Idea, and your self nothing but *Modus cogitandi*, then are you both the *Mark* impreth, and the *subject* of the Impression? I profess sincerely, after a due perpension, I cannot determine, which of the two *Inductions* carries the greater weight in the impartial balance of right reason: sure I am, that the *Analogie* stands fair and even in all points.

Nor can your Contradiction of that venust and almost Catholick Article, *Hominem esse Dei Charagma*, that man is made after the Image of God, founded upon a collection of those various particulars, whereby the *Humane Nature* is discrepant from the *Divine*, be found more Dialecticall, or perswasory, then this feeble, because preposterous *Enunciation*. If any Picture drawn by *Apelles* did ever exactly resemble *Alexander*, then was *Alexander* in all parts exactly like that Picture: but the Picture was made up of severall different ingredients or materials, as divers Colours, oyle, wood, vernish, &c. and *Alexander* composed of skin, flesh, bones, hair, &c. Ergo, no picture was ever like *Alexander*, the Disparity between his nature, and the nature of a Picture, being so great, as never to be reconciled in a full analogie. For every temperate brain knows full well, that it is not required to the *Formality* of an *Image*, or *Pourtracture*, to be the same in *all points* with the *Antitype*, or *Original*; but onely that it resemble in *some*: and we all submit to this Manifest, that that most *perfect Faculty* (so I speak as not being ignorant, that all the *Attributes* of God are in him *Actually*; but wanting a word more

ſignificant and convenient to this notion) *of cogitation*, which we underſtand to be in *God*, is in ſome ſort fitly repreſented by that *imperfect one*, which is in *Man*. Further, I cannot but point obliquely at your imprudence, in chooſing rather to compare the Creation of Man by God, with the Mechanick operation of a Maſon, or Carpenter, then with the Generation of a Parent; ſince no pretext of reaſon can juſtifie that unmannerly Conference. For though thoſe three manners of acting, *Creation*, *Generation*, *Fabrefaction*, ſtand a whole *Genus* wide of each from other, and can never be brought neerer then the ſwords point: yet to argue from a Production *Natural* to a *Divine*, is, by a whole climate, a neerer way, then from an *Artificial*. Again, (to leave no point of a ſcruple unreſolved) though I have long ſince aſſented, that the reſemblance betwixt *God* and *Man*, is not ſo great as that betwixt a *Parent* and his *iſſue*; yet cannot I be brought to hold it impoſſible, that an *operation* ſhould ever be inriched with the *Eſfigies* of the *operator*; ſince Experience whiſpers me, that I have ſeen a *ſtatuary* carve his own ſtatue, out of white Marble, aſwell in the proportion and ſymmetry, as lineaments of each part, ſo exquiſitely reſembling, that every common-eye knew him aſwell by his Statue, as his ſtatue by him. Nor is your *Memory* more faithfull, then your *Judgement* profound; for when you accuſe me to have ſaid, *that I evidently perceive the ſimilitude betwixt God and Man, from hence, that I underſtand my ſelf to be an Ens incomplete, dependent, &c.* You make but a confuſed and perverſe rehearſal of my words, which placed in their proper order expreſs the *Antitheton*, or quite contrary, *viz. that from the Imperfection, Subordination, and depending of my own nature, I deduced the higheſt Perfection, Supremacy, and Indepedency of Gods*; that whereas it was eſſential to me unceſſantly to aſpire to greater and better things, and that thoſe greater and better things are actually inherent in God: therefore had I in me ſomething of *Affinity* to thoſe greater and better things, by the incitement whereof I become ambitious and aſpiring to them. And truly, this I inſerted as an unqueſtionable remonſtrance of the infinite *Diſſimilitude*, which I underſtood to be betwixt *Divinity* and *Humanity*; with deſign to prevent both miſapprehenſion and ſcan-

dal, to both which, otherwise I had some reason to conceive my self obnoxious. Finally, whereas you make it no less then a wonder, why all men in general should not understand the same Attributes in God, that I doe; since if the Idea of his Divinity be impreſt universally and equally, upon the Minds of men, every one hath as great a privilege, by the Charter of his Essence, to speculate the same, as my self: in sober truth you may with equal reason wonder, that since all men know the Idea of a *Triangle*, why all men doe not yet perceive as many *Proprieties* and *Perfections* in that figure, as learned *Geometricians* doe; and why some reason *truly*, others *falsly* upon that Idea.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

That God created the world ex nihilo, *proved by Arguments Apodictical.*

Sect. I.

THe *Existence* of God being amply Demonstrated, 'tis a natural consequence, that the whole World, and all things existent therein besides himself, were *Created* by him. For those Attributes, *Omnipotence*, *Omniscience*, and *Independence*, which are particularly, and in association required to that great Act of *Creation*, are all (together with all other *Perfections*, that lie in the ken of mans Cogitation) comprised under the *Idea*, which we hold of his *Essence*. Nor can any man deny, that every single Entity in the vast ark of the Universe, was created by, and holds its existence by dependence upon God; unless he shall have first denyed, that God doth exist: which our precedent Demonstration hath made appear to be impossible. For at the same time he denies, that God doth exist, he unavoidably precipitates himself into an Absurdity, implicitely denying that himself doth exist: which his very act of denyal contradicts; since, had he no existence, he could not deny; all men embracing that *Axiome*, *Non-entis non sunt Actus.*

Article 1. The inseparability, or (rather) identity of *God*, and *Creator*.

Upon a serious perpension of the irresistible pressure or weight of this plain and genuine *Inference*, I once resolved to supersede all other Arguments of the *Creation of the World out of nothing, by the sole and immediate Goodness, Wisdome, and Power*

Article 2. The two respects, which inclined the Author to a more ample comprobation of the first Article of our Chri-

stian breed; together with a dielenchical explosion of that antiquated delusion, that the Universe was *autoctbones* in its original, or constructed meerly by *Chance*.

Power of the Supreme, because *most perfect Being*; especially when I converted my thoughts upon the almost Catholick belief of this truth, every man, at least, every Christian, receiving and retaining it as an Article of Faith: but when my second and more advised meditations had whispered me, that most heads are so indurate by the frost of ignorance, as not to feel the soft touches of a *Collaterall* and *enthymematicall Demonstration*; as also, that my proper business was to evince by the testimony of meer *Reason*, what is commonly embraced upon the single auctority of *Moses* pen: I could not but conceive it necessary, in order to the plenary confutation of that as impious, as ridiculous Error of some antient *Naturalists*, *that the World was made by Chance, or Fortune*; to endevour the probation of the same, by other more *direct* and *express* means of perswasion, deduced from the *Magna Charta* of all temporal knowledge, the *Light of Nature*. Now that I may perform this, with that exactness, and satisfaction, which is due to so excellent a subject; I am necessitated to bespeak my Readers Patience to endure the recital, explanation, and examen of those specious reasons, which deluded the uncircumspect and easie judgements of those unhappy *Pagans*, who sitting in the Philosophers chair, either founded, or supported, or repaired that detestable opinion, that *Fortune was the Author and Architect of this admirable fabrick the Universe*.

Article 3. The summary of *Empedocles*, *Leucippus*, *Epicurus*, *Democritus*, &c. doctrine of the worlds spontaneous result from a *Chaos* of *Atoms*.

Epicurus (for him have I fingled out, as the most notorious *Patron*, though not the *Father* of this execrable delusion; since the moniments of time assure the invention hereof upon his great Master, *Leucippus*) being great with a monstrous design to expunge those Characters of Piety and reverence towards the Deity, which the observation of prodigious Meteors, of frequent Eclipses of the two great Lamps of heaven, of Thunder, and Coruscations, of Earthquakes, of the regular and constant motions of the Sphears, &c. had impressed upon the minds of men; as also to eradicate all conceit of the so-much talkt of Compensation of good and evil actions after death openly breaks forth into the insolent assertion of these three horrid positions; (1) *Quod mundus non sit à Deo constitutus*, that the World was not constituted by

by God; (2.) *Quod mundus à Deo non gubernetur*, that the World was not governed by God; (3.) *Quod animus noſter non ſuperſit à funere*, that the ſoul of man doth not ſurvive the funeral of his body. The *Firſt* he eſſayes to declare thus; *Exi-*
« *ſtimare oportet mundos, uti & finitam omnem concretionem in*
« *immenſo inani factam, quidpiam ſimile cum iis, quas paſſim*
« *obſervamus, habentem, ortum ex infinita rerum univerſitate*
« *habuiſſe; & alios quidem majores, alios minores, per proprios*
« *quoſdam Atomorum quaſi Vortices* (Συσσόους) *ſeu convolutio-*
« *nes, ſeorſim procreatos, &c. (in Epiſt. ad Herodotum apud Di-*
ogen. Laert. lib. 10.) The ſubſtance of all which, and much more to the ſame intent, may be rendred more plainly thus. That the Celeſtiall orbs, and all their radiant Furniture the ſtars, are wheeld about, by a conſtant and even circumgyration; that they veer perpetually towards that point of the World, unto which they firſt inclin'd, and never change either the way, or tenor of their Circumvolutions; that they obſerve the ſame diſtance each from other, which they obtained at the inſtant of their Formation, nor ſink down upon, and ſo crowd or enterfeire each the other; that the Eclipſes of the two great Luminaries neceſſarily ſucceed upon the conjunction of the ſame Cauſes, in our days, as in the infancy of Nature, and may therefore with ſo much facility, as certainty, be prognoſticated and predicted by the rules of *Aſtronomy*; in brief, that ſuch and ſuch determinate effects ariſe from the Concurrenee and coefficiencies of ſuch and ſuch particular Cauſes, &c. all theſe we are not to referre to any other *Principle*, or *Efficient*, but that *Fortune*, whereby they were ſo and ſo diſpoſed in the firſt *Caſual Emergency* of the World; nor are thoſe conſtant and ſetled operations produced by any other *neceſſity*, then what fell to their Efficients, at the primitive ſegregation, concourſe, diſpoſition, coadunation of thoſe *Atoms*, whereof their bodies are compacted. That before the conſtitution of the Univerſe, there was an infinite Chaos of Atoms, of various figures and magnitudes, in an infinite ſpace, floating hither and thither, hurried up and down, on all ſides crowding, impelling, and juſtling each other, by reaſon of the Tendency reſulting from their own innate Gravity. That after a long, long afflux, reflux, con-

flux, elevation, depression, coagmentation and other various and successive agitations and molitions of these Atoms, when each order had chanced to confront and meet with others most consimilar and convenient; then at last they all conspired, acquiesced, and fixed in this regular position and situation, which constitutes the Forme of the Universe; as *Lucretius* (who was deplorably infected with this accurst contagion of *Epicurus*) hath briefly expresst it;

Quæ quia multa modis multis vexata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur pereita plagis,
Omne genus motus, & cœtus experiunde,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata, &c.

The Worlds *Materials* having first been tost,
An infinite *Time*, within an infinite *Roome*,
From this to that uncircumscribed coast,
And made by their own *Tendency* to roame
In various *Motions*; did at last quiesce
In these *Positions*, which they now possess.

That upon the *Diacrisis*, or segregation of heterogeneal Atoms, succeeding upon a circumvolution, gyration, or vertiginous eddy of them, in the confusion of their eternal Chaos; the more gross and ponderous tended towards the *Center*, or downwards, and in their descent expressed the more gracile and lighter, and impelled them upwards; which convening all together in the *circumference* of the immense vortex, wedged in each other into the form of an integument or cortex, called *Cœlum* or *heaven*; but the more gross and weighty, crowding to the centrals, were there compacted and coagmentated into a solid mass the *Earth*: and the remaining matter of a midle nature, upon the concurse of its insensible particles assumed to it self the form of a Humid substance, and part thereof being afterward circumagitated uncessantly, and so both tornated and calefacted, was graduated into many orbs of *Light*, the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*: the residue being re-

ser-

ſerved for the compaction of other bodies; &c. And this, if my memory hath proved a faithfull Steward of my readings, is the narrow of *Leucippus*, *Empedocles*, *Epicurus*, and *Democritus* their doctrine concerning the ſpontaneous configuration of the Univerſe.

Article 4. A *Digreſſion*, winnowing the Chaffe from the Wheat concealed in the former theory of *Epicurus*, & by the corollary of ſome caſtigations, reſtrictions and additions, declaring the great advantages, that this *Hypotheſis* of *Atoms* hath beyond any other concerning the *Material Principle* of all *Bodies*, as yet excogitated.

Tis proverbial amongſt Scholars, and long ſince applyed by an Author of good repute (*Aneponymus, in lib. de ſubſtant. phyſic.*) to this particular Caſe; *Nullam eſſe tam falſam opinionem, quæ non habeat aliquid veri admiſtum; ſed tamen illud admiſtione conjuſdam falſi obſcurari*: that no opinion hath ſo much of falſhood, as not to contain ſome ſprinkling of truth; though that ſpark of truth be ſo obſcured by the cloud of prejudice ariſing from the diſcovery of the falſity admixt, that it may require the ſubtile and deciſive judgement of an *Oedipus* for its diſcernment and ſequeſtration. And in this heap of *droſs* lies raked up ſo much pure and rich *metall*, as, if by the chymiſtry of an induſtrious hand extracted, may more then fully compenſate the patient Lecture of a ſhort *Digreſſion*.

In this old Romance of the ſpontaneous reſult of the World from a Caſual ſegregation and diſpoſition of that Abyſſe of Atoms, which rowled up and down, to and fro, by an impetuous and continual inquietude, eſtuation, or civil war, cauſed by their ingenite propenſity to motion, in the range of the infinite ſpace; ſome things ſound ſo harſh and diſcordant to meer Reaſon, as they are juſtly to be abominated; others carry the ſmooth face of ſo much Veriſimility, as they deſerve to be admitted, at leaſt diligently and impartially examined. The Poſitions we are to reject, are theſe; (1.) *that the Chaos of Atoms was non-principiate*, or as antient as Eternity: (2.) that they were not created *ex nihilo, ab aliqua beata ſimul ac immortali Cauſa*, by God: (3.) that they were not becalmd, ſeparated, ranged, and diſpoſed into their proper ſtations, in that ſerene order and figure, which they are now of inevitable neceſſity bound to obſerve, in every ſingle concretion, or individual Entity, by the artifice of any other *Cauſe*, but the blind Ordination, or improvident diſpoſure of *Fortune*. All which ſmells ſo ſtrong of the Fable, and ſtrikes the noſethrills as wel

of the meer Natural man, as the Pious, with such infectious stench, that nothing but the opportunity of confutation can excuse my coming so neer it. And yet notwithstanding, I have never yet found out any justifiable ground, why *Atoms* may not be reputed *Mundi materies*, the Material Principle of the Universe, provided that we allow, that God created that first *Matter* out of *Nothing*; that his Wisdome modelled and cast them into that excellent composure or figure, which the visible World now holds; and that ever since, by reason of the impulsion of their native *Tendency*, or primitive *impression*, they strictly conform to the laws of his *beneplacnits*, and punctually execute those several functions, which his almighty *Will* then charged upon their determinate and specifical *Concretions*. For, with the advantage of these restrictions, the *Atoms* of *Epicurus* have more of probability, and hold rational through most of those operations, which occurr to the curiosity of the Philosopher, with more familiarity to our conceptions, and less variation or apostasie from the first Hypothesis, then the impossible *Materia Prima* of *Aristotle*, then the *Substantial Principle* of *Plato*, the *Hyle* of the *Stoicks*, or, indeed, then any other imaginable *Praexistent* in the immense space. And after a mature confronting, collation, and comparative perpension, of the most general *conveniences* and *congruities* of all; we have found that, from the ground-work of *Atoms*, we are able to make out what is *Material*, what *Corporeal*, what *Great*, what *Little*, what *Rare*, *Dense*, *&c.* but from the others we could never deduce the formal attributes of a *body*, or *substance*, while the original of all things is determined absolutely devoyd both of *Quantity* and *Quality Actual*, and amounts to no higher a degree of reality, then a meer *Privation*; which a righteous enquiry will soon reduce to *nothing*.

Nor is that affrighting *Difficulty* in the *Theory of Atoms*, which the eye of every *Pedantick Sophister* first glances upon, at the very mention thereof, more then this shadow of a scruple; *viz.* how so vast a mass, as this Giant the Universe, could be made up of such minute particles, as Atoms, which every man understands to be much below the perception of sense, and never to be fathomed but by the subtile arms of the Intellect? For I dare entrust the so-

ſolution of it to any moderate judgement, that ſhall take the pleaſure to conceive this *Analytick Scale*, or degradation of *Magnitude*. Let us grant the *globe of Earth*, which ſeems to contain moſt of *corporeity*, to be but one part of the Univerſe compoſed of many ſuch maſſes congeſted, and the law of conſequence will compell us to concede, that the globe of the earth may be coagmentated of many ſmaller maſſes piled one upon another, or of mountains, as *Atlas*, *Caucaſus* &c. cemented together; that thoſe *Mountains* may reſult from an aggregation of rocks, thoſe *rocks* from an accumulation of *ſtones*, thoſe ſtones from a conflux, and ferrumination of grains of *ſand*, that *ſand* from a leſſer aſſembly of *duſt*, that *duſt* from a minor collection of *Atoms*. This granted, let us have recourſe to that famous Demonſtration of the glorious *Archimed* (*in Aren.*) whereby it is evicted, that twenty five *Cyphers*, or Arithmetical notes ſet in ſucceſſive order, 100000 &c. do exhibite the full number of thoſe Granules of ſand, which ſuffice to make up the vaſt bulk of the World, according to the vulgarly received magnitude thereof, though each of thoſe granules be determined ſo exiguous, that one grain of Popie ſeed may contain ten thouſand of them. I ſay, according to the Magnitude vulgarly received; for if, with *Ariſtarchus* (whoſe opinion *Copernicus*, in the laſt age, revived) you ſhall goe higher, and enlarge the extenſion of the world: yet according to the *Algebra* of *Archimed*, will no more then ſixty four *Cyphers* be required to calculate the number of grains of ſand, of the ſame dimenſions with the former, which equal the almoſt incredible vaſtity of the Univerſe. Now, if you pleaſe to goe lower in the quantity of thoſe minute grains, and ſink them down even to the tenuity of an *Atom*; imagine that each of thoſe ſmall particles is compoſed of ten hundred thouſand Atoms, and advance this number by multiplying it into 64, and even then will the number of thoſe particles be expreſt by no more then 70. Lower yet, if you think your laſt diviſion went not ſo far as *inſectility*, dichotomize thoſe minute particles each into ten hundred millions; and then, upon a juſt Multiplication made, the number provenient ſhall not exceed the reach of 76 Cyphers. Nay drive the matter ſo far, that your thoughts may even loſe themſelves in the purſuit; and you

shall still deprehend how easily you may be supplyed with Cyphers enough to fulfill the number of all those Atoms, which are necessary to the amassment of a bulk, equal to this of the World.

There is yet a *fourth* incongruity in this doctrine of *Epicurus*, worthy our explosion; *viz. That Atoms had, from all eternity, a faculty of Motion, or impetuous tendency, inherent in them, and received not the same from any forreign principle, or impression extradvenient.* But yet can I meet with no impediment, that may hinder me from conceiving, that Atoms are perpetually active and moveable, by the agitation of that internal tendency, or virtual impression, which the *Father of Nature* conferred upon them, in the first moment of their miraculous production *ex nihilo.* And truly, thus refined, the Hypothesis of *Atoms* is less guilty of either inconvenience or incertitude, then any other concerning the first material principle; nay, it hath thus much more of congruity and satisfaction then all the rest, that it fitly declares the radical Cause of all Motion, activity or energie in second Causes, or natures once removed from the *Primus Motor*, God: which can by no means be commonstrated from any other supposition, with the like constancy, correspondence, and perspicuity; especially if we look upon that *Form*, which the Schools commonly conclude on, as the main spring in all motion, or efficient of all activity. For whatever of real *Entity* they allow to be therein, they desume from no other origine, but the simple and naked *Matter*: and yet, by unpardonable incircumspection, or forgetfulness, they make that Matter absolutely *idle*, and *devoid* of all *Motive* or *active virtue.*

Nor did *Plato* himself miss this consideration, but seems to have held the lamp to posterity, in this particular; for though he restrains not his notion to the word, *Atoms*, yet from his description of an *Exiguity*, *Quam intellectus, non sensus capiat*, and from the immediate subjunction of *De multitudine illarum, déq; motionibus, aliisque facultatibus, congruum prorsus erat Deum providere, quatenus natura necessitati obediens ultrò obsecundaret*, &c. (*in Timæo*) tis a lawful conjecture, that he pointed directly upon the sense. These short Animadversions premised; that we may as well supply the Defects, as correct the depravities

of

of this opinion of *Epicurus*; ſuppoſe we, in ſhort, that God in the firſt act of his Wiſdome and Power, out of the *Tohu*, or nothing, created ſuch a proportionate congeries, or juſt maſs of Atoms, as was neceſſary to the conſtitution of the Uniuerſe: ſuppoſe we alſo, that all thoſe Atoms, in the inſtant of their creation received immediately from God a faculty of *ſelf-motion*, and conſequently of concurring, crowding, juſtling, repelling, reſilition, exſilition, and reciprocal complectence, concatenation revinction, &c. according to the reſpective preordination in the *Divine Intellect*: and then will all the ſubſequent operations of nature remain ſo clear and eaſie, that a meer *Ethnick* by the guidance of thoſe two lamps, *Senſe* and *Ratiocination*, may progreſs to a phyſical theory of them, and thereby ſalve all the *Phænomena's* with leſs apoſtaſie from firſt Principles propoſed, then by any other hypotheſis yet excogitated. A meer *Ethnick*, I ſay; for we, who have devolved unto us the ineſtimable bleſſing of *Moſes* hiſtory of the Creation, have far other thoughts of that method or order, wherein the World was founded, and finiſhed by God: but the pure Natural man, who wants the illumination of ſacred Writ, can follow no other conduct, but what, by the light of nature, appears moſt conſonant to truth. My *Digreſſion* is now ended, and I returne to the diſcharge of my Aſſumption, the redargution of that blaſphemous opinion, which aſcribes the honour of the Worlds compoſure to *Fortune*.

Sect. II.

Article 1. The conceit of the Worlds fortuitous production, diſparaged by a prepollency even of Pagan *Authority*, that profoundly aſſerted the contrary, viz. of

AND firſt I oppoſe to the Patron of this error, the more noble *Auctority* of many antient and eminent *Philoſophers*; who, though unhappily born and educated in the midnight of Paganiſm, had yet their intellectuals, ſo irradiated by the refulgent Light of Nature, which their Vigilancy and aſſiduous Contemplation always kept, like the Veſtal tapours, ſhining and unecliped by the Cimmerian fogges of *Tradition* and *Prejudice*, that they diſcovered more then a glimps of *Divinity* in the original of the World. For Tha-

Article 2. *Thales Milesius.* *Thales Milesius*, being introduced by *Diogenes Laertius* (in *vita ejusdem*) as rendring a reason, *Cur mundus sit pulcherrimus*, of the extreme glory, comelineſs, and decency of the World, and exact ſymmetry obſerved in all and every part thereof; moſt wiſely ſets up his reſt, and ſilences all further diſpute, in this full ſolution, ποίημα γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ, *tis the Artifice of God.*

Article 3. *Anaxagoras.* That *Anaxagoras* had found out the ſame truth, by his retrograde tracing of nature up to her firſt head, or fountain; can be obſcure to none, that ſhall doe his meditations ſo much right, as to interpret his νοῦς, *Mens*, or *ſupreme Intelligence*, to be the ſame with that, which we call *God*: for even our *School-men* doe as much, frequently uſing thoſe appellatives, *Summa Intelligentia* and *Deus*, indifferently and as Synonomas.

Article 4. *Pythagoras* and *Plato.* Of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* we need no other record, then the ſingle teſtimony of *Timæus Locrus*, who, being a famous Pythagorean, and therefore prudently deputed by *Plato* to deliver his own ſenſe, in that golden Dialogue concerning *Nature*, (which in the Commentary of *Marſilius Ficinus*, ſignifies no more than *Divinitatis inſtrumentum*) in many paſſages of the debate, or inveſtigation, takes occaſion to declare, *Deum eſſe Parentem & opificem mundi.* Nor can it coſt the ſtudy of many houres to collect from *Plato's* other inqueſt into Divinity called *Parmenides* (who alſo was a diſciple of *Pythagoras*) or *De uno omnium principio*, and the now mentioned deſcription of Nature, *Timæus*, conferred together; that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* ſhook hands in that opinion, that the world had its beginning, οὐ κατὰ χρόνον, not in *Time*, in regard, as they conceived, it never had beginning, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἐπίνοιαν, but in *Cogitation*, *i. e.* though it be Non-principiate, yet may our thoughts have the licence to aſſume that there was ſome præexiſtent matter, out of which it was formed. For they both apprehended ſo abſolute a dependence of the world upon God; that God being exiſtent in the World, muſt of neceſſity be reputed the Efficient thereof, inſomuch as the World could have no other Cauſe of its Matter, Diſtinction, Diſpoſition,

Beauty,

Beauty and ornament. And is not this the ſame, that our Doctors now admit, while they defend, that the World might have been created by God, had his Wiſdome thought fit, from all Eternity; and if ſo, yet notwithſtanding he muſt ſtill have been the Cauſe of it, in regard of that neceſſary dependence of the World upon him, for if there were no God, there could be no World: κατ' ἰσονομίαν, by the ſame reaſon, as though we grant the Sun together with its light, or a Seal together with its ſignature, to have been from all Eternity; yet muſt we grant the Sun to be the Cauſe of his light, and the Seal to be the Cauſe of its impreſſion. For they condeſcend to this, that an Effect may be coævous to its Cauſe; and that, though the *Cauſe* be not *prior Tempore*, it ſufficeth that it be onely *prior Natura*, or τῇ φύσει, which is the very expreſſion of *Timæus Locrus*. However this may be diſputed, yet ſure I am, that as well theſe two Patriarchs of Learning, as all their Sectators and Interpreters were unanimous in this point, That God was Author of the Univerſe.

Article 5. *The Stoicks.*

What the *Stoicks* thoughts were, concerning this grand particular; is publick, and cannot eſcape the cognizance of any, who have look't into the lives of the Scholiarchs, or Heads of that numerous Sect, amply regiſtred by the even pen of *Diogen. Laert.* or read *Cicero's* ſecond Book, *De natura Deorum*, where he elegantly perſonates *Balbus* ſmartly and profoundly diſputing againſt *Velleius* and *Epicurus*; whither I remit the unſatisfied Reader, in avoidance of Prolixity.

Article 6. *Ariſtotle.*

For the grand ſignieur of the Schools, *Ariſtotle*; truth is, I cannot conceal, that when he maintains (*in* 8. *Phyſic. & prioribus de Cœlo*) the Univerſe to be *ingenitum*, without origination, and contemns that forementioned diſtinction of *Priority*, τῇ φύσει, & κατὰ χρόνον, as excogitated by *Pythagoras*, and continued by *Plato*, rather διδασκαλικὸς χάριν, for the convenience of *Doctrine*, then the intereſt of *Truth*: he is poſitive, that he could not admit the World to have had any Author at all; and therefore *Simplicius* (*in* 8. *Phyſic. digreſſ.* 3.) chiding *Philoponus* for daring to aſſert, that the World had its origin and production from

God, according to the testimony of *Moses* Chronicle, cries out that his doctrine was repugnant to the Fundamentals of his oracle, *Arist.* and in some sort highly derogatory to the majesty of the assigned *Producter*; since it tacitly rendred him subject to that imperfection, *Mutability*, which is incompatible with the constant simplicity of an Essence sufficiently accomplisht for so mighty an action, and implies that he was not the same from all Eternity, and but lastly became *Parens, Conditórque mundi*. But yet have I ground enough to stand upon, that *Arist.* grew wiser, as he grew older, and that the flame of his reason shined brighter when that of his life burned dim; for in the last exercise of his pen, his book *De mundo*, which most Antiquaries conclude written in the close of his studies, (*cap.* 5. & 6.) he sings a palinodia, and makes open profession, that the universal harmony, consonance, and pulchritude of this great machine were ἀπὸ τῦ πάντων γενέτου, *ab universorum Conditore*: Confirming the verity of that pious Adage confest and pronounced by all men, ἐκ Θεῦ τὰ πάντα, *All from God*. That he hinted this from that oraculous Motto, fathered upon *Zoroaster*, that King and Magus of the antient *Bactrians*, and contemporary to *Ninus* and *Semiramis*, as *Eusebius* (*lib.* 10. *de prap. Evangel. cap.* 3.) accounts; *Factor, qui per se operans, fabrefecit mundum* doth not want its share of probability, inasmuch as the monuments of the *Chaldean* Learning were transcript by the *Platonicks*, and so came to the view of *Aristotle*, is manifest as well from the circumstance of *Time*, his life falling not much below the plunder of the Oriental Libraries, as from the *Rhapsodies* or Excerptions, which the *Pythagoreans* had made out of the reliefs of *Zoroaster* and *Trismegistus*, and transmitted down to the hands of *Plato* and his Scholars, who frequently interlaced them upon their own writings, a copious series of which sentential transcriptions hath been not long since bequeathed to posterity by the bounty of *Cæsar Longinus*. But however, I am inclined to beleive rather, that his second thoughts, and more advanced Contemplations on the excellency and glory of the first cause, disposed him to this recantation, and enforced him to confess, that the fabrick of the world was too full of Wisdom and Providence, to have been performed by any thing below the

Highest

Highest: for tis warrantable for me to conjecture, that since he had his erudition, at least his education, at the feet of *Plato*, and so could not be ignorant of any Tradition of moment, which his Master knew; had his judgement been imbued with that lesson in his greener years, he could not well have stifled it till immediately before his death, especially when the knowledge of this great truth might have preserved him from that swarm of Difficulties, which he endured in maintaining his Thesis of the *Non-pradoctia*, or *Eternity* of the World. There are, I confess, who stiffely question the propriety of legitimation of this book, *De Mundo*, owning it upon some younger Composer; who ambitious to have the Minerva of his own colder brain, long lived in estimation, gave it the glorious name of *Aristotle*, and under the defence of that prosperous title, committed it to the encounter of *Censure*. To the satisfaction of these, I shall alledge a place or two out of those pieces, which have ever escaped the imputation of spurious; whereby the former sentence is so ratified, that *Aristotle* may appear to have had great indignation against their incogitancy and stupidity, who could believe the world to be once produced, and yet ascribe the production thereof to Fortune. *Dignum est*, saith he, (in 2. *Physic.* cap. 4.) *admiratione videre istos, Animalia quidem & Plantas & Corpora neque esse, neque fieri, sed aut naturam aut quendam mentem, aut quampiam aliam Causam habere (viz. non ex cujusvis semine quidvis nascitur, sed ex hac quidem olea, ex illo vero homo) cælum autem, & quæ sunt sensibilium divinissima, sponte nata fuisse, nec causam ullam, quibus animalia plantæque fiuntur, habuisse.*

"Tis well worthy our admiration, how these men can affirm, "that Animals and Plants neither proceed from, nor can be made "by Fortune; but must have either Nature, or some Intelligence "or other efficient (for the seminalities of things do notably vary in "promiscuous and indifferent Generations, but every distinct "species hath its seed restrained and determined to the procreati-"on of its like: nor can the fructifying principle of an Olive de-"viate into the production of a Vine; or the sperm of man pro-"duce any thing but man) but as for the Heavens, and other "pieces of the world, which seem of farre greater alliance to Di-

« vinity : that these are spontaneous and casual in their originals, « and have not obtained any Efficient to their Formations, equal « to that of Animals or Plants. And (*in* 1. *de Anim. Part. c.* 1.) he speaks expressely to the same purpose, though in other words; which, to prevent the further trouble of the Reader, I shall faithfully transcribe. *Quamobrem verisimilius dixerim cœlum & factum esse ab ejusmodi causa, si factum est; & magis esse ob eam causam, quam Animalia caduca atque mortalia: ordo enim, certúsque status longe magis in ipsis rebus cœlestibus, quam in nobis patet; incerta enim, et inconstans, fortuitáque conditio in genere mortali est potius. Atilli genus Animalium quódque natura constare, extitisséque censent; cœlum autem ipsum Fortuna, spontéque ejusmodi constitisse volunt; in quo tamen nihil Fortunæ ac temeritatis deprehendi potest.* Again, *Calius Rhodiginus* (*lib.* 17. *cap.* 34. *pag.* 814) reports of him, that, though during the greatest part of his life he had ascribed all effects solely to *secondary* and *inferiour* Causes, yet immediately before his death, when his soul began to be weaned from sensibility, and feel her wings, he most earnestly implored the compassion and forgiveness of the *First and Supreme Cause*, *Prima causa misericordiam intentius implorabat*, &c. To these I might have annexed a third text of *Aristotle*, selected by the Master of Roman Eloquence, and adæquately engraffed into his second discourse *De Natura Deorum*: but I conceived the two former to be testimony sufficient to the stability of my assertion, that he abhorred the absurd usurpation of *Fortune*.

Now if the meer *Naturall Explorator* shall but perpend both the *Number* and *Dignity* of these more venerable Professors of Science, wholly abating the weight of their Reasons; I cannot doubt, but he will finde them infinitely to overbalance the single School of *Epicurus*, and of reputation great enough to excuse the conformity of his judgement to theirs: if he look no higher then the point of *Authority*.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Article 1. The pretext of Fortune destroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act of specification, (*i. e.*) the restraint and determination of the seminalities of *Animals* to the procreation of their like in *specie*: and the Atheists objection, of frequent Anomalous and Heteroplasmical, or monstrous Productions, dissolved.

TIs no easie wonder, how any man, whose Faculties are not in disorder, nor the Oeconomie of his head subverted into a Wildness beyond the absurdities of Melancholy adust, can be infatuated into a conceit, that so great, so unform, so durable, so magnificent, and therefore so glorious a work, as this of the World, could be performed by the lesse then feeble, and ignorant hands of *Nothing*, of *Fortune*. For however it may be allowed, that this imaginary Deity, may produce some effects extraordinary or miraculous: yet how petite and inconsiderable are those atcheivements of *Chance*, if put in the scale against those more admirable performances of *Reason* and *Wisdome*? Suppose we, that *Prodigies* may arise from the unequal concurrence of dissimilar and disproportionate *Actives* and *Passives*; and Monsters be generated by the casual confusion of distinct seminalities, as well amongst Animals, as Plants: yet how incomparably more prodigious are those ordinary propagations in each *Classis*; which by the certain and invariable law of their peculiar species, are restrained to their determinate Forms, and whose Constancy excludes all pretence of Fortune, or the accidental Efficiency of Chance? I leave to the decision of every sober man, which hath most of the Miracle; that the seed of every Animal should be confined to the procreation of its like *in specie*, for the most part; and that the *Plastick Spirit* thereof punctually observe the modell, or pattern of that Fabrick of the body, from whence it came: or that, upon a prepostorous commixture of various and unequal seeds, once in an age, there should succeed the production of some new *Heteroclite*, or unpatternd Monster, whose Composition is onely *contingent*, and difform to the Idea of either its *Active*, or *Passive* Principle, in the simplicity of their divided *Figures*. And are not the exquisite Delineations of every *Embryon*, woven out by the subtile fingers of *Archeus*, or the *Formative spirit*; the multiplicity, distinction, elaboration of *organs* both external,

and internal; the severall *Functions*, and *Offices* assigned to those organs, and so artificially contrived, that every one is *distinct*, yet none *independent*; every one *single*, yet all *conspiring* to the same end, all *operative*, yet none (*per se*) *locomotive*: are not these certain and præordinate effects, with innumerable others, the meaneſt whereof we cannot seriously think upon, without a rapture of amazement, more worthy our admiration, then a single *irregularity*, a spontaneous *Monster* of Nilus, a bipartite *Centaure*, a prodigious *Insect*, &c. whose generations are accounted *accidental*, and their configurations not preordained, but the inconsiderate and extemporary results of *Fortune*? Perhaps these stupid Idolaters of Chance will referre these constant and setled operations to *Nature*; but whatever they mean by Nature, how immense a stock of *Wisdom* must it necessarily be endowed withall, which in all its works so cunningly contrives so great variety of organs, observes such exact Symmetry in all parts, so providently disposeth every member, and fits them to the easie execution of their predestinate functions? If they goe farther, and affirm, that *Nature is nothing but the primitive Constitution of the World, which resulted from the casual separation, confluxe, and disposition of its material principle, Atoms; and that it doth constantly persist in the same Method, which it first obtained from Fortune*: the answer is easie, that though Nature be constant to that order in all her productions, which the World obtained in its first composure; yet how ridiculously stupid must he be, who can admit a serious perswasion, that the bodies of Animals, in the beginning could be so exquisitely configurated by meer Chance, and without the direction and indeed the designement of an infinite *Wisdome*; in whose eternal intellect the *prototypes* of each *species* were first adumbrated? Let them object again, that every day affords examples of the skill of *Fortune*, in the production of *Frogs*, *Toads*, *Flies*, and other spontaneous *Insects*: and I shall in return, that those Insects or spontaneous Animals have their *Causes certain*, and by reason of that energie once conferred upon their *Efficients*, must arise to animation in such or such a figure, according to the magnitude, number, situation, connexion, quiet, motion, or, in a word, the *Temperament* of the

particles, out of which their bodies are amassed; and according to the activity of that domestick *Heat*, which ferments and actuates the matter: Secondly, that our debate is about the *original of Nature it self*, and of that precise *Virtue* radically implanted in the *seeds* of things; or more emphatically, what hand inoculated that *procreative power* in each seminality, and endowed it with a capacity requisite to the conformation of bodies so admirable in their structure: if there were not some principle in the nonage of the Universe, who infused that *Prolifical* or fertile *Tincture*, ordained that scheme of members, and gave it rules to act by; from which it never swerves, but upon a disobedience and non-conformity of matter. If we looke no farther then the *Cortex* or *Exteriors* of *Animals*; and there speculated as well the amiable comelines of their *Figures* in the whole (for there is no real Deformity in Nature) as the *geometrical Analogie*, or convenience betwixt the *Members* and their *Offices*, each being respectively configurated to the performance of its peculiar office: 'twere more then sufficient to discover to us the impossibility of their primitive institution by Fortune. But when we *dissect* them, prie into their *Entrails*, and there survey the almost infinite multitude of organs, principal and subordinate; the variety of their uses, some being officiall to *Nutrition*, some to *Vitality*, some to *Generation*, others to *Sense*, others to *Locomotion*, none impeding the activity of another, but all unanimously conspiring to conserve the economy of that *Form*, which, like the main *spring* in an Automaton, invigorates, and actuates the whole fabrick; either we must bid defiance to the chief inducement of beleif, and drown the loud clamors of our Conscience, or else fall down, transported with an ecstasie of pious Wonder, and humbly confess, that these are the *Impresses* of the infinite *power* and *wisdome* of an *omnisicient, and omnipotent Creator*; but not the *Contingencies*, or temerarious effects of *Chance*. Thoughts like these had the prudent *Grafender*, when, in his detestation of the interest of that Pretendress, Fortune (*cap. de exosa mundi.*) his golden pen dropt this rhetorical logick; *Id quod stuporem generat, dispositio interna est in corporibus Animalium. Nam si foret quidem duntaxat multitudo aliqua partium, forte fortuna commistarum, tum ea*

posset

posset Fortuna tribui: at in multitudine illa pene innumerabili nullam esse partem, non tantam, non talem, non ubi, non quomodo, non cum ea functione, qua congruum est, ut neque inutilis sit, neque este commodior valeat: rationem prorsus omnem fugit, ut ita fieri non sapientiâ, sed Fortuna sit constitutum.

Article 2. The necessity of the Worlds Creation by an Agent infinite in Science and Power, proclaimed by the constant Uniformity of Nature, in her perpetuation of *Vegetables*.

Nor doe *Animals* alone, but *Vegetables* also, though of an inferior Classis, amply and sensibly testifie the *Divinity* of their *Founder*, and confute the *Apotheosis* of *Fortune*. Thus, when the Aliment of a Plant, being the aqueous irrigation of the earth insensibly prolected, ascends from the lowest filament of the shaggy root up to the *Trunck*, and thence works up to the extremities of every branch and twigge; can we imagine, that this thin, insipid juice can be so inspissated, and so ingeniously moulded into a *Bud*; that bud discriminated and variegated into a larger particoloured *Blossom*; that Blossom gradually expanded into a determinate *flower*, which gratifies our eyes with the beauty of its embroidery, and our nosthrils with the fragrancy of its odour; that Flower lost in the richer emergencie of a *Fruit*, which hath its figure, colour, magnitude, odour, sapour, maturity, duration, all certain and constant; and the abridgement, or Epitome of this included in the *seed* of that fruit, which being insperst upon the earth, is impregnate with a Faculty to expand it self into a second Plant, in all things rivall to the former, and empowered to act all those several Metamorphoses over again, to a perpetuall rejuvenescence of that peculiar species: can we, I say, imagine, that all this could arise from a *spontaneous range of Atoms*, or that *Necessity* which ensued upon the casual disposition of the *First matter*; and not rather with devout hymns proclaim the *Efficiency* of a Glorious and Eternall *Cause*, whose *Essence* being incomprehensible, and *Attributes* infinite Intelligence, Goodnesse, Power, Beatitude, Glory, &c. must therefore be the *Ordainer*, *Creater*, and *Consecrator* of all things?

Let us ſink our meditations yet one degree lower on the ſcale of Creatures, and conſider how convincively even *Inanimates* argue for the wiſedom of their *Maker*. Doth not the *Sun* (to omit the ſpeculation of its glorious *Light*, and comfortable *Influence*; the former whereof is ſo excellent, the other ſo neceſſary, that they challenge as due the *Admiration* of all, and have drawn the *Adoration* of many ingenious nations) by three prevalent arguments, *viz.* the *Commodiouſneſs of its ſituation*, the *Deſignment of its motion*, and the *Line or tract of its revolution*, ſufficiently illuſtrate the forecaſt and artifice of its *Creator*?

Article 3. The Sun convincively demonſtrates the Infinite wiſdom of its Creator, by 3 Arguments: *viz.*

1. The univerſal convenience of its ſituation in its proper orb.

Firſt *by the univerſal Convenience of its ſituation*. For had it been placed in any other orb, either inferior, or ſuperior to its own; ſuch horrid incommodities, as are inconſiſtent with its uſe and intention, and deſtructive to the two principal deſignes of Nature, Conſervation and Generation, muſt unavoidably have followed; nor had the whole fabrick of the Univerſe been more then one degree removed from the confuſion of its originary Chaos. To particular; had the Sun been ſetled in the loweſt ſphear, and obtained that place, which the Moon now poſſeſſeth: the year had been no longer then a moneth; for in that account of time, it muſt have fulfilled its courſe through every part of the Ecliptick, and ſo the intervalls of ſeaſons had ſuffered ſuch a contraction, that muſt have been repugnant to their inſtitution, *i. e.* muſt have prevented the production of all things; For the *Antipraxis, or Counter-activity of contrary ſeaſons, immaturely ſucceeding one upon the neck of another, deſtroys the principles of Vegetation, and checks the promotion of ſeminalities*. Again, by this unſafe vicinity, or too neer approach to the globe of the earth, its intenſer beams had verified the Conflagration of Phaeton; at leaſt proved ſo intolerable, as that all things muſt have had the ycie and glutinous temper of the Salamander, or elſe been torrified into cynders; and to have had no Sun at all, had been the eaſier miſery. For if there be (and ſome are poſitive there muſt be) an intention and remiſſion of heat, reſpective to the different points, or acceſs and receſs of the Sun, in its proper orb;

and that in its *Apogæum*, or mountee to the highest point in Cancer, the heat is not so scorching under that Tropick on this side the Æquator, as on the other side, in its *Perigæum* or stoop to the lowest point of its excentricity in Capricorne: we cannot with any pretext of reason doubt, that, had the Sun been lodged in the bed of the Moon, it had long since anticipated the general combustion of the last day, and calcined all things to the exiguity of their primitive Atoms. And on the other extreme, had the Sun been appointed to the eight or highest sphear; then must it have been, by reason of the exceeding slow motion assigned to that sphear, so many thousand years in the absolution of its course, as that it must have extended one year to the compute of *Platos* Jubile; nor could the world (if learned men guess aright concerning its duration) have attained to the period of one revolution. Besides that Hemisphear, which first faced the Sun in the beginning of its tedious gyre, must have enjoyd the curse of a long long day, and consequently have mist the fertile blessing of a vicissitude, or reciprocal succession of distinct seasons; but the opposite Hemisphear must have, for many myriads of ages, continued as cold, dark and barren as the grave, and so half of the earth had been made to no purpose. And the like discommodities, though more moderate, would have succeeded to the earth, had the Sun obtained a situation in any one of the other six orbs, between the two former extreams.

2. The appointment of its continual Circumgyration.

Secondly, *by the appointment of its Circumrotation*. For had it remained fixt and not moved at all; then must the world have wanted that necessary division of times and seasons, of Spring and Autumne, Summer and Winter, day and night: and by consequence, the generation and conservation of things dependent on those vicissitudes of Heat and Cold; it being necessary, that the fixation of this Luminary must have caused a perpetual summer in one hemisphear, and as lasting and disconsolate a Winter in the other; or driven nature upon the exigent of making another Sun to irradiate and cherish the opposite half of the earth, it being experimentally true (and therefore advanced to the dignity of an Axiome by *Galilæo*, *Philolaus*, *Niceron*, *Kircherus*, and other

junior

junior Masters in the *Opticks*) *that no spherical luminous body, of what diameter soever, can project its light upon the whole sphear of another at once, or in a fixt position; though it illuminate more then the half of a lesser placed at convenient distance.*

Lastly, *by the contrivement of its oblique motion along the line Ecliptick.* For had its revolution been assigned to any other circle; discommodities no less fatal then the former had unavoidably ensued. *First*, had it sayled along on either side the *Æquator*, some parts of the earth could have known no Sun at all, but should have groand under the oppression of perpetual frigidity and opacity; while others had suffered the contrary extream of an everlasting noon, and been parched by the violence of its too constant and perpendicular beams: and so the whole had been inhabitable; an *Alternation* of *Heat* and *Cold* being indispensably requisite aswell to the *Conservation* and growth of all things in their *Individuals*, as to their *Propagation* in *Specie*. *Secondly*, had it been confined to the conduct of the Æquator; first unto a parallel sphear, or such who have the Pole for their Zenith, its revolution could have made neither perfect day, nor perfect night; for being in the Æquator, it would intersect their horizon, and be half above, and half below it: and to those, who inhabite under the Æquator, though it made a distinction of day and night, yet would it not make any considerable distinction of seasons; for the Sun being always vertical to them, in that situation, would have introduced a constant Summer, and the perpendicularity of its unremitted heat have exhausted the fructifying humidity of the earth, and so left the womb of our common mother, squalid and barren as the desert *Sarra* in *Africa*. *Lastly*, had it moved directly upon the Æquator, unto what position soever; well might it have described a day, but never measured out a year: for the progression of it from West to East (by the compass of which motion the circle of the year is constituted) had been wanting; in regard that 'tis impossible that on one and the same circle, observing the same Poles, the Sun should have performed its two contrary motions, one from East to West, which defines the day, the other from West to East, which measures out the year, both at once. Now all these palpable inconveniences (with many

3. The contrivement of its oblique motion along the line Ecliptick.

other first observed and enumerated to us by a *Spanish*, and lately most elegantly explained by an *English Physician*; both which selected this choice subject, as an impregnable argument of the *Wisdome of the Creator*) were artificially prævented by the device of the Suns motion along the Ecliptick, and the obliquity of its annual progress upon the Poles of the *Zodiack*, full 23 degrees, and an half from the Poles of the World.

Now this meditation naturally applies it self, and so clearly demonstrates the forecast and artifice of an infinite Intelligence; that I have nothing left to say, but this; that tis a wonder, which nothing but the delusion of the Father of lies can make out to be beleif, how *Epicurus*, being a Philosopher, in many abstrusities of nature acute enough, nay beyond most of his Tutors, as *Diogenes Laertius* testifies of him; and one that pretended to so much insight in the problems of Astronomy, as to be able to salve all the *Phænomena*, or Apparitions above the Terraqueous orb, (in *Epist. ad Pythoclem*) could yet be so infatuated, as to ascribe the composure, and location of the Sun, and the invention of its regular, and to all parts convenient motion, to the *Temerity* and *Incogitancy* of *Fortune*. Nor could I have conceived it possible that so much of the *Scholar*, and so much of the *Fool* could have at once met in one and the same brain; had not I been perswaded thereto, by the agreeing testimonies of many credible Authors, high both in Antiquity and Fame.

Article 4. The impresses of an infinite Intelligence, plainly legible in the fronts even of Subterraneous Inanimates.

If these Arguments reach not, we may descend yet lower (if there be any thing low in Nature) and from the entrals of our Grandmother fetch *Stones* and *Mineral Concretions*, to give in evidence against the insolent arrogance of *Fortune*. For who dares contract the suspicion of madnes so meritoriously, as once to dream that the *Magnet* obtained its rich endowments of *Verticity* and *Attraction*; the *Adamant* its radiant traluceny and conical angularity; *Alum* its octohedrical or eight-faced Figure; *Salt* its Sexangular; *Nitre* its striate or cycle-resembling; *Vitriol* its multangular, &c. from a meer accidental and undetermined conflux and coalition of their minute and insensible particles: and not from the provident and artificial disposition of them into such and

and such situations, as are requisite to the causation of those particular qualities and Figures, by the discreet and methodicall influence of an infinite wisdome? If any such there be (and I have reason for more then my fears, that such there are, in these accursed days, when all the *Errors* of the elder world are revived, desperate *Hæresies* belched out even by those, who profess to be the Patriots of truth, and horrid *Blasphemies* applauded as commendable strains of high devotion) who tremble not to deny the Creation of all things by God: these I shall pity, and leave to ponder that exclamation of *Gassendus*, (*de exortu mundi*) *O quam hebetem esse oportet, aut quam reclamantem habere conscientiam, si dum adista attenditur, sola interim Fortuna laudatur!* "O how insensible must that man be either of the advisoes of "reason, or the convulsions of Conscience; who can consider "these things, and yet ascribe the honour of their Creation to "Fortune!

Article 5. The impossibility of the worlds Creation by any Agent but God, illustrated both by the Magnitude, and Pulchritude thereof: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive faculty eternally inherent in Atoms, derided.

And if the Characters of an *Infinite Wisdome* be so plainly visible in the *single and divided peices of the Universe*; how incomparably more legible must they be in the *Whole*, wherein *Amplitude* holds an æmulous contention with *Pulchritude*? True it is, the *Epicureans* were not staggered at the consideration of so vast a mass, instantly addressing themselves for refuge, to *an infinite stock of Atoms congested in an infinite space*. But this Sanctuary is rotten, and cannot protect the credulity of any, unless it be supported by this additional base; that there was some first *Active principle*, which by its infinite power first *created* out of nothing, and then *congested* this mass of Atoms into a Chaos, and after by its infinite wisdome *digested* the same into that exquisite order which doth now constitute the form of the world. Is it possible for any thing that dares pretend to *Humanity*, to imagine, or by any specious argument to hope to perswade, that so many minute bodies, or Atoms, by the rash and indeterminate conduct of their own innate propensity to motion, indifferently hurried up and down, hither and thither, and by reason of the discord arising from their different quantities, and Figures, apt to maintain an everlasting civil war and confusion;

could notwithstanding by a spontaneous direction meet and unite in that just number, which was sufficient to make up the Globe of the *Earth*, requisite to compose the body of the Sun, proportioned to the dimensions of the *Moon*, equal to the several orbs of those radiant Centinels of night, the *Stars*, whose multitude exceeds the figures of Arithmetick, and their magnitude never yet rightly explored; in fine, exactly accommodate to the great body of the *World*, whose bounds we know not, and whose dimensions are immense? The conviction of this impossibility they have endeavoured (though by running into as great a one) thus to evade, As he (say they) must have been deceived, who having observed the generation of nothing greater then a *Flea*, could not therefore beleive the generation of an *Elephant*, as if there could not be found matter enough to arise to so gigantick a body: so are we deceived, while regarding the generation of onely smal things we beleive that the great body of the universe could not be made up by the same means, and after the same manner; as if so vast a proportion of matter could not concur and unite into one Form; nay by so much the more are we deceived, by how much the more proportion the matter of a Flea holds to that of an Elephant, and the matter of an Elephant holds to that of the World; then the matter of the World holds to that mass of Atoms, which is infinite in the infinite space. But I may with good reason demand how they can be assured, that in the imaginary space, without the circumferrence of the world, there is such an inexhaustible abyss of matter, as sufficeth to the generation not onely of this world, but of an infinite multitude of others, fully as large as this: for as well as we are assured, that in this world is contained matter sufficient to the composition of an Elephant, as well as of a Flea? Sure I am, no man ever saw the outside of the world; and if so, is it not a meer Rhodomontado of phansie, or (as *Pliny* calls it) a high madness, to imagine such an infinite abyss of matter? Let us, however, deal with these, as wise Physicians with Hypochondriacks, that they may the more easily cure them, allow them their absurdities; and grant that from eternity there was such an infinity of Atoms confusedly hurried to and fro, in an infinite space: yet the difficulty will always remain, how in so great a laxity and infinite

infinite liberty of range, ſo many Atoms could ſo convene and combine together, as to terminate and ſetle each other, by reciprocal coherence and mutual concatenation; how ſo orderly marſhal and diſpoſe their ſeveral diviſions into ſuch elegant Figures: how adapt thoſe figures to ſuch genuine and conſtant operations; and all this without the counſell, diſpoſition, and revinction of any other cauſe, but their own rude and giddy propenſity to motion, and the caſual reſult of their ceſſation from diſcord? That *Animals* have obtained ſuch exquiſite forms, reſpective to their ſeveral deſtinations; this we can refer to the artifice of their peculiar *Seminalities*, or the cunning of that *Formative virtue*, which lying ambuſcadoed in the ſpumous conſiſtence of their genital emiſſions, and being once awakened into Activity by the excitement of a convenient *Matrix*, or *Receptarie*, immediately deſignes this or that parcel of matter for ſuch or ſuch a part, another for another, and ſo ſpins it out into an uniform labyrinth of members, at laſt weaving all thoſe into an ingenious *Figure*, in all points reſembling the Protoplaſt or firſt genitor of that ſpecies; who received this *Seminal Tincture*, or faculty prolifical from the immediate bounty of its *Creator*. But that *Atoms*, as they are in their naked and inconiplex nature, ſhould be allowed to have a *Plaſtick* or *fabrefactive virtue* equal to that conferred upon the ſeeds of Animals; is a figment as worthy our ſpleen, as that ridiculous branch of the ſame root the *Autoctthonons*, or ſpontaneous eruption of our firſt Parents from the confermentation of *Water and Earth*, and the production of mankinde like that of Muſhroms: which whimſey is alſo entituled to *Epicurus*, by no meanet a tradition then that of *Cenſorinus* (*de Di. Nat. cap.* 2.) whoſe words, for the more clear and credible tranſmiſsion of the Fable, I thought it not altogether impertinent here to inſert. *Nec longe ſecus Epicurus credidit, limo calefactos uteros neſcio quos, radicibus terra cohærentes primum inorreviſſe, & infantibus ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura miniſtrante prabuiſſe; quos ita educatos, & adultos genus hominum propagaſſe.* To this we may adde (for a ſingle teſtimony is not ſtrong enough to oblige any man to beleive ſo unpardonable a dotage in a grave Philoſopher) the concur-

concurrent Auctorities of *Lactantius* (*lib.* 2. *cap.* 7.) *Plutarch* (5. *Placit.* 19.) *Diogenes Laertius* (*lib.* 2. *in vita Archelai Atheniensi.*) *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib.* 1.) and *Macrobius* (3. *Saturn.* 6.) Though, for my part, I conceive this phrenzie to have possessed many heads, upon whose skulls corruption had planted growing Perewikes of Moss, many hundreds of years before *Epicurus* his was warm; in regard many antient Nations, in particular the *Ægyptians* and *Phœnicians*, contending for the honor of seniority, have gloried in the title of *Autochthone*, and thought their Escutcheons sufficiently noble, if charged onely with this impress, *Terræ filii.* But I return from this my Excursion.

If the World, indeed, were as *Ovids* Chaos, *rudis indigestaque moles*, a deformed and promiscuous miscellanie, or masse of Heterogeneities, and the several parts of it variously blended together without either discrimination or order: then might the pretence of *Fortune* be more plausible. For should we take a man, who had been born and bred up to maturity of years in some obscure cavern of the earth, and never lookt abroad upon the World, nor heard of more then what immediately concerned his aliment and other natural necessities; on a sudden educe him from his dungeon, and shew him an Animal cut in peices, and all its dissimilar parts, as skin, muscles, fat, veins, arteries, nerves, tendons, ligaments, cartilages, bones, marrow, &c. laied together in a promiscuous heap: doubtless we could not quarrel at his incredulity, if he would not be perswaded, that any thing but *Chance* had a hand in that confusion. But should we instantly present him another Animal, feeding, walking, and performing all the comely functions of vitality; instruct him in the several uses and actions of all those parts, which he had formerly surveyed in the disorder of an heap; then kill that Animal also, and for his farther information, anatomzie its carcase; and exhibit to him the several parts, in all things respondent to the former: 'tis conjectural that we should finde, that the rudeness of his education would not so totally have extinguished the *Light of Nature* in him, as not to have left some spark, by the glimmering whereof he might discover some more noble *Principle* then Fortune, to have been the *Efficient* of that more then ingenious machine.

Now

Now we cannot but obſerve, that in the great engine of the univerſe, nothing is with leſs order, decency, beauty, uniformity, ſymmetry, conſtancy, in a word, with leſs wiſdom, either deſigned, or finiſhed; then in the ſmaller organ of an Animal, in the perfection of its integrality. And if ſo, how neer comes it to an abſolute contradiction, that we ſhould acknowledge ſome *noble and prudent Cauſe*, that moulded and compacted all thoſe different parts into one moſt elegant and accompliſht body, and exactly accommodated that body to the eaſie execution of its predeſtinate operations: and yet not acknowledg the ſame, in the ordination and conſtruction of the more admirable, becauſe more difficult fabrick of the Univerſe? I ſay, a *Contradiction*; for if the eaſier Artifice of an *Animal* be conceded too *hard*; aſſuredly the more difficult machination of the innumerably organ'd *World* muſt needs be granted *impoſſible*, to be wrought by the impotent and ignorant fingers of *Fortune*. *Quanto enim major operis moles, tanto erit ut ſapientiæ, ita & potentiæ major argumentum; non quod aliunde elaboratio minutorum corpuſculorum non commendet artificem: ſed quod in opere ingenti & ſymmetriam ſervare induſtrium, & materiam regere operoſum eſſe videatur.*

Article 6. The *Epicureans* grand Argument, of the poſſibility of the configuration of the Univerſe by a caſual and ſpontaneous diſpoſition of Atoms, from the frequent actuall production of an Inſect by the ſame means or principles; countermined by an Inverſion or Argument à *majori ad minus*.

Laſtly, as the Votaries of Fortune have argued *à minori ad majus*, thus; if the ſmaller machine of a *Hand-worm*, wherein the almoſt inviſible (without an engyſcope, or magnifying glaſs) exiguity of the whole frame, the multiplicity of organs, and the variety of reſpective functions aſſigned thereunto, may worthily contend, concerning elegance of compoſure, wtih the large captain of the watry regiments, the *Whale*, may be configured by *Chance*, or the caſual concourſe of convenient particles of the *Firſt matter*: why may not the groſſer movement of the *Univerſe* be alſo wrought by the like contingent ſegregation of diſagreeing, and convention of conſimilar Atoms; whoſe tumultuation and conflict growing from the antipathy of different *magnitude* and *Figure*, made the *Chaos*; and their working themſelves into peculiar orders, by the accidental conflux aud mutual coheſence of *Homogeneities*, made the *forme* of the *World*. So we, by

counter-demonstration, may argue *à majori ad minus*, thus; if Fortune had the power and skill to make the *World*, why can she not make the more rude and facile movement of a *Watch*? If Atoms could spontaneously range and combine themselves into the immense batlements of the World: why not also into the narrower structure of a *Castle*? If they met into the mighty bulwarks of an *Island*: why not into the thinner and more fragil rampiers of a *Fort*? If they could dispose themselves into wide campania's of *Herbs* and variegated *Flowers*: why not into a peice of *Landskip Tapestry*? All which require, as infinitely less of *Power*, so also of *Science*.

Should they endevour a subterfuge, by replying; that these are the *Effects* of *Art*, and not of *Nature*: we may prevent their evasion by rejoyning, that since they allow *Chance* to have an interest even in the operations of *Art*; why doe they not aswell make her the Founderess of a *City*, as of the ædifice of a spontaneous *Animal*, whose structure is more difficult? We are not backward to confess, what we lately supposed concerning the dissected and disordered parts of an Animal, that if the World were but a promiscuous heap of different materials, such as stone, Timber, Sand, Lime, Clay, Nailes, Tyles, &c. confusedly congested: then could not our choler swell to so high a tide of indignation against the arrogance of Fortune; nor should we be so well provided of arms to fight in defence of a divine contrivement. But since the building of the same is, by infinite transcendency, more durable, more distinct, more symmetrical, and more gorgeous in all its parts, then the most elaborate and magnificent Palace: since the *Heart* of a *Pismire* hath more of magisterial artifice, then the *Escburial*; the *proboscis* or trunk of a *Flea* more industry in its delicate and sinuous perforation, then all the costly *Aquaducts* of *Nero's Rome*, the *Arsenal* at *Venice*, or the two Spanish *Engines*, one for the traduction and elevation of Water, at *Toledo*, the other for the automatous coyning of money, at *Segovia*, both admired by a Person for the most part above admiration, Sr. *Kenelme Digby*; since the *breast* or laboratory of a *Bee* contains more anfractuous convolutions then the *Labyrinth* of *Dadalus*, and more Cellules then the famous monastery of

of S^t. *Lawrence*, in *Spain*, for bravery and amplitude of architecture reputed the eighth wonder of the World: and since the *skull* of a *Louse* hath more ventrieles or receptaries for the numerous swarms of Animal spirits, then the spatious *Amphitheatre* of Rome had seats for the spectators: in fine, since the meanest peice of Nature throwes disparagement and contempt upon the greatest masterpeice of Art; how can it be, that man, noble and ingenious man, should fall so much lower then his incircumspect Father *Adam*, as to confess the visible influence of *Prudence* in the *easier*, and yet, at the same time, deny any cause, but *Ignorance* to have been exercised in the *harder*; to admit the managery of an *Architect*, or knowing principle, in the structure of a *house*, and yet determine the more magnificent Creation of the *Universe* upon the blind disposal of *Fortune*?

Article 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inference and ours, prevented: and the invalidity of theirs, though their own hypothesis were conceded *in terminis*, declared, by an adequate similitude.

To conclude this unworthy vindication of the injured wisdom of our Maker, by leaving no possible objection unanswered, let us suppose that our opponents should recurre to their old starting hole, or salley port, the *Spontaneous motion of Atoms*, and urge, that if the materials of a house, or other artificial structure, were endowed with an innate propensity to motion, as the materials of the World were; then might they also, without the direction of any external Agent, onely by reciprocal convention, complication and revinction, acquire setled and orderly situations, and so dispose themselves into a regular Fabrick: but since they are devoid of all domestick Activity, the disparity betwixt the operations of chance, and those of Art, is so great, that an argument drawn from the impossibility of a performance by one, is not conclusive against the possibility of an atcheivement by the other. And when we have supposed this retort, let us also suppose what they would have, *viz.* that the materials of a house were radically impregnated with a perpetual tendency to motion; and that, by the drift of this internal activity, they should from different quarters meet together in one heap, there croud, compress, express, impell, repell, detrude, elevate, circumgyrate, fix each other, and at last by reciprocal combination acquiesce: yet can it never be supposed, by a sober imagination, that the result of all this hurly

burly betwixt those unequal parts, and the peace ensuing upon the casual acquisition of situations proper and convenient to each, would be a well ordered ædifice; nay any thing half so neer allied to architecture as a ruine.

I conceive the wit of *Balbus* wound up to a very happy strain, when disputing against *Velleius* (one that blush't not to weare the infamous badge of *Epicurus*) concerning this monstrous figment of the worlds Projection from the dissolution of the Chaos, and a fortuitous concursion of the universal matter; he invented this apposite *similitude*: *Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur idem non putet, si innumerabiles, unius & viginti formæ literarum vel aureæ, vel quales-libet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere Fortuna.* Upon which we may briefly thus descant; if that congruous series of letters, which is necessary to the lecture of one page, line, or word, can never result from a careless congestion of prints; but must be the setled effect of great industry and diligence in the *Compositor*: undoubtedly, with no less violence to reason, can any man opinion, that the innumerable parts of the World, that observe a far more distinct and elegant order then the characters of any Typographer disposed into words, lines, pages, sheets, should attain to that admirable Form, which they now hold; by a meer fortuitous assembly; and not by the certain and predestinate ordination of some *supremely-intelligent Cause.*

Article 8. The conclusion of this section; or, the æquipondium of the precedent reasons, if perpended in the mass and conjunctively, to the most perfect demonstration.

These reasons, though not woven into that strict method, which is required to fulfill the web of perfect demonstrations; doe yet seem strong enough in their single inferences undeniably to conclude the *Creation of the Universe out of no præexistence, by the sole and immediate Fiat of the same Essence*, and if judiciously twisted together into one *Syndrome*, or complex Argument, must oblige as firmly; since they clearly evince the first *Article* of the *Christians Creed*, as an uncontrollable verity, which none, but such degenerate miscreants, in whom the *Light of Nature* is wholly extinct, or such as are desperatly resolved to shut the eye of

of their minde againſt the ſplendor of that infallible *Criterion*, can longer doubt of. And therefore, having determined neither to ſcandal the intellectuals of my Reader, either by indubitating his facile perception of the force of thoſe proofs already urged, or multiplying others in order to the illuſtration of that truth, to which he hath formerly ſubmitted his plenary aſſent; nor unfruitfully to ſpend that time and paper, which I have devoted to the explanation and ratification of other neceſſary points, on a work of ſupererogation: I ſhall onely fringe this exerciſe with that pertinent and emphatical paſſage of *Lactantius* (*De Opif. Dei cap. 6.*) *Tanta ergo qui videat & talia, poteſt exiſtimare nulla effecta eſſe conſilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina; ſed ex Atomis ſubtilibus, exiguis concreta eſſe tanta miracula? nonne prodigio ſimile eſt, aut natum eſſe hominem qui hac diceret, ut Leucippum; aut extitiſſe qui crederet, ut Democritum, qui auditor ejus fuit; vel Epicurum, in quem vanitas omnis de Leucippi fonte profluxit?* and ſo proceed to the ſatisfaction of two collateral *Scruples*.

Sect. IV.

Scruple 1.

Article 1. That Antique abſurd expoſtulation, what *Inſtruments Auxiliants*, *materials* preTHe Curioſity of ſome, (whether more *inſolent* or *vain*, is hard to determine,) hath been ſo audacious, as to adventure upon this *Quere*; *If God made the world, pray what inſtruments, tools, mechanick engines, what aſſiſtants did he make uſe of in the work?*

diſpoſd, God made uſe of, in his act of Fabrication of the Univerſe, copiouſly ſatisfied: and the *energie* of the divine *will* commonſtrated ſuperior to the indigence of either.

The Satisfaction.

This is no green impiety (unleſs it hath lately budded forth again amongſt thoſe Human-devils, the *Ranters*; the report of whoſe prodigious blaſphemies hath ſometimes tranſported me to a hatred, at leaſt a contempt of my ſelf, for being in the ſame rank of Creatures; and made me wiſh for a ſecond deluge) but almoſt half as old as Time, and may be traced as high as the Epoche of the Grecian learning; witneſs thoſe many ſecret convulſions of it by *Plato* (both in his *Parmenides* and *Timæus*) while he frequently affirmes the *divine Nature* to be *Inorganical*, and the immediate operations of the *univerſal cauſe* to be above the neceſſity of *Corporeal means*: witneſs alſo *Cicero* (moſt of whoſe ſtreams came out of the Grecian fountain) who (*in* 1. *De Nat. Deor.*) introducing the Atheiſt, *Vellejus* diſputing againſt *Plato* and the *Stoicks*, who held the divine eſſence to be the Author of the Univerſe; propoſeth the ſcruple at large, in theſe Words: *Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit veſter Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua conſtrui à Deo atque ædificari mundum facit? qua molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui miniſtri tanti muneris fuerunt? &c.* That boldneſs is the daughter of ignorance, is herein plainly verified; for had theſe unhappy Pagans underſtood any thing of the majeſtick eſſence of divinity, or but apprehended the vaſt diſparity between the efficiency of the *Higheſt*, and that of all other *Subordinate cauſes*; tis more then probable, they had not been ſo ſawcy with his imperial Attribute, *Omnipotence*, nor run into that common miſtake of fleſh and bloud, of *meaſuring the ways of God by the ways of man*. True tis, that man hath need of inſtruments to the performance of any peice of Art, nor can the Geometrician draw his lines without a rule, or deſcribe a circle without the help of his compaſs; the Carpenter work without his Axe, Saw, and other tools; the Smith without his fire, hammer, anvill, &c. all which the wit of man, ſharpned by neceſſity, hath invented to compenſate the inſufficiency of his naked hands, made by nature either too ſoft, too weak, or too obtuſe for thoſe difficult uſes:

uſes: But yet what can impede our aſſurance of the eternal exiſtence of a more *Noble Efficient*; whoſe *Will* is infinite *Power*, and that *Power* infinite *Activity*; whoſe ſingle *Let it be done*, is both *Cauſe* and *Means*; and whoſe ſimple act of *Volition* not onely the *Efficient*, but alſo the *Inſtrument*? Do not we obſerve (that I may extract an *Argument* from the evidence of *ſenſe*) how, in the twinckling of a lovers eye, that comely Arch of colours, the *Rain-bow*, is painted on the clouds; and yet without either hand, compaſs, or pencill? doe we not behold whole mountains of ponderous *Clouds* piled one upon another; and yet neither veſſels to lave up, nor engines to ſuſtain that ſea of water? And cannot theſe familiar obſervations inſtruct us with more knowledge, then to doubt the fabrication of the world without *corporeal organs*? Why is our reaſon ſo immodeſt, as to inquire into the ability of the *Firſt cauſe*; when alas! it is not large enough to comprehend the efficacy of the weakeſt *Secondary*? if the meaneſt and moſt ordinary effect of Nature imports ſo much ſtupendious induſtry, as tranſcends the narrow capacity of man; what audacious ignorance is it in him, to queſtion the energie of that *Principle*, that made Nature her ſelf, and preſcribed her rules to act by: from which ſhe cannot vary, without a miraculous diſpenſation? We are willing forſooth, to profeſs, that we cannot underſtand by what artifice the delicate body of a *Piſmire* is configurated, animated, and impowered for the noble actions of *ſenſe* and *voluntary motion*, nay (for ought we know to the contrary) for that more noble and elaborate office of *diſcourſe* alſo: and yet, when we come to contemplate the more magnificent *form* of the *Univerſe*, ſhall we degenerate into ſuch impertinent Ideots, as to debate the *Mathematick energie* of its *Creator*, and demand how he could operate without *Engines* to tranſport, adfer, and winde up the materials, with ſcaffolds to advance the roof, or ſervants to aſſiſt in ſeveral offices requiſite? Aſſuredly, as the frame of that ſlender Animal doth confeſs a certain *Faculty*, by which it was modelled, delineated, and compacted; though the reaſon and manner of its contexture remain in the dark to us: ſo alſo doth the huge machine of this viſible World proclaim a certain *Energetical principle*, of infinitly

finitly more potency and perfection, by which it was compoſed; though the manner and way of its compoſure be too abſtruſe and ſublime for the diſcernment of our weak-ſighted intellectuals. Now, whether you ſhall denominate that *Energy*, a *Power divine*, or *God*; it is indifferent: but indiſpenſably neceſſary, that you acknowledge it to be ſo great, as by incomputable intervals to exceed the comprehenſion of the minde of man; nor is it ſafe for us to attempt the commenſuration of it by the unequal module, or ſcale of *particular finite Cauſes*, ſince even from theſe our reaſon ſtands ſo remote, as to be able at moſt onely to conjecture their dimenſions. Upon this conſideration, if a *Pilot*, while he onely ſits in the ſteerage and hands the helme, doth direct the ſhip in its courſe, by a far more excellent induſtry, then all the rude officers inſervient thereunto, that ſtretch their tougher ſinewes to hoiſe and tack about her ſayls, and toyle their tawny bodies in other inferior labours: if a *Prince*, who ſits calmely in his throne, doth by a ſingle nod of his ſceptre awe millions of his ſubjects to obedience, and by the magick of a ſmile or frown conjure whole nations into joy or terror; if he, I ſay, doth govern his people, by a more myſterious and noble influence, then all his ſubordinate miniſters of ſtate, with all their tumultuous pains and travell, either in the tranſmiſſion, or execution of his mandates: if an *Architect*, or maſter-builder, who in his cloſet onely draws the plat-form, and deſignes the figure of the ſtructure; doth by his meer deſignation, operate more exquiſitely, and by a more excellent artifice contribute to the perfection of the work, then all the ſwarm of buſtling mechanicks imployd in ſquaring, or placing the materials: why ſhould we not allow that mighty *Pilot*, *Prince*, and *Architect of the World* to be empowerd with a certain kind of *Efficacy* ſo eminent, that whatever can be thought moſt abſolute and puiſſant in all other natures, muſt be infinitely inferior to it? And therefore when we, who have learned our leſſon outof the ſacred leaves of *Moſes*, ſay that he made the univerſe *ſolo nutu, atque ſimplici volitione*, by one ſimple and entire act of his *Will*, expreſt in that word, *Fiat*; we ſpeak all that can be underſtood by us of that miracle.

As for the laſt part of the Atheiſts indecent expoſtulation; *viz.*

what

What coadjutors or miniſters had God to attend him, and what materials præexiſtent and prepared to conform to his diſpoſure? that may be ſoon reſolved, by offering that *ſupereminence*, whereby he is, by infinite exceſſes, above all other *Efficients*. For what were the *Prerogative* of *Divinity*, if it were ſubject to the want of the ſame *means*, or cooperating *Cauſes*, with us deſpicable and impotent men? To conclude, it will not onely ſuppreſs all dangerous *Curioſities* of this kind, but alſo highly commend our *judgments*; that we draw a large line of diſtinction betwixt the *Almightineſs* of the *Creator*, and the *reſtrained activity*, or rather pure *imbecillity* of the *Creature*; aſcribe to him a *ſuperlative and pancratical energie*, or *virtue paramount*; and on our devout knees proclaim him more able to *create*, then *want* either *miniſters*, or *matter*, whereby, whereon to accompliſh his *Will*.

Scruple 2.

The other profane *Scruple* objected by the Atheiſt, is this; *Cur Deus tamdiu à fabricatione mundi abſtinuerit?* If God were elder then Time, and the world made in the beginning of time; why did he ſo long ſuſpend the Fabrication of it?

Article 2: A ſecond immodeſt interrogation, wherefore God ſo long deferred the creation, reſolved: with a detection of the unreaſonableneſs of undecent curioſity.

The Reſponſe.

This is alſo a poyſon ſpit from the accurſed jaws of that black Viper, *Velleius*, againſt the *Stoicks* (*apud Ciceron. 1. de nat. Deor.*) in this ſquallid ſtream; *iſto igitur tam immenſo ſpatio, quæro, cur Pronœa veſtra* (ſo according to their own phraſe he calls that *Minde*, or *ſupreme Intelligence*, to whom that ſober ſect of Philoſophers juſtly aſcribed the origination of all things except the *material Principle*, which they erroneouſly affirmed to have been the *Aſhes*, or cynders of a former World, whoſe production alſo they conceived to have been, like that fabulous one of the Phœnix, out of the urne of its predeceſſor) *ceſſaverit? laborémne fugiebat?* and not lately wiped clean off, and its contagious venome cured by the generous antidote of *Euſebius*, who

(*in* 1. *de prap. Evang.* 1.) moſt expreſly, amply, and judiciouſly oppoſed it. However, leſt this poyſon ferment afreſh, and again exulcerate the impure *Libertines* of this Age (not more for its extraordinary *Calamities*, then unpattern'd *Impieties*, as well the wonder, as grief of our poſterity) and ſince it cannot but be thought moſt pertinent to my preſent ſcope: I ſhall endevour the total extinction of it, by applying a ſmart *Alexitterion* of reaſon.

From an *Agent infinite in Wiſdome, Power, and Liberty*, ſuch as we muſt allow *God* to be, no account either of *Motive*, *Means*, or *Time*, ought to be required. It was, according to their meaſure of time, about ſix thouſand years from the nativity of the Univerſe, when the unhappy diſciples of *Epicurus* diſſeminated this uncivil interrogation: but had it been created many myriads of myriads of thouſands ſooner then it was, tis open to conjecture, that they would have inſiſted on the ſame ſawcy demand; ſince eternity compared to more myriads of years, then all the figures of Arithmetick can amount to the computation of, muſt yet import a vaſt tract or flux of *Time* (for other idiome to expreſs this notion, I could not either recognize, or excogitate) below the foot of that accompt; and that precedent ſpace might have afforded room enough for the intruſion of the ſame frivolous quære. And therefore it becomes us, either not to enquire, why the world was produced, rather then not produced; or allowing its production, to eſteem it all one, whether it were produced then, before, or after, in this ſo great a latitude of Eternity. For the ſame queſtion now propoſed, why God did not determine in himſelf to create the World, ten millions of years ſooner then he did; may alſo be revived hereafter, concerning the times of ours, if another rand of ten millions more ſhould be unravelled. From whence this modeſt and truly humane leſſon fairly infers it ſelf; that it is oraculous in the greateſt wiſdome to ſay, *God Created the World in that article of eternity* (we may now call it *Time*) *which ſeemed moſt opportune to his Wiſdom*. For that he had ſome important reaſons ſo long to deferr the creation, and then onely to contrive and finiſh it, when he did; though thoſe reaſons be cryptick and ignote to us: we may more then con-

conjecture, from the consideration of his inexhaustible and ever moving abyss of his *Prudence*, which is the rule to all other his actions. And truely, if *Princes* ground many of their designes upon profound reasons of State, the knowledge whereof is never diffused among their subjects, but lockt up in the cabinet of their own heart: why may not *God*, who is all *Counsel* and *Prudence*, be afforded the prerogative of having some weighty respects, that moved him to create the World, then when he did, rather then either sooner or later? Which respects, for ought we can explore, is *Mercy* in him to conceal from us: sure I am, tis a pride not much beneath, if not equal to that of *Lucifer*, in us to dare to enquire. Tis a confest truth, that no man can know the thoughts of another, who is constant to his resolve to reserve them sealed up within his own breast; and can any man be so incurably overrun with the itch of vanity, when he despaires of pretending certainly to divine the cogitations of his familiar friend, whose indinations he hath so frequently read in the book of his conversation: yet to arrogate to himself an ability of searching into the abscondite counsels of him, whom neither *Minde* nor *Sense* can touch? Wherefore tis our duty to reclaim our wild curiosities, to set bounds to our inquisitions, and gratefully sate our boulimie of science with this wholsome morsel; that from hence, that the World was once created, we may safely inferre, that the *Creator* was pleased to declare himself so *Potent*, that no impediment could intervene betwixt his eternal decree, and the opportune execution thereof: so *Free*, as to be above the impulsion or constraint of any necessity: so *Wise*, as to prevent all temerity and colluſion of Fortune: so *Good*, that the prescience of mans future ingratitude, and so the infertility of his masterpeice, could not dehort him from fulfilling his purpose of conferring that inestimable blessing of *Existence* both upon him, and all things else for his sake.

As for the last clause of this foolish demand, *An vigilarit tanto æternitatis spatio, an verò dormierit mundi opifex*? Whether *God* continued *vigilant*, or *dormant* from eternity, untill he set about the fabrick of this vast All? This includes a manifest *incongruity*, and speaks a *contradiction* loud enough to answer

and refute it self. For those two terms, *Sleep* and *Divinity*, stand at open defiance, and placed in one notion reciprocally deny each other; the one importing an *Affection* of a *Body*, or the effect of the Concidence, or Angustation of the ventricles of the brain, and slender conduits of the nerves in an Animal, caused either by a deficiency, or quiet of the spirits inservient to the Animal Faculties, and causing a temporary and periodical cessation from the offices of sense and Arbitrary motion: the other expressing an *Eternal simple Essence*, neither oppresst with corporeity, nor (therefore) subject to defatigation upon any exolution or wast of spirits; and consequently not capable of sleep. However, to manifest the extreme stupidity of their reply; *viz. that if he were perpetually awake, yet we must grant him to have been constantly idle*, before he began his work of Creation: I shall vouchsafe them that judicious rejoynder of many *Fathers* (whose studies were also not rarely infested with these vermine) that in all that precedent tract of eternity (mortality will excuse the necessary soleciſme) he was fully imployed *in the most blissful contemplation of himself*. Which is an operation most easie, most quiet, most pleasant; as all Philosophers, who ever have, by the steps of abstracted meditation, advanced their minds so high as to ken that perfection of beatitude, have observed.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Why God Created the World.

Sect. I.

THat *every Action presupposeth an end, or scope*; is Canonical: and hence is it customary amongst men, by so much the more hardly to beleive that such or such a considerable Action was done by such or such a Person; by how much the less either of probable *Pleasure*, or *Emolument* may appear to have invited him to that enterprise. Nor was *Velleius* a stranger to this rule; for fighting the unjust quarrel of that usurpress, Fortune, and having at first invaded *Providence Divine* with direct and down-right blowes, unsuccesfully: he at last contrives to wound it with oblique thrusts, and attempts to stab the opinion of the Worlds Creation by God, by striking at the End, or more plainly by cutting off all possibility of either *Pleasure* or *Profit* to accrew to him thereby. And in pursuance of this stratagem, he endevours to prove (1.) *Conditum non fuisse mundum Dei causa*; that the World was not created for Gods sake, (*i.e.*) that he is no more concerned in the construction of it, then if it had never been altered from its Chaos: (2) *neque hominum gratia*, nor for the behoof of man, (*i. e.*) that man hath no juster plea to the Royalty of the World, then the meanest Animal; nor did Nature look with a more amorous and indulgent aspect upon him, then upon any other of her productions.

Article 1: The improbability of the worlds creation by God, insinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible *Motive, scope* or *final cause*.

Article 2. Their first Argument, that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either *emolument*, or *delectation*, from the Universe.

The *First* position he essays to illustrate and inferre by a *Socratical* way of argumentation, or by circumventing our judgements with a chain of *Interogatories*, all whose links are dependent each upon other, though by a connexion so subtile, as to be imperceptible to the incircumspect; the *Abstract* whereof, as taken by *Cicero* (1. *De Natur. Deorum*) lies in these words. *Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus, mundum signis & luminibus, tanquam Ædilis, ornare? Si ut Deus melius habitaret; antea, videlicet tempore infinito, in tenebris, tanquam in angustio habitaverat? post autem; varietaténe eum delectari putamus, qua Cœlum & Terras exornatas videmus? quæ ista potest esse oblectatio Deo, quæ si esset, non ea tamdiu carere potuisset?* « What politique respect put God upon the servile office « of an Ædile? What motive prevailed with him to trim the « Universe with gawdy Asterisms, and imbellish the azure roof « thereof with variety of refulgent studs? if to better his habitati- « on; tis a signe that forever before he was but ill accommodated « with a dark and narrow mansion: But afterwards, can we « conceive that he entertained and solaced himself with that va- « riety of beauteous forms, wherewith we observe both stories « of this great Palace to be adorned? What delight is that, « wherewith divinity can be affected? if any such there be, why « would he so long deny himself the fruition of it?

Nor did *Velleius* want a second to joyne with him in this bloudy design for the assassination of that sacred Truth, *That God made the World chiefly for his own Glory*; for that witty villain *Lucretius* (and the finest wits, if not maturely pruned and kept under by the severe hand of Prudence, are the rankest Plants and most apt to run up to the highest impieties) hath digested the challenge into verse, thus:

Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur,
Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit ægri,
Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degerat ævum,
Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?

An

An, credo, in tenebris vita, ac mœrore jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo? &c. in lib. 5.

After so long Content, what new delight
Could th'happy Gods to this great change invite?
To affect Innovation, doth confess
The present state obnoxious to distress.
He only can t'enjoy new things desire,
Whom the deficience of the old doth tire.
What therefore could Divinity perswade,
To leave his antient quiet, for a trade
Of Architecture? Can I think, till then
Him cloysterd in a dark and narrow Den? &c.

The Refutation.

Article 3. The satisfactory refutation thereof; and *Gods glory* manifested to have been his prime and principal end.

Tis an Apophthegme fathered (and that not unjustly) upon *Epicurus*; *Facere sapientem omnia sui caussa*, that a wiseman in all his actions doth principally regard himself. And could not this learn his Scholars more discretion, then to doubt, whether or no *God* the *Elixir of wisdome*, in this weighty operation had an eye upon himself, or reflected upon his own concernment? The Word, *God*, to a metaphysical consideration, contains reasons more then enough to decide this idle controvertie, excited only by a predominion of *sensuality*. For when there was nothing existent besides himself; tis plain, that he could gratifie nothing besides himself: and as he not only derived the power of operating from himself alone, but also was the *exemplar* to himself; so also must he be the principal *End* of his operation. The *End* I say, *non utilitatis*; as if his *Essence* were capable of *melioration*, his *Beatitude* so remiss, as to admit of *Augmentation*, his *Condition* so imperfect, as to be improved by *Alteration*: *sed gloriæ*, which as he could not want, so was there no reason why he should want. Such was the freedom of his Will, that no necessity could constrain him to the production of any thing; such the Bounty, that none could restrain him from the voluntary profusion of his goodness. When twas indifferent to him, or to constitute a World, or to continue alone; he yet was pleased to follow the propensity of his own infinity,

infinity Benignity, and to create: insomuch as he judged it better that there should be other natures beside his own, to which he might impart the overflowings of his goodness; then not. *Better*, I say, not for *himself*; for as the perpetual *Emanation* or *diffusion* of his *Goodness* upon the creature, since time (the *Image of eternity*, as *Plato* (in *Timæo*) describes it) began, hath not diminished: so could not the *Concentration*, or *Confinement* of it to the orb of his own essence, have lessened his *Felicity*; which hath *Plenitude* and *Constancy* for its supporters, and is therefore raised above the imperfections of *Access* or *Change*. And upon this perswasion (I cannot forget to speak after the manner of men) he vouchsafed to constitute all other natures that are besides his own; and more especially Man: not that he might receive any emolument from them, since himself is all goodness, and by consequence all glory; but that, conferring respective endowments upon them, he might have convenient subjects, whereon to exercise his immense liberality and make known his magnificence. That since the creation he expects from man the retribution of *Reverence*, *Adoration*, and *Obedience*; ariseth not *ex indigentia*, from any need he stands in of, or benefit that redounds to him by the unfruitfull homage of man: but, *ne homines sint erga ipsum ingrati*, from his own free *Love* to prevent mans being hurried into that misery of *Ingratitude*. I say, *Misery* of *Ingratitude*; for that forlorn hope of hell having once taken possession of the minde of man, instantly brings in a whole host of perturbations, subverts its government, destroys its tranquillity, and so layes it open to the devastation of *Infelicity*.

And whereas they demand, *Why God, if he take any delight in these experiments of his wisedome, Power, and munificence, would so long endure the privation, or rather defect of that delight?* The solution is obvious, that this kinde of *delectation* is no more then *Accidentary* to him, and can adfer infinitely less of addition to that fulness of *Beatitude*, formally radicated in his *Essence*; then one smal drop of water superaffused to the immensity of a million of Oceans. For *sibi sufficientissimus*, All to himself, is his peculiar Motto; since he hath the source of all that's *Amiable* and *Delectable*, arising from, and perpetually flowing

flowing round his own most perfect nature, nor can he be affected with the unequal oblation of humane *Doxologie*, otherwise then by reflecting upon his own *Goodness*, which freely ordained, formed, and disposed man to that honourable and beatifical duety: and therefore that sentence of the School Divine, *Quicquid agit prater seipsum, ad alterius commodum spectat*, deserves our gratefull assent; for all his *Extrinsecall* or *Emanative* operations look *directly* upon the benefit of that Creature, whom he hath adopted to be the object of his Love, which is Man; *obliquely* upon the convenience or accommodation of all other Creatures, necessary or adjuvant to the well being of that Favorite; and by *reflexion*, upon his own munificence. And hence is it manifest, that he adorned the Universe with asterisms, and beautified the heavens with radiant lamps; not that he might better his own habitation, which is impossible, he being a mansion to himself, and his eternal condition being extreme felicity: but provide a more commodious place of residence for men, for whose sake principally (after that of his own Glory) he intended the Creation, He, doubtless, could want the illumination of neither Sun, nor Moon, whose dwelling is in light inaccessible; nor be enriched by the faint splendor of the Stars, whose glory is so refulgent, that we hyperbolize the lustre of the Meridian Sun, when we define it to be the shadow of its Creator; and since those shining orbs are but pale tapours kindled at his more splendid abyss of light, how infinitely more lucent must his essence be, who is described by some to be *Supersubstantialis Lux?* (*Athanas Kircher in metaphysic. Lucis & umbra, Epichiremate* 5.) Nor can we say less of that admirable *variety of forms*, wherewith we observe both stories of the World to be adorned; for if they appear so full of *Elegance* and *beauty*; how incomparably more fair and amiable must their *Maker* be, who is the *Soul* of *Pulchritude*, and by the Analogy which they hold to the comely ideas in his intellect, all things are determined to perfection? For that mighty *Cause*, which can give being to so many various perfections, must of necessity possess all those perfections, *modo eminentiori*, in a transcendent manner. Wherefore the excellencies of his own nature did, before he was pleased to create others, so amply suffice to the

Accompletion of his beatitude; that they now at this day wholly ſuffice to the ſame; nor is he capable of having his Felicity encreaſed by the contributions of any thing without himſelf. And ſince all things created, are nought but certain *Emiſſions*, or as it were *deradiations*, which he pleaſed to diffuſe from himſelf; tis perſpicuous, that before that *Diffuſion* he comprehended all natures in his own, as in their *Fountain*, and therefore could not have his being meliorated by their production; as alſo, that he may at pleaſure, adnihilate all again, with no more detriment to his glory, then the Sun can want thoſe beams, which yeſterday it emitted upon my hand.

Sect. II.

Neque Hominum gratiâ.

Article 1. Their ſecond Argument; that God had no eſpecial regard to the benefit of *Man*: and the

THis *ſecond Poſition* he likewiſe inſinuates, by the ſame impoſture of enſnaring the minde in a complex ſeries of *Queſtions*, after this manner; « If all things were conſtituted by God « for the ſake of *Man* onely, as you affirme, then either for the « peculiar intereſt of *Wiſe men* or *Fools*? if for the ſole behoof « of *Wiſe men*; then a far leſs proviſion might have ſerved « the turn: for no age could ever glory in the production of ma« ny ſuch at once; and if all that ever were, or ſhall be, met toge« ther into one colonie, a very ſmal Iſland might be both large and « rich enough to accommodate them with neceſſaries: and ſo the « greateſt part of the creation muſt be confeſt ſuperfluous, as to « the principal deſtination thereof? But if for *Fools* only; then « you entangle your ſelves in a two fold *Incongruity*. *Firſt*, you « entrench upon the *Juſtice* of the Creator, ſince thereby you im« plicitely confeſs, that he was partial in conferring ſo great a be« nefit upon thoſe, who muſt ſo ill deſerve, as not to know right« ly how to uſe it: *Secondly*, you infringe his *Providence*, by « making him not to have had a foreſight of the unfruitfulneſs of « his chief deſign, which muſt miſcarry and be quite loſt in a con« trary

« trary event: Fools being without any diſpute, moſt miſerable « in that they are Fools; for what can be reputed a more abſo- « lute miſery, then Fatuity? And if for the conjunctive intereſt, « or promiſcuous concernment of both; then do you offer vio- « lence to the goodneſs of the Architect; in regard, that during « life there unavoidably occur ſo many bitter diſcommodities, « that wiſe men cannot ſweeten them with the compenſation of « Commodities: and Fools neither avoid them as they approach, « nor endure them when they come, &c.

Nor was *Velleius* ſingular in this error; for *Lactantius* (*Lib.* 7. *cap.* 5.) hath accuſed *Epicurus* alſo of words to the ſame effect; which according to the record of his indictment run thus: *Quid enim Deo cultus hominis confert beato, & nulla re indigenti? vel ſi tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipſius cauſâ mundum fabricaret, ut inſtrueret eum ſapientia, ut dominum viventium faceret, eúmque diligeret tanquam filium; cur mortalem fragilemque conſtituit? cur omnibus malis, quem diligebat, objecit? Cum oporteret & beatum eſſe hominem, tanquam conjunctum & proximum Deo; & perpetuum, ſicut eſt ipſe, ad quem colendum & contemplandum figuratus eſt.* What advantage can the barren veneration of man yeeld to God, who is perfectly happy, and knows no indigency? or, if he deigned to beſtow ſo high honour upon man, as to create the whole world for his uſe, to endue him with wiſdome, to inaugurate him Lord royall of all living creatures, and love him with as much affection and indulgence as a Son; why did he yet make him mortal, and ſo fatally ſubject to fragility? why expoſe him whom he adopted to a filial love, to the invaſion of all kinds of evill? when on the contrary, in all reaſon, man alſo ought to have been both compleatly happy, as being allied to God, by a very neer affinity; and immortal as God himſelf, to the worſhip and contemplation of whom he was configurated.

Lucretius alſo would not be exempted from acting a part in this tragical ſcene; but ſcorning to come behind the moſt adventurous Bravo, that had bid defiance to Divinity, or be outdone by any in the feats of Atheiſme: he not only ſucks all the venome in the former Arguments, but adds much of his own alſo, and

Fortification thereof by 8 reaſons.

and distills it together through his quill into 8 *reasons.*

1. That God reaps no benefit by the fealty and doxologies of man: *Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, ut nostra quidquam causa gerere aggrederentur?*

2. That in case man had never had existence, it could not have been unpleasant not to have been at all. *Qui nunqam blandum vitæ gustavit amorem, nec fuit in numero; quid obest non esse beatum?* What never knew existence, can nere know the want of bliss: Nothing can feel no woe.

3. That the greatest moity of the Earth is wholly barren and unprofitable to man.

Principio, quantum Cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, sylvæque ferarum
Possedêre: tenent rupes, vastæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet oras;
Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor,
Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert, &c.

4. That even from those narrow cantons of the earth, which are inhabited, men reap no other harvest, but what themselves have sown, with unceſſant toyle; nor doe they find any ground fruitfull, but what they have manured with their own industry, and enriched with the salt dew of their own laborious brows:

Quod supereſt arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat, &c.

5. That even those fruits of the earth, which they have so dearly earned, with the profusion of so many showers of sweat, frequently miscarry, and become abortive; the hopes of the husband-man being often frustrated by the unexpected intervention of cross seasons, Ustilagos or Blites, Mildewes, Sulphureous Meteors, late Frosts, high Winds, &c.

6. That if neither the world, nor men, had ever been existent; their Ideas had never falne under the conception of the divine intellect.

7. That

7 That poor, weak, and fragil man is obnoxious to deſtruction by a thouſand divers contingencies; the ravenous appetite of wild Beaſts, the deleterious punctures of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contuſion of Thunderbolts, the eruption of Earth-quakes, the arſenical eructations of Minerals, the epidemick contagion of Peſtilential Diſeaſes, kindled either by Anomalous ſeaſons, Tempeſts, or malignant impreſſions in the aer; the invaſion of inteſtine infirmities, upon the civil war often breaking out between the Heterogeneities of his bloud, or a mutiny of his Elements; and though he eſcape all theſe, yet doth the Palſie hand of Time ſoon ſhake down his ounce of ſand, and then turn him over to be devoured by oblivion.

8. *Tum porro puer, ut ſævis projectus ab undis*
Navita, nudus humi jacet infans, indigus omni
Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit,
Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum 'ſt,
Quoi tantum in vita reſtet tranſire malorum. &c.

That Nature ſeems more a ſtep-mother to man, then any other Animal; having caſt him into the world naked, feeble, unarmed, unprovided for in all but want, and by his early tears portending that deluge of calamities, which in caſe he be ſo miſerable to ſurvive his birth, muſt drown all the comforts of his life, and waſh him into earth again after a ſhort flight of time; in brief, ſhe expoſeth him, as a baſtard, to be taken up and nurſed by the charity of that giddy headed goſſip, Fortune: who hath no ſooner ſmiled him into ſtrength enough to ſuffer, but ſhe contracts her browes, diſinherits and abandons the deſolate wretch to all the hardſhip and afflictions, that the witty malice of Fate (to whom our tortures are pleaſures, and the hoarſe groans of the rack ſound perfect melody) can either invent or inflict.

And thus have we heard, in Summary, the plea of thoſe three eminent Levellers, who endevoured to ſupplant man of his birthright, to take away the prerogative of his nature, and reduce him to no greater a ſhare in the favour of his Maker, then the meaneſt

of his fellow Animals. It comes now to our turn to examine whether their Arguments are ſtrong enough to carry the Cauſe.

The Refutation.

Article 2. The total redargution thereof by a commonſtrãce that the benefit and felicity of man, was Gods ſecondary end: and the impoſſibility of ſatisfaction to the firſt end, by any creature but man, concluded, from his

1. *Rationality.*

That God, in his atcheivem of the Univerſe, had a principal regard to *Man*, above all other the works of his hands; and conſidered him, *tanquam finem interjectum*, as the *Mediate* or *Secondary End*, his own *Glory* being the *Immediate* or *Primary*, or, more plainly, the end of that end: is clearly deduceable even from this; *that man only among that infinite variety of natures liſted in the inventory of the Creation, is conſtituted in a capacity to ſatisfie that firſt end; his intellectuals, or cogitative eſſence being, by a genial verticity, or ſpontaneous propenſion, qualified to admire, in admiration to ſpeculate, in ſpeculation to acknowledge, in acknowledgement to laud the Goodneſs, Wiſdome, and Power of the Worlds Creator*; while the ignoble Faculties of all other Animals are terminated in the inferior offices of ſenſe, nor ever attain above the inconſiderate operations of their brutal appetites. And this one reaſon, if duely perpended, will be found of weight enough to counterpoize all thoſe empty frothy ſophiſms alleaged to the contrary: nor can any æquitable conſideration (if I rightly underſtand its value) allow it to be much leſs then *Apodictical*. I ſay if duely perpended: for we are not raſhly to underſtand this peculiar *Adæquation* or Præeminence of man to conſiſt in the bare *Uprightneſs of his Figure*, which accommodates him *Cœlum intueri, & erectos ad ſidera tollere vultus*. For, according to the vulgar acceptation of *Erectneſs*, and as it is conſidered to be a poſition oppoſite to *Proneneſs*, or the horizontal ſituation of the *Spina dorſi*, or rack bones in Animals progredient with their bellies toward the earth: man hath no reaſon to boaſt a ſingularity therein. Since many other Animals, as the *Penguin*, a kind of water fowle frequent upon the ſtraights of Magellan; the devout inſect of Province, or *Pregadio*, the praying Graſhopper, ſo called becauſe for the moſt part found in an upright poſture anſwerable to that of man, when his hands

are elevated at his devotions; the *Bitour*, which my ſelf hath ſometimes obſerved ſtanding upright as an arrow ſalne perpendicular, and his eyes ſo advanced, as to ſhoot their viſual beams point blank at the zenith, or vertical point of heaven; all *Plane Fiſhes*, that have the apophyſes or proceſſes of their ſpine carried laterally, or made like the teeth of a Comb, as the *Thornback*, *Plaice*, *Flounder*, *Soles*, &c. and their eyes placed in the upper ſide of their head, and ſo pointing directly upward; and diverſe others attaining an erectneſs beyond his, and by reaſon of the ſublimimity of their faces taking a far larger proſpect of the firmament. For man cannot look ſo high as the Æquinoctial circle, unleſs he either recline the ſpondils of his neck and loyns, or place himſelf in a ſupine poſition. And therefore *Lactantius*, though he conceived his argument impregnable, when he ſaid (*Lib.* 7 *cap.* 5.) *Quod planius argumentum proferri poteſt, & mundum hominis, & hominem ſuâ cauſſa Deum feciſſe, quam quod ex omnibus Animantibus ſolus ita formatus eſt, ut oculi ejus ad cœlum directi, facies ad Deum ſpectans, vultus cum ſuo parente communis ſit?* to him that ſhall literally interpret the ſame, cannot appear to have ſtopt the mouth of contradiction: unleſs perhaps we ſhall afford him ſo much favour, as to reſtrain the erectnes of man to that preciſe definition of our Maſter *Galen* (*De uſu part. lib.* 1.) which allowes thoſe Animals only to have an erect figure *whoſe ſpines and thigh bones are ſituate in right lines.* For in this ſtrict ſignification, no Animal (for ought Zoographers, or thoſe that write the Natural Hiſtories of living Creatures have diſcovered, or our ſelves obſerved) can exactly fulfill that figure, but man; all others having their thighs pitched at angles, either right, or obtuſe, or acute, to their ſpines. And for this reſpect was it, that having premiſed, that *Man only was conſtituted in a capacity to ſatisfie that prime end of the Creation, the glory of God*; I thought neceſſary to ſubjoyn, *his intellectual or Cogitative ſoul being naturally diſpoſed to admire*, &c. thereby importing, that the baſis of my Argument was fixt upon the very root of his *Eſſence*, or *better Nature*, as *Plato* calls it, whoſe propriety is *ſurſum aſpicere*, to look up to his original, and ſpeculate the excellencies of his Maker. And thus underſtood, I prefer *Plato's* etymologie of

of ἄνθρωπος, and am perſwaded that the primitive Grecians ſo denominated man, *quaſi ἀναθρῶντα ἃ ὄπωπε, Contemplantem quæ videt*: nor can I conceive that *Anaxagoras* ſpake other then tropologically, when being askt, *cur natus eſſet*, he ſmartly and pathetically returned, *ut videret cœlum & terras*; by this figurative expreſſion intending, that man was made not to gape about or gaze upon the external beauties of heaven and earth, with the dull eye of his body: but to have his thoughts ſublime, and with the acies of his mind to ſpeculate the Wiſdome, &c. of him that made them. Now by virtue of this divine Prerogative is it, that man is of undoubted right entituled to the eſpecial care, and declared to be the *Secondary end*, or ſcope of the *Creation*. But farther to expatiate upon this manifeſt truth; were to light a candle to ſhew the Sun in the Meridian.

2. *Sermocination.*

Nor by the title of Cogitation only, doth man lay claim to this dignity; but he inherits a ſecond endowment alſo more noble then any other Animal, whereby he is empowerd to fulfill the principal deſtination of the World, the glory of God: and this is *Sermocination* or *Locution*. For the tongue of man only can own that character, ὄργανον διαλεκτικὸν, *inſerviens ſermocinationi inſtrumentum*, and can modulate the inſpired aër into articulate ſounds, and ſo intelligibly proclaim the majeſty of its *Efficient*. This *Lactantius* wiſely urged againſt *Epicurus* his objective expoſtulation, *Qua utilitas Deo in Homine, ut eum propter ſe faceret?* appoſitely oppoſing, *ſcilicet ut eſſet, qui opera ejus intelligeret, qui providentiam diſponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem conſummandi & ſenſu admirari, & voce proloqui poſſet*, &c. and (*in lib. de Ira Dei cap.* 13.) more plainly he ſays, *Num & mutorum cauſſâ Deus laboravit? minime, quia ſunt & rationis & loquelæ expertia: ſed intelligimus & ipſa eodem modo ad uſum hominis à Deo facta*, &c.

As for that couchant *Dilemma* of *Velleius*, *whether the World was intended for the uſe of wiſe men, or Fools*: tis ſoon extricated, by diſtinguiſhing the purpoſe of the Creator into *General* and *Particular*: and ſo returning, that the Goodneſs of God had a reſpect to the benefit of all, *in general*; but of wiſe men in *eſpecial*.

Now

Now, if by *Wiſe men*, he mean ſuch, whoſe minds are imbued with the maximes of Virtue, and their lives conform to the upright rules of morality (who only, in the judgment of Philoſophy, can challenge that Attribute) then is it not eaſie to doubt, that the beneficence of God was loſt to them, or unadviſedly placed upon them: ſince their opportune, moderate, and grateſull husbandry of theſe bleſſings, though it cannot be extended ſo high as abſolute merit; may yet reach ſo far as to juſtifie the prudence of their donation, and manifeſt the provident collocation of them upon convenient ſubjects, *i. e.* upon ſuch as make it the conſtant buſineſs of their lives to learn how rightly to uſe them, and practiſe that excellent leſſon, of imploying all things to the temporal ſupportation, comfort, and improvement of themſelves, and themſelves to magnifie the bounty of that hand, that ſo freely beſtowed them.

And on the other ſide, if by *Fools* he intend ſuch as are degenerated from the nobility of their nature, degraded below meer Humanity, that know no good beyond the preſent blandiſhments of ſenſuality, and have ſworn themſelves voluntary captives to their own luxurious Appetites, (and ſuch was the wiſe mans fool) then can neither the Juſtice of God be taxed for conferring ſuch rich favours upon thoſe, that know only how to abuſe them; nor his Prævision diſparaged, as not foreſeeing the miſcarriage or unfruitfulneſs of his charity: ſince he left it in the arbitrary power of their Wills to make an election of Good or Evill, to turn to the right hand, and purſue the real and true delights of virtue, or deflect on the left, and be loſt in the deviations of the only apparent and falſe pleaſures of vice: having ſet before them the means both of Sapience and Reſipiſcence, and furniſhed them with advantages and opportunities either to acquire more knowledge, or at leaſt recant and diſclaim their ignorance. Or, if by Fools, he deſigne ſuch as our common Ideots, in whom the light of Nature is totally eclipſed, by ſome native diſtemper, or non-ſymmetrical configuration, or contingent concuſſion of the brain, or Preſence-Chamber of the Intellect: then alſo is the caſe the ſame with divine Prudence, *ſiquidem ex ipſorum deſipientia, caterorum ſapientia efflorescit & collucet magis*, ſince the

ſtolidity of an ignorant hath this uſe, that it ſerves as a foyl to ſet off the ingenuity of the knowing, and by the incompatible diſparity which appears at the conference of thoſe two contraries, infinitely enhanceth the value of wiſdom. The ſatisfactory force of this ſolution maturely perpended, it can be reputed neither incogitancy nor precipitation in me to omit the prolix appropriation of thoſe pertinent *ſimilitudes*; that the wary husbandman doth cultivate and prepare his field, as well for the fertility of Pulſe, as Wheat; that the moſt skilfull Gardiner provides room in his nurſery for the ſprouting of wild, degenerous, and barren plants, as well as for the geniculation of wholſome, generous and fruitful; that Princes account Plebeians, as well as Nobles, members of their Common-wealth; and that *Apelles* prepared his Table as well to receive the black of ſhadowing, as the finer touches of his Pencill, and the brighter gradualities of Colours, in emulation of the life. And this, not only becauſe I conceive the objection already more then refuted, and therefore all that can be ſuperadded may found as nothing to the purpoſe: but chiefly becauſe I underſtand, that the Logick of *ſimiles*, or the way of probation by *Comparatives*, is at beſt but *Analogiſme*; and therefore inconſiſtent with my aſſumption of declining all but *Demonſtrations*, or *Reaſons* equally convictive.

As for that demand, *Why God did not endow his favorite with immortality, but expoſed him to the ſtroke of death*; it is manifeſt that the ſoul of man is conſtituted immortal, and ſhall enjoy being to all eternity, by the Charter of its *Eſſence*, and not *gratia* only, as Mr. *Hobbs* endevours to aſſert (*in Leviathan*) But the demonſtration of this grand truth, being too large to be circumſcribed by a Parentheſis, or foiſted in by way of digreſſion, I have reſerved for a ſingular Chapter in the future.

Article 3. *Lucretius* his 8 reaſons ſubverted, particularly.

For thoſe remaining difficulties contained in the Argument of *Lucretius*, they are eaſily ſalved, by anſwering ſuccinctly to the

Firſt, that the motive which inclined the divine Will to create the World, was not any poſſibility of emolument accruable to God from the veneration and gratitude of man: but the vo-

lun-

tary diffusion of his own communicative goodness, in chief; and the benefit of man, as subservient thereto.

Second, that though that Axiome be undeniable, *Non entia non sunt accidentia*, and therefore it could have been no trouble to us, not to have been at all; yet that invincible reluctancy against *Adnihilation*, radicated in every vital entity, is demonstration enough, that to be, is far better then not to be, and we our selves experimentally find, *that tis one degree of happiness to have obtained existence*; because to be nothing, is a meer *Privation*; to be something, attains to the perfection of *Reality*. Upon which ground many have erected a conjecture, the the devill himself would not consent to his own Adnihilation, though he might evade his torments by the bargain: with advantage preferring the miserable condition of something, to the horrid opacity of nothing. 2.

Third, that God made such abundant provision conductive to the utility of men, that both from the *Amplitude* and *Variety* of his work, they might collect matter sufficient to incite them to the constant contemplation of his *Wisdome*, and gratefull acknowledgement of his *Munificence*: as also, that having observed what of the Creatures were less commodious, they might be directed in their election of the more commodious and beneficial, as well for their Conservation as Delight. 3.

Fourth, that the labours of *Agriculture* are superfluous, and voluntarily undergoo by man, more for the maintainance of his *delicacy* and inordinate *luxury*, then the provision of *Necessaries* to his livelyhood. Since the same liberal earth, which is Mother, Nurse and Purveyer to all other *Animals*, cannot be thought inhospitable to man only, nor so cruelly penurious as to exclude her best guest from participating the inexhaustible bounty of her table. And though we grant some moderate labour necessary in order to the comfortable sustentation of our prodigal bodies, always upon the expence; yet have we good cause to esteem that more a blessing then a curse, since the sweat of industry is sweet. Not only the 4.

cause the active genius of man is constellated for busines, and therefore never more oppresst then with the burthen of idleness; but also because the sprightly hopes of a wealthy harvest sweeten and compensate the labour of semination. Nor is the contentment which growes from ingenious Husbandry much below any other solace of the mind, in this life; if we may credit the experience of many Princes, who having surfeited on the distractions of royalty, have voluntarily quitted the magnified pleasures of the Court (magnified only by such ambitious Novices, who never discovered the gall that lyes at the bottom of those guilded sweets) and with inestimable advantage exchanged the tumult of their palaces for the privacy of Granges; have found it a greater delight to cultivate the obedient and gratefull earth, then rule that giddy beast, the multitude; a happier entertainment of the mind, and more wholsome exercise of the body, to hold the easie plough, then sway an unweildy Scepter, and revell in the infatuating pomp of greatness.

5. *Fifth*, that those preposterous seasons, Blights, Mildews, Combustions, &c. putrefactive accidents, that make the pregnant earth suffer abortion, and so nip the forward hopes of the laborious swain; doe neither intervene so *frequently*, nor invade so *generally*, as to introduce an universal famine, or so cut off all provision, as not to leave a sufficient stock of Aliment for the sustentation of mankind.

6. *Sixth*, that the divine Intellect was the universal exemplar to it self, framing the types or ideas both of the world and of man, within it self, and accordingly configurating them. This may be evinced by an argument *à minori*; since even our selves have a power to design and modell some artificial engine, whose pattern or idea we never borrowed from any thing existent without the circle of our selves, but coyned in the solitary recesses of our mind.

7. *Seventh*, concerning mans being obnoxious to the injury of many Contingencies, as the voracity of wild beasts, the venome of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contagion of the

Pestilence

Peſtilence, the corruption of ſwarms of other diſeaſes both epidemick and ſporadick, &c. that all theſe are the regular effects of Gods *Generall Providence*, and have their cauſes, times, and finalities preordained, and inſcribed in the diary of Fate, to whoſe preſcience nothing is contingent. But of this more ſatisfactorily in our ſubſequent conſideration of univerſal Providence; whither in ſtrictneſs of method, it refers it ſelf.

Eight, that this complaint againſt the unkindneſs of Nature, for producing man, tender, naked, unarmed, &c. is groſly unjuſt. For the imbecillity of our Infancy is neceſſary to the perfection and maturity of thoſe noble organs, contrived for the adminiſtration of the mandates of that Empreſs, the *Cogitant Soul*; and is amply compenſated either by the vigor and acuteneſs of the ſenſes, or by diuturnity of life. It being obſerved by Naturaliſts, that thoſe Animals which live long, have a long geſtation in the womb, a long infancy, and attain but ſlowly to their maturity and ſtandard of growth; the four general motions of life, *Inception*, *Augmentation*, *State*, and *Declination*, carrying ſet and proportional intervals each to other, as that truly noble Philoſopher, *Scaliger* hath hinted, in his correction of that fabulous tradition of the extreme longævity of Deer in theſe words: *De ejus vitæ longitudine fabulantur, neque enim aut geſtatio, aut incrementum hinnulorum ejuſmodi ſunt, ut præſtent argumentum longævi Animalis.* As for his being born *naked*; tis no diſavour, nor neglect in her, for that cumberſom wardrobe of raggs, which man hath gotten upon his back, is become neceſſary only by the delicacy of his education and cuſtome, not to intended by nature in the primitive ſimplicity and eucraſie of his conſtitution; when there needed nothing but the ſkin either to warme, or adorn the body. Laſtly, thoſe *Armes*, which Nature hath denied him; either he wants not at all, or his own ingenious hands can provide at pleaſure. 8.

CHAP. IV.

The General Providence of God, DEMONSTRATED.

SECT. I.

Article 1. The Authors reasons for his present adherence to the common discrimination of *Providence* from *Creation.*

THE Synopsis of my method, exhibited in the end of the first Section of the first Chapter, was designed as a clue to conduct the thoughts of my Reader along the series of those *Attributes* of the *Supreme Ens*, which (as being of most general concernment, and such as may be clearly demonstrated by the *Light of Nature*, even to those, who either never heard of, or except against the testimony of *Holy Writ*) I have promised to illustrate, by the conviction of Arguments deduced from that catholique Criterion, *Reason*; to whose Judicature all Nations and Ages have readily submitted their assent: and therefore I am not necessitated here to insert any farther explanation of the connexion and dependence of this *Theme* upon the precedent; but only, in avoydance of misconception, to advertise, that when I say, the *Creation* of the World *ex nihilo*, and the constant *Conservation* of the same in its primitive order and harmonious Coefficiency of causes subordinate, are the general operations of the *Wisdome* and *Power* of the *First cause*; I do not intend, that those are *Acts really distinct* each from other (for in the demonstration of the Existence of God 'tis plainly, though succinctly evinced, that *the Conservation of the Universe is no thing*

thing but the Act of Creation prolonged or continued) but only conform my theory to the customary notions and terms of the Schools, and yeeld to the necessity of a division in the gross capacity of mans understanding, in order to the more gentle enforcement of a stable belief.

Article 2. The Definition and received Division of divine Providence.

The Act of *Conservation* of all things in their originary stations, and the perpetual obedience of all second Causes, in their several motions, to the laws of his will, that elemented them; hath ever been called *Providence divine*: which derived high enough, seems to import, *the constant operation of an infinite Wisdom, and infinite Power, combined in the effusion of an infinite Goodness*. This *Providence* (for to that Appellation, as most antient, most common, and therefore most familiar, I shall adhere) most Clerks have branched into *General*, whereby the government of the whole Universe is administred: and *Particular*, or *special*, whereby God doth take special care of mankind, and regulate the affairs of his master-peice. Now according to this necessary *Division*, must I range my forces into two Files, and draw up one to defeat those Atheists, who have proclaimed open hostility against the *First*; and the other to subdue those, that have declared against the *Second*.

Article 3. A short list of the principal ethnick *Physiologists*, who, in order to their propagation of Atheism, have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence: & a gentle cure of S. *Hieroms* wound, caused by his venial lapse from the same.

The Colonell to that black regiment, that fought against the opinion of the government of the World by the Sceptre of Divine Monarchy, is generally accounted *Epicurus*; but in the authentique records of *Stobaus* (*Ecl. Phys.* 25.) we may finde him to have been no more then Captain-lieutenant to *Leucippus*, who of all the Græcian Philosophers, whose doctrines have escaped the spunge of oblivion, was the first that appeared in the field against universal Providence, and not long after surrendred the stafe to *Democritus* the elder, whose immediate successor was *Heraclitus*, as we are told by *Nemesius* (*De nat. Homin.* 15.) But whoever led up the van, was closely followed by many both of the same and succeeding ages; the most eminent whereof were *Diagoras* (*Cicero* 4. *Academ.*) *Strato* (*Idem de Divinat.* 2.) *Ennius* (*Idem de Nat. Deor.* 3.) *Lucretius* (*Libro ejus* 2.) *Vellius* (*Cicero*

(*Cicero de Nat. Deor.* 1.) *Lucian* (*in his Accus.*) who like a facetious villain, perſonates *Jupiter* complaining of the oppreſſion of overmuch buſineſs; nay the devout Father S. *Hieron.* (*in Comment. in Abac.*) ſeems to have eſpouſed the quarrel, though doubtleſs upon another intereſt. His words I ſhall faithfully tranſcribe for two important reaſons. Firſt becauſe I would not appear to have fixt a ſcandal upon ſo venerable a Pillar of our Church, who otherwiſe hath deſerved ſo amply of the Chriſtian faith; that the conſideration of the tranſcendent merits of his pious labours had once almoſt perſwaded me to beleive the poſſibility of *juſtification by works*. Secondly, to deliver his memory from the imputation of impiety; for it may be naturally collected from the ſyntax and ſcope of his diſcourſe, that it was a noble eſteem which he had of the majeſty of the Divine Nature, whom he thought too fully taken up with the bliſfull contemplation of his own perfections (in truth, the only Felicity God can be capable of) to be concerned in ordering the trifling occurrences of the world; and not any conceit of the inſufficiency of omnipotence, that caſt him upon this rock. *Caeterum abſurdum eſt* (ſays he) *ad hoc Dei deducere majeſtatem ut ſciat per momenta ſingula, quot naſcantur culices, quotve moriantur: quot cimicum & pulicum & muſcarum ſit in terra multitudo: quanti piſces in aqua natent, & qui de minoribus majorum praeda cedere debeant. Non ſimus tam fatui Adulatores Dei, ut dum potentiam ejus ad ima detrahimus, in noſipſos injurioſi ſimus, eandem rationabilium, quam irrationabilium Providentiam eſſe dicentes.*

So that his diminution of the univerſality of Providence, may ſeem the pardonable effect of immoderate devotion, and but a high ſtrained deſcription of the glory of that eſſence, which in ſtrict truth, can be concerned in nothing but it ſelf; and muſt then appear to be undervalued, when moſt magnified by the extenſion of its influence to petty and trivial mutations, and conceived to act a part in the interludes of Flies, order the militia of Piſmires, and decree what, and how many Gnats ſhall be devoured by ſwallowes in a ſummers day. But as for *Epicurus*, and the reſt of that miſcreant crew; tis more then probable, that a quite

different

different intereſt inveigled them into this dangerous error. For, *firſt*, their own writings bare record, that they made it the grand ſcope of their ſtudies to promote Atheiſme, by plotting how to undermine the received beleif of an omnipotent *eternal Being*, to murder the *immortality of the Soul* (the baſis of all religion) and deride the *Compenſation of good and evil actions after death*. In particular, *Epicurus* did not bluſh to profeſs that the chief end at which his *Phyſiology* was collineated, was this; *ut mens ex perſpectis cauſis conquieſcat, neque aliam eamque divinam ſubeſſe cauſam ſuſpicando, felicitatem interturbet*. And *Secondly*, the grounds upon which they erected this deteſtable negation of univerſal Providence, may ſufficiently ſatisfie a heedfull enquirer; that not any intenſe honour or veneration of the moſt perfect and happy nature, tranſported their minds to this height of deluſion: but rather a confirmed *infidelity of the infinity of his Wiſdome and Power*, which is affirmed by us, that maintain the diffuſion of Providence over all, and deſcry the finger of Divinity in the ſmalleſt actions of inferior cauſes, though ne're ſo contemptible in the eyes of Humane reaſon. But a more ample knowledge of this doth offer it ſelf to our thoughts, in the particular examination of their Arguments: to which we therefore immediately addreſs.

Article 4. The Atheiſts firſt Argument againſt univerſal Providence; with the abſurd and malicious comment of *Lucretius* thereupon.

The *Firſt Argument* they drew from the apparent *incompatibility of buſineſs and happineſs*; or more plainly, from the vaſt diſparity between the bliſfull condition or contemplative quiet of the ſupreme Nature, and the trouble, or diſturbance (for ſo their ignorance unfitly apprehended it) that muſt ariſe from the overſight and managery of ſuch infinite variety of Actions, as are every minute performed within the immenſe Amphitheatre of the World. For *Epicurus*, indiſcreetly attempting to take the altitude of the *Divine Intellect*, by the unequal *Jacobs*-ſtaffe of the *Humane*; raſhly inferred, that it could not be extended below the ſphear of its own manſion, and that no *Intelligence* could be ſo large, as not to be overwhelmed by that Ocean of Cares, that muſt flow from the multitude and diverſity of continual emergencies here below. This he contracted into that ſentence; *Quod eſt beatum & immortale, neque ſibi habet, neque*

alteri exhibet negotium: which so pleased him, that he reputed it a Cornerstone in the fabrick of science, and enacted it to stand in the front of those *Sententiæ rata*, which he dared Scepticity withall.

Nor did his sedulous Commentator *Lucretius*, recede an inch from the same text; but fondly commensurating the power of an *Infinite wisdome*, by the narrow capacity of his own *finite reason*, preached to the world; that to ascribe the government of sublunary affairs to the Gods, was impiety in the inference, and must implicitly destroy the fundamentals of their *Divinity*, which is made up of *Beatitude* and *Immortality*, neither of which can consist with the perpetual disquiet, and impetuous anxiety of mind, which the Administration of so vast and tumultuous a Commonwealth, as this of the World, must introduce. For when he would impose, that the shoulders of Divinity, though a real *Atlas*, are too weak to sustain so great a weight, as that of *Rector Generalis*; under a pretext of tender zeal (forsooth) he insinuates those of prophanation, *Qui summum illud, quicquid est, non tristi, atque multiplici ministerio polluunt*, as *Pliny* expresseth it: and therefore exclaims.

Nam (proh! Suadin Deum tranquilla pectora pace,
Quæ placidum degunt ævum, vitamque serenam)
Quis regere immensi summum? Quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter Cœlos omnis convertere? & omneis
Ignibus æthereis terras suffire feraceis?
Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore præsto,
Nubibus ut faciat tenebras, cœlique serenum
Concutiat sonitu? tum fulmina mittat, & ædeis
Sæpe suas disturbet? & in diversa recedens
Sæviat, exercens telum; quod sæpe nocenteis
Præterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merentreis? &c. lib. 2.

Ah! since the happy and immortal *Powers*
In calme content melt their eternal houres,
Feasting on *self-enjoyment*; who can keep
The reins of *Nature*? Who command the *Deep*?

To

To wind about the ponderous *Spheares*, what arme
Hath ſtrength enough? what *Influence* can warme
The fruitfull earth with *Fires atherial*? who
Can fill all places, and all actions doe?
To veil the face of *Light* with ſable clouds,
And wrap the lucid *ſky* in ſulph'ry ſhrouds:
Whoſe *Coruſcations* ſplit the fluid aer,
Convell the feet of Rocks, and with deſpair
Affect poor *Mortals* into *Quick ſilver*: then turn,
And with Granadoes his own *Temples* burn:
Then dart his flames at *Innocence*, and wound
Virtue, while guilty *Vice* continues ſound?

Article 5. Their ſecond *Argument*: and its convenient diſſection into two parts, *viz.* 1. The irregularity of contingencies: and

Their other *Argument* is extracted from the conceived *Uncertainty and irregularity of Contingencies*, and the *unequal diſpenſation of good and evill*; all things ſeeming to fall out according to the giddy lottery of Chance, and as confuſedly as if there were no Providence at all. This may be collected as well from that ſpeech of *Epicurus*, charged upon him by that heroick Champian of Divine Monarchy, *Lactantius*; *Nulla diſpoſitio eſt, multa enim facta ſunt aliter, quàm fieri debuerunt*: as from the context of his *Phyſiology*, wherein having made it his *Hypotheſis*, that all bodies both cœleſtial and ſublunary were at firſt configurated by Fortune, *i.e.* aroſe to ſuch and ſuch particular figures, by the caſual ſegregation, convention and complexion of the General matter, divided into ſeveral maſſes; and that, by the inclination of their convenient *Figures*, they were adliged to ſuch and ſuch peculiar *Motions*, and accommodated to the neceſſary cauſation of determinate viciſſitudes: he proceeds to reduce all ſucceeding events in the World to that primitive ſeries of Cauſes, which made their own ſpontaneous eruption out of the Chaos, and attained to the certain rules of their future activity, at the ſame time they attained to their diſtinctions and ſingle eſſences; denominating that chain of cauſalities, *Nature*, and holding her to be her own *Directreſs*, and by the law of innate tendency obliged to a perpetual continuation of the ſame motions begun in

the first minute of the worlds composure; according to that exclamation of *Pontanus* (*Lib.* 1. *de Stellis.*)

Quid vexare Deos frustrà juvat? ordine certo
Fert Natura vices; labuntur & ordine certo
Sydera; tam varios rerum patientia casus.
Illa suos peragunt motus, servantque tenorem
Sorte datum, &c.

What boot's it man with fruitless praiers to fret
The Ears o'th *Gods*; when *Natures Laws* are set,
Beyond *Repeal* or *Alteration*?
The radiant *Lamps* of heaven still move on
In their old tracks: nor can the *Planets* stray,
In all their wandrings, from their native way;
Or change that *Tenor*, which at first they got
Consign'd unto them, by their proper *Lot*.

The result of all which is, that *Epicurus* would perswade, that the Universe is a Commonwealth, wherein every single member is, by the signature and necessity of its particular constitution, instructed in, and impelled upon the præcise performance of its peculiar office; so as not to want the direction of any *Superintendent*, or to conform to the directions of a *General Councel*: and seems to allow this only difference between the universal *Politie* of the *World*, and the particular *Republique* of *mankind*; that in *this*, men frequently make deflexions from the general scope, by reason of the seductions of their unstable and irregular judgments; but in *that*, all individuals punctually keep to their primitive assignations, and so conspire to the satisfaction of the common interest, by reason of the constancy of their natures, and unalterable necessity of their forms. And this Abridgement of his doctrine, *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) hath prepared to our hands, when personating *Epicurus*, he thus argues; *Nulla est opus sapientia ordinis instruendi in exercitu, si militum quivis sua sponte noverit locum, ordinem, stationem, quam accipere debet & tueri: neque etiam opus doctoribus, Fabrisve murariis, si aqua illeic ultrò affluat indigentibus irrationo plantis; huc lateres, ligna, lapidesque eas, naturæ duce, motiones atque inclinationes subeant, quibus in sua loca, inque expetitam concinnitatem coeant, &c.*

Now

Now for the other part of the Argument, *viz. the unequal diſtribution of Good and Evill, and the ordinary intervention of many effects inconſiſtent with the juſtice and righteous adminiſtration of Divinity*: this is clearly hinted by *Lucretius*, who makes it the main ſcope of his ſixth *Canto*, to alienate mens minds from the beleif of an *Univerſal moderator*, by ſeveral inſtances of events, that ſeem to hold too viſible an affinity to *Temerity* and *Inconſideration*, to have any relation at all to the judicious method requiſite to *Providence*; and particularly towers himſelf over that one example of the *Thunder-bolt*, as if his reaſon had flown to a pitch above all poſſibility of contradiction, when yet the ſummary of all that bold diſcourſe, abſtracted by an impartial hand, amounts to no more then this.

2. The unequal or injuſt diſtribution of *good* and *evill*.

Since we obſerve the Thunder-bolt (1.) To be, for the moſt part, diſcharged on the heads of the *Innocent*, and not the *Guilty*: (2.) To batter *Sancta Deûm delubra*, the Temples of the Gods themſelves, more frequently then common buildings: (3.) To be idly ſpent at random, upon the ſea and void Campanias; and ſo ſeems not to have been the Artillery of *Divine Vengeance*, prepared for the puniſhment of impious mortals: (4.) To be generated, like other meteors, by natural Cauſes, being a ſulphureous exhalation compacted in the clouds, and thence darted *ala volee*, or at a venture, on whatever is ſituate in the level of its projection: it appears an abſurdity of timerous ſuperſtition to beleive, that every ſingle occurrence is præordained by *Wiſdom*, or that all extemporary *Accidents* have their præſcripts in the book of *Fate*.

And theſe are the *Goliah* objections, or nerves of the Atheiſts Remonſtrance againſt *Univerſal Providence*; which though many of the *Fathers*, and particularly S. *Clement* (*in* 5. *Strom.*) have decreed to be filed amongſt thoſe impious queſtions, that deſerve no anſwer but a whip, like the doubts of a Mahometan in point of faith: yet ſince promiſe hath made it my duty, to endevour the demonſtration of the Attributes of the divine nature (ſuch at leaſt as occurre to the contemplation of a meer Philoſopher, who hath wholly referred himſelf to the Teſtimonies of the *Light of Nature*) by the conviction of *Reaſon* alone; I am confident ſo clearly and fully to confute, that no man, who

hath not ſtubbornly put out the eye of his ſoul, ſhall in the future remain a Sceptick, as to this particular.

Sect. II.

The Vindication.

Article 1. That the Notion of general Providence is *Prolepticall*, inferred from the univerſality of its reception.

FIrſt I plead *the general conſent of all Nations and Ages in the acknowledgement* of *Providence*; for, according to the Logical *Canons* even of *Epicurus* (*apud Gaſſend. in Animadverſ. in Canonic. Epicuri*) any motion, that is held in common, and by long preſcription grown into κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων πρόληψιν, *Anticipation*, ought not to be doubted of; as being its own *Criterion*, and from which there lies no farther Appeal.

Article 2. From the miſplaced devotion of Idolaters.

Now that all *Nations* have met in one Chorus to proclaim the univerſal and abſolute ſoveraignty of Providence, cannot be obſcure to any, that have, but with half an eye, glanced on the Records of Antient and Cuſtomes of Preſent; or but conſidered, that even the Idolatry of the moſt ſtupid and barbarous people that ever lived, doth plainly commonſtrate, that they paid both their ſacrifices and orizons, as homage to ſome *Power*, which held the rains of ſecond Cauſes, and could diſpoſe them to the production of good or evil events, according to his own beneplacets; and therefore not only in publique Calamities, as War, Peſtilence, Famine, &c. but alſo in the private diſtreſſes of each Family and Perſon, they immediately addreſſed themſelves to the Sanctuary of their devotions, hoping by that means to appeaſe the anger of that flexible hand, that had the arbitrary donation of happineſs and miſery.

Article 3. From the confeſſion of moſt Philoſophers of the higheſt form; as of

That all Philoſophers alſo (who being generally reputed wiſe men, and all their very Tenets exemplary; could not but draw whole ſhoals of under-heads into the ſtream of their opinions) gave

gave in their votes on the side of Providence; cannot cast much oyle to illustrate: it being obvious, first, that

Ecphantus, with most of that elder sect, who gave in their names to the doctrine of Atoms, did yet establish the necessary concession of some universal Moderator, and unanimously referred the ordination of all contingents, as well frequent as rare, auspicious and inauspicious, popular and domestique, to the arbitrary disposal of one common Pilot, who sate at the helme of this great vessel, the Universe. (*Leg. Stobæum in Ecl. Phys.*) 1. *Ecphantus.*

Secondly, that those also, who held the World to be *Non-principiate*, or to have been so old, as never to have been young, did yet notwithstanding condemn the delirium of *Fortune*, and concluded the gubernation of all upon the *supreme Intelligence*. For *Plato* seems so strongly convicted, and his reason so violently ravished into the armes of Divine Providence; that, though he inclined to the eternity of the World, he yet conceded the production thereof in time, as a necessary Hypothesis, or foundation, whereon he might the more firmely erect his superstructure of that magisterial Truth, which otherwise would have been impossible to be made out, *viz. The universal Administration of Providence.* And thus much he frequently declared, *in Lib. de Legibus: in Epinomide, & in Timæo* more expresly; out of which meditation *Plutarch* (*De procreat. Animæ in Timæo, & de Fato*) collected his tripartite distinction of Providence. *Primo enim* (saith he) *& suprema, est Primi Dei intelligentia, sive mavis, voluntas benefica erga res omnes; qua primum singula divine ac omninò optimè ac pulcherrimè ordinata sunt: secunda secundarum deorum per cœlum incedentium qua res mortales ordinatè fiunt, & singulorum generum constantia atque salus procuratur: Tertia non inepte dicitur Providentia, & Procuratio Geniorum, qui circa terram collocati, humanarum actionum custodes atque inspectores sunt.* 2. *Plato.*

And *Aristotle*, who was much more bold and plain in his assertion of the Worlds eternity, though (*in Metaphys. 12. cap. 9.*) he pretends an unwillingness to have the majestick sanctity of the *supreme Nature* disparaged, by being debased to the overfight of petit and inconsiderable affairs transacted here below; 3. *Aristotle.*

and

and therefore limited his juriſdiction to the cœleſtial orbs: yet was he forced to confeſs the impoſſibility of the worlds ſubſiſtence in the due harmony and requiſite order of all its motions, without the conſtant regulation thereof by *Providence*, as *Laertius*, *Theodoretus*, *Stobæus*, and other of his moſt judicious *Expoſitors* have aſſured us. And upon this conſideration was it, that the good Father, *Origen* allowed him to have been one degree leſs impious then *Epicurus*. Nay *Cicero* (2. *de Natur. deorum*) makes him upon ſecond thoughts, to have profeſſed a recantation, by allowing the ubiquity of the divine Wiſdome, and extending the arme of Providence, which he had formerly ſhortned and terminated in the loweſt ſphear, even to the meaneſt of ſublunary paſſages, introducing him diſguiſed (doubtleſs to prevent the diſhonour of unconſtancy to his own principles) under a third perſon telling a ſtory of ſome, *Qui poſt ævum tranſactum in locis ſubterraneis, & repente emerſi, intuitique hunc ordinem rerum, ipſum ſine numine eſſe non poſſe arbitrarentur.*

4. The *Stoicks*. Thirdly, that the *Stoicks*, albeit upon that vulgar preſumption that to aſſign the procuration of all minute and trivial occurences to that *Nature*, which is all *Felicity* and *Quiet*, was implicitly to infringe the right hand of its divinity; they abridged its empire, and limited its influence to the more weighty and popular actions of mankind only; were howſoever zealous aſſertors of Providence, is manifeſt from that ſaying of *Cotta* reproving *Balbus*, an eminent Stoick (*apud Cicer. de natur. Deor. 3.*) *At enim minora ne deus neque agellos ſingulorum, nec viticulas proſequuntur; nec ſi uredo, aut grando quidpiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant: ſic enim dicitis*, &c.

5. The *Academicks* and *Scepticks*. And laſtly, that the *Academicks* and *Scepticks* were of the ſame perſwaſion; however being carried againſt the ſtream of all *Affirmative* learning, by the contrary tide of their own *Negative* humor, and obliged to fall foul upon all truths, in defence of their own affected *Neſcience*; they have been obſerved to have had ſome light skirmiſhes with the Champians of *Providence*. Nor need we acquieſce in the bare affirmation hereof, while to any man, that ſhall with equanimity and attention compare their

their tender arguments againſt the opinion of general Providence, with thoſe more ſinewy and vehement reaſons of their profeſt neutrality in many other notions; there will offer it ſelf a fair ground for more then conjecture, that they purpoſely contrived them ſoft, gentle, and diſſoluble, that ſo they might ſeem neither to quit their habit of contradiction, nor yet to dare the ſubverſion of that catholick poſition, to which all men (thoſe few of the black guard of Hell, whom we lately nominated, excepted) had ſubſcribed, and which the dictates of their own domeſtick oracle, Reaſon, had confirmed as ſacred and uncontrollable. To which we may annex the teſtimony of *Gaſſendus*, who (*in Animadverſ. in lib.* 10. *Diogen. Laert. de Phyſiologia Epicuri pag.* 731.) ſpeaking conjunctively of both thoſe ſects, ſaies thus: *ut argumentatiſunt adverſus Providentiam, ſic opinioni de providentia ſuam probabilitatem fecerunt, neque ſaltem ea fronte fuerunt, ut eſſe providentiam abſolutè inficiarentur.*

Article 4. A review of the induction: and the Argument found to be *Apodictical* on one ſide; and on the other only *perſwaſive*.

Now to take the juſt dimenſions of this Argument, let us allow it, like *Janus*, to have two faces; and then ſurvey the aſpect of each a part. On one hand it looks *Abſolute and Apodictical*: on the other only *Perſwaſive*.

Apodictical; ſince the univerſality of any beleif (ſuch eſpecially, as hath ever been atteſted even by thoſe, who have made the profoundeſt ſearch into its fundamentals, and ſtreyned every nerve in the whole body of reaſon to demoliſh it,) is no obſcure proof, that it muſt be one of thoſe λήμματα, ἔννοιαι, or *Implantate Notions*, which the ſame hand, that made our nature, hath engraven on the table of our minds, and left it not in the power of our depraved Wills totally to obliterate.

That there are ſome *Implantate Notions*, no man, who hath but learned the Alphabet of his own Nature, will diſpute. Nor is it leſs certain, that all Philoſophers have decreed *Anticipation* (which *Ariſtotle* (*in* 1. *Poſter.* 1.) calls προυπάρχουσαν γνῶσιν, *praexiſtentem cognitionem*; and *Cicero* hath interpreted (1 *de Nat. Deor.*) *notionem menti inſitam, & anteceptam quandam in animo informationem*) to be the Touch-ſtone of verity: nay *Empiricus* himſelf forgot his cuſtome of Scepticiſme, when he came

to this point, and grew poſitive (*adverſ. Gramm. & adverſ. Ethic.*) ὅτι ζητεῖν, ὅτι ἀπορεῖν ἐστὶ ἄνευ προλήψεως, that no man could ſo much as enquire, or doubt of any thing without *Prænotion.*

And that the Notion of the worlds regiment by univerſal Providence, is one of thoſe propoſitious, *Quæ ſunt in nobis ades antiquæ, ut iis, ex quo eſſe & ſentire cœpimus, evaſerimus informati:* which, like letters carved on the bark of a young plant, are impreſſed upon our very Intellect, and grow up together with us; is already proved collaterally and upon induction, in our *Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God*: for therein it is cleared, that the excellent *Idea*, which we have of the *Supreme Being*, contains all *Perfections* whatever, and among the reſt, that noble Attribute, *Creator*; which to him that ſhall attentively conſider the nature of *Duration*, muſt ſound one and the ſame thing, with *Conſervator*, or *Governour.*

Only perſwaſive; ſince humane Auctority, conſidered *per ſe*, is but an inartificial Argument, and binds not, but when conſorted with others more rational, into one ſyndrome or multiplex demonſtration: nor is the concentration of all mens minds in one and the ſame aſſertion, an infallible Criterion of its verity. For the judgement of man in generall lyes open to the encroachments of Error, and the common infirmity of humane nature is not only diſcoverable in the groſs and viſible deluſions of vulgar heads (whoſe buſineſs is to beleive, not examine) but hath frequently broken out upon the ſoundeſt brains, and conſeſt it ſelf Epidemical in the abſurd miſtakes of the greateſt Criticks of Truth, eſpecially in the promotion and tranſmiſſion of opinions hæreditary and traditional.

Sect.

Sect. III.

Article 1. Gods General Providence demonſtrated by the *Idea* of his *Nature* reflected on our thoughts.

Let us not, therefore, entruſt the ſupportation of ſo weighty a Truth to that fragile reed of *Auctority*; but give our ſelves liberty to imagine, that no man ever beleived or aſſerted an univerſal Providence: and having thus deveſted our minds of all *Preſumption*, or *Anticipation*, expoſe them as tables newly deraſed to receive the pure impreſſions or ſincere documents of the *Light of Nature*; converting our contemplations, Firſt upon the *Nature of God*, and thence upon the *moſt exact order and confederacy of all ſecondary cauſes in the world.*

Firſt, I ſay, let us ſet our reaſon a work upon the *nature of the Firſt Cauſe*, or *Eternal Being*; and order our cogitations thus. The ſame demonſtration, whereby the mind of man is convicted of the *Exiſtence of God*, doth alſo at the ſame time violently, but naturally, conclude his nature to be ſo *accompliſht in all Perfections*, as to be above all *Acceſs* or *Addition*. For manifeſt it is, that by the terme, *God*, every man doth underſtand *ſomething to which no perfection is wanting*: and ſhould it be granted poſſible, that the mind of man could conceive any perfection more then what is comprehended in the idea, which it holds of the nature of God; yet ſtill would that thing, to which it could aſcribe that perfection, be God. Since tis impoſſible to cogitate any perfection, which is not the eſſential propriety of ſome Nature: and to think any Nature more perfect then the *Divine*, plainly abſurd; becauſe we conceive that to be moſt perfect, or elſe we do not conceive it to be *God*; *God*, and *Abſolute Perfection being one and the ſame thing*, and ordinarily conceived as one notion. Now, to be ſo infinitely *Wiſe*, *Potent*, and *Good*, as to order all things in the world to the beſt, to regulate and predetermine the operations of all ſecond Cauſes, to keep Nature her ſelf ſober and in tune, and ſo prevent thoſe diſcords, which otherwiſe would in a moment ſucceed to the reduction of all to a greater confuſion then that of the Chaos; in a word, to conſerve all things in exiſtence: this no man will deny to be a *Perfection*, ſince we define the perfection

fection of man, by his *abilities for dominion* (i. e.) in the judgement of our reason, every man is esteemed by so much the more perfect, by how much the more generous, august, liberal, prudent and benigne mind he is endued withall, and by inference, by how much the more digne he is to bear rule over others. Therefore is this *Perfection*, *Mundo providere, seu singulis rebus consulere*, to take care of the world, and provide for the subsistence of every single entity; of necessity to be ascribed to *God*.

For though that obsolet fallacy, that *business* imports *disquiet*, and disquiet contradicts *felicity*, be retrived upon us; and our reason seem captived in the snare of this conclusion; That this *Perfection*, as it stands in relation to *Divinity*, must be an *imperfection*, as being point blanck repugnant to its nature, which cannot at once be superlatively happy, and yet subject to multiplicity of business: yet we may soon redeem it to the liberty of truth, by conceiving some nature, wherein these two seeming contraries may be reconciled, (*i. e.*) the *Procuration of affaires* may shake hands with *extreme beatitude*. Nor do we conceive an impossibility herein; because even among men we daily find, that those Negotiations, which are an oppression to a low, narrow and unpractised Wit, are but the pleasant diversions and familiar recreations of a sublime, capacious, and polypragmatical: and by consequence that Nature which is able to sustain the administration of affairs infinite in number and variety, without detriment to its complet happiness; must be conceded, by incomputable degrees of transcendency more perfect, then that whose quiet must suffer diminution by the distraction of cares. Wherefore let us not suffer our cogitations to acquiesce in this imperfect, but vigorously advance to that *most perfect Nature*, whose propriety it is to be at once both *supremely Provident*, and *supremely Beate*. And since we conceive *God* to be such, it is of necessity inevitable, that we grant *Universal Providence to be his proper Attribute*.

For Confirmation, or (more properly) requisite Explanation (for sure no man, whose intellectuals are not suppressed by that intolerable tyrant, profest *Incredulity*, can longer doubt) of this; let us reflect upon our *Idea* of the *Deity*, and therein we shall discover, that tis impossible for the minde of man to conceive

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the import of this word, *God*; and not in the same numerical notion to understand him to be most *Wise*, most *Potent*, most *Good*, *et in abstracto*, *infinite Wisdome*, *infinite Power*, *infinite Goodness*, *assimilated*, *or rather identified into one simple eternal essence*. For undoubtedly our minds would speculate the Idea of a poor inconsiderable and imperfect *Divinity*; if they conceived it subject to circumscription, and apprehended his *Intellection* so narrow as not actually to comprehend all things; his *Power* so restrained, as to know *Impossibility*; his *Goodness* so scant and shallow, as to be exhausted in a partial diffusion, or limited by the admixture of *Envy*, (i. e.) withdrawn from, or denied unto any of the works of his hand, out of a designe to delight, or glory in their infelicity.

Article 2. The same particularly supported by that trinity of Attributes, *viz.* his 1. Infinite *Wisdome*.

Now if God be *infinitely wise*, he must be *Omniscient*; and consequently, must understand not only the simple and naked *Forms* of all natures in the Universe, but hold also a full and clear theory of their *Essential proprieties*, how and by what kind of activities they operate toward the satisfaction of their prædeliminate ends, and in what method they may be most conveniently disposed to maintain the order and harmony of the whole; and so must know and exercise the due administration of all things in this vast Common-wealth. I say, must *know* and *exercise*; for if he understood the politie or method of the worlds Gubernation, only *Contemplatively*: then would not his *Intellection* be complet and absolute in all points, and we should have been compelled to recurre to our former device of cogitating some other nature more perfect, which might be actually possessed of both the *Theorical* and *Practical Intelligence*. Again, since *Sapience* doth consist in, and manifest it self cheifly by *Action*, and the real administration of difficult and important affairs; with what shadow of reason can we argue God to be most *Sapient*, if we conceive him to be *Idle*, devoyd of all action, and taking care of nothing?

Secondly, if God be *infinitely Potent*, then must he be *Omnipotent*: and so to his power there is no ἀδύνατον, or *impossibility*. 2. Infinite *Power*.

But how can we apprehend this aright, unless we first grant, that having produced all things, and endowed them with faculties respectively inservient to their conducement to the satisfaction of the general end; he doth, through all the independent subdivisions of time, (*i. e.*) constantly, moderate their activities, in full conformity to the prudent rules of his own *Will*: and how can this be done, unless we allow him to have a hand in all operations, and that both Causes and effects doe so fully and wholly depend upon him, that they can have neither *Existence*, nor *Motion*, without the assent and coefficiency of his *Beneplacet*. Again, *Action* is the Pathognomonick, or proper manifest of *Power*; nay, in precise and orthodox logick, they are *Correlatives*, or twins that are born, live and dye together; and we are not now to learn, that Gods prime scope in the Creation, was to have an opportunity for the manifestation of his excellencies: if so, can *Inactivity* declare *Supreme Power*, or a cessation from acting not induce a suspicion of *Lassitude* and imbecillity?

3. Infinite *Goodness.*

Lastly, if God be *infinitely good*; it necessarily follows, *Goodness* being *Communicative*, that all natures must be sensible of, by participating that his inexhaustible goodness. And with what unpardonable incogitancy can that be asserted, while we opinion that he doth *concenter* his goodness, and when he hath created so many excellent natures, take no care or make no provision for their welbeing, but abandon them to the impendent misery of confusion? Might we not justly censure him of *Malevolence* or *Envy*, if he should withhold the communication of his perpetual Providence from the works of his own hands; which must unavoydably perish by the Antipathies of their Constitutions, and relaps into their primitive nothing in that moment, when he should intermit his act of *Conservation*? Nay, so essential is the constant oversight and tuition of the Creator to the subsistence of the Creature; that some contemplative heads have hereupon hinted a conjecture, that nothing shall go to the dissolution of all, at the period of time, but the meer *Cessation of Providence*, or the dereliction of Nature to the necessary discord of her several peices.

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And thus hath the clue of Gods chief *Attributes* (chief in his relation to the World) in a direct line conducted our ſingle reaſon to the demonſtration of his *General Providence*; which indeed, is the cleareſt mirror of his ſuperexcellent Nature, and to the opticks of mortality doth afford a lively reflexion of his *infinite Wiſedome, Power, and Goodneſs*. It ſucceeds, that we endevour to look at Providence through the *Teleſcope* or Perſpective of the *World*.

Article 3. The neceſſity of the worlds gubernation, by the indefinent influence of Gods general Providence, demonſtrated from the conſideration of the abſolute and total dependence of all *Second Cauſes* upon the *Firſt*.

Since God made the World, as hath been already proved; it cannot but be abſurd to imagine, that he inſtantly deſerted it, or having once impreſt a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vaſt machin, immediately withdrew his hand from action, leaving them to be carried on by their own rapt or ſwinge; and all the leſſer and ſubordinate wheels of particular natures to conforme to the impulſion of thoſe greater. For though he made all things *Perfect*, (*i. e.*) omitted nothing requirable to the integral accompliſhment of each Creature, *in ſuo genere*: yet ſince himſelf is the *Univerſal Soul*, that both *Materiald* and *Informed* each particle of this great body; in ſtrictneſs of conſequence, nothing can have exiſtence longer then he ſhall pleaſe, in every minute of its duration, freſhly to create it, or (to ſpeak the intereſt of Providence) to conſerve it in being, by a continual communication of it ſelf; all the *Actions* of *Divinity*, being *real Divinity at ſecond hand*, or nothing but *Diffuſions*, or *Emanctions* of its own eſſence.

Again, who ever reared a magnificent ſtructure a purpoſe to ruine it? and ſince there is no *Artificer* ſo unnatural or ſtupid, as not to deſire rather that his *Artifice* ſhould proſper and continue long by carefull looking to, then be expoſed to ruine by neglect or violence: tis infinitely more improbable, that the great *Exemplar* of all *Mechanicks* (for no age ever produced a peice of *Art, whoſe pattern was not firſt in Nature*) ſhould ſo far grow out of love with his own operation, and deſpiſe thoſe perfections, which were but the *extracts* of himſelf; as to diſclaim it, commit it to the imminent diſorder and demolition of *Fortune*, and not make proviſion of all things conducible to its preſervation: eſpecially when

when no *Intellect* but his own could be large enough to comprehend the Idea of the work, no *Prudence* but his own absolute enough to project the convenient modell of its due gubernation, no *Power* but his own almighty enough to furnish him with requisites thereto.

Nor can it, with safety, or honour to our judgements, be imagined, that God might, had he so pleased, have constituted the World in such absolute perfection, as that from the minute of its complete existence it might have continued *independent*, and to all eternity have subsisted *by it self*, and all its appointed motions have constantly, without intermission, or variation, succeeded by the direction of their bequeathed impressions, without the assiduous moderation of his care, or the minutely supply of his providence, since the Universe, according to the Grammar of sound Philosophy, is no *Noune Substantive*, and enjoyes *reality* only by a *distinction*: *i. e.* is *something by dependence upon him, who was eternally contrary to nothing*; and being, at that instant, when *Omniety* informed *Nullity* into *existence*, educed out of nothing, by the single *Fiat* of *God*, and thence forward continued to be something by the continued Power of the Creator: must unavoidably revert to nothing again, if the perseverance of that identical power be substracted, from which it once obtained to be something. And as *Light* cannot subsist, if separated from a *lucid body*; but instantly vanishes into opacity: so cannot the World (which is but a reflexive deradiation from that *Light*, which is invisible) continue, if the perpetual sourse of that miraculous *Virtue*, which upholds its existence, be withdrawn, but must immediately vanish into nothing. For the *Analogy* holds in all points, and the dependence of the *Creature* upon the *Creator*, is as highly absolute, as that of *Light* upon the *Sun*, or other *lucid body*. And though there are some things, which being once assisted into determinate essences by their causes, doe afterwards subsist without them, and keep possession of those Forms by their own native force: yet are they such as were still *something* before their specification to this or that nature by their causes; since all that natural Causes can doe, is *to mould an old matter into a new figure*, and so dispose the faculties existent therein, that a new

new ſomething may ſtart out of the ruines of an old ſomething. But the World which was nothing before the fruitfull voyce of *Elohim* called it into ſomething, hath nothing from it ſelf to ſubſiſt upon; but muſt therefore, in the twinckling of an eye, become nothing again, unleſs its exiſtence be ſupported and maintained by the conſtant recruit of the ſame *miraculous Power*, which firſt created it. I ſay, the ſame *miraculous Power*; for the *Creation* doubtleſs was the greateſt *miracle*, that ever was wrought: it being more difficult to turn *Nothing* into *all things*, by the bare *nutus* or *vote* of the *Firſt Cauſe*, then to produce an extraordinary *effect* by inverting the uſual method of *Secondary Cauſes*; a harder wonder to make *Nature* herſelf, then to præpoſter, or tranſcend her cuſtomary rules of acting, to the cauſation of an effect either againſt, or above her ſelf. Though to ſpeak rationally, and as men that underſtand ſomething of *Theoſophy*; nothing can be a miracle to him, to whom all things are not only of equal *poſſibility*, but of equal *facility* alſo. When therefore we ſay, that *God is the Cauſe of the world*; we are to underſtand him to be ſo in the ſame relation, that the *Sun* is the *Cauſe of Light*: and by conſequence, as the *Light* diſappears in the Aer, when the *Sun* diſcontinues its *Actinobeliſme* or deradiation in our hemiſphear, by viſiting the lower; ſo alſo muſt the *World* diſappear and be loſt in adnihilation, when *God* ſhall pleaſe to diſcontinue his influx of minutely *Creation*, or (to ſpeak more conform to our præſent ſcope, though it ſignifie the ſame thing in height of truth) to intermit his *Providence*.

Article 4. The vaſtity of the world: the infinite variety of its parts: and the irreconcileable diſcord of many natures: demonſtrate as much.

Moreover, ſo immenſe are the bounds of this vaſt Empire, the World, ſo numerous and various its ſubdiviſions, and thoſe again dichotomized into ſo many myriads of Cantons, or Provinces, and each of thoſe peopled with ſo many millions of different and diſcordant natures; that no reaſon can admit it ſo much as probable, that a conſtant correſpondence could be maintained, and a general amity obſerved though all, without the conſerving influence of a *Rector General*, or *Supervisor*, whoſe *Will* receives laws from his *Wiſdome*, and gives them to all beſides himſelf. And therefore their thoughts miſſed not much of the white of

truth, who conceived *God* to hold the same place in the world, as a *Pilot* in a ship, a *Charioter* in his Chariot, a *Chanter* in a Chorus, a *Father* in a family, a *Monarch* in a Kingdome, or a *General* in an Army. For, as the first preserves from shipwrack, the second from deviation and subversion, the third from discord, the fourth from poverty and desolation, the fifth from divisions, and the last from confusion: so doth the wise oversight of God regulate the efficiencies of all *Natural Agents*, with such admirable policie, that the whole is preserved in safety, in the direct road that leadeth to the general end, in harmony, in prosperity, in union, in perfect order.

To draw a line yet more parallel; we every day observe in the sad experiments of death, what a leaden and unweildly mass of clay the *body* becomes, so soon as its sprightly Tenant, the *Soul*, hath surrendred to corruption; and it needs not much proof, that the *Soul* of this giganuk *body*, the Universe, is *God*: therefore when this soul shall withdraw and cease its Animation, must that body fall by its own weight, and suffer dissolution.

Not that therefore, in strictness of sense, or without the latitude of a metaphor, *God* is a *Soul*, and the *World* his *Body*; but because the informing and actuating Presence of God is as absolutely necessary to the vitality of the World, and the moderation of all its parts in the due execution of their distinct offices, as the Presence of a soul to the animation of a body, and the regulation of all its members in the requisite administrations of their several functions.

Article 5. Under what restriction we are to understand that tropology of some Hermetical Philosophers, *Deum esse Animam Mundi.*

And upon this ground, our zeal ought not to distast that *Figurative expression* of those *mystical and symbolical Philosophers*, who call *God*, the *Soul of the World*; nor be captious at that rhetorique, which hath comparatively styled him, the *Pilot*, *Emperour*, and *General of Nature*: since tis the most mannerly language mortality can invent, for the explanation of his *Government*; nor is it probable, that those profound speculators, who first adopted those modest metaphors, to shadow the unutterable infinity of his *Wisdome* and *Power*, were ignorant that there ought still this *difference* to be allowed, that though a *Pilot* is not *ubiquitary* in all

all parts of his ſhip, nor an *Emperour* actually *omnipreſent* in all places of his dominions, nor a *General locally preſent* in all quarters and ſtations of his Army; yet God is *intimately omnipreſent* in every particle of the world. So that what is uncertainly ſaid of the *Soul, Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte*: may be moſt certainly ſaid of *God, Totus in toto, and totus in qualibet parte.*

In fine, as the inſpection and conſideration of the World, hath formerly repleniſhed us with irrefutable Arguments of its *Creation* by God: ſo alſo may it evince the conſtant *Conſervation* of it, by the influence of his *Providence.*

For whoever (though a meer *Pagan*, whoſe brain never received the impreſſion of either of thoſe two notions, *Creator* and *Providence*) ſhall ſpeculate the world in an Engyſcope or magnifying Glaſs, *i.e.* ſhal look upon it in the diſtinction of its ſeveral orders of natures, obſerve the commodious diſpoſition of parts ſo vaſt in quantity, ſo infinite in diverſity, ſo ſymmetrical in proportions, ſo exquiſite in pulchritude: ſhall contemplate the comelineſs, ſplendor, conſtancy, converſions, revolutions, viciſſitudes, and harmony of celeſtial bodies: ſhall thence deſcend to ſublunary, and with ſober admiration conſider the neceſſary difference of ſeaſons, the certain-uncertain ſucceſſion of contrary tempeſts, the inexhauſtible treaſury of Jewels, Metals, and other wealthy Minerals concreted in the fertile womb of the earth; the numerous, uſefull and elegant ſtock of vegetables; the ſwarms of various Animals, and in each of theſe, the multitude, ſymmetry, connexion, and deſtination of organs: I ſay, whoever ſhall with attentive thoughts perpend the excellencies of theſe unimitable *Artifices* (for all things are *Artificiall, Nature being the Art of God*) cannot, unleſs he contradict the teſtimony of his own *Conſcience*, and invalidate the evidence of that authentique *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*, but be ſatisfied; that as nothing leſs then an infinite *Power and Wiſdome* could contrive and finiſh, ſo nothing leſs then the unceſſant vigilancy and moderation of an infinite *Providence* can conſerve and regulate them, in order to the mutual benefit each of other, and all conſpiring, though in their contentions, to the promotion of the common intereſt.

Article 6. The Atheiſts ſubterfuges of *Nature* and *Fortune*, præcluded.

If any ſhall yet ſtand out and object, that what I call *Providence*, is no other but *Nature* nicknamed, all thoſe ſetled motions and regular effects in the world being but the neceſſary products of its eſtabliſht laws, and unalterable method: yet ſince they all declare an *Infinite intelligence* in that Nature, which could decree thoſe perfect conſtitutions, and ſo ſtrictly oblige all things to obſerve them in order to a general and particular good; he muſt at laſt by compulſion diſcover *Divinity* diſguiſed under the vizard of Nature, by whoſe counſel and directions all things operate.

Nor can any man with more hopes of ſafety recurre to *Fortune*; or affirme, that there is no *Præordination* of contingencies, but that all events are the inconſiderate and extemporary reſults of *Chance*: ſince we have lately beheld the ruines of that Sanctuary, nor dare I be ſo uncharitable, as to preſume that the reaſon of any thing prætending to humanity, can be ſo infatuted with the ſtupid idolatry of that Fairy Queen, as to expect a farther refutation of that delirium.

Sect. IV.

HAving, with perſpicuity equal to the higheſt expectation, demonſtrated the neceſſity of *Univerſal Providence*, from the nature both of the *Agent* and *Patient*; *God* and the *World*; it remains only that we withdraw that curtain of *objections*, wherewith the Impiety of its adverſaries hath darkned the proſpect of leſs ocular diſcerners, and terminated the viſion of thoſe whoſe opticks have not been ſtrong enough to transfix it.

Article 1. The Atheiſts firſt Antiprovidential Argument refuted, by the *Perfection* of the *Divine Nature*: and their abſurdity, in commenſurating the *excellencies* of *God*, by the infinitely inferior *Faculties* of man, detected.

The firſt, we may remember, was that vanity of *Epicurus*, that *the condition of a bliſsful and immortal Nature* (ſuch was his character of Divinity) *is inconſiſtent with the neceſſary perturbations and perplexities of buſineſs.*

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But alas! how groſly muſt he delude himſelf, who fathoms the extent of an *Infinite*, by the unequal geometry of a *Finite*, and limits incomprehenſible *Omniety* to the narrow circumſcriptions of *Humanity*; which in compariſon is but one remove from *Nullity*? Had *God*, indeed, been, as he conceived him, of *Humane figure*; it had been no error in the Court of Reaſon to have concluded him not much ſuperior in the capacity of his *Intellect*: but when the *Divine Nature*, as himſelf acknowledged, muſt tranſcend all other in perfection and excellencies; how palpable a contradiction did he fall upon, in commenſurating the latitude of its *Power* and *Wiſdome*, by the ſpan of an imperfect and caduce nature, betwixt which and *Omnipotent-omniſcience* are ſo many degrees of difference, as all the figures and cyphers of Arithmetick cannot amount to their compute, nor is mortality qualified to conceive. To paint a *Sound*, is a far eaſier task, then to deſcribe the imperveſtigable manner of *Gods operations*: and to deny the poſſibility of that, whoſe reaſon we cannot explore, is to proclaim our ignorance of any nature more perfect then our own; and that upon conſequence, is to make our nature more imperfect then really it is, by rendring it uncapable of the greateſt *Truth*; nay, of that truth, upon whoſe certitude, the aſſurance of all poſſible cognition doth neceſſarily depend. This had the raſh *Epicurus* conſidered, doubtleſs he never had diſparaged the nature of man, by equalizing it to Gods. I ſay, *diſparaged*; becauſe to conceive a *Finite eſſence*, as *perfect* as an *Infinite*, is openly to confeſs that nature, which can conceive ſo horrid and ſenſible an *Abſurdity*, to be far more frail and contemptible, then all other of its actions declare it to be: not but, in direct vetity, tis the greateſt diſparagement, and no leſs then blaſphemy to the infinitely ſacred majeſty of *God*, to be put in the ſcales againſt vile, ignorant, and impotent *Man*.

And while his thoughts ſtagged ſo many ſphears below the *Empyreum* of all perfection, twas no wonder that he was ſtaggered at *Univerſal Providence*; that being a notion impoſſible to be inſtilled into any mind, that is not firſt prepared with the beleif of an *Univerſal Intelligence*.

Again, to draw into a ſharper angle, and render the abſurdity

of this Comparison more ridiculous; the Reasons why a man, though of the strongest brain, and greatest abilities for business, must of necessity suffer disquiet, distractions and wearisome solicitude from the multiplicity of cares, are (1.) the narrowness of his Understanding, which cannot be expanded to take in all the remote, proxime, and confederate Causes, events, dependencies, connexions, circumstances, &c. of occurrences: (2.) the shortness of his Power, which cannot stretch to furnish him with all things necessary as well to the prevention and remove of all incident impediments, as to the molition, promotion, and accomplishment of his designes: and (3.) the restraint of his Person to Time, Place and distance. But, on the other side, God is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipræsent; and therefore in the præordination, direction and compulsion of all things to the causation of those effects, which his Will hath decreed, he knows infinitely less of labour or disquiet, then the healthiest man doth in the motions of respiration, in his soundest sleep.

Article 2. Divinity demonstrated superior to the circumscription both of *Time* and *Place*.

That God is not subject to the restraint of *Time*, is manifest from his *Eternity*; for that is *indivisible*, and knows no distinction of tenses: and therefore what we (whose imperfect reason cannot compute the duration of things, but by the successive instances, or concatenated moments of time) call *Prædestination*, is really no prædetermination of what's to come, in respect to God, but an act of his will already accomplisht, and as soon fulfilled as decreed; and so we may truely say, that in relation to himself, there is no *Foreknowledge* in God, all things which to our inferior Capacities seem either past, or to come, being actually præsent to him, whose whole duration is altogether, or but one constant and permanent point, one Τὸ νῦν, entire in unity, and uncapable of division into successive minutes, or articles.

That he is not subject to the restraint of *Place*, is evident from his *Omniety*, his being all in all; *Ubiquity* being the proper and inseparable *Attribute* of his nature. His being *All in All*, not only *ratione Præsentiæ*, but *ratione Essentiæ* also; he being the chief *Soul* not only of all *Bodies*, but of all *Spirits* also. And for this reason we cannot offend Theology, if we affirme, that God is

is as *fully Present* in Hell among the accursed, as in Heaven among the blessed natures, though not so *comfortably*; and that the Devils would rejoyce if they could conceive it possible for him to be absent thence: since their existence, and so their Torments would then cease, his presence being the original and support of all existence.

Now if all this be amassed into one demonstration, and that duely perpended; I demand as well of the most contumacious infidelity, as the rankest ignorance, what can remain desirable, in order to the full information of our reason; that if there were a million of Worlds, nay as many as there are individuals in this, and in each a 1000000 times more business then in this: yet could the oversight and gubernation of them all, and the regular managery of every the smallest occurrence in them, put *Divinity* to no more trouble, disquiet, or interruption of felicity, then the simple *Act* of *Volition* doth induce upon the soul of man.

Article 3. That the procuration of all the Infinitely various actions of second causes, in the World, cannot be any interturbation of Gods serene *felicity*, proved by an Argument *à minori*.

However, for further illustration, I cannot think it unnecessary to superadd this; that since *Man* himself doth ordinarily perform some actions, particularly those, which he is not only qualified and impowered, but also inclined to doe, by the native virtue, or congenial propensity of his Essence, as to *Cogitate*, *Desire*, *Love*, *Rejoyce* in the manifestation of his good parts or endowments, &c. not only without labour and inquietude, but even with superlative delight and content: it cannot but be concordant to reason to assert, that *God* is so far from sustaining any difficulty, molestation, or diminution of felicity, in the constant act of *Universal Providence*; which is the natural effect of his *Infinite Intelligence* and *Indefatigable Activity*, that 'tis rather a part of his *Beatitude* so to exercise and manifest his *Divinity*. Not that the abyss of his *Happiness* was not full before the World was; but because, being moved by his own immense *Goodness* to create a convenient subject, whereon to actuate his *Munificence*, he is pleased still to delight himself in the continued diffusion and communication of his excellencies, by the conservation and regulation of the same, according to the most prudent laws of his Will.

I have often consulted the most knowing and best ordered minds,

minds, with whom I could attain the bleſſing of a free converſation (and ſuch, doubtleſs, are the only competent judges of delight) wherein lay the Philoſophers ſtone of *Content* in this life, and in what actions of their lives they diſcovered the higheſt and moſt permanent pleaſure: and they all concurred in this determination, *Aliis proeſſe, & quàm licet plurimis bene facere.* And this upon no ſlender ground, ſince the *Beatitude* of *Man* doth radically and totally conſiſt in his *appropinquation* to *God*, and we never come ſo neer him, in this remote vale of tears, as when we go out of our ſelves to relieve the neceſſities, lighten the oppreſſions, and prevent or repair the ruines of others. For *Charity* is the only excellence, wherein we may, in ſome ſort, rival our maker: and were but our *Wills* conſtantly fixt upon the practiſe of this virtue, and our *Abilities* of doing good but half ſo infinite as our Wills (for the wings of our *Underſtanding* are, indeed, but *ſhort*; but thoſe of our *Will* are *long*, and have a liberty to fly at all, as ſhall be ſingularly proved in convenient place) we might anticipate no ſmall part of the joys of heaven, while we ſojourne upon earth, and ſhould need no other Heraldry to teſtifie our ſelves the off-ſpring of *Divinity*. Now if it be ſo intenſe a *delight* to the mind of *man*, which is but a beam deradiated from that immenſe *Sun of Charity*, to do good: ought we to think it a *trouble* to *God*, who is *moſt intelligent*, and ſo beſt knows the neceſſities of all things; *moſt beneficent*, and ſo moſt ready to relieve them; *moſt rich*, and ſo not obnoxious to impoveriſhment by the continual profuſion of his favours; to be a *general benefactor* by his Providence?

Article 4. The ſame illuſtrated by a ſecond compariſon.

To conclude; if the *viſible* and *periſhable Sun* can with unceſſant liberality, diffuſe his conſolatory and all-impregnating ſtreams of light, heat, and influence on all parts of the ſenſible or adſpectable World; and ſo concurre to the generation, vitality, growth, perfection and conſervation of all ſublunary Natures; and this without labour, laſſation, or exhauſtion: Why ſhould not the *Inviſible*, *Unperiſhable*, and *Infinite Sun* (of which the other is but a dark and contracted ſhadow) be allowed to have his *Wiſdome*, *Power*, *and Goodneſs* (which Trinity of Attributes make

make the unity of Providence, as I have formerly hinted) in all places, and at all times diffused, in their operations, over all his Works, with the same facility.

Article 5. That the administration of petty occurrences can be no *indignity* or disparagement to the sacred Majesty of God; but, on the contrary absolutely *essentiall* to him, firmly evicted, from the universality of his *Cognition* and *Presence*.

And as it can be no *Interturbation* to the serene *Felicity*, so neither can it be a *Dishonour* or disparagement to the superexcellent *Majesty* of *God*, to transmit the rayes of his *Providence* to the most minute, and seemingly most trivial and contemptible transactions on this great exchange of the world. And therefore *Pliny*, who said, *necesse est ut Deus tam tristi, tamque multiplici ministerio polluatur*; might with less absurdity have affirmed, that the Sun doth an action much below the dignity of so glorious a creature, and must have the purity of his light suffer diminution and contamination, when it projects its radiant beams upon sordid and putrid bodies; when it cooperates to the production of Toads, Serpents, worms and other the like base vermin; and when it promotes the fertility of noxious and deleterious weeds, as well as wholsome and medical plants. For those things which appear vile, despicable and ugly to the queazy judgment of man; are not so really to *Nature*: since she knowes no *deformity*, and therefore all her pieces must be amiable: not really so to the eyes of the *Author of Nature*, since he hath thought good to configurate them according to the most exact ideas in his own wise intellect; and therefore *Beauty* is best defined by the conformity every thing holds to its primitive exemplar in the Intellect of its Creator: not so to *themselves*, since they have obtained a perfection congruous to their *species*, and enjoy an absolute pulchritude respective to their distinct kinde; and therefore no Animal is so insensible of the perfection of its *Forme*, as to desire either to lose, or exchange it.

Again, those Actions, which seem various, cary the face of multiplicity, and fill up whole sheets, in the diary of man; stand but for an unit in the Arithmetick of Nature, and make but a monosyllable in the book of Fate: it being the natural prerogative of Ubiquitary Omnipotence, to doe all things at once.

Consider we, with what ease and quiet the pale and feeble *Soul* of a *Tree* can at once provide for the *Vegetation* as well of each

leafe and blossome, as of the trunck and root, and cook the insipid juice of the earth into an Aliment conveniet to the conservation and growth of each single fiber and filament both of the cortex or bark, and of the interior and medullary substance: in a word, transfuse a vital influence through each indivisible particle of that great mass, of which it is composed.

Consider we, how easily the more luminous and energetical *Soul* of an *Elephant*, can at one and the same time, in one and the same blast, or deradiation of virtue, administer its nourishing influx to each particle of that vast body; and omitts not to take care of every single haire among so many myriads as cloth the skin, in its common doale or distribution of Vitality.

And when we have thus gently informed our selves, that tis as easie to the weak and evanid soul of a *Plant* (which the best *Physiology* defines to be nothing, *but a certain modification of matter volatilized, or a contexture of smooth, globular aqual and so of salubrious Atoms, moved by the seminal virtue or plastick Faculty of that particular species, and soon dissolved again upon a variation of figure and situation of those insensible particles of which it is composed*) to make provision for the livelyhood & sustentation of all parts in that mass, as for any one of them: that tis as genuine and familiar to the *Soul* of an *Animal* (which is also a *Corporeal substance*, or the more spiritual part of the bloud subtiliated by vital heat, traduced from its genitor) to animate and govern all parts of its body, as any one: we cannot but acknowledge, that the *Procuration* and *Administration* of all the affairs of the world, is as facil and natural to the *Providence of God* (who is the *Soul* of all *Souls*, and the *life of Spirits*) as to take the care of any one individual Nature.

If the oversight and regency of but half so many different operations, as that immaterial Empress, which keeps her invisible Court somewhere within us, doth every minute, even when we are fast lockt in the narcotick armes of Morpheus, and all our thoughts keep holy day, order and effect, while she maintains the oeconomy of the body; were charged upon the hands of our understanding, but for one houre: without question, the burden would prove insupportable, nor could either the skill or strength

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of our limited reason, in any measure responsible, suffice to the due administration of so large a Province. When, therefore, to fathom the depth of that immense natural prudence, and soveraign virtue, wherewith the soul of man is richly endowed, and which she constantly declares in the prosperous exercise of her Monarchy, with the short line of our intelligence; or to estimate her Providence according to the rate of our cheaper faculties; is both ignorance and unjustice: how infinitely more stupid and unwarrantable a course doth that wretch take, who adventures to commensurate the superexcellent *knowledge* and almighty *virtue* of *God*, whereby he procures and moderates the affairs of the World?

That man is, for the most, incurious of final and trivial occurrences; is so far from being a wonder, that contrariwise those, who could tripartite their thoughts to the contrivemẽt of but three different businesses, at once, as *Cæsar*, have been lookt upon as *Prodigies*: and he that can lay the grounds of but one popular designe, so as to have it succeed without impediment, or the intervention of cross accidents; is reputed a profound *Politician*, and his head a whole spheat above the vulgar. This, I am not ignorant, the haughtiness of his spirit hath referred to the *fixation of his thoughts upon objects either of his pleasure or ambition*; when in modest truth, this pretension of *sublimity* is but a gloss, or specious vernish to conceal the *imbecillity* and *limitation* of his *intelligence*. For that being two narrow, to be extended to the forecast and regulation of many things at once; and his stomach too high to descend to a due acknowledgment of the imperfection of his nature: he guilds over the poverty with the pride of his minde, and endevours to excuse his frailty, by insimulating, that to attend the study of trifles, and in the interim supersed the projection of matters of importance, is a disparagement to the nobility of his Intellectuals. When if his reason were so capacious, as to admit the care of petty affairs, without the confusion, or neglect of others of more concernment; nothing, though nere so mean and ordinary, could seem below the dignity of his Providence. But that *God* should be incurious of any action in the world, is absolutely impossible; since contrapugnant to the *Uni-*

versality of his *Cognition* and *Præsence*: for what is *Omniscient* and *Ubiquitary*, can be ignorant of nothing; and consequently it can be no more either of *Profanation* to the *Sanctity*, or *dishonour* to the glorious *Majesty* of the *Deity*, to extend his Providence to the meanest contingents in nature, then it can be to the *Soul*, to vegetate and inspire each single *hair* of that body she informs.

Sect. V.

Article 1. The first division of the Atheists second objection; *viz.* that *the apparent irregularity of events doth justifie their non-prædestination or meer Contingency*; strongly confuted: and that to the prædordination of divinity nothing can be casual; clearly commonstrated.

TO their *Second objection, that all events in the World are either the non-prædestinate and extemporary results of Chance; or the necessary and setled effects of Nature, all Actives and Passives being, by the unalterable laws of their primitive constitutions, firmely adliged unto, and irresistibly impelled upon the causation of determinate effects respective to the energy of their particular configurations*: we as easily as uprightly answer,

First, that to the prædestination of that *Almighty Cause*, which can and doth dispose the motions of all things according to the præscripts of his own *Will*, no event can be casual or unexpected; though indeed, if we have regard to the præscience and forecast of man, to whose dim opticks all things are invisible, that stand in the dark of futurity, many events seem meer *Accidents*, and the most mature *determinations* of *Fate* may pass for the rash and inconsiderate *hitts* of *Fortune*.

And if so, how audacious a temerity is it in us, so to magnifie our own slender perspicacity, as when we cannot discern why this or that particular concurse and encounter of natural causes should occur, rather then another, and such or such an issue of their confederate activities succeed, rather then another; instantly to conclude, that there can be no *Superior Cause*, or *superintendent power*, which hath thus or thus ordained and disposed those certain means to those certain ends, and whose counsels we are not privy

ptivy unto? Look we no farther then the ordinary Providence of *Princes*, and in every *Republick* our observation shall meet with a thousand events, which in the judgements of their vulgar subjects, and such as stand aloof from the Councel table, are deemed meer *Contingents*, as never at all designed upon any secret reasons of State; when yet to the Prince himself, and those to whom he hath communicated the mystery of his designations, they really are the *intended effects of his Prudence*, which had so politickly ordered his affairs, and so wisely prepared all Agents requisite to the bringing about of his purposes, that they could not but hit and be accomplish't accordingly. And is there then, why we should not be confirmed, that in this *immense Commonwealth*, in whose government the most inobservant cannot but take notice of innumerable passages so admirable, both in respect of the weak *Instruments* that served to bring them to pass, and of the obscurity or impervestigability of the *Ends*, at which they were levelled; that nothing less then an *infinite Wisdome* could contrive, nothing less then an *infinite Power* effect them: there must of necessity be a *Rector General* or *President Paramont*, by whose soveraign dictates all subordinate ministers are set on work, in order to the execution of his pleasure, and in their operations vary not a hairs-bredth from the rules prescribed by his Will; though neither the *manner* of their *activities*, nor the *Ends* to which they are destined fall under the discovery of our purblinde reason? For the *Polity* of *God* is inscrutable, and may well delight our *Piety* with wonder, but must empuzzle our insolent *Curiosity*: and the eye of our souls, being in this life far dimmer then that of *Moses* body, cannot survey so much as the back parts, or *dark side* of *Divinity*; much less pry into the maze of his *Counsels*, and read the invisible decrees of that mystical *Senate*, wherein though there be a consult of *three Persons*, there is yet but *one minde*, which votes without contradiction, and his *Volition, deliberation* and *Election*, make but one simple act. For my part, that the wayes of God in the World are past finding out; that there is a *Sanctum Sanctorum* in the Ark of Providence, into which blind mortality cannot look; and that the cryptick turnings, doublings, and redoublings of that hand, which works all its rarities in the

dark, and sometimes inverts, now and then transcends, and anon infringes the *Axioms* of *Nature* (to shew, that as he made, so he can alter her, and tune all her strings to a concord with his will) make a labyrinth to intricate and lose the presumptious reason of man, that dares hope to explore and trace it: this, I say, is demonstration enough to me, that there is one *Universal Intelligence*, which both moves and directs all individual *Agents* to act, in order to the accomplishment of some positive end, for the most part best, and many times only known to himself.

Nor is it an illegal process of our reason, but the best logick, as to *supernaturals*; to conclude not only the excellencies, but even the necessary being of some things, meerly from hence that we cannot fully comprehend them: since their very being above our capacity, is argument both clear and strong enough, that they are not only so as, but more perfect and far greater then we understand them to be; as he that sees but a small part of the sea with a Telescope at distance, may safely conclude that tis exceeding large; because the circumferrence thereof is, by infinite degrees of magnitude, wider then to be drawn into the aperture of his slender tube. Sure I am, at least, that the *Antisyllogisme*, or *Counter-argument*; the understanding of man cannot discover its abstruse and mysterious plots, resolve its multiplex ænigma's, nor analyze its method, or series of Causes subordinate, and so by a retrograde chase hunt out its first and chief intention: *Ergo*, there can be no Providence: is intolerable, and deserves a greater dose of Ellebor, then that absurdity of the blinde man, who concluded there was not, nor could be any such thing as light, or Colours, only because he could not see them. When therefore we shall have run our eager contemplations to a stand, in the wilderness of Providence, and lost our busie thoughts in the maze of Gods secret decrees; all the satisfaction our bold curiosity can return home with, will be only this: that all occurrences in the World are predetermined, have their *Causes*, *Times*, and *Ends* punctually set down in the *Ephemerides* of *Fate*; and though in the incompetent judgment of man, some of them may seem the *Peradventures*, or temerarious *Hits* of *Chance*: yet are they the mature *Designations* of the *supreme Wisdome*: though in the ears

ears of man, they may ſound *diſcords* to the muſick of *particular Natures*, yet will they at laſt be found *well compoſed Parts* neceſſary both to ſweeten, and fill up the common *Harmony* of the Univerſe. To inſtance; are there not many *Monſters*, *Hetteroclites*, *Equivocal* and irregular births, on the earth: many prodigious and new-faced *Meteors* in the upper, and uncertain *Anomalies* or unſeaſonable *Tempeſts* in the lower diviſion of the Aer: many new *Phænomena* among the fixed; various encounters, divitions, and conſpiracies among the erratick ſtars &c. and yet doe not all theſe, as Chrotchets and Quavers in a grave and ſolemn leſſon on a Lute, conduce to the advancement of the *General Melody*? Doth not *irregularity* render *order* the more conſpicuous and amiable? and *Deformity*, like the *Negro* drawn at *Cleopatra's* elbow, ſerve as a foile to ſet off *Beauty*? Are not the *Moles* on the cheeks of *Nature*, as thoſe on *Venus* skin, placed there to illuſtrate or whiten the ſnow, and ſweeten the feature of her face? Is it not exceeding gracefull in a *Comedian*, to temper and endear the ſage and weighey ſcenes of *Princes*, and Melancholy *States-men*, with the light interludes of *Pantalons*, *Clowns*, and *Anticks*? Doth not the *Painter* then ſhew the moſt of skill, when he refracts the glaring luſter of his *lighter* Colours, with a veil of *Sables*; and makes the *beauty* of his peice more viſible by clouding it with a becoming *ſhadow*? And without doubt, every man will readily conjoyne his vote to ours, that he is beſt able to *adorn* and imbelliſh a piece of Art, who firſt *contrived* and wrought it: and therefore the *Perfection* and *Condecoration* of a work doth properly and ſolely belong to his hand, that brought it to that height, as to want only ornament; nor is it his part to preſcribe what's neceſſary to the conciliation of gracefulneſs and decorament to an engine, who is ignorant of the modell, and holds not a perfect Idea of the Artifice thereof. Now the importance of all theſe *ſimiles* being put together, who can be ſo ignorant in the Alphabet, or rudiments of ratiocination, as not, at firſt ſight, to ſpell them into this ſhort leſſon, conſiſting only of two orthodox Poſitions.

Firſt, that thoſe ſubitaneous *Accidents*, which the ignorance or careleſneſs of the vulgar doth uſually refer to the blind ſortilegies.

legies of *Chance*; are truely the meer *hand of God*, and the prudent designes of that *Catholick Providence, which hath numbred the sands on the Sea shoar, and weighed the dust of the earth in a balance: which feeds the young Ravens, when they cry, and while the old ones wander for meat: which thundereth marvellously with his voyce; and doth great things, that we cannot comprehend: for he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the smal rain, and to the great rain of his strength: by whose breath frost is given; and the breadth of the waters is straightned: which turneth the bright clouds round about by his Counsels, that they may doe what ever he commandeth them upon the earth: who made the ordinances of heaven, and hath set the dominions thereof in the earth: who can binde the sweet influences of the Pleiades, and lose the bands of Orion: can bring forth Mazaroth in his season, and guide Arcturus with his sons, &c.*

Secondly, that those *Monstrosities*, or extraordinary and prodigious effects, which the nescience of the multitude cals *Irregularities*, *Perversions*, and *Deformities* of *Nature*; to wiser considerations, prove themselves to be no wanton excursions, or randome shots of her hand, made without aim at any final cause; but *praordained*, and *collineated* by that sure one of *Divine Providence*, point blanck at some certain *end*, *private* or *publick*. The *former* being known only to himself, *à priori*; and frequently mistaken by man, *à posteriori*: the *later*, indeed, we have a liberty to conjecture, to be either that he leaves the straight, and chalks out this serpentine and crooked line, to satisfie the World of his *Prerogative*, that himself is the *Agent*, and *Nature* but his *Instrument*, and therefore to be turned, wrenched, altered, and perverted at his pleasure; or else, that his wisdome thinks those spots requisite to enhance the beauty of the whole, those private fewds and petty discords betwixt Individuals, necessary not only to endear, but conserve the peace of the whole.

Both which durable Truths are, with so much piety, as judgement, contracted by that *Emperor* of the *Stoicks* as well as of the *Romans*, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* (of whom the smooth *Herodian* (*initio historiæ*) gives this glorious Character, μόνος τὲ βασιλέων φιλοσοφίαν, ὐ λόγοις, ὐδὲ δογμάτων γνώσεσι, σεμνῷ

σμῷ δ' ἤθει καὶ βίῳ σώφρονι διηρώτησε: *Solus imperatorum ſapientiæ ſtudium non verbis aut decretorum ſcientia, ſed gravitate morum, vitæque continentia uſurpavit*) into one ſhort meditation, in theſe words; Τὰ τῶν θεῶν, προνοίας μεστὰ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἐκ ἄνευ φύσεως ἢ συγκλώσεως, καὶ ἐπιπλοκῆς τῆ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων. πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ, πρόσεστι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον, οὗ μέρος εἶ. παντὶ δὲ φύσεως μέρει ἀγαθὸν, ὃ φέρει ἡ τῆδε ὅλης φύσις, καὶ ὃ ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωτικόν. Σώζουσι δὲ κόσμον ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν στοιχείων, ὕτως καὶ αἱ τῶν συγκριμάτων μεταβολαί: *Quæ ad Deos ut auctores referuntur, ea Providentia plena eſſe nemo dubitat. Quæ Fortunæ vulgò adſcribuntur, ne illa quidem extra Naturæ leges, fatalemque illum contextum, complexúmque rerum, quæ à providentia adminiſtrantur. Inde omnia fluunt: adde quod neceſſarium eſt, quicquid eſt, & toti univerſo (cujus tu pars es) conducibile. Porro autem quod natura Univerſi fert, quódque ad eam facit conſervandam, id bonum eſt unicuivis Univerſi particulæ. Conſervant autem mundum, quemadmodum elementorum, ita & ex iis concretarum rerum mutationes.* Libri εἰς ἑαυτὸν primi ſect. ultima.

Secondly, that no *Natural Agent* hath the rains in its own hands, or the liberty to act in a *looſe and arbitrary way*; but all things obſerve that immutable *Tenor*, or ſetled courſe, which they began to operate in at their firſt inauguration to eſſence: provided that we underſtand this aſſertion under a twofold *reſtriction*.

Article 2. The Authors *Antitheſis*, that all Natural Agents are under the ſtrict laws of their diſtinct ſpecies.

Firſt, that this Tenor or eſtabliſht method, was not inſtituted by the improvidence of Fortune, as our Atheiſts would have it; but ordained, enrolled and enacted by the counſel of an infinite Wiſdome.

Article 3. A ſecond *Counterpoſition*, that thoſe laws were inſtituted and ſancted by an *infinite wiſdom*.

Secondly, *that this ſupernatural Nature, which excogitated and decreed this convenient law, and endowed each ſingle entity*

Article 4. A third, that the *legiſlator* hath reſerved to himſelf a prærogative power to alter, tranſcend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature.

with a Power or Faculty respective to its duty thereto, and observance or execution thereof; hath not thereby so tied up his own hands, or limited his Prerogative, as not to have reserved to himself an absolute superiority, or capacity, at pleasure to infringe, transcend, or pervert it, by giving special dispensation to any of his Creatures, to vary the manner of their Activities, in order to the Causation of any effect, which his own prudence shall think expedient.

Article 5. The verity of the first and second Positions, amply demonstrated.

For the *First* and *Second* of these *Positions*; *viz.* that as well the general Law of Nature, as those particular and œconomical rules, which being engraven not only upon every distinct species, but also upon every single or individual entity, stand both for warrant and directions to them in their several operations; were made and established by the counsel of an infinite Wisdome: may (if we may assume the liberty to aggravate what we have formerly adferd toward the attestation of the same subject) be thus demonstrated.

In the whole *Scale* of *Creatures*, we finde but five *Gradations* or roundles, by which our contemplations may orderly ascend to the highest pinnacle, or summity of Nature, and thence take a full survey of all her Provinces at large: and those are *Existence*, *Life*, *Sense*, *Locomotion voluntary*, and *Reason*. To speak yet more perspicuously.

First, there are some things, which have obtained a bare *Existence*, or meer *Being* only, and remain devoid of all the other four: such are all *simple bodies*, as the *Heavens*, and those four which common Physiology calls στοιχεῖα *Elements*; and all συγκείμενα inanimate *Concretions*, or Compositions, as Stones, Metals, Minerals, &c.

Secondly, some have not only Existence, but also *Vitality* or *Vegetability* allotted unto them, and yet want sense, and motion arbitrary, as all *Vegetables*.

A *Third* Classe is endowed with *Being*, *Life*, and *Sense*; and yet hath not attained so high as *Animal* or *voluntary motion*: to which belong all *Conchylia*, as Oysters, Muscles, Cockles, &c. which *Aristotle* (3. *De Gener. Animal. cap.* 2.) for the same reason

reaſon, facetiouſly calls *Aquatiles Plantas*, a kind of *Water Plants*; as by an inverſion, he calls earthly Plants, *Oſtrea Terrena*, a kind of *Land Oyſters*: becauſe they have not, as he opinioned, the power of tranſlating themſelves *de loco in locum* (though our *Democritus Londinenſis*, that incomparable indagator of Natures Arcana, Dr. *Harvey*, hath obſerved that Oyſters protrude, or belch out on the conical extreme of their ſhells, a certain Filme or natural ſaile, by the help whereof they remove, veer, tack about, and ſo, obſerving the Tides, conduct themſelves to ſhoars, rocks, and other places of advantage both for their feeding, and quiet) but are tumbled up and down by the impulſe of the Current.

Others of a *fourth order* are admitted to goe higher, and to their *Exiſtence*, *Vitality*, and *Senſibility*, is alſo ſuperadded *Locomotion arbitrary*, or the Faculty of removing their ſtations at pleaſure; but yet they are excluded from the perfection of *Rationality*, and know nothing good or evill, but by the diſcernment or diſcrimination of *Senſe*: as all brute Animals, Quadrupeds, Birds, Fiſhes, Amphibions, and Inſects.

And *Laſtly*, others there are, which being higheſt in the favour of their maker, poſſeſs all theſe accumulated endowments together, and have *Exiſtence*, *Life*, *Senſe*, *Voluntary motion*, and *Ratiocination* contorted together into one excellent Nature, which ſeems in an epitomy or contraction to comprehend all the others: and theſe are *our ſelves*. Some over pregnant Wits there have been, I well remember, who have added one round more to this Ladder of *Corporeal Natures*, making the *Zoophytes* or *Plant-Animals* an half-pace, or midle ſtep betwixt the 2 and 3 degrees: but untill either an autoptical experiment, or the obſervation of ſome, who are more curious of Truth, then exotique Rarities, ſhall remove thoſe ſcruples which I have in me, concerning the fidelity of thoſe large ſtories obtruded upon us by Travellers, of the *Herba mimoſa*, or mimick Plant, deſcribed by *Chriſtopher Acoſta*, firſt, afterwards by *Cluſius*, and ſince grown traditional amongſt all *Botanicks*; of the *Boramez*, or *Vegetable Lambs of Tartary* (no ſparing relation whereof was firſt communicated to the world in the common language of Europe, by *Sigiſmund*

Baron of Verbestein (*in rerum Moscoviarum Commentariis*) then countenanced by the glorious Pen of *Jul. Cæsar Scaliger* (*Exercit.* 181. *Sect.* 29.) since made more passant by *Fortunius Licetus* (*Lib.* 3. *de spont. vivent. ortu, cap.* 4.) and *Libavius* (*part* 2. *singul. exercitat. de Agno vegetabili Scythia*) and now taken for granted by all or most Herbarists of our age; of the *Sponge*, &c. I shall beg leave to suspend my belief, that there are any such Heteroclites, or midle Natures, *half Vegetable, half sensible*; or, at least, that both Faculties are so conspicuous and eminent in them, as that thence they should deserve really to be accounted a distinct order of Creatures.

Now the *Faculties*, or *essential proprieties* of all things being thus incommunicable downward, and each distinct classis so confined to its proper orb of endowments, that it can never advance upward, and usurpe more perfection then what it already stands possessed of by the Charter of its particular specification; it follows, that we explore the *reason* or *original* of this *Limitation*, and why those Natures of the first degree, are limited to meer Existence, and cannot aspire to Vegetation: why those of the second are chained down to Existence and Vegetation, without possibility of being ever promoted to Sense; those of the third preferd to Sense, but denied the additional favour of Locomotion voluntary; those of the fourth admitted to Arbitrary motion, but excluded Reason; and those of the highest enriched with all. Either this *Necessity* must be imposed upon them by *Fortune*; or by *themselves*; or by some *other principle*, which hath the free donation, and so the limitation of all those priviledges or Faculties.

First, not by *Fortune*; for that she could not institute these assignations, draw this Helix, that still enlargeth into a wider capacity, nor make this law of Propriety inviolable: is amply manifest from the *Perpetuity*, or constant observation of the same by all corporeal entities, every one having their peculiar capacities so defined, circumscribed, and immured, that no one did ever, since the first hour of Time, exceed the bounds of its own species, nor climbe up to the state of its superior; for *Constancy* and *Fortune* are Antagonists never to be reconciled, but, like *Castor* and *Pollux*,

Pollux, when one peeps above, the other ſculks below the horizon.

Secondly, not by *Themſelves*; for there is in every thing a kind of native Ambition to ennoble its nature, enlarge its power, nay (ſo much as in it lies) to mount even to infinity, according to that Axiom of *Scaliger* (*Exercit. 9. pag. 52.*) *Unicuique enti ineſt appetitio infinitatis.* Thus ſimple Natures covet to become compounds; Compounds ſpurre on to arrive at Vegetables; thoſe affect the dignity of Senſe; ſenſibles grow deſirous of muſculary Motion, &c. Can wee conceive, that a *Plant* would continue fixed and nayled down by its own roots to the earth, and there live a cold, dull, unactive life; if it could give to its ſelf motion and abilities for nobler actions? That a *Braſt* would be conſtant to the groſs and heavy operations of meer ſenſe, ſubmit to the burdens, and endure the tyrannous oppreſſions of man; if it could endow it ſelf with the prerogative of Reaſon, and ſo become equal to his imperious Lord? Or that man would ſit down quiet, and remain ſubject to the infirmities, calamities, and mortality of his nature; if he had any hopes to better it, to wind up himſelf to heaven, and there take the wall of Cherubins, nay rival the calme felicity and immortality of God? For ſo invincible a reluctancy have we againſt the neceſſity of our frailties, and ſo unceſſant hormetick a deſire to be above them, by the melioration of our ſtate; that we may truly accommodate to our pride, what the eloquent *Tertullian* ſpake to expreſs that of ſome of the Roman Emperours; *ſi ipſi ſe Deos facere potuiſſent, certè quidem homines nunquam fuiſſent*, could they have made themſelves Gods, doubtleſs they never would have been men. Seeing therefore, that tis repugnant to that inſatiable *Appetite* of *Melioration*, even to infinity, radically inherent in every entity create, though (I confeſs) ſcarce perceptible in bodies devoid of Animation; to deny to it ſelf any perfection, which is in its own power to give, or acquire: what clearer evidence can be expected, to enſure our reaſon, that the *Ampliation*, and *Limitation* of all *Natural Faculties*, or endowments, is not in the arbitrary diſpoſition, or elective power of *Finite eſſences*; and, by conſequence, that the *Law* of *Propriety*, or the reſtriction of every

species to its own orb of activity, was not made by compact among themselves, but imposed upon them by an *Infinite*.

This considered, it remains indisputable, that the *Distribution* and *Assignation* of those different *Qualifications*, being neither in the power of *Fortune*, nor of the *Things* that enjoy them; it must properly and solely belong to that *supernatural Infinite*, which is the fountain of *Being*, *Life*, *Sense*, *Locomotion* and *Reason*, and therefore had the power freely to give them; being induced to the *Collocation* of them by the meer invitement of his own *Goodness*, and directed in the convenient *Distribution* of them by the Counsel of his own *Wisdome*.

This Truth, all Ages have held sacred, and the wiser Ethnicks both of *Greece* and *Rome* ever engraffed it into their Creed, preaching it to the world, though blended under the Chaos of their symbolical or Hieroglyphical Idolatry. For *Homer*, courting the propitious aspect of his best Deity, *Jupiter*, in a panegyricall Hymn; ascribes to him, as a chief and peculiar Attribute, the power of *Circumscribing and Bounding* of all things, thus bespeaking him,

Ζλῶα Διῶν Φ ἄριστον ἀείσομαι, ὐδὲ μέγιστον,
Εὐρύοπα, κραίοντα, τελεσφόρον, &c.

Jovem Deorum optimum canam, & maximum,
Lateſonantem, validiſſimum, Terminos afferentem, &c.

And *Aristotle* likewise (*de Mundo Tom.* 2. *pag.* 1592.) cals his *Infinitum divinum*, or God, περιωμένον, διὰ τὸ περιέχεσθαι πάντα, ϗ μηδὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄπειρον εἶναι, *Quod ab eo omnia terminata ſunt, ac nihil in rerum natura ſit infinitum*, from his setting bounds to all things, and leaving nothing undefined. Nor was this unacknowledged by the elder Romans; for they had a set form of devotion, and a solemn sacrifice appointed particularly *ad Iovem terminalem*, as *Dionyſius Halicarnaſs.* (*Antiquit. Roman. Lib.* 2. *p.* 133.) hath transmitted to posterity. To this also seems the sweet tongued *Ovid* to allude, when in his description of the Creation, he saith, *Limitibus diſcrevit omnia certis.*

Now

Now the *Faculties* of all *Natural Agents* being immediately *derived* from, and ſtrictly *limited* by *God*, ſo that no one can ever tranſcend its own, nor uſurpe upon anothers confines: the *Light of Nature* will infer, that all their *operations* alſo are preſcribed, and both the *manner*, and *end* of all their activities preciſely predetermined, nay the very time and place with all other adjuncts and circumſtances of their effects appointed by the *Providence* of his *Infinite Wiſdome*.

Hitherto have we confronted only *Nature* to *Fortune*; let us therefore now give her one charge more with an *Argument* deſumed *à minori*, from *Art*.

Did ever any man, that beheld the curious Mathematicks of *Archimedes* his Sphear; the automatous flight of *Regiomontanus* his Eagle; the artificial wings of *Architas* Dove; or thoſe inanimate Birds that the ingenious Mathematician, whom the glorious *Charles* the fifth ſelected for his companion in his retirement from Empire ſent flying in at his window; or but obſerve the regular motions in a *trochiliack Horodix*, or Watch: conceive that the motions of thoſe engines were originally ſpontaneous, inſtituted by meer chance; or that each wheel aſſumed to it ſelf, by Lot, its particular figure, ſituation, axis, number of teeth, and preciſe meaſure of circumrotation? Undoubtedly no; but on the contrary, inſtantly concluded, that they were the appointed effects of provident induſtry, and had their models grounded upon maximes of the higheſt and moſt learned reaſon. And yet is our Atheiſt ſo effronted with impudence, as to give check to his own Conſcience, by daring to affirme; that the ſyſtem of the Celeſtial orbs, the Laws of natural motions, and the Architecture of thoſe admirable organs in the body of an Animal (which are engines, whoſe Artifice doth, by incomprehenſible exceſſes, tranſcend our theory in the mathematicks; inſomuch that ſome of the ſtrongeſt skuls of our age have venturd orazing to finde out the *Geometry of the Muſcles*, or the *Mechanicks* of *Voluntary motion*: and yet are forced, by an hoſt of difficulties, to retire and ſuſpend their hopes of perfecting their deſigne) were contrived by *Fortune*, and not by the skill of an *Artiſt infuſing in Science and Power*. How familiar is this Logick to every mans underſtanding;

ding; the Figures of all things in the adspectable World, are exactly Geometrical, their actions and uses respectively accommodate, their motions constant and regular at all times, their effects certain, and the laws of every distinct species immutable (as to themselves) *ergo* those *Figures*, *Actions*, *Uses*, *Motions*, and *Laws* were delineated, appointed, assigned, begun, and enacted, by an *Omniscient and omnipotent Providence*? And this I conceive sufficient to demonstrate the truth of our *First assertion*; *viz. that that constant Tenor, or establisht method, according to which all Natural causes operate, was instituted and is perpetuated by an Infinite Wisdome.*

Article 6. The verity of the third Position demonstrated.

For the support of our *Third Thesis*; that though the actions of all *Second* causes are *impulsive* and *necessary*, yet those of the *First Cause* are *Elective* and *Arbitrary*; though God hath by the severe laws of Nature, bound up the hands of his Creatures, limited their activities, and punctually consigned them their several provinces: yet he hath reserved his own free, and as an absolute Monarch, can at pleasure alter, transcend, or pervert those Statutes, and give a new Commission to his Ministers to work by a new way, in order to the causation of any extraordinary effect, which his providence hath decreed, of universal, or particular benefit: we need erect no other pillar of argument, but that one firme and immoveable basis, the importance of the word, *Creator*.

For since to be able to *produce all things out of nothing*, by the single efficacy of his word, or the energetical blast of his will, to endow each distinct species with faculties exactly proportionate and meridional to their distinct destinations, and to entail upon them to the expiration of Times own lease, that estate, in which he enfeoffed them at their creation: doth necessarily imply a greater perfection of power, then meerly to *vary* or *innovate* their efficiencies, according to the expedients, emergencies, or occasional designes of his *Providence*: it remains indisputable upon consequence, that to allow him the *Greater*, and yet deny him the *less*: to beleive him to be the *Author* of that *mighty and difficult miracle*, the Creation, and yet doubt the suptemacy of his Power, by conceiving that he cannot turn Natural Agents out of their common

common road, and order their digreſſions to the effecting of *ſmaller and eaſier Rarities*; muſt be a manifeſt *Contradiction*, and an *Abſurdity* that ſtabbs it ſelf.

Article 7. A farther confirmation of the ſame by an Argument, from the miraculous operations of God *in præterito.*

However, that we may not ſeem to entruſt ſo noble and ſacred a Truth, to the protection of one ſingle Reaſon; it becomes our care to ſuperadd, for the more ſecurity, this defence alſo. *If God hath frequently manifeſted his Supremacy, by working effects as well above, as againſt the eſtabliſht and cuſtomary power of natural Agents, in times paſt; then, doubtleſs, is not his arme ſhortned, nor the fountain of his energy dryed up, and he can do the like, in the future: but he frequently hath*; ergo, &c.

The *Major*, I am ſure, no man will boggle at, who ſhall conſider, that tis the proper *privilege* of *Divinity*, to be *ſtill the ſame*, that that *virtue*, which is extreme, and ſo above all *addition*, muſt neceſſarily alſo be above all decay or *diminution*: and therefore he that conceives God ſubject to *Mutability*, *Alteriety*, or *Deflux*, blaſphemes the Simplicity, Purity and Eternity of his Eſſence, and holds but a falſe Idea of his Nature.

Nor can the *Minor* require more proof then its bare Prolation; unleſs the unbeleif of any man ſhall be ſo inflexible, as not to bowe at the Convulſion of a truth, which the Records of all Nations, Times, and Religions, lye open to atteſt; For that there have been obſerved *Prodigious and miraculous accidents*, (ſuch as the moſt obſtinate Idolaters of Nature, and thoſe who grew gray in the ſtudy of her laws, cuſtomes, and ſecret magnalias, and kept a liſt of her forces; were ſurprized with aſtoniſhment at the conſideration of: and after a vain and tedious ſcrutiny into their abſtruſe Cauſalities, were forced to refer to the immediate arme of a *Supernatural efficient*) the indiſputable monuments of faithfull Antiquity bear witneſs. And he, who hath not heard of thoſe *Three grand Examples* (to omit the enumeration of any other, that are not univerſally beleived by men of all intereſts and perſwaſions) of the ſuperiority of Gods power to that of his ſervant, Nature; *viz.* The *Univerſal deluge*, the *Ceſſation of Oracles*, and the total *Eclipſe of the Sun* at the paſſion of our *Redeemer*: can give but weak teſtimony, that he is either *Iew*, *Mahometan*, or *Chriſtian*.

Article 8. That there was an univerſal Deluge.

The *Firſt* being reputed not onely true, but ſacred, and therefore held as point of faith in common by all three Religions; nay countenanced even by Pagan ſtories, and more, their ſetled account of time; they computing the ſecond ſpace or intervall of Time (the *Firſt* being little better to them then *Prolepticall*, or as the Heathen called it, *Adelon*, immaniſeſt and obſcure, was dated from the beginning of the World to *Ogyges Floud*, which was about 530 yeers after *Noahs*) from the Floud to the firſt *Olympiad*, which anſwers to the year of the World 3174. and comes within about 20 years before the foundation of Rome.

Article 9. The Ceſſation of Satans Oracles, after the advent of the Word of Truth, proved authentiquely.

The *Second* being imbraced, and made authentical by the general conſent of Chriſtians, upon the forced acknowledgment of thoſe, whoſe intereſt obliged them to invalidate it; and thoſe not only *Pagans* ſurrounded with the horrid darkneſſe of idolatry, and expecting no day-break from the glorious Sun of Righteouſneſs; but even of the *Devil* himſelf: who though the Father of lies, and his honour ſo highly concerned in the interciſion of his impoſtures and deluſions, could not yet diſſemble this verity; but at four ſeverall times, and in as many ſeverall places publickly proclaimed it. Firſt, when from his famous Oracle at *Delphos* he confeſt himſelf to be tongue-tied, his fallacious predictions countermanded, and his ſo ſolemnly pretended Divinity expired: being able to return no other anſwer to the great *Auguſtus* (whoſe errand was to have his fortune told him) but this:

Ad Puer Hebræus, Divos Deus ipſe gubernans,
Cedere ſede jubet, triſtemque redire ſub Orcum;
Aris ergo dehinc tacitus diſcedito noſtris.

An *Hebrew Child*, that *God*, whoſe power's above
All other Gods, commands me to remove
Hence to the *Court* of *ſorrow*; wherefore, goe,
My Altars quit in ſilence, and here moe
Of *Future* things from me expect to know.

A

A ſecond time, when Legion howled out the hideous dirge of their black Prince, and the ſhoars were heard by Mariners far off at ſea to echo their groans into this diſmal note; *Great Pan is dead:* as *Plutarch* hath reported in his *defect of Oracles*. A third, about the time of *Conſtantine*, ſo affectionately magnified by *Euſebius*, in his ſad complaint, that his lips were ſealed up, his Prognoſticks ſuppreſſed, and his ſophiſtry fooled, by the *Righteous upon earth:* as the ſame *Euſebius* hath related *in Vita Conſtantini*. And again, in his excuſe to the Emperour *Iulian*; who being ſuperſtitiouſly curious to foreknow the ſucceſs of his great expedition into Perſia, and therefore addreſſing himſelf with exceeding ſolemnity to the temple of *Apollo Daphnes*, to anticipate the knowledg of his fortune, could notwithſtanding worm out of him no other ſatisfaction but this; *that he ſhould firſt remove the bodies about him, before he could have the liberty to return him an anſwer*: as *Theodoret* hath regiſtred, who alſo tells us, that not long after that Temple was conſumed by lightning.

But I muſt heer arreſt my Reader with a civil and ſhort Advertiſement, that by the *Ceſſation of Oracles*, I may not intend a *total and abſolute expulſion* of that grand *Impoſtor* from all his Fanes, Tripods, and other ſhops wherein he profeſſed his deluſions, at once; as if the *Incarnation of Truth* had ſtrook him dumb at one blow: but an extermination of him from his metropolitan Temple at Delphos, and an *Interciſion, Diminution*, or *ſenſible Decay* of his Amphibologies, Predictions and other Colluſions in all other places. For, otherwiſe, I ſhould not only ſtrik a contradiction upon my ſelf, that unſatisfactory reſponſe, which he ſtammered out to *Iulian*, being full 363 years after the nativity of him, that cruſh't the Serpents head; but alſo incur the juſt cenſure either of being ignorant of, or undecently neglecting thoſe ſolid reaſons, which *Plutarch*, *Suetonius*, and our modern learned Wits, *Montaentius*, and *Dr. Browne* have addueed to atteſt the continuation of his ceremonious Legerdemain and ſolemn cheats practiſed upon groſs and credulous Pagans, in the point of *Vaticination*, much beyond the riſing, ſetting, and reſurrection of the *Sun of righteouſneſs*, who came down to diſpell

thoſe foggs of Hell, and irradiate the poor benighted world with *Light ſupernatural.*

Article 10. That there was a prodigious Eclips of the Sun, at the paſſion of our Saviour.

And the *Laſt* is ſworn to by all. For (1) the *Chriſtian* hath it ratified to him both by ſacred and profane Auctority: (2) the *Jews*, that deny Chriſt to have bin the true Meſſias, do yet acknowledg the prodigious Eclipſe of the Sun, that renowned his paſſion: and (3) the *Turks*, who allow him to have bin no more then a geat and holy Prophet, as their Alcoran frequently intimateth; are yet ſo zealous of the honour of their antient records, that they would confute him with a ſcimiter, who ſhould dare to indubitate the preterition of ſo remarkable a wonder, which certified the half of the earth of its verity, by the ſenſible perſwaſion of a panick terror; inſomuch that many of the Jews who beheld it, were ſo ſhatterd with fear, that their hearts were rent aſwell as the vail of the Temple, and themſelves ready to ſneak into the graves of thoſe Saints, that were newly riſen, to evidence his conqueſt over death, and give humanity a prelibation or taſt of the benefit of his ſufferings. Nor was this, as other Eclipſes, only *Partial* and *Vertical* to Hieruſalem; but the darkneſs was viſible to the whole *Hemiſphear*: els, how could the *Ægyptian Aſtronomer* take notice of it, and being amazed at the unnatural Apparition, cry out, *Aut Deus Naturæ patitur, aut machina mundi diſſolvitur*; as the reverend Father, his nameſake, *Dionyſius* hath remembred in his Epiſtle to *Polycarpus, and Apollophanes?* els, how could the antient Greeks, in their Annals, have filed up a monſtrous Defection of the great Luminary, in the 4th. year of 202. *Olympiad*; as *Phlegon Trallianus* noteth? Now the 4th. year of the 202. *Olympiad* jumps even with the 19th. of *Tiberius*, and the 33. of the Nativity, which was the 4745. of the Julian period; and therefore that exact ſynchroniſme makes that monſtrous Eclipſe obſerved by the more mathematical eyes of the Greeks, to be the ſame which happened at the death of the *Lord of life.*

That

Article 11. A *Demonstration* of the impossibility of the Catholique Deluges proceeding from *Causes Natural.*

That the *Catholique Deluge* was purely *Supernatural*, and the destruction of all Living Creatures upon the sublunary Globe (those few that were shifted aboard the Ark, only preserved) by an *Abyss of Waters*, immediately caused by the revenging *Will* of that same Fruitfull *Spirit*, that formerly *brooding* upon the same abyss of waters, had hatcht them into being; though of some difficulty to him, that shall wave all testimonies deduceable from the sacred relation adscribed to *Moses*: can yet be no impossibility to prove, from Considerations meerly *Physical*. For

First, the vast *Quantity* of Waters requisite to overflow the whole earth, and prevail upon the high hills, nay exceed the heads of the most lofty mountains by 15 cubits (for *mountains* there were before the floud; els how could the waters by degrees encreasing, ascend and cover them: and therefore those wanton Wits, which affirm the Antediluvian earth to have had her face a meer *Plane* or level, without those protuberancies and rugosities, undertake not only a *Paradox*, but a manifest *Absurdity*, point blanck repugnant aswell to the *Text*, as to the natural *Necessity* of those *Inaqualities*) could not be powred out from the *Receptaries* or storehouses of the *Ocean*; the Earth having as great (if not a greater) share in the Terraqueous Globe, as the Waters, and the perpendicular Altitude of the mountains, by more then two parts of three, at least, transcending the profundity of the deepest Chanel of the Sea, that ever the sounding line of any Mariner did profound, except of that *Barathrum or Vorago Aquarum, in mari dulci*, between *Roest* and *Leoffelt*, described by *Olaus Magnus*; which yet is but a kind of *Sluice* or sink, and therefore of no considerable latitude. For that the Eminency of the highest Hills hath scarcely the same proportion to the Semidiametre of the Earth, that there is betwixt 1. & 1000; hath bin frequently demonstrated by many of our best Geographers: and though we descend to *Eratosthenes* his commensuration, who hath affirmed, that by instruments Dioptrick, and an exact measure of the distances of Places, he hath certainly found the Altitude of the highest mountains not to exceed *ten stadia*; we shall not however be provided of water enough in the bowells of the Sea to advance

our inundation, the depth of the profoundeſt ocean ſeldom amounting to a 100 *Fathom*, as *Scaliger* (38 *Exercit. contra Cardanum*) hath upon juſtifiable grounds declared.

Nor can this immane Collection of Waters be derived, as ſome have inconſiderately opinioned, from the *Whole lower Region of the Aer condenſed into clouds, and thoſe compreſt into waters.* For (to take no ſtrict notice of that large *Tohu, Vacuum Coacervatum*, or *Nothing*, which muſt then have bin introduced, from the ſurface of the Waters up to the midle region; which *Nature* could never endure, nor had *God* any neceſſity to enforce,) if Aer condenſed into Water ſhrinks into a ſpace or Continent, 400. times leſs then what it poſſeſt before condenſation (for ſince Water *weighs* 400. times heavier then Aer, as the ſubtile *Galileo* (*Dialog.* 1. *del moviment. pag.* 81.) examining the proportions of Gravity betwixt thoſe two bodies, demonſtratively diſcovered; it muſt neceſſarily carry the ſame proportion alſo to *Space*, or *Locality*,) then aſſuredly, when we ſhall have calculated the perpendicular height of the Atmoſphear, or lower region of the Aer, and reduced it to the 400th. part: we ſhall ſoon be ſatisfied, that the Addition which the Aer Aquæfied could bring to the waters of the Sea effuſed upon the boſome of the earth, cannot ſuffice to ſwell the Deluge ſo high as the ſemiaſſitude of many lofty mountains, ſuch as *Slorns* in Norway (which *Franc. Patricius*, out of *Fr. Bacon* and *Scaliger*, hath accounted the higheſt on the earth,) *Athos* in Macedonia, *Tenariff*, *Caucaſus*, *Atlas*, &c. whoſe tops make large encroachments on the midle region, and ſeem to invade the Firmament.

Again, to charge this immenſe Accumulation of Waters upon 40. *days rain*, though we ſhould conced that rain to be neither Sea evaporated, nor Aer condenſed; is not to undo, but entangle the miracle. For taking the Altitude of the mountains according to the calculation of the moſt moderate Geometry; and then ſoberly perpending what aggravation to the Waters of the Sea now converted upon the earth, the moſt violent natural rain of 40. days and nights could probably make, which the moſt hyperbolical conceit cannot advance high her then 40. fathom: we ſhall eaſily detect the difficulty.

And

And *secondly*, as *Nature* could not afford the *Material Cause* of this general Inundation, the *Waters*; so neither the Mighty *Efficient*, or *Impulsive*, that should with such prodigious impetuosity hoyse up so huge a mass of Sea, contrary to the strong reluctancy, or depressure of its Gravity, drive it from its native easy Currents in the declining veins and cavities of the earth, upon an absolute δυσφορίαν or Acclivity on the elevated surface thereof, and make it fall in Cataracts up-hill. For (1) though the *Waters desire to stand above the mountains*, as the Divine Hebrew Poet hath pleased to phrase it (*Psalm* 104. *vers.* 9.) yet they but desire it, and by their own inherent and essential Tendency are rendred uncapable to satisfy that elemental ambition; for water permitted to its own propensity or inclination, immediately tendeth downward: and therfore he that can conceive a river to desert its declive chanel, and climb a precipice, without the violence of a Miracle; hath a strong Phansy, but a weak judgement: nor need any man despair to perswade his credulity, that *Helmonts* ridiculous Romance of the *Cause of Earthquakes* (viz. that an *Angel*, or minister of Divine revenge, descends into the Centrals of the Earth, and there with a great *Clapper* or Sledge giving a mighty *Thump* against the feet of Rocks, makes a hearse or grave kind of *Boom*, which enlarging its sound, rends the foundations thereof, and puts the percussed mass into a *rigor*, or shaking fit of an Ague.) is a solid and philosophical Verity.

And *thirdly*, as the Waters could not elevate themselves, so neither could the *Attractive Virtue* of those *Celestial Magnets*, the Sun, Moon and Stars, work them out of their depths, by rarefying them into vapours, which mounted up to the midst region of the Aer, and there encountred by intense Cold, should be reduced to clouds, and those again dissolved in Cataracts. For should we grant, what the *Arabian Astrologers* returned in answer to the *Ægyptian Caliph*, who had set them to unty this knot; *viz.* that there was a great *Conjunction* of ♄ and ♃ not long before the floud, and the malignant influence of that confederacy much aggravated by another fatal Convention of all the *Planets*, in the watery signe of *Pisces*, immediately preceding it, as *Sepher Juchasin* (*fol.* 148.) hath delivered; which the learned

learned *Mirandula* hath sufficiently disproved, and smiled at yet must the greatness of the *Effect* manifestly confute the possibility of that for a *Cause*. First, because Nature hath frequently shewed to the world the like Conjunctions, but never the like event: and again, because those *Luminaries* are not commissioned with so unlimited a power, and in their strongest conspiracies of influence can at most but weakly *incline* or *dispose*, not at all *compell* or *necessitate*; nor are their destinations to *ruine*, but *conserve* the world.

If therfore *Nature*, uniting all her divisions of Waters below the Moon, into one great heap, or Abyss, must yet fall very much short of that immane proportion requisite to furnish out the Deluge; and though her stock had bin large enough, yet could she not, without apparent destruction of her self, *i. e.* infringing those fundamental Constitutions, or Elementary Laws, whose constant *Tenor* only defines her to be Nature, assist to their eruption out of their proper Receptaries, and their prepostrous Ascension up hill: truely, I am yet to learn, what can be conceived to remain, but this, that those *Decumani Fluctus*, those immens Cataracts had both their *supply* and *motion* immediatly from that high hand, to which nothing that he *wills* can be difficult.

With this *Problem*, I confess, I have more then once impuzled my reason; yet doth the difficulty sometimes enflame my Curiosity to enquire out the pervestigable part of the miracle: viz. *Whence Omnipotence summoned this mighty Syndrome, or Confluxe of Waters to appear, at so short a warning, upon the face of the Earth*, or in what part of the Universe they were quartered before, and *by what wayes and means they were drawn off again and voyded after the Floud*? That eminent Master of the Opticks, and excellent Mathematician, *Christoph. Scheinerus* (*in Rosa Vrsina, pag.* 693.) discoursing against those who have assented the *Incorruptibility of the Heavens, & quoad partes, & totum*, introduceth *Ferdinand. Quirinus de Salazar.* a Jesuit, in his *Comment* upon 27. *vers. of the* 8. *chap. of the Proverbs of Solomon*, delivering his opinion derived from others, together with reasons to support it; that there must be a *Tehom Rabba*, or *Abyss of Waters* above the *Firmament*, or betwixt the 8th. sphear and the

the *Shecinah*, or dwelling place of God. The Texts of Scripture, upon which this opinion is supported, are (1) the 7. *vers.* of the 1. *Chap. of Genes.* where the Author of that book describing the several piles or stories of this great building, saith thus; and *God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the waters which were above the firmament, &c.* (2) that of *David* (*Psalm* 33. *vers.* 7.) *he layd up the depth in storehouses.* (3) that of the Angel to *Esdras* (2. *ch.* 4. *vers.* 7.) proposing questions to puzle weak but proud mortality; *How many Springs are above the Firmament, or which are the outgoings of Paradise?* (4) that expression of the greatest Naturalist, *Salomon*; *and Wisdome saw him set his compass upon the face of the depth* (which the *Septuagint, plus de sententia, quam de singulis vocibus soliciti*, have rendred, *aderam cum secerneret sedem super ventos.*) (5) that also of the Psalmist (*Psal.* 104. *vers.* 3.) *who hath layd the beams of his chambers in the Waters.*

Upon these and the like perswasions many of the most learned *Rabbines*, and after them not a few of our modern *Divines*, have concluded; that at the Deluge the Floudgates of this *Tehom Rabba*, were unlockt, and the waters being showred down in Cataracts upon the earth, swell'd the deluge above the mountains. This, indeed, seemed smooth and plausible to my first apprehensions, and promised not only to satisfy, but compensate my former anxious disquisition: but when I had a little recovered my thoughts out of the pleasant surprise of the novelty, and cast about, by what conveyances or *Aqueducts* the tides of this *Supercelestiall Ocean* might be transmitted through so many *Orbs* (which not a few great *Clerks* have affirmed to be *Solid*) without dislocation of any one, at least without interrupting or confounding their regular Circumvolutions; which happend not, for the stars kept on their Courses, as the retrograde Calculations of their severall Periods will soon evince: as also, if they were transfused, *what became of them afterward*, when the fourty days were over? For either they must be returned from whence they came, to repleniſh that monstrous *Vacuity*, their absence had made betwixt the 8th. orb, and the Empyreum; or else continue

hoer below, and so perpetuate the Inundation, and so put God to the exigent of making a new supply of Waters above the firmament. When, I say, I had abated the edge of my Credulity with these occurring difficulties, I sadly relapsed into my former incertitude. Not but that I am almost perswaded, from the literal sense of those Texts, that betwixt the *Shecinah* or paradise of God and his blessed retinue, and the 8th. orb, there is a *Tehom Rabba*; for I do not see how those places can be otherwise, if rightly, interpreted: but that I cannot yet drive my belief beyond those two objections, and find it more ready to incline to this Conjecture (for tis yet gone no farther) of my own; *That God miraculously created a sufficient supply of Waters purposely for the Deluge, and afterwards adnihilated them again.* This, I am sure, was as easy to him, as any other Course imaginable; less injurious to and inconsistent with the works of the former Creation; and renders the wonder most familiar to our Comprehension. If it be objected upon me, that God put a period to all *Creation* after the first Hexameron or six days; I shall defend my self, with the barrel of Meal, and cruise of Oyle, that sustaind the Widow and her son in the famin of Zarephath; wherein there was a fresh Creation of two several *substances*, with all their specifical *Accidents* about them every day; or a transmutation of Aer into Meal and Oyle, which was equivalent. And as for the other harsh term of Adnihilation, I say tis equally facil to him to reduce any thing to, as to educe it from Nothing. But this might well have bin spared, it being my proper business to prove that the Deluge was *not Naturall*; not to digress into a disquisition how or by what cryptick means twas *supernatural*.

Article 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect meerly supernatural; comprobated uncontrollably.

That the Cessation, or (rather) *Intercision of Oracles*, was an Atcheivem too difficult for the single arm of Nature; I conceive few will dispute, but such ridiculous Ignorants in the Metaphysicks of *Spirits*, or Scale of *Creatures*, as endevour to indubitate the very *Existence* of *Evil Angels*, and refuse to be perswaded, that there is any such real *Entity* as a *Devil*, without a Demonstration from Sense, and the conviction of an *Apparition*. But if any shall, the best advice my hast can at this time afford them,

them, is this; that they would weave their long clue of thoughts into this ſhort and plain *Dilemma*.

We muſt grant, either that that black Prophet, *Satan*, made a *voluntary* or ſpontaneous reſignation of his uſurped Divinity, at the nativity of the *Prince of Peace*; and of his own accord grew ſilent, upon the Advent of the *Word of Life*: or els, that by a Power infinitely more abſolute and ſoveraign then his own, he was *compelled* to confeſs the decay of his tyranny by an Exile from his Altars, and himſelf ſtrucken with an *Aphonia*, or Palſy in his double tongue, ſo that all he could utter, was, that he could no longer ſpeak; for one of theſe two Propoſitions muſt be true.

The *Firſt* cannot; ſince to make a *Voluntary* Confeſſion of his *Ignorance*, *Impotency*, and *ſubjection*, in the face of the World, and eſpecially in thoſe places, where for ſo many Ages together he had ſolemnly pretended to *Omniſcience*, *Omnipotence*, and *Supremacy*; is wholly repugnant to Satans *Pride*: nor would that ſtrong *Ambition*, which even in the purity of his nature ſpurred him beyond the ken of his Angelical wiſdome, up to an Attempt of the higheſt impoſſibility, (*viz.* to make himſelf equal to that *Eſſence*, which made him what he was) ſuffer him to proclaim himſelf to be leſs, then what he had made himſelf appear to be in the eſteem of his infatuated Votaries. For notwithſtanding the hand of *Divine Vengeance* had hurled him, (like a prodigious *Meteor* that durſt outface the brighter *Sun*, from which its ſplendor was deſumed) from the higheſt heaven into the loweſt hell; and degraded him from the moſt glorious order of Creatures to the moſt vile, accurſed and deſpicable: yet is his ſtomach as great, as when he aſpired to the throne of *Unity*; nor hath the *ignis rota*, or reverberated flames of hell ever ſince, bin able to conſume that humor of *Competition* in him. Witneſs his ſeveral impudent invaſions of the prerogative of God, by arrogating to himſelf the tribute of *Divine Adoration* from his ſuperior, man; nay even from the Sonne of God, when yet he more then ſuſpected his Divinity. Beſides, as it ſeems a manifeſt Contradiction, that the *Author* of *Pride* ſhould freely detect his own *ſhame*: ſo alſo, that the *Father of lies* ſhould voluntarily broach a *Truth*; and ſuch a one as once received muſt openly impeach him of Delufion,

and diſcover his Indivinity; cannot but ſound a very great improbability at leaſt. For how unlikely is it, that that ſophiſtical *Spirit*, whoſe Tyranny was founded, ſupported, and continued ſolely by his cunning promotion of *Error*, and his ſubtil workings upon the deceptible Condition of man; ſhould willingly depoſe himſelf, diſmantle his ſtrongeſt holds, proclaim the impoſtures of his Amphibologies, and divulge his ruine, by rectifying the ſeduced judgements of his greateſt Favourites, and declaring a *Verity* that muſt diſprove all that ever he ſayd before? How diſſimilar to Reaſon, that he who durſt adventure upon the higheſt falſhood in the world, to make himſelf *God*: ſhould ſo far forget the maximes of his black Art, as of his own accord to confeſs himſelf to be the baſeſt of *Entities*, a *Devil*? How remote from all the ways of perſwaſion, that he who had boaſted himſelf *Ubiquitary*, uſurped by a counterfeit title the *Monarchy* of the World, and given out, that the *Preſcience* of Future Events was not only the natural annex of his *Omniſcience*, but the *Preordination* and diſpoſal of them the adjunct of his *Providence*: ſhould, without the impulſion of a ſuperior, betray himſelf *chained to utter darkneſſe*, to be but a *Slave*, that there was a ſetled law of *Fate* above his comptroll, as in his excuſe to *Cræſus* ruined by his Amphibologie; and that his *Providence* was at beſt but *Præſagition* from the concurrent inclinations of ſecond Cauſes, nor his *Predictions* of things to come, other then artificial *Conjectures*? To conclude, no man, I ſuppoſe, will be able to remember any other Inſtance of the Devils *Fidelity* and *Veracity* (thoſe Confeſſions of *Chriſts Divinity*, and that in the preſence of *Truth* it ſelf, that he came from compaſſing the earth in queſt of whom he might devour, mentioned in holy Writ, excepted;) or produce one ſentence of truth ever ſpoken by him to his own diſadvantage, beſides this one; *that he was commanded to ſhut up his Oracles, by a Power, which he could never contradict*: And therefore the *Second Propoſition* muſt be *true* and *evident*: viz. that his Oracles were ſilenced by the immediate hand of that *Cauſe*, whoſe *Activity* is ſo far above the *Power* of either *Satan* or *Nature*, taken either ſingly, or combined together, (for the Former is but a languid Agent, if you deny him the auxiliatory concurrenet of the

the Latter) as *Infinitude* is above *Limitation*, *Almightineſs* above *Impotency*, or *Omniſcience* above *Ignorance*.

Now to me, this proceſs of Argumentation ſeems ſo ſmooth, familiar and cuſtomary, and the whole ſeries of Inductions ſo obvious to a dialectical conſideration; that, when I reflect upon the facility of their occurence to our thoughts, I cannot but extremely wonder, how ſo many profound and circumſpect Philoſophers, and thoſe whoſe threads of life were unraveld in the eager purſuit of knowledge, could referre the ceſſation of Oracles to *Natural neceſſities*, and acquieſce in a confidence of thoſe weak, remote, inconſiſtent, impertinent and ſo contemptible *reaſons*, urged by *Plutarch*, &c. to ſalve the difficulty of this accident, and ſerve as a ſpecious *Aſylum* for their puzled curioſities to retreat to.

Article 13. That the Eclips of the Sun, at the death of Chriſt, was purely *Metaphyſical*, irrefutably demonſtrated.

Laſtly, that that generally confeſt *Eclipſe of the Sun*, (and, indeed, the only one this great Luminary did ever ſuffer; ſince we may with more propriety call all others but *Partial Interceptions* of his light, by the leſſer body of the Moon interpoſed in a ſtraight line to ſome part of the Terreſtrial Globe) which happened at the *Death of Chriſt*, was above, nay againſt the fundamental conſtitutions of Nature; is manifeſt from hence, that on the third of *April*, or *Feria ſexta*, being the Paſſion day, in the year *Æræ Chriſti nati* 33. (which is ſynchronical to the 78. of the *Julian* account) the Sun and Moon were then in *oppoſition diametrical*, and the *Moon* her ſelf totally eclipſed in *Libra* to the *Antipodes* of *Jeruſalem*: as may be certified to any man that can read the *Celeſtial Ephemerides* backward, *i. e.* recalculate the periodical *Conjunctions* and *Oppoſitions* of thoſe two great *Lights* of heaven, by the Tables of Aſtronomy. For thoſe *Characters of time* being punctually reſtrained to ſet & certain periods, the Aſtronomer may as eaſily attain to the minute of any eclipſe *in præterito*, as to the preſcience of any *in futuro*; provided that his *Hypotheſis* be ſound, and his *Schemes* erected with exactneſs correſpondent: nay ſuch is the certitude of this rule, as to the ſtrict deciſion of time, that though the Aſtronomer may chance to learn of the Hiſtorian, that there hath bin an eclipſe; yet for the determination of its preciſe *time* & *place*, *hiſtory* muſt go to ſchool to *Aſtronomy*, as *Scaliger* (*de Emendat.*

Emendat. tempor.) hath obſerved to our hands. Thus when *Euſebius* and *Dio* had recorded an Eclipſe of the Sun to have falne out a little before the death of *Auguſtus*, and ſo to have been a kind of prodigy portending the fall of ſo bright a Star; the Aſtronomers coming after to examine the ſynchroniſme, by their retrograde calculations, found the Hiſtorians in a double error: that Eclipſe being not of the *Sun*, but the *Moon*; and not *preceding*, but *ſucceeding* his funerals.

To aſſure the miracle yet nearer, let us look back to the *Elements of Aſtronomy*. The Eclipſe of the Moon is cauſed by the *Intervention* (for ſo tis according to the moſt probable *Hypotheſis* of *Copernicus*) of the opac body of the earth, between her and the original of her light, the Sun; and the Eclipſe of the Sun, by the interpoſition of the Moon betwixt him and the earth: and therefore the Sun cannot be eclipſed, but when he is in *Conjunction* with the Moon; nor the Moon, but when ſhe is in *oppoſition* to the Sun. Yet notwithſtanding doth not every monthly conjunction and oppoſition of theſe two lights produce an eclipſe to one of the two; but only that *Conjunction* and *Oppoſition* which is *Diametrical*: *i. e.* when the Central point of the Sun faceth the Central point of the Moon, and that again confronteth the centre of the earth, ſo directly, that an arrow ſhot in a ſtreight line from the circumference of the Sun through its Centre, would alſo perpendicularly tranſfix the Centers of the other two orbs. And this falls out only when the Moons *Eccentrick* tranſecteth the Suns, in that line, which is for that reaſon called the *Ecliptick*; nor this in more then two points, called by *Ptolemy*, the *Nodi*, or knots, and by the *Arabians*, the *Head and Taile of the Dragon*.

Again, theſe *Interſections* are not conſtant to one certain point, or place, but circumgyrated by a ſlow motion, make a circle of 18 years complete; and therefore every 18th year the Moon muſt be eclipſed in the ſame degree of the ſame ſigne in the Zodiack, infallibly to the end of the world: which is the rule by which every common Almanack maker doth calculate his predictions of Lunar Eclipſes.

Now this being excogitated, and the eclipſes retrived back as high as the *Nabr*, or foot of the Julian compute, by revolving the leaves

leaves of the Celestial Volume; we discover that the Moon indeed, was naturally eclipsed on the self same day, whereon the Sun prodigiously suffered together with its Author, in the 2 *deg. of Libra*, the opacity beginning to the horizon of *Jerusalem* some few minutes before six in the evening: so that the Sun was no sooner set in the West, but the Moon appeared in the East deprived of more then half her light; the *Calculation* and *figure* of which *Lunar eclipse*, are largely set down by *Sethus Calvisius*, to the 3 of *April*, in the 33 year of the Nativity, under *Tiberius Cæsar*, and by *Henricus Buntingius, in Chronologia Cathalic. fol.* 337. And thereupon we may safely conclude, that the *Defection of the Moon*, on the Passion day, being meerly *Natural*; that of the Sun on the same day must be *Supernatural*; it being impossible for the Moon to keep two different stations, or to possess those two opposite points of heaven, which define the Conjunction and Opposition, at one and the same time. This *S. Aug.* (3. *de Civit. Dei cap.* 15.) had respect unto, when he said; *Quam solis obscurationem, non ex canonico syderum cursu accidisse ostenditur, quod tunc erat Pascha Judæorum.*

Twas a *Dismal* day that same, though the *King of Terrors* was then vanquisht; for *Darkness* was not only *upon*, but *under* the earth, the miraculous obfuscation of the Sun in our Hemisphere, of necessity causing a defection of the Moon in the subterraneous one, and so making it more then midnight to the *Antipodes*: and a second *natural eclipse* of the Moon succeeding within six hours after; nay, more then all this, *Saturn* (the signifier of *blackness*) aggravated this horrid opacity, for at the same time rising from the *Horoscope*, he beheld both eclipses in a square malignant aspect.

But though this eclipse was *Unnatural* to the *Sun, per περίλογον*: yet twas purely *Natural per συμπάθειαν*, it being requisite, nay necessary for a *stream* or reflex of *Light* to suffer a *defection*, when the *Fountain of Light* was under a cloud; proper for the *Creature* to sympathize with the *Creator*. And therefore, though twas a *miracle*, yet twas no *wonder*. The wonder was in the reverse part of the accident; that the most glorious *Sun of Righteousness* should suffer a dark and unnatural eclipse, to expiate

piate our deeds of darkneſs. Nor was that a wonder neither, now I think ont; for twas the *natural effect* of his infinite *love* to mankind.

Article 14. The Adequation of all to the verification of the Authors third Poſition.

And this, I preſume, the moſt ſtubborn and prejudicate Atheiſt will admit, as evidence both ſtrong and clear enough, to evince the verity of our *Minor Propoſition*; viz. *that God hath, in times prelapſed, frequently manifeſted his prerogative of cauſing effects not only ſuperior, but alſo contradictory to the ordinary and eſtabliſht Laws of Nature, his ordinary inſtrument, when ſuch effects ſeemed either neceſſary, or expedient to his Providence:* and therefore our *Concluſion*, viz. *that his arme is not ſhortned, and he can doe the like in the future, upon any occaſional emergency deſigned by his ſecret counſel*; comes not much ſhort of perfectly *Apodictical.*

Sect. VI.

Article 1. *Lucretius* his blaſphemy, that mans ignorance of the energy of *Natural Cauſes*, is the ſole baſis of the opinion of an *Univerſal Providence.*

WE have now brought our ſelves to the laſt *Objection* urged againſt Univerſal Providence; namely, *the unequal diſtribution of good and evil*, or the frequent occurence of events which carry too much appearance of *Temerity*, to be interpreted the mature *deſignes* of an *infinite Wiſdome*; and ſeem too oblique and deflecting towards *Partiality*, to ſtand in a right line with the hand of *divine Iuſtice*, which muſt be conceived to diſcriminate betwixt the *Pious* and *Impious* in the Conſignation of *Happineſs* and *Miſery*, and accordingly to diſtribute its benefits in ſome proportion to the merits, at leaſt the worthy ſuſceptibility of the receivers: this is a member belonging to another head, and falls more properly under the contents of our next Chapter, of the *Special or Particular Providence of God*; and therefore we ſhall thither transfer the plenary refutation thereof, making it the ſubject of this laſt ſection, to blow off thoſe light and cobweb *ſcruples*, that were ſpun by that Spider, *Lucretius*, when he compoſed

compoſed theſe verſes to alienate mens minds from the fear of an *Univerſal Moderator.*

Cætera, quæ fieri in terris, cæloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis quorum pendent mentibus ſæpe,
Efficiunt animos humileis formidine divûm,
Depreſſoſque premunt ad terram; propterea quod
Ignorantia cauſſarum conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res, & concedere regnum, &
Quorum operum cauſas nulla ratione videre
Poſſunt; hæc fieri divino Numine rentur, &c. lib. 6to.

Thoſe bug-bear *Meteors*, which the tim'rous eyes
Of pavid *Mortals* wonder at i'th skies;
And thoſe unfrequent *Prodigies*, that appear,
On earth (while their weak ſouls are fool'd by *Fear*)
Are the ſole charms, that emaſculate,
And cheat mens minds to a beleif of *Fate*,
And ſome *vindictive Numen*. For, becauſe
Men underſtand not *Natures* cryptick Laws,
Nor her occult *Efficiency*; they fly,
(To ſalve their *Ign'rance*) to *Divinity*:
And idly reſt in this; what ere befall,
Twas caus'd by *Providence*, that diſpoſeth all.

The Redargution.

Article 2. The redarguti-on thereof.

True it is, indeed, nor will any thing but ignorance deny that *Phyſiology*, or the ſpeculation of Natural Cauſes hath a power to raiſe the mind of man to a generous height, from whence it may ſecurely, and without that vertigo or giddineſs, which uſually turnes the brains of the multitude, behold the moſt prodigious meteors; and look in the threatning face of Lightning without growing pale, while thoſe that ſtand below become convulſt with needleſs horror, and are ready to be ſhook to duſt with ſuperſtitious fear.

True it is alſo, as *Lucretius* would have it, that tis unworthy

the constancy and setled courage of a *Philosopher*, when he sees a bearded comet, hears a loud crack of Thunder, or feels the earth unhinged (all which Natural events common eyes gaze upon as horrid Portents, and dangerous agonies of Nature) instantly to forget his Principles, and run to consult with the superstitious books of the Hetrurians, and other pusillanimous Comments on those pageants, or necessary Phænomenas, whose Causalities are establisht, and their precise contingencies presageable by the easie prognosticks of meteorology.

But however, though this ought to prevent our fears: yet it cannot be extended to the extinction of our devotion. Though it may commend our knowledge, to smile when the heavens frown: yet it more commends it, if we look above them, and through those visible operations of Nature discover that invisible cause, that made, conserves, and regulates her. Though it demonstrate our skill in Physicks, to stand unmoved, when the ground trembles: yet will it detect our ignorance in the Metaphysicks, not to fall prostrate in an humble reverence to that awfull *majesty, that stretched out the North over the empty place, and hanged the earth upon nothing*. And though it be an honour to our Reason, to explore the Abstrusities of Nature, and readily refer her most admirable effects to their proper efficients: yet, at the same time, not to confess that omnipotent Agent, which is the soul of all energy, and the highest link in the Chain of Causes; dishonours it even to the most odious shame of Atheisme, which is the greatest ignorance.

Article 3. Magnanimity the proper effect of Religion.

Nor is it *Religion* that makes men *Cowards*; for the best way to harden the *Spirit* of man, is first to soften it with the *Fear of God*: and the noblest Tincture of magnanimity is extracted out of an humble apprehension, and fiduciary acknowledgement of an *all observant Deity*. This the wise *Father* well understood, when refuting that impious error of the Poet, *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor*, he writ this golden Aphorisme; *Qui Deum non agnoscit, is non Dominum excutit superbum, sed aversatur optimum Parentem; cujus respectu Animus fit non formidine humilis, sed reverentia fiducia plenus.*

Again,

Article 4. The opinion of a *General Providence*, consistent with *Physiology*.

Again, when we ascribe the Monarchy of the World to one supreme Cause, we do not derogate a jot from the Power of second Causes; but rather confirme and subscribe the Charter of their deputations: since we thereby inferre an assurance, that those Causes are really such as he was pleased to constitute them, that their activities are but emanations of his omnipotence; and their effects the appointments of his Wisdome. And upon this meditation is it, that when we observe unfrequent wildfires in the Clouds, shaggy Meteors in the aer, Trepidations in the earth, and other the like admirable effects resulting from the concourse and conspiracy of potent Natural agents; we doe not instantly quench our wonder and check our curiosity, by ascribing the production of them to God, so as if he were the sole and immediate *Author* of them, and that no other *Natural Cause* intervened betwixt his *Volition* and their *Contingency*: but by supposing him to be the *First* and *General Cause* aswell of that particular one, as of all others in the World; and that besides the *First* there is required a *Second Particular* one, whose indagation will fully compensate the sweat and oyle of our study, and which we must not *deny*, though we cannot *discover*, but acknowledge it to be a Natural one, however to obscure for the invention of our perspicacity.

Article 5. *Lucretius* his scruples concerning the seemingly temerarious effects of the *Thunderbolt*; singularly resolved.

To conclude, out of this one Fountain may be derived streams enough to rince away all those feculent *Scruples*, which the polluted wit of *Lucretius* hath scraped off the *Thunderbolt*, to obstruct the current of *Providence*. For the *Principles* of that affrighting Meteor are comprehended under that series of *Natural Causes* which *God* permits to act their appointed parts, on the theatre of this sublunary Globe; nor doth he force them from the ordinary road of their essential and proper Activities, upon any extraordinary or new way of violence: and therefore tis as natural an event if this Granado of the clouds fall on the head of an *Innocent*, as if it fell on the head of the most *guilty* person; as regular for it to strike the sacred batlements of a *Temple*, as to light upon an unhallowed roof; and as consonant to the rules of its projection or

explosion, to be shot point blanck at any mark on *land*, as to be discharged at randome on the *Sea*.

But here some have, by way of objection, enquired; *Why did not God, that he might leave nothing to Chance, at his first institution of the Laws of Nature, ordain such a series of Causes, both for the Generation and Explosion of the Thunderbolt, and limit their operations to such a certainty of events, as that it should never come to pass, that this Fireball should destroy the Good, and miss the Impious?*

This itch of ignorant, and therefore bold, curiosity may easily be mortified by applying this euporiston or obvious *solution*; that the *ends* or *designes* of *Particular Providence*, in these or the like occurrences, are full of *Prudence*, as to the intention of *God*; though full of obscurity, as to the investigation of our unequal *Understandings*: and therefore for us, when we cannot find out these imperceptible ends, therefore to conclude that those *Accidents*, are *meer accidents*, and have no ends at all; is not to palliate, but aggravate our ignorance, since tis a rash and open delusion of the judgment of man, to presume that he is acquainted with the secret Counsels of God; a madness beyond the severity of *Bethlem*, for mortality to pretend ability to read those *Arcana Imperii*, or mystical decrees of Fate, written in invisible Hieroglyphicks, which are too hard for the intuition of Angels.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The especial Providence of God Demonstrated.

SECT. I.

HAving sayled over the immens Ocean of *Gods General Providence*, by the direction of our own congenial Cynosure, the *Light of Nature*; our next voyage ought to be up the channel of his *Particular* or *Special*: which being the golden River, that constantly invirons the Microcosme, or *Isle of Man*, and imports all the advantages and mutations of *Happiness* and *Misery*, that occurre to humanity during the trade of life; is that point we have thus long coasted about to discover. But before we put into the mouth of this *Euphrates* *, we conceive it necessary first to sound, and send out our Pilot Reason, to detect those *Shelves* and *Rocks* cast up by the common Adversary of mankind; upon which many weak vessels have founderd, sprung dangerous leaks of Atheisme, and so sunk down right into that *Barathrum* of *sorrow*, which knowes no exhaustion, and admits of no regression.

Article 1. The introduction, intimating the neer cognation betwixt this *present*, and the *precedent* Theme: and the necessity of the Authors beginning at the Atheists *Objections*.

* *Ab ἐυφραίνειν, quod ægrum lætum facundumque reddat.*

Article 2. The first objection, desumed from the *Apathie* of the *Divine Nature.*

The *First* of those, we finde to be that contraprovidential Argument of that Secretary of Hell, *Epicurus*; *Quod beatum est, ac immortale, id neque ira, neque gratia tangi*: that those *Passions* of *Anger* and *Love* are inconsistent with the constant and immutable condition of that *Nature*, whose simple essence is compounded of *Immortality* and *Beatitude*; and therefore, as *Busines* and *Cares* must destroy the *Tranquillity*, so the affections of *Indignation* and *Placability* must subvert the *Constancy*, or eternal *Sameness* of divinity; and upon inference, that neither our most fervent *Impieties* can accend, nor our penitential *Tears* extinguish the *Wrath* of *God.*

Article 3. The same excogitated by *Epicurus*: and promoted by *Lucretius.*

That this poysonous Grape grew upon that wild Vine, *Epicurus* (that we may not seem to belie the Devill) is not only colligible from its stinking odour, and affinity of taste, that it bears to that detestable design of his (*in Epist. ad Herodotum*) to erase out of the mind of man all the impressions of Religion, by the induction of a belief, that God doth not observe the good and evil actions of men, in this life, and by consequence shall not compensate them with Felicity, or misery, after death: but manifest upon the asseveration of three judicious and conscientious witnesses, *Seneca*, *Cicero*, and *Lactantius*. For the *First* chargeth it upon him in these words; (4. *de Benefic.* 4.) *Deus, inquit Epicurus, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia, quam injuria tangunt*: The *Second* in these; *Dii, inquit Epicurus, neque propitii cuiquam esse solent, neque irati*, (3. *de Nat. Deor.*) the *Third*, in these; *De schola Epicuri est, sicut iram in Deo non esse, ita nec gratiam quidem*; *nam cum putat Epicurus, alienum esse à Deo malum facere, atque nocere, quod ex affectu iracundiæ plerumque nascitur, ademit ei etiam beneficentiam, quoniam videbat consequens esse, ut si iram habeat Deus, habeat & gratiam. Itaque ne vitium concederet, etiam virtutis fecit expertem.* Which argument his disciple *Lucretius* (who, as *Theseus*, scorned to forsake his Master, though he led him into hell) hath contracted into this Tristich:

Nam

Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tangitur ira.

Th' Immortal Nature, placed above the sense
Of sorrow, danger, and all indigence,
Rich in its own *Perfections*; neither can
Smile at the *Good*, nor frown at'h *Ill* of *Man*.

The import of all which amounts to no higher a sum of reason, then only this; that the *Supreme Nature*, being wholly imployed in a blisfull vacancy, and entirely taken up with the superlatively-pleasant contemplation of its own excellencies, hath cast the reins upon our own necks, committed the managery of all our affairs to our own providence, and hears neither the clamours of our profane impieties, nor the sighes of our supplications, but stands as unconcerned in, so unregardant of all our actions. *Sic enim sese res habet, ut ad prosperam, adversamve fortunam quaeque sis, aut quemadmodum vixeris, nihil interfit*; as *Cotta*, personated by *Cicero* (3. *de Nat. Deor.*) or as *Cæsar* in *Lucan*,

——— *Nunquam se cura Deorum*
Sic premit, ut vestra vita, vestræque saluti
Fata vacent ———

The *Gods* are never subject to a *Care*;
Nor doe the *Fates* look how you *Mortals* fare.

Article 4. The second objection, extorted from mans being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Natures.

The *Second*, objected frequently against the *Stoicks*, by the *Academicks*, as that incomparable Atheomastix, *Lactantius*, hath observed (*de ira Dei, cap.* 13.) is this; *Cur, si Deus omnia hominum caussâ fecerit, etiam multa contraria, & inimica, & pestifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari, quam in terra?* If man be the chief object of *Gods* love, and his welfare the grand intention of his Providence; why then did he create so many powerfull and malicious enemies against him, in all elements, and still expose him to encounter more dangers then his dayes, nay

then

then his haires can number? If God be an indulgent *Father*, how dares *Nature* prove her self so cruel a *Stepmother* to man? If his *Creator* intended him for a *Favorite*, and made him the centre in which all the lines of his blessings should convene to make up a full and constant felicity; how comes it to pass, that the vilest of *Creatures* insult over him, and make him the point at which all their darts of hostility are levelled, so that his life is made a full and constant infelicity?

Article 5. The last objection, of the *Adversity* of the *Pious* and *Prosperity* of the *Impious*, in this life.

The *Last*, and indeed the most dangerous rock, against which innumerable numbers not only of unhappy *Ethnicks*, that wanted the Compass of true *Religion*, and so were forced to steer by the imperfect *Chart* of their own *natural judgment*; but also of *Christians*, who had the inestimable advantage of the *Scriptures* (the only Loadstone that never deflects from the point or unity of truth) have suffered shipwrack; is this: *The calamitous condition of the Virtuous, and the prosperous estate of the Vitious, in this life.*

The most full and accurate description of this Scylla we can meet with amongst many of those venerable Fathers, who with as much profound learning, as strenuous industry, have attempted the remove of it; is given us by *Lactantius* (*lib.* 3. *cap.* 17.) in these words: *Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, paupertatem, labores, exilia, carorum amissiones: malos contra beatos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus affici. Videbat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera impune committi. Videbat sine delectu morum, sine ordine, ac discrimine annorum, sævire mortem: sed alios ad senectutem pervenire, alios infantes rapi, alios jam robustos interire, alios in primo adolescentiæ flore immaturis funeribus extingui. In bellis potius meliores & vinci, & perire, maxime autem commovebat, homines imprimis religiosos malis affici; iis autem, qui aut Deos omninò negligerent, aut minus piè colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire, vel nulla.* To the observation of *Epicurus* it appeared, that unjust *Fortune*, not the discriminating hand of *Divine Providence*, had the dispensation of *Happiness* and *Misery*: for *Adversity* is the common cognizance of *Honesty*, and poverty, unceasant and unsuccessfull

cessfull labours, banishment, loss of friends, and the like dolefull accidents are alwaies in the lots of *Good men*: but on the contrary, *Prosperity* is frequently the pathognomonick of *Villainy*, and increase of power, accumulation of honours, and other blandishments of fortune are the portion of *Wicked men*. That the ready way to *danger*, was to be *innocent*; and to be extremely *nefarious* the only hopefull means to attain *impunity*. That death, like an inconsiderate Tyrant, spares none upon the exceptions of age, sex, dignities, or merits; but, raging in an arbitrary way of cruelty, suffers some to unravell their clue of life to the last minute of old age, while he cuts off the threads of others more hopefull in the first rundle of infancy. That he extinguisheth the vital lamp of some, in their brightest and strongest lustre; of others before they are well and throughly kindled; and permits others to shine till they have consumed their last drop of oyle. That the sword of war both conquers and cuts off the most noble and valiant heads: while the degenerous and cowardly escape unwounded. And, what with the greatest violence swayed him from the belief of Particular Providence, that the most *religious* had, for the most part, the most *afflictions*; but those, who either contemned, or neglected, or but coldly affected the worship of the Gods, had either less & lighter misfortunes, or none at all.

Nor did the impiety of *Epicurus* rest here, but, as if this objection, though fine enough to entangle the phansies of vulgar flies, were yet too loosly woven to ensnare the judgments of more decisive and penetrating heads; proceeds to reduce it to more closeness and strength, by superadding these sophistical knots. *Aut Deus vult tollere mala, & non potest; aut potest, & non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut & vult, & potest. Si vult, & non potest, imbecillis est, ideoque non Deus; si potest, & non vult, invidus est, quod æque alienum à Deo; si neque vult, neque potest, & invidus & imbecillis est, ideoque neque Deus; si vult & potest, quod solum Deo convenit, unde ergo mala? aut cur illa non tollit?*

Either God is willing to amove those evils from good men, but cannot; or can, and will not; or neither can, nor will; or both will and can. If he hath a will, but not a power, then is

he impotent, and so no God. If he hath a power, but not a will, then is he malevolent and envious, and so no God: for malice and weakness are equally incompetent to the divine Nature. If he want both will and Power, then is he both malevolent and impotent; and by consequence no God. If he want neither, as he must not if he be God: whence come those evils? or why doth he not amove them?

Article 6. The sporadical diffusion thereof upon *Ethnicks*, *Hebrews* and *Christians*: and the probability of their opinion, who hold the book of *Job*, to be a Treatise concerning the same subject, insinuated.

And too far did this designe of his succeed; for the contagion of this pestiferous error became so Epidemical, as that it diffused it self not only upon his school, and there corrupted the brains of *Philosophers*; but dilated even to the infection of the more remote and grosser mindes of *Women* and *Poets* (both which *Imitation* makes easily subject to any impression of *fleshood*) that lived many ages after him. For *Women*, witness that relation, assured by the records of *Athenæus* (lib. 13.) of one *Dana*, daughter to *Leontius* of the Epicurean sect; who being on her way towards the place appointed for her execution, in the bitterness of her spirit, ejaculated this desperate blasphemy: *Non injuriâ Deos à multis contemni; nam quod meum maritum servavi, hanc mihi gratiam rependunt Dii; Laodice autem, quod maritum suum interfecerit, maximo in honore est.* With very good reason are the Gods contemned by many; for that I have faithfully preserved my husband from an immature death, do the Gods thus ungratefully gratifie me with this my own unjust and violent one: but *Laodice*, because she hath perfidiously destroyed hers, doth now live, flourish, and hath her guilty head incircled with a wreath of the most refulgent honours. Whether the crime, for which she was sentenced, might deserve so severe a doom, as death; I dare not determine, our Author being not positive, nor open in that particular: but this I am sure of, that she suffered justly; and therefore though I cannot acquit her *Judges*, I may her *Executioners*. For *Poets*, witness that confession of *Ovid*.

Cum rapiant mala Fata bonos, ignoscite fusso,
Sollicitor nullos esse putare Deos.

When

When I see *Good men* by *ill Fates* to fall,
(Forgive't) I think there are no *Gods* at all.

Nay the sober *Claudian* professeth, that the *Felicity* of the most *impious* and unjust, and the smart *Afflictions* of the *Pious* and just persons, here on earth, had often staggered his confidence of *Divine Providence*, and more then inclined him to become an Apostate from all Religion, and declare himself on the side of *Epicurus*.

Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem,
Curarent superi terras; an nullus inesset
Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia casu?
Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Adspicerem, latosque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios: rursus labefacta cadebat
Religio, cunctaque viam non sponte sequebar
Alterius vatis quæ currere semina motu
Affirmat, magnumque novas per Inane figuras
Fortuna, non arte regi, quæ Numina sensu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.

Lib. 1. in Rufinum, sub init.

Oft hath my dubious mind seem'd well assur'd,
That *Gods* above th' affairs on earth procur'd;
That one wise *Rector* all events did guide;
Nor *Good*, nor *Ill* from *Fortunes* wheel could slide.
But when I saw the *Chaos* of mens *Fates*,
The *Guilty* flourish long in smooth estates,
And *Innocence* afflicted, was the heart
Of my *Religion* stab'd, fore'd to take part
With the adverse opinion: which concludes
That an immense *Vacuity* includes
The *Principles* of all; in that vast range
Fortune, not *Art*, doth their old *Figures* change;
Gods there are none, or such as doe not know
What parts self-ruling *Mortals* act below.

Concerning this eminent Poet, *Claudian*, there hath been old

hacking and slashing among Antiquaries, whether he lived in the owle light of *Paganisme*, or the illuminating day of *Christianisme*; S^t. *Augustine*, *P. Orosius*, and *Paul the Diacon* (the two former whereof flourished not long after he was withered) describing him to be *à Christi nomine alienus*, and *paganus pervicacissimus*; and *Franc. Petrarcha* and *Landinus* having adopted him for a Proselyte, and affirming himself to be not only *Christianæ pietati addictus*, but also to have bin the composer of this devout Epigram:

Christe potens rerum, redeuntis conditor ævi,
Vox Summi, sensusque Dei: quem fundit ab alta
Mente Pater, &c.

But if he were a *Christian*, yet could he not want the excuse of very holy Precedents even of that profession, who had frequently stumbled at the same stone. For the *Royall Hebrew*, whose *Muse* was the *Holy Ghost*, though a man after Gods own heart, a Christian by the baptisme of his prophetique faith, and one who had frequently instructed his harp to echo forth Panegyricks of the speciall Providence of the great preserver of men; had yet his confidence sometimes damp't, and judgement eclipsed by the same fogg of error, exhaled from his experience of the prosperity of Libertines. Nor was the shock of this temptation easily withstood by so strong a Champion; for it made him reel again, as he thus confesseth: *My feet were almost gone, my steps had welnigh slipt. For I was envious at the prosperity of the wicked. They are not in trouble, neither are they plagued like other men. Their eyes stand out with fatnesse: they have more then their heart could wish. They are corrupt, and speak wickedly concerning oppression: they speak loftily. They set their mouth against the heavens: and their tongue walketh through the earth. Behold, these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world: they increase in riches. Verily, I have cleansed my heart in vain: and washed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I bin plagued, and chastened every morning, &c.* (*Psalm.* 73.) To which we may annex that blunt and emphatical lesson of *Jesus ben Syrach* (*Ecclesiastic.* 2.) *My son, if thou come to serve*

ſerve the Lord, prepare thy ſoul for temptation: the concernment of which every man underſtands to be this: *The more righteous, the more afflicted.* Here alſo is a convenient place for their opinion, who affirme the *Book* of *Job* to have bin intended as no hiſtory (though they conced him to have bin no faigned perſon, from *Ezek.* 14. 14. and *James* 5. 2. but a real example of both Fortunes, in an exceeding meaſure) but a grave Treatiſe concerning this ſubject, viz. *the proſperity of the impious, and conſtant adverſity of the pious*, comprehending the arguments of both the *Opponent* and *Defendant* of *Divine Providence.* Which is grounded upon ſtrong probability, ſince, as S^t. *Ierom* hath obſerved and atteſted, in the original Hebrew, from the beginning of the book to the 3 verſe of the 3 chapter, where the complaint of *Iob* begins, all is written in *Proſe*, and thenceforward, during the whole diſpute, to the 6th. verſe of the laſt chapter all in *Hexameter verſe*, where the compoſer again let looſe his pen into proſe, whereby it is manifeſt that the *Proſe* was deſtined for a *Prologue* and an *Epilogue* to the conteſt in *verſe.* Now every man knows the ſorrows and ſickneſs of *Iob* to have bin too intenſe and urgent, to endure the calme and leaſure requiring humor of *Poetry* either in himſelf or his friends: and therefore muſt the book be compoſed by ſome Perſon not moleſted with either of thoſe two impediments, but of ſerene thoughts, and acquainted with the antient cuſtome of diſpoſing their Moral Philoſophy into verſe.

And there are *inſtances* enough to illuſtrate both the contumacy and large diffuſion of this *objection.* I might have ſayd *more then enough*; the ſtrongeſt and moſt military *Faith* among us, though aſſiſted by the moſt evident and firm *reaſon*, being hardly able juſtly to boaſt an abſolute conqueſt of, and conſtant immunity from the ſharpe clandeſtine aſſaults of the ſame *ſcruple:* and ſo no man needing other example to evince the frequent prevalency of it, but what his retired meditations may find alleaged in the inventory of his own frailties, lapſes, and temptations; (all which are punctually and orderly regiſtred by that recorder of his ſoul, which the Divine call's Συνείδησις, or *Conſcience*) eſpecially in theſe evil times, wherein *Piety*, *Wiſedom*, *Iuſtice*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Innocence*, and all other *Graces* and *Virtues* are

deposed, and onely their *Contraries* advanced; in a word, *wherein nothing can make a man temporally miserable, but the severe profession of Goodness.*

Sect. II.

Article 1. That man is the sole object of Gods special *Providence*, argued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (extrinsecal) *love*: and that inferred from hence, (1) that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a greater knowledg of his Divinity, then upon any other Creature, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualified to speculate, admire, and laud the *pulchritude* of Nature.

That God extends the right hand of his Providence upon the head of man (the *Heir* of all his *blessings*, though the *youngest* of his *Creatures*) ordering the occurrences of his life, nay the manner and moment of his death, by a paternal and special care, more excellent then that whereby he is pleased to regulate and dispose the operations of all other Entities in the Republique of the World; is amply manifest from hence, *Quod majorem sui hominibus, quam cæteris rebus notitiam impressit*, that he hath impressed upon the mind of man a knowledg of his Divinity more clear and distinct, then upon any created natures beside, *Angelical* and *intuitively intellectual spirits* only excepted.

For though all the works of God carry, in the front of their distinct Forms, some certain Signatures or Characters, that undeniably attest their Creation by an Efficient infinite in Power and Wisdom; and in that respect may be properly enough said, to shew forth the glory of their Maker: and though all *Animals* do, by a kind of tacit homage, confess their origination from, and constant dependence on one *Eternal* and *Omnipotent Cause*; yet are they induced, excited, or rather impelled thereunto, *instinctu solum quodam cæco*, only by a blind and confused instinct, of which themselves have no possible notion. But as for the *Favorite*, *man*, he holds a clear and distinct *idea* of the Nature of God, as hath formerly bin demonstrated; and hath therefore a Logical, assured, and express cognition of his *Creator* and *Conservator*, and that so *radically* united, or identified to his essence, that it can be no Paradox to averr, that this science is part of his soul, though that be a simple, pure, homogeneal, and so

ſo indiviſible ſubſtance: nay ſome modern Enquirers into the nature of the ſoul, have deſcribed it to be, *Actus ſimplex Cognitionis omnium, quæ cognoſci poſſint*, a ſimple Act, or preſent Cognition of all things intelligible, *i. e.* of *God*, and conſequently, tis not in the power of the moſt deſperate and obdurate Atheiſt, to eraſe this idea out of his mind, no more then to change, meliorate, or adnihilate his eſſence, or prevent the ſtroke of Death. Now, what could be the *Motive*, that induced God to ennoble man by the prerogative of this excellent Idea, or repreſentation of himſelf, other then the reflex act of his own infinite Goodneſs; which in the language of mortality, is *Free Love*, that flowed in a fuller and richer ſtream upon man, then upon all the World beſide? And what can be the *End* of this implantate and coeſſential Knowledg in man, other then this; that he ſhould conſtantly contemplate, admire, and laud the Perfections of the *Donor* thereof, and more particularly that concerned *Attribute*, which moved him to the free *Donation*, namely his immenſe *Beneficence?* This being conceded, it remains a plain and perpendicular *Inference*; that ſince between God and man there is a greater relation, or *Communion* (ſo the learned *Gaſſendus* calls it, *in Animadverſ. in lib.* 10. *Diogen. Laert. de phyſiolog. Epicuri. pag.* 744.) then betwixt God and any other of his Creatures: therefore alſo muſt there be a greater meaſure of *Providence* in God for man, then for any other; it being neceſſary that the *Providence* of God ſhould hold exact proportion, and be æquilibrated to his *Love*. This neceſſity of a parity or *æquipondium* betwixt *Love* and *Providence Divine*, may be conveniently exemplified in our ſelves; for by how much the more we love our Friends, Wives or Children, by ſo much the more carefull and provident are we for their conſervation and welfare.

Again, our own Experience is both argument and teſtimony ſufficient, that the perſecutation of the myſteries of Nature, and the contemplation of ſublime and celeſtial objects, is proper only to man; no other Animal being conſtituted in a capacity to rival him in thoſe noble operations. And if ſo, undoubtedly he muſt violently ſtifle the conviction of his experience in this particular,

who,

who dares deny, that those heavenly beauties, and all the peices of Nature beside were created principally for the use of man, insomuch as man was created principally to declare the Glory of the Creator. *Ad quid enim tantus decor universi, nisi esset homo, qui consideraret, ipsoque perspecto hymnum Authori caneret?* Tis an Axiome of constant Verity, *that Nature makes nothing in vain*; and this rule, doubtless, she learned from that *Wisdom*, which determineth all its actions to certain, adequate, and proper Ends: now we must grant, either that God adorned the Universe with such exquisite pulchritude, and admirable imbellishment of Art, to no purpose at all; and so was more vain and improvident then his instrument, Nature: or else, that he conferred that elegancy and amiable decorament upon it, to this end, that the curious Cogitations of man might be entertained, exercised, and delighted in the speculation and admiration thereof, and through that maze of pleasant wonder be conducted to the true Elyzium, the contemplation of the *Fountain* of *Pulchritude*, and *entelechia* of Excellencies, *God*. For there is no *medium* between these two Contraries, nor any hope of evading the rigour of this *Dilemma*, upon pretence of neutrality: since God had no other end, wherefore he beautified the World, but his own Glory in chief, and the excitement of the Admiration and Magnificat of man, as subservient thereunto; nor doth the World contain any other Nature, but Man, that is qualified with Faculties requisite to the satisfaction of that end. *Quis enim aliquam aliam unquam invenit naturam, qua ædificium hoc tantum conspiciens, in Architecti sapientissimi admirationem perinde rapiatur?* We well know, that *Relatives* (*secundum esse*) positively necessitate the existence each of other; and therefore to allow (what cannot be disallowed, but by incurring a more dangerous absurdity) that God made, and exhibited the *Beauty* of the World, *tanquam admirandum spectaculum*, as a spectacle that cannot but excite *Admiration* in the *speculator*; and yet to deny that he provided a fit and respective *spectator*, such whose *Sense* should transmit the *idea* of that *Pulchritude* to the judicature of a higher *Faculty*, and that again be thereby impregnated with *Admiration* (which is nothing but our Reasons being at a stand at the *novelty*

or

of *excellence* of an object occurring to our ſenſe; for what is either frequent, or manifeſt to our cognition, we never admire: and that's the cauſe, why this *Affection* of the mind as it is the firſt of *Paſſions*, ſo it is the only one that wants a *Contrary*, as the unimitable *Des Cartes* hath diſcovered to us, *in lib. de paſſion. part.* 1. *articl.* 54.) is not only an impious derogation to the wiſdome of God, but alſo a manifeſt Contradiction to our own reaſon, which from the exiſtence of the *Relatum*, a *ſpectacle*, immediately concludes the neceſſary exiſtence of the *Correlatum*, a *ſpectator*. And that this Spectator can be no other Animal, but man; is too bright a truth to need any other illuſtration, but what is reflected from it ſelf.

To which Argument, of the Creators adopting man to be his Darling and intimate Favorite, the Logick of every man may ſuperadd many others of equivalent importance, drawn from the conſideration of thoſe *Praeminences and Prarogatives*, wherewith his Munificence hath bin pleaſed to ennoble his nature, and exalt him to a neerer Cognation or Affinity to his own glorious Eſſence, then any other Creature in the Univerſe; as the excellent contexture and majeſtique *Figure* of his *Body*; the ſemi-divine *Faculties* of his *Soul*; his *Monarchy*, domination, or royalty over all other ſublunary natures, *Omnia enim ſibi ſubmittit, dum omnia quæ in mundo ſunt, vel ad uſus vitæ neceſſarios refert, vel ad varia genera voluptatum*; and laſtly that ineſtimable propriety, the *Immortality* of his Soul.

Now to direct all this to the mark; ſince God hath thus prodaimed Man to be, next to his own *Glory* (which is the *laſt* of *Ends*, as his *Will* is the *firſt* of *Cauſes*) the grand and principal ſcope of his mighty work of Creation; and that he made all things, in order to his accommodation and well-being in this life, and allurement, nay manuduction or conduct to immarceſcible beatitude after Death: and ſince his Act of Providence, or the conſtant Conſervation of all things, in the primitive perfection, diſtinction and order of their Natures, is nothing but his act of Creation prolonged, or ſpun out through all the independent Atoms, or ſucceſſive particles of time, as hath bin more then once intimated; beyond all diſpute, the *Product* muſt be the ſame

with our *Thesis*, viz. *That Man is the object of Gods special Providence*, and by consequence, *that all occurrences of his life are punctually predetermined, ordered, and brought to pass by the same.*

Article 2. That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of Gods special Providence.

As every man brings into the World with him a certain *Prolepticall*, or *Anticipated Cognition* of a *Deity*, or *First Cause* of all things, deeply and indelebly stamp'd upon his *mind*; as hath bin formerly demonstrated: so also holds he, as an *Adjunct*, or rather a *part* thereof, a coessentiall *Prenotion*, that this *First Cause*, or *Supreme Nature*, is the *Fountain* from whence those two different streams of *Happiness* and *Misery*, or *Good* and *Evil*, the former by *Condonation*, the other by *Permission*, are constantly derived: and upon consequence, that all *Occurrences* of his life, are the just and prudent *Designations* of its *special Providence*.

That every man, in whom the *Light of Nature* is not damp't by *Fatuity*, either native and temperamental, or casually supervenient, hath this *Ἔννοια*, or *impress* of an *especial Providence*, decreeing and disposing all events, that have, do, or shall befall him; is manifest from hence, that no man, though educated in the wildest ignorance, or highest barbarisme imaginable, but was naturally, and by the advisoes of his intestine *Dictator*, inclined either to conceive, or imbrace some kind of *Religion*, as an homage or fealty due from him to that *Supreme Power*, in whose hands he apprehended the rains of Good and Evil to be held, and whose favour and benigne aspect he thought procurable, and anger attoneable by the seasonable addresses of *Invocation* and *Sacrifice*.

Article 3. That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion.

And in truth, to him, whose meditations shall sink deep enough, it will soon appear, that this *Anticipation is the very root of Religion*; for though man stood fully perswaded of the *Existence* of *God*, yet would not that alone be argument sufficient to convince him into the necessity of a devout *Adoration* of him, unless his mind were also possessed with a firme beleif of this proper *Attribute* of his Nature, which so neerly concerns his felicity or infelicity, viz. his *special Providence*, which regulates all the affaires, and appoints all the Contingencies of every individual man

mans life. For tis the ſenſe of our own *Defects*, *Imperfections*, and *Dependency*, that firſt leads us to the knowledg of his *Allſufficiency*, *Perfections*, and *Self-ſubſiſtence*; the apprehenſion of our *Neceſsities*, is the ſchool wherein we firſt learned our *Orizons*, and the hope of obtaining *Bleſsings* from his immenſe Bounty, is both the excitement and encouragement of our *Devotion:* and therefore the *Devil* ſpake profoundly and to the purpoſe, in his expoſtulation with God concerning the cauſe of *Iobs* integrity, *Doth Iob ſerve God for nought?* This being duely perpended, I hope I ſhall not offend Theology, if I affirme, that ſince to love God aright, is to love him purely and ſolely becauſe he is God, *i. e.* all that's truely Good and Amiable; *tis impoſsible for the ſoul of man, in this life, to love God as ſhe ought to doe*: becauſe impoſſible for her, before her refinement by Glorification, ſo to caſt off all *ſelf-intereſt*, as to love him without reflexions upon her ſelf, *i. e.* without the hopes of being made eternally happy by that love. If this reaſon bear not out my paradox, I dare any man to the bar of Experience, and boldly appeal to the *Conſcience* of any the moſt mortified Chriſtian, whether in his moſt pure, abſtracted, and holy raptures of *Divine love*, he did not always perceive a conſiderable mixture, and weighty alloy of *Ipſeity* or *Selfneſs*.

That the Conceſſion of an *Eſpecial Providence* in the *Supreme Being*, whereby he conſtantly moderateth and diſpoſeth the operations and products of Second Cauſes for the induction of *Good* on the heads of thoſe, whoſe Virtuous inclinations may, in ſome latitude of *Worthyneſs*, ſeem to prepare and qualify them for the gratefull *Acceptance*, and genuine *uſe* thereof; and of *Evil* on thoſe whoſe *Vitioſities* and habitual Depravities ſeem, by the importunity or violence of demerit, to extort it from the *Juſtice* of his *Indignation*: that this inbred *perſwaſion*, I ſay, is the ſpark, at which all the Tapors of *Religion* were firſt kindled, the very *Ethnicks* themſelves, while groping in the Chaos of Idolatry, have long ſince diſcovered. Witneſs their Magnificent Temples, coſtly Hecatombs, human Holocauſts, and frequent ſolemne Invocations; all which kinds of addreſſes they generally made uſe of, and obliged themſelves unto, as the only hopefull means as well to atone the diſpleaſure, as conciliate the favour of that *Power*,

in whose hands they conceived the book of *Fate* to be kept, and who had the *Gardianship* or *Administration* of the *Fortunes* not only of Cities, nations, and families, but even of every individual Person. Witness also, that Glorious Pagan, *Cicero*, who deriving the pedegree of *Religion*, fathers it immediately upon the *persuasion of an Especial Providence*, (1. *de nat. Deor.*) in these words; *Sunt Philosophi, & fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent humanarum rerum procurationem Deos. Quorum si vera est sententia, quæ potest esse Pietas? quæ Religio? Hæc enim omnia purè ac castè tribuenda Deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab his, & si est aliquid à Diis immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem Dii neque possunt, nec volunt nos juvare, nec curant omnino, nec quid agamus animadvertant, nec est quod ab his ad hominum vitam permanare possit: quid est, quod ullos Diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul & sanctitatem, & religionem tolli necesse est. Quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitæ sequitur, & magna confusio.*

Article 4. That Man brings into the world with him, an irresistible propension to Religion.

That no man ever entred upon the theatre of the World, but he acted some one *Religious* part, bringing along with him an irresistible propension to revere and adore that *Nature*, which he conceived superior to his own, and all others; cannot be obscure to any, whom either *Peregrinations*, or *Books* have acquainted with the religious Customes and practises of forreign *Nations*, either *Ancient* or *Modern*. For read we the voluminous monuments of Antiquity, erected by the noble industry of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Ptolome*, *Mela*, *Pliny*, *Solinus*, *Justine*, and other *senior Historiographers*; read we *Munster's Cosmography*, *Ortelius* his *Theatrum Orbis*, the *Histories* of *Brasile*, written by the judicious pens of *Guilelm. Piso*, the Hollander and Physician to the States Fleet, of *Georg. Marcgravus* the German, and *Iohan. de Laet* of *Antwerp*; and in our Mother tongue, *Grimstones Estates* and *Empires*, *Purchas his Pilgrimage* (a work that speaks its venerable Compiler, to have bin a man of many Languages, indefatigable study, vast readings, large

large rhapsodies, and strong judgement,) *Hackluit's Collection of English Voyages*, the several Descriptions of *America*, together with the manners of its various Inhabitants; and other Works of the *Neotericks* (in all which we find not only the *Chorography* and *Topography*, but also the faithfull *Morography* of all the known parts of the World) I say, read we all these, and we shall find them unanimously positive in this point, *That there is no Nation but hath its Religion.* And therefore, with *Arnobius* (*lib.* 1. *contr. Gent. pag.* 476.) I am bold to demand of the whole world; *Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius Principis notione, diem primæ nativitatis intraverit? Cui non sit ingenitum, imo affixum, & pene in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum; esse Regem ac Dominum cunctorum, quæcunque sunt, Moderatorem?*

Article 5. An objection, that the *Calaici* were absolute Atheists, refuted.

If any shall pull me by the eare, and here object out of *Strabo* (*lib.* 13. *pag.* 382.) that the *Calaici*, a rude and savage people of old *Spain*, were absolute *Atheists*, and worshiped no Gods at all; I answer, that *Strabo* wrote this particular with no more authenticall a quill, but what he found drop't from the wings of *Fame*, himself insinuating as much: for his words are, *Calaicis Deum nullum esse, quidam ajunt*; there is a certain rumor, or traditional report, raised, dispersed and authorized, where, when, upon what grounds, or by whom, I know not, that the *Calaici* had no religion among them. And if a *quidam sic ajunt*, be proof enough to ratifie any historicall position, or assertion; then may *Fame* aspire to the throne of *Truth*, *Fables* become *Histories*, and strangers may beleive that we *Christians* are the most *absolute Atheists*. For *Cæcilius* hath reported of us, that we doe *templa despicere, & Deos despuere:* both despise the temples, and despite the Gods; as *Arnobius* (*lib.* 8. *cont. Gent. pag.* 748.) hath informed us.

Article 6. A second objection, that the *Massagetæ* and *Scythians* were devoyd of all Religion, prevented.

Nor have I forgotten, that the two fierce Nations, the *Massagetæ* and *Scythians*, (whose *rudeness* and want of Civility, the indiscretion or severity of some hath aggravated into an *Atheistical Barbarisme*, and want of all *Religion*) have bin stigmatiz'd with

with the same infamous brand; and therefore to anticipate this exception, I refer the doubting Reader to the testimonies of *Herodotus* and *Lucian*: the former (*lib. 4. pag. 278. & 279.*) at large expunging that fabulous aspersion, and proving them strict, solemne, and ceremonious Votaries to all the Gods of Greece: the latter (*lib. de sacrificiis. p. 57.*) deriding them for their superstition, nay such immoderate and frantique zeal, towards the honour of their principal Deity, *Diana*, as made them embrace the flames, and offer themselves as holocausts unto her.

Article 7. That it is not in the power of man, totally to eradicate this plant of Religion, or notion of special Providence Divine, out of his mind; evinced from hence, that the most contumacious Atheists have, at some time or other, acknowledged it: as

Moreover, as this inoppugnable propensity to *Religion* is a *Cyence* of *Gods* own ingrafting on the mind of man; so also is it not in the power of any man, though assisted by all the stratagems and legions of Hell, totally to *eradicate* it thence.

This is a truth confirmed by the *Experience* of all Ages. For, notwithstanding the insolent pretences, and blasphemous Rhodomontadoes of many miscreants, who have gloried in the most execrable cognomen of Ἄθεοι, and studied to advance their name to the highest pinacle of Fame, by being accounted men of such absolute and fearless Spirits, as that they scorned to own any *Being superior* to their own, to which they should be accountable for their actions: yet have they bin compelled (so violent are the secret touches of that hand, which converts all things into demostrations of his own Glory) either by the scourge of some sharp calamity, or the rack of some excruciating disease, in their lives, to recant; or at the neer approach of that King of terrors, Death, to confess this their horrid impiety.

Article 8. *Pharaoh.*

Thus the proud and Adamant-hearted *Pharaoh*, who deriding the Divine Embassy of *Moses*, in an imperious strain of Scorn, and expostulatory bravado, demanded of him; *Quis est Jehovah, cujus voci auscultem, dimittendo Israelem? non novi Jehovam, &c.* did yet, when the *Violentum* of Divine Vengeance by heavy judgements had convinced him; when the true and real Miracles of *Moses* had won the garland from those weak Delusions and prestigious impostures of his *Magicians*, and he beheld their black Art fooled in their vain attempts to imitate

imitate *Moſes* in the viſible transformation of Duſt into Lice; when the tangible darkneſs that benegroed the horizon of *Ægypt*, and ſo made it more then midnight to the eye of his body, had illuminated that of his Soul; and when the frozen Granadoes of the clouds had broke open the iron door of his Conſcience; then ſends he poſt for thoſe, whom he had barbarouſly exiled from his preſence, humbles himſelf before them, and howles out this *Palinodia*; *Peccavi hac vice: Jehovah juſtiſſimus, ego vero & populus meus ſumus improbiſſimi.*

Article 9. *Herod Agrippa.*

Thus *Herod Agrippa*, who, in the morne, to enhance the eſtimate of majeſty, and ſtroke that vertiginous and admiring beaſt, the multitude, had arrayed him in his brighteſt ornaments of State, thickly imbrodered with plates of Oriental Gold, and ſtudded with Diamonds and all other reſplendent Gemms, ſo that the incident Sun beams ſeemed to have acquired a greater luſtre by reflexion from him, and who by the blaſt of popular Euges had the wings of his Pride fanned up to ſo ſublime a pitch, that he loſt ſight of his own Humanity, and vainly conceived the adulatory Hyperbole of his Auditors to be but their juſt acknowledgement of his Divinity: being wounded by the inviſible ſword of a revenging Angel, before Sun ſet, by a fatal experiment confuted both his own and his flatterers blaſphemy, and with the hoarſe groans of a tortured wretch, cryed out; *En ille Ego, veſtra appellatione Deus, vitam relinquere jubeor; fatali neceſſitate mendacium veſtrum coarguente: & quem immortalem ſalutaſtis, ad mortem rapior. Sed ferenda eſt voluntas cæleſtis Numinis.* (*Joſeph.* 19. *Antiquit. p.* 565.)

Article 10. *Antiochus Epiphanes.*

Thus that real *Lycaon*, *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who had not only denied, but being enraged by a malitious Phrenſy beyond that of *Lucifer* newly degraded, publickly deſpited and reviled the *Almighty Patron* of the Jews, blaſphemed his moſt ſacred name, demoliſhed his temples, profaned his conſecrated Utenſils, violated his religious inſtitutions, and perſecuted his worſhipers with all the moſt bloody cruelties, that the wit of an exalted malice could invent, or inflict: being put upon the rack of a ſore

sore and mortal disease (which some have conjectured, and not without good warrant from probability, to have bin a *Cancer* in his bowells, introduced *mediately* by *Divine Justice*, *immediately* by a fix't *melancholy* generated by the unceſſant ſtings and convulſions of his guilty Conſcience, as by its *procatarctick Cauſes*) and deſpairing of any eaſe or cure but from his injured enemy, God; he ſighes out his Confeſſion. *The ſleep is gon from my eyes, and my heart faileth for very Care. And I thought with my ſelf, into what tribulation am I come, and how great a floud of miſery is it, wherein I now am? But now I remember the evills that I did at Jeruſalem, and that I took all the veſſels of Gold and Silver that were therein, and ſent to deſtroy the inhabitants without a Cauſe. I perceive therefore, that for this cauſe, theſe troubles are come upon me &c. It is meet to be ſubject unto God, and that a man who is mortal, ſhould not think himſelf equal unto God through pride.* (*Maccab.* 1. *chap.* 6. *verſ.* 9, 10, 11.)

Article 11. *Maximinus.* Thus the Giant Emperour, *Maximinus*, as inſatiate a Blood-hound to the *Chriſtians*, as *Antiochus* had bin to the *Jews*, *novorum ſuppliciorum inventione ſeſe inſolenter efferens*, boaſting the acuteneſs of his wit by the invention of new ways of tortures for thoſe patient martyrs, as *Euſebius* (*lib.* 1. *de vita Conſtant. cap.* 51.) hath deſcribed him; and advancing the Roman *Eagle* in defiance of thoſe who fought under the ſanguine ſtandard of the *Croſs*; nay ſo infatuated with the confidence of his own Greatneſs and perſonal ſtrength, that he entertained a conceit, that *Death* durſt not adventure to encounter him, for feare of having his javelin broke about his own crazy skull, and all his skeleton of bones rattled to duſt, as *Capitolinus* tells us: notwithſtanding when he felt himſelf invaded with a *Verminous Ulcer*, or *Fiſtula*, *in mediis corporis arcanis*, which did *letificum fœtorem exhalare, ut medicorum aliqui incredibilem fœtorem ferre non valentes, occiderentur*, evaporate ſo contagious and peſtilential a ſtench, that ſome of his Phyſicians, not able to endure that mephitis or ſteam of intenſe corruption, fell down dead; and underſtood the ſame to be *ſupplicium Divinitus illatum*, a judgement

ment sent from God to retaliate upon him those tortures, which he had caused in the bowells and secret parts of many innocents; then did his flinty heart melt within him, and *tandem sentire cœpit, quæ contra pios Dei cultores impiè gesserat, & hac se propter insaniam contra Christum præsumptam, merito & ultionis vice, perpeti confessus est*, and in the midst of these confessions of his own *Guilt*, and *Gods justice*, breathed out his execrable soul from a gangrenous and loathsome body. (*Eusebius, lib.* 8. *Histor. Eccles. cap.* 17.)

Article 12. *Julian Apostata.*

Thus also that notorious *Apostate, Julian*, who had not only renounced the faith of *Christ*, but proclaimed open and implacable hostility against him, and to quench the thirst of his diabolical malice, drank whole Tuns of the pretious blood of his *Members*; being defeated and mortally wounded in a battaile fought against the Persians: he instantly learned of his awaked Conscience, that the Cause of his present overthrow was his former impiety, and rightly ascribing the Victory to the revenging finger of that God, whose Divinity he had abjured, rather then to the arme of flesh, he threw up his blood into the aer, and together with his black Soul, gasped out this desperate ejaculation; *Vicisti Galilæe, vicisti!* Thou hast overcome me, oh! thou *Jesus of Galile*, thou hast overcome me: *simul confessus & victoriam, & blasphemiam*, at once confessing both Christs conquest and his own detestable blasphemy; as *Theodoret* (*lib.* 3. *Histor. Eccles. cap.* 20.) hath descanted upon those his last (but truest) words.

Article 13. *Tullus Hostilius.*

And thus also *Tullus Hostilius* (a *Cognomen* exactly accommodated to his fierce *nature*,) immediate successor to *Numa Pompilius* in his throne, though not in his manfuete and pious inclinations; being a man of so rough and martial a temper, that he held *Religion* to be but a kind of *Emollient Cataplasme*, prescribed by *State Policy* to soften and emasculate the minds of men, as *Plutarch* (*in vita Numæ pag.* 158.) hath noted of him; and thereupon in his prosperity neither acknowledging, nor sacrificing unto any *Deity*, but his *Ferreus Acinaces*, or old sword: when cast upon the thorny bed of sickness, he soon

diſcovered, retracted, and renounced his *Atheiſme*. (which remarkable mutation of his judgement, *Livie* (*lib.* 1. *pag.* 13.) hath both amply and elegantly deſcribed thus, *Adeo fracti ſimul cum corpore ſunt ſpiritus illi feroces, ut qui nihil antea ratus eſſet minus regium, quam ſæris dedere animum; repente omnibus magnis parviſque ſuperſtitionibus obnoxius degeret, religionibuſque populum impleret.* I ſayd *Mutation* of his judgement, not *Rectification*; nor can I properly allow him ſo much: ſince he that runs from one extreme of *Atheiſme* to the other of *Polytheiſme*, ſhall find himſelf in the ſame point of *Error*, from whence he ſet forth. For to beleive, that there are more Gods then one, in ſtrictneſs of truth is to beleive there is none at all; *Unity* being the eſſential and inſeparable Attribute of the *Deity*. And therefore we may allow him to have bin *ſuperſtitious*, but never truely *religious*. Nor did the *Judge of all hearts* accept of this *Change* for a *Converſion*; for the records both of *Livy* and *Eutropius* concur in this; *Fulmine ictus, cum tota domo ſua, conflagravit*: he, his houſe, and family were conſumed by Lightning. A puniſhment ſo proportionate to the rules of *Divine Juſtice*, that we may therein give a faire conjecture of his guilt: and that which all Atheiſts have ſtood convulſt at.

Iuvenal. Satyr. 13.

Hi ſunt, qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent,
Cum tonat, exanimes, primo quoque murmure cœli.

Such *Villains* quake at *Thunder*, and each flaſh
Of *Lightning* doth their *Soules* with *Terror* quaſh.

Article 14. *Bion Boryſthenites.*

A like example of the impoſſibility of extinguiſhing this ſpark of Religion, which the Creator hath kindled in the breaſt of every man, doth *Diogenes Laertius* afford us (*in vit. Bionis*) in the recantation of *Bion* of *Boryſthenes*. Who continuing (or rather only pretending to continue) in profeſt Atheiſme, till he was arreſted by ſickneſs, that rough Serjeant of Death, and then affrighted into an acknowledgement of that truth, he had ſo long ſtifled: *inductus eſt pœnitentiam agere ſuper iis, quæ peccavit in Deum*, was induced to become a penitentiary for thoſe offences he had prepetrated againſt the ſacred majeſty of God.

To

To conclude therefore; as *Lucilius* ſayd of *Homer, Nemo qui culpat Homerum, perpetuo culpat*; ſo may we more truely ſay of *God, Nemo qui Deum negat, perpetuo negat*, no man who denys God, doth conſtantly deny him. For all men have confuted, diſavowed, or repented that impiety at or before their death, which they ſeemed with ſo much impudence and pride, to cheriſh in their lives. This the ſweet-tongued *Tertullian* (*Apolog. cap.* 17.) profoundly obſerved, when he diſtilled the quinteſſence or ſpirit of all we have ſayd, concerning this aſſertion, into this ſhort ſentence: *Anima, licet carcere corporis preſſa, licet inſtitutionibus pravis circumſcripta, licet libidinibus & concupiſcentiis evigorata, licet falſis Diis exancillata, cum tamen reſipiſcit, ut ex crapula, ut ex ſomno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, & ſanitatem ſuam patitur, Deum nominat.*

Article 15. The poſſibility of the *obſcuration* of the Impreſs of ſpecial Providence Divine, *pro tempore*, conceded: and the impoſſibility of the total *Deletion* thereof, briefly proved.

I ſhall not gainſay, but that 'tis *poſſible* (I am ſorry, I might have ſayd, too *frequent*) to have this ingravement of Divinity on the mind of man, obſcured, and buried under the duſt raiſed in the ſummer of *Proſperity*; for as *Lactantius* (*lib.* 2. *cap.* 1.) moſt ſolidly, *tum maxime Deus ex hominum memoria elabitur, cum beneficiis ejus fruentes honorem dare Divinæ indulgentiæ deberent*, men are then moſt prone to forget God, when being ſated with the accumulations of his immenſe bounty, they have the greateſt reaſon to remember him: yet I ſhall confidently affirme, that the leaſt guſt of Affliction, in the winter of *Adverſity*, ſoon blows that duſt off again, and renders the Characters faire and legible to the firſt reflexive or inward glance of the ſoul. *Si qua enim neceſſitas gravis preſſerit, tum demum recordantur; ſi belli terror infremuerit, ſi alimenta frugibus longa ſiccitas denegaverit, ſi ſæva tempeſtas, ſi grando ingruerit: ad Deum protinus confugiunt, à Deo petitur auxilium, Deus, ut ſubvenias, oratur; ſi quis in mari vento ſæviente jactatur, hunc invocat; ſi quis aliqua vi afflictatur, hunc protinus implorat, &c.* as the ſame *Lactantius*.

Article 16. The reduction of all, to a concise and memorable demonstration; that the occurrences of every mans life are the consignations of special Providence

Now to abstract all this to a smaller bulk, such as may be no burthen to the weakest memory; and reduce our Argument into a sharper point, so that it may, with the greater facility, sink into the thickest skull; If *Religion* be a *Plant* radicated in the soul of man, so deeply and firmely, that though the damp of a *barbarous education* may for a while *retard*, or the rankness of those Weeds of Sensuality, the *Honours* and *Delights* of this World, *conceal* the *germination* of it: yet will it, at some time or other, early or late, and always in the Winter of *Calamity*, shoot up and bud forth into an absolute *Demonstration* of the dependence of our *Happiness* and *Misery* on the *Will* of the *Supreme Being*: and if the πληροφορία, or full *Perswasion* of an *Especial Providence*, as a relative *Attribute* of the *Supreme Being*, whereby all the various Occurrences of every individual mans life are predetermined and disposed, bee the *Seed* from whence this *Plant* of *Religion* hath its root; both which *Propositions* we conceive sufficiently proved: then doe not I see, how the subtilest Wit can evade the rigour of the *Inference*, or *Conclusion*, viz. *That all the affaires of man are regulated by the Special Providence of God.*

Sect. III.

Article 1. The Atheists first objection, confuted: and the Divine Nature demonstrated both *irascible* and *placable*, (anthropopathically.)

THus far have we Demostrated the *Necessity of Gods Special Providence*; and our next business is to remove those *Rocks* cast up by the Pioners of Satan, to obstruct the Current of mans cleare and full beleif thereof.

As for the *First*, *Deum neque ira*, *neque gratia tangi*; this may without much difficulty be dejected, by answering, that it can no way infringe the *Immutability* or constant *Sameness* of the *Divine Nature*, to affirme it to be capable of *Anger* and *Placability*: provided that we understand neither of these as a

Passion,

Paſſion, but (as the *Schoolemen* preciſely ſpeak) *in effectu executionem, potius quàm in Affectu perturbationem*, rather an execution in *Effect*, then a Perturbation in *Affect*. As for *Anger*; if a *Wiſe-man* can ſo conſerve the ſerenity and tranquillity of his mind, as to chaſtiſe or ſeverely puniſh his diſobedient ſervant, without any paſſion or internal commotion at all: 'tis very hard, if *God*, the *Fountain of Wiſdome*, cannot be admitted to conſerve the conſtant and immutable peace or calme of his Beatitude, when he puniſheth the improbous actions of men. For *Juſtice* is a *virtue*, which to ſpeak ſtrictly, cannot frown, which abhor's the ſociety of a *Paſſion*, and only actuates the mind into a noble and commendable *Zeal*, not an illiberall or rough *Perturbation*. And upon the conſideration of this was it, that the firſt *Preſervers of Equity*, knowing it not to be impoſſible for the breaſt of a *Magiſtrate* to be inflamed, beyond this moderate heat, into an exceſs of Indignation againſt a *Malefactor*; therefore wiſely provided, that the *Judge* ſhould ſquare his *Sentence* by the direct and impartial rule of the *Law*; which ſome Civilians have therefore wittily defined to be *Ira ſedata*, Anger without Cholet, Indignation refracted, or the ſword of Vengeance put in the hand of Mercy. As for the Contrary to *Anger*, viz. *Grace*, or *Placability*; why this alſo may not be aſcribed to God, as fully conſiſtent to the Eternal plenitude and immutability of the *Divine Beatitude*, I cannot underſtand: provided that we aecept it *abſque geſtiente latitia*, and as an effect infinitely remote from that kind of *Paſſionate Joy*, which tickles the heart of man into a ſuddain paroxyſme of delight, upon the apprehenſion of a gratefull and pleaſing Object, either in the anticipation of Hope, or actual fruition. The *Reaſon* is the immenſe *Goodneſs* of his *Nature*, which being in perpetual *Effuſion*, without poſſibility of exhauſtion, or an Ocean that repleniſheth all things with *Amability*, yet ſuffers no diminution of its own fulneſs; doth more then incline him to be pleaſed with, or accept of as gratefull, that in man, which is originally but an *Extract* of his own *Delightfulneſs*, or himſelf gratefully returned to himſelf by reflexion from us. This the *Schoolemen* moſt judiciouſly pondered, when they eſtabliſht as Canonical, *Deum*

exercere gratiam, ea natura ſinceritate, qua Bonus eſt. Nor are we to deny this *Placency* or *Delight* to *God*, ſince it is ſo far from *infringing* this conſtant and equall tenor of his eſſential *Felicity*, that in ſome ſort it mainly conduceth to the *Conſervation* thereof; inſomuch as to be unceſſantly exerciſed in a liberal *Benefaction* to other Natures, is to doe what is moſt conſentaneous and genuine to the ſwindge or *Verticity* of his own: and ſo to do, all men, doubtleſs, will allow to be the higheſt and moſt permanent Delight in the World.

Nor is it a legal proceſs in the common Pleas of *Reaſon*, to argue thus; God hath left us to act our own parts, in the world, therefore he takes no farther care of us, and therefore all the *Occurrences* of our lives are either the neceſſary *ſubſequents*, or collaterall *Adjuncts* of our own either *natural*, or *moral Actions*: for though it be moſt true, that he hath endowed us with an abſolute *Freedom* of our *Wills* (an evidence of his exceeding *Grace* and *Benignity*,) and that, indeed, which ſupports the neceſſity of our *Rationality*; for if our *Wills* were ſubject to compulſion, undoubtedly we ſhould have little or no uſe at all of our *Reaſon*, ſince then our *Objects* would be both *judged* of and *elected* to our hands) and ſo permitted us the enjoyment of our own intire liberty: yet hath he, out of a compaſſionate prenotion of the *Deceptibility* of our *judgement*, preſcribed us rules, whereby our *Underſtanding* may be directed in the *ſelection* of *Good*, and *devitation* of *evill*.

To ſpeak more expreſly; he hath ſet on our right hand *real* and *true Good*, on our left only *ſpecious* and *apparent*: the Election of either is dependent on our *Will*, our *Will* is guided by our *Judgement*, and our *Judgement* is the *Determination* or reſolve of our *Intellect* (for, without diſpute, though common Phyſiology hath founded this *Liberty* on the indifferency of the *Will*; yet is it radicated in the indifferency of the *Intellect*, or *Cognoſcent Faculty*, primarily, and in the *Will* only ſecondarily, inſomuch as that ever follows the manuduction of the *Intellect*,) but yet that he might in a manner direct us in our choyce, he hath annexed *Happineſs* as a *reward* to invite us to the one, and *Miſery* as a *puniſhment* to deter us from the other: and therefore

tis

tis manifest, that God wills the felicity of all men, more then themselves can desire it.

And hence comes it to be a truth, that on one side *Fortune* (*respectu nostri*) frequently puts in for a share in the playing of our Cards; but yet still the *Special Providence* of God supervises her hand, and manageth the whole game: and on the other, that our own *Prudence* doth many times conduce to our winning of the stake; but yet still 'twas the *Goodness* of *God* that gave us that *Prudence*, and takes great delight to see us use it, as we ought to do, to our own advantage.

Article 2. The Atheists scruple, of Gods inaudition of the prayers of good men, or not concession of their petitions; satisfied.

Doth he so, sayth the *Atheist*, how comes it about then, that he frequently turnes a deaf eare to our most earnest *Prayers*, and but rarely grants our *Petitions*? For how few barren wombs have bin cured of their sterility, by the fumes of sacrifices? and how few Mariners preserved from naufrage, by the appension of their Votive tables? or who hath observed such holy magick in the perishing Seamans pious sighes, as to have husht the dreadfull scolding of the waves and winds? For answer let us return,

That the most indulgent *Father* doth not always condescend to the importunate desires of his child: that as well *Pious*, as *Impious* men may be included in the same ship, that's banded up and down by the wanton Billows of the Sea; that the Good may be lost, and the Bad escape the fury of the tempest: and all this consist both with the *Goodness* and righteous *Providence* of God. The *Reason* in brief (for the full solution of this *Parallaxis* of *Justice* doth more properly belong to our refutation of the last *Objection*, concerning the apparent Prosperity of the Vitious, and the calamitous condition of the Virtuous, in this life) is this; *God in his Wisdome knows our real necessities, and understands what's most convenient for us.* This the acute *Satyrist* handsomly expresseth thus;

Inven. Sat. 10.

——————Si Consilium vis,
Permittes ipsis expendere Numinibus, quid
Conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris:
Nam pro jucundis aptissima quaque dabunt Dii.

Carior

Carior eſt illis Homo, quàm ſibi. Nos animorum
Impulſu, & magna, cæcaque cupidine ducti
Conjugium petimus, partumque Uxoris, at illi
Norunt qui Pueri, qualiſque futura ſit Uxor. &c.

Would'ſt be adviſ'd to chooſe the beſt? refer
That choyce unto the *Gods*, who cannot err.
For better then our ſelves our wants they know:
And will *true joys*, for *falſe delights*, beſtow.
Their love to us tranſcends our own. By blind
Affections ſpur'd, and fury of the mind,
We *Wife* and *Sons* deſire; the *Gods* above
Know what that *Wife*, and how thoſe *Sons* will prove.

Article 3. The Atheiſts ſecond Argument againſt Special Providence divine, diſſolved: and the neceſſitie of Objects hoſtile, and deleterious to the life of man, demonſtrated.

As for the *ſecond Rock*, *Cur ſi Deus omnia hominum cauſa fecerit, etiam multa contraria, imò & peſtifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari quàm in terra?* this alſo may eaſily be removed, by digeſting our meditations into this ſhort reply.

The *Creator*, having formed the machine of mans body into a Figure fit to receive the majeſtick charagme of Divinity, as the laſt act of his hand, and the accompletion of his moſt exquiſite Artifice, breathed into him a *Wiſe*, *intelligent*, or *cognſcent Soul*; that by the tranſcendent operations thereof, man might juſtly intitle himſelf to the Empire of the Creatures, ſubjugate them to the dominion of his unconfined Will, and accommodate all things either to the reliefe of his *Neceſſities*, or the promotion of his *Delights*. This done, he ſet before him *Good* and *Evill*; and this upon the higheſt reaſon: becauſe he had endowed him with *Sapience*, whoſe baſis is founded in the actual diſcernement of thoſe two Contraries For no man can make an election of the *Better*, and know what's really *Good*, unleſs at the ſame time he know alſo what's really *Evill*, and how to reject and avoyd the *Worſe*. Thoſe two *objects*, though abſolute *Contraries*, are yet perfect *Relatives*; though irreconcileable Enemies, are yet coſubſiſtent Twins, and live ſo connexed hand in hand, that the ablation of the one neceſſitates the ablation of the other. *Good* and *Evill* therefore being thus blended together,

and

and in this miſcellany propoſed to man; then begins that *Criterion*, *Wiſdome* to exercile its Faculties; diſplay its diſcretive energy, and immediately exploring the difference, *affects* the *Good* for *Utility*, but *rejects* the *Evill* for *Safety*. As therefore there are innumerable *Goods* offered to the judgement of man, which he may with happineſs enjoy; ſo alſo are there as many *Evills*, which he may with caution abhor. For if there were nothing evill, nothing dangerous, in ſhort, nothing hurtfull to man; pray, what ſtead could his *Reaſon* ſtand him in? And hence is it manifeſt, that whoever ſtrikes at the neceſſity of *Evill*, at the ſame time cuts off the neceſſity of *Wiſdome*, and downright annulls the uſe of the *Intellect*: ſince if *God* had created nothing that might prove noxious to man, to what purpoſe would his *Cogitation*, *Intellect*, *Science* and *Reaſon* have ſerved? For then to what object ſoever he had extended his hand, though at adventure; yet would that have bin by nature fit and commodious for him.

Article 4. The ſame illuſtrated, by a correſpondent *Simile*.

To illuſtrate this by a familiar, yet in all points reſpondent *Example*; if any man make a feaſt for a company of *Infants*, and prepare a liberal table of many both pleaſant and wholſom meats for them; though they are not wiſe enough to make their own choyce, by *rational judgement*, but purſue the inclination of their *Senſual Appetite*: yet can they not chooſe amiſs, all things good and gratefull being prælected to their hands. And if ſo, of what diſadvantage is their *Ignorance*, or of what advantage could their *Intelligence*, were they arrived at ſo much maturity, be unto them? Truely, none at all; for as they could know no want of the one, ſo could they receive no damage by the continuation of the other. But if among thoſe many pleaſant and nutritive diſhes the maſter ſhould mingle as many either *bitter* and diſtaſtfull, or *poyſonous*; then doubtleſs muſt the greedy Wretches be deceived through their ignorance of Good and Evill, unleſs *Wiſdome* ſtep in to their protection, and informe them what is ſafe, and what deſtructive, and ſo direct them in the *Delection* of the one and *Refuſall* of the other. Now clearly the Caſe is the ſame, in all particulars, twixt God and Man, as to

the point of Good and Evill: and therefore we may conclude, with *Lactantius*; *Propter mala opus nobis esse sapientia, quæ nisi fuissent proposita, rationale Animal non essemus*: had there bin no evill for man to avoyd, he never had bin endowed with a rational Soul.

Article 5. The Atheists last and grand objection, of the prosperity of the Vitious, and adversity of the Virtuous, redargued: and the nature of the *Goods* of *Fortune* profounded.

The last, and greatest *Rock*, upon whose shelves Myriads have bin split and shipwrackt in their judgements, our memory tells us is this; πῶς δὲ ἔτι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φρονήσεως τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποις οἰκονομεῖσθαι, τὸ μὲν κάβδηλον εὐτυχεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τἀναντία πάσχει; *Quæ ratione, si curæ Deo res humanæ sunt, malis est bene, & bonis malè?*

This, I confess, to the first and superficial survey of my meditations, appeared mountainous and flinty, and such as might require both a larger Current of acuteness to dissolve it, then what runs in the shallow chanel of my braines; and a greater strength of Argument to dislodge and crane it up piece after piece, then the lax and feeble nerves of my Reason could afford: but to my second and penetrating thoughts, it discovered it self to be, like those objects we look upon through the magnifying glass of Fear, great only at a distance, and devoyd of all Solidity, nay in reality no more then a heap of mud heaved up by the back of that subterraneous Mole, the *Devil*. For though Experience assures us, that this field of the World hath a strange and prepostrous soyle, wherein *Weeds* most commonly prosper, and usefull *Plants* wither: yet a profound scrutiny into the business, shall soon detect, that there is an *admirable Providence* in the distribution of *Good* and *Evill*, or *Prosperity* and *Adversity*.

First therefore, let us seriously examine the inside of those *Good* things, that are showred down on the laps of Evill men, and make their tides of Fortune high and smooth; while the streams of Good mens lives seem to run low, sink down to the lowest ebbs, and are constantly ruffled by the contrary gusts of Afflictions. Certain it is, that nothing can be affirmed to be *really Good*, but only *Virtue*, or at least that, which being contempered, impregnated and qualifyed by Virtue, doth positively conduce to our *Well-being*: and as certain it is, that Evill men want this

this *Universal Ferment*, or *Elixir*, *Virtue*, which only hath a power to convert all things into Good; and therefore cannot they either receive, or use those things called the *Goods of Fortune*, with that temper and moderation of mind, which is requisite to the perfect assimilation of them into their well-being; and upon consequence, those abused Goods instantly alter their Property, and degenerate into *Evils*, *Vice*, like a depraved stomach, having a power to corrupt the best things into the worst. And this the reason is, why those *Blessings*, which the bounty of *Providence* hath ordained for our refreshment and consolation in this tedious pilgrimage on earth, and furtherances or contributions towards our easier purchase of immarcescible Felicity in heaven, when Death shall have evacuated our Faith; such as *Vigor*, *health*, and *beauty* of Body, *ingennity of disposition*, *longevity*, *multitude of Friends*, *equality in marriage*, *fertility of issue*, *education in civility and learning*, *science*, *wealth*, *nobility of blood*, *absoluteness in power and government*, *&c.* when they come into the polluting hands of *Vitious* men, they instantly suffer a total castration of their *Goodness*, a depravation of their *benignity*, and putrify into perfect *Curses*: the possession of them raising uncessant tempests and distracting storms of *Passions* in the obnubilated region of their minds; nor permitting that comfortable sun of true *Content* to shine clearly forth, and make one faire day, during their whole lives.

For though the Mole-eyed multitude, whose sight is always terminated in the gawdy outsight, admire even to envy the lustre of splendid *Vice*, cry up the happiness of wealth, and beleive that the Rich man, though here so unjust and sinfull, doth every moment surfeit with variety of Delights: yet if his *Conscience* were strictly examined, twould soon confess, that all his luxurious *Viands* are but *Pils of Coloquintida* neatly gilded, or *Apples of Sodom*, whose Vermilian rind doth emulate the blushes of Aurora, but are within nothing but sulphureous dust; that his magnificent *Buildings* are but a more strong and spatious *Prison*; his numerous *Attendants*, but so many *plummets* superadded to that oppressing weight of cares, which keeps his mind in the perpetual motion of inquietude; his troop of *Adulators*, but a swarme of

hungry *Fleas* that moleſt him by ſucking, or a neſt of *Tarantula's*, whoſe titillations prove venenate and poyſon his ſobriety into a phrenſy of deadly jollity; that his *bed of down* growes every night more full of *thorns*; that his *baggs* of treaſure, like the maſſy ſtatue of *Jupiter* on the Aſſe's back, *oppreſs* and gall him; in ſhort, that he never taſted any one ſincere and limpid drop of pleaſure in his life.

And this one truth brancheth it ſelf into the manifeſtation of *two* others;

Firſt, that thoſe golden ſhowers which *Providence* raineth into the boſomes of Vitious men, are no more then *Bona fucata*, real Evils couched under the ſpecious hatchment of apparent Goods; fruit whoſe Cortex is ſweet and beautifull, but Kernels full of amaritude and loathſom venom; and all the magnified preſents of Fortune, like *Pandora's* Box, have glorious outſides, but contain millions of infections and peſtilential Evils.

Secondly, that the *Poſſeſſors* of them, by reaſon of the exorbitances, and habitual depravities of their minds, ſeem uncapable and therefore, in the judgement of the Supreme Wiſdome, abſolutely unworthy of more ſolid and ſubſtantial Goods; *Providence* dealing with theſe, as a Wiſe *General* with *Cowards*, who are aſſigned to the ſordid offices of common Sutlers, and Baggage-Carriers, while the generous and heroical are appointed to Arms, difficulties, and encounters. *Cum videris bonos acceptoſque Dii viros, laborare, ſudare, per arduum aſcendere; malos autem laſcivientes & voluptatibus fluere: Cogita, filiorum nos modeſtia delectari, Vernularum licentia; illos diſciplina triſtiori cotineri, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat, bonum virum in deliciis non habet; experitur, indurat, ſibi illum preparat. Seneca (de Providentia.)*

Nay, more then all this, ſhould we grant that the *Cornu Copia*, or affluence of the Goods of Fortune makes one ſtep, or gradation in the aſcent to the Palace of *Temporal Happineſs*: yet can we not infer, that Vitious men are therefore neerer to the top, then thoſe indigent and tatterd *Lazaruſſe's*, that ly groveling below, becauſe they are mounted thereon; ſince, as *Iamblicus* (*in Protrept.*) hath moſt prudently obſerved, Malice ever drinks the

the greatest part of her own poyson; since the continually excruciating torture, resulting from the sense of their own impiety, ten times more dejects them, towards the abyss of misery, then the fruition of those goods can advance them; since that sharp-beaked Vultur, an Evil Conscience, never ceaseth day nor night to dilacerate their hearts, but racks them into a most severe condemnation of themselves, which doubtless is the keenest arrow in the quiver of Divine Revenge, and that affliction which best defines the terrible essence of Hell.

To all which we may justly superadd this, that the brightest and longest days of *Fortune* have ever closed in the blackest and most tragical nights of *Sorrow*; that the *Plays* of *Libertines* have always proved *Come-tragedies*, and their pompous Masks finished in dismal Catastrophes; nor can the records of the whole world produce one Example of *Sinfull Greatness*, that hath not, either before, or at his eternal Adieu, by woefull experiment manifested the truth of this maxime; *That none can ever arrive at the Elizium of true Felicity, who constantly pursue it through the gardens of Sensuality: that the Rose of happiness grows on the prickly stem of Virtue: and that the just discharge of our duties to God and Man, in all things, to the utmost of our abilities, is the only means of acquiring that Philosophers stone*, Content, *the only* Summum Bonum *in nature.*

Article 6. The Reason, wherefore Divine Providence confers Good things on Evil men.

Lastly, as to that seeming Ἀφορισμὸν that the hand of Gods *Bounty* is observed to be extended early and long on the heads of Impious men; but, on the contrary, that of *Justice* either late, or not at all, in this life: though we grant the *Question*, yet shall we soon salve the *scruple*, by considering, that his *Providence* observes this method, for two important Reasons: *First* in respect of themselves, and *Secondly* in respect of the Virtuous. (1.) *Of themselves*; God, in order to the manifestation of his infinite *Goodness*, therefore confer's a plentifull portion of his benefits upon them, that by the blandishments of their sense he might allure them to a desire of those delights, whose pleasantness consists in this, that they infinitely transcend the apprehension of Sense; and that the fragrant odor of his temporal Mercies

might attract their minds to the affectation of Virtue, and thence lead their thoughts on to a gratefull and reverentiall Contemplation of him, that both made them out of nothing, and bestowed them freely, upon no motive of worthinesse in the receivers: and in order to the manifestation of his *Longanimity*, and *Clemency*, he therefore suspends their punishment, *ut tempus habeant, quo in se descendant, atque resipiscant*, as the holy Father expresseth it, that they may have both time enough to discover, and opportunities to repent and reforme their heynous enormities. (2.) *Of the Virtuous*, in a threefold respect; *first*, that he might become an Exemplar of mansuetude, patience, and long-suffering to them; *secondly*, that the tyranny and oppression of Ungodly men might serve to actuate and exercise those Virtues in them, which otherwise had wanted an opportunity to display their Soveraign and all-conquering efficacy: and *thirdly*, that they might extract to themselves a Cordial out of the poysonous Fate of others: *i.e.* when they shall observe those, who dayly bathed themselves in rivers of Voluptuousnesse, to be by Divine revenge on a sudden precipitated into the black Sea of misery, they may recruite their Confidence, that the same Justice will, in his own appointed time, more then compensate their momentany objections, and convert their night of obscurity and trouble into a glorious day of interminable Delectation.

Article 7. Those *apparent Evils*, which Providence Divine consignes to Virtuous men, anatomized; and found to be *real Goods* intrinsecally.

Having thus precisely dissected the *Apparent Good*, which Divine Providence allots to *Evil men*, as their portion to this life; and found it to be, as painted fire, bright but comfortless, or such at best, whose Abuse aggravates the Guilt, and upon consequence, the misery of the receivers: it will no less conduce to the rectification of our distorted judgements, and so to the cure of our depraved Affections, to anatomize also the other Ventricle in the heart of the objection, viz. the *Apparent Evil* frequently assigned to *Good men*.

If *Felicity* be the Daughter of *Virtue*, as the *Philosopher* most judiciously, τῆς γὰρ τελείας ἀρετῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια, εὐδαιμονία, *perfecta virtutis actio est beatitudo* (*magn. Moral. lib.* 1. *cap.* 4.) and *Virtue* the daughter of *Wisdome*, as the same, γίνονται δὲ ἀρεταὶ

ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἄνλων ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μορίῳ, *Virtutes omnes, in Animæ parte rationali sint, necesse est,* (*lib. ejusd. cap.* 1.) and if the *Wisdome of God* be infinitely more perfect then the Wisdome of man, as all justly confess; then assuredly can they only be *happy, who conform their Wills to the Will of the Highest Wisdome*: now *Good men*, in all conditions of their lives, and all the changes of Fortune, still submit their desires and affections to the Will of *Divine Providence*; therefore are they constantly happy, and consequently those *seeming Evils*, which befall them, prove real Goods, that implicite resignation of themselves, and that equanimity wherewith they entertain those *External Evils*, instantly altering their malignity, dulcifying their amaritude, and converting them unto *Intrinsick Blessings*.

Article 8. The Authors *Sanctuary* wherein he secured his mind from discontent, in all those stormes of Calamities, which our late Civil war showred upon him.

This Argument (without ostentation, I profess it) was the ground upon which I erected me a Sanctuary to secure my judgement in, when the multiplied stormes of Adversity, raised by the impetuous winds of our Civil Wars, had beaten me from all other probability of shelter. For taking this for my *Hypothesis, that man, in this life, wants only so much of Happiness, as he doth of Obedience, so much of Content, as he doth of absolute Conformity to the good will of Providence*; I inferred, that no man can be truely miserable, but he that makes himself so, nor any man really happy, but he that hath pared off the bias of Affection from his mind, and fitted it to run smooth and even in the levell of Indifferency, as to the Goods of Fortune, having no other mark, but *Fiat Voluntas Dei*. And, having first humbly implored the assistance of *Divine Grace* to enable me to reduce this excellent lesson into practice, I wore it as a sacred charme or *Pentacle* on my breast, and thereby become Shot-free from all the bullets of an angry Fortune: nor did I feel that to be a considerable *loss*, which the conquest and rapine of an insulting Enemy called my totall *ruine*; but could with more constant and internal alacrity sing Pæans to Heaven, for this victory over my *Pusillanimity*, then did the triumphant Foe, for his, over my *Royal Master* and his *loyal Armies*.

Let

Article 9. *Virtue*, a meer *Chimera*, without the occursion of those things, which *Sensuality* calls *Evil*.

Let us take away those things, which the deluſion of Senſuality call's *Evils*, and *Virtue* muſt then be, what the miſtaken Libertine will have it, a *bare Notion*, or *empty Terme*, as neer of kin to a Chimera, as one of *Plato's* Ideas: For what would become of *Magnanimity*, if there were no *danger*? what of *Patience*, if there were no *ſufferings*, *&c. Marcet ſine adverſario virtus*, and every man knows that the *Inſignia*, or Coat-armes of a gallant mind, is a *Palme* tree, that thrives by oppreſſion, with an orient *Pyropus*, or *Carbuncle* ſuſpended on its trunk, which deradiates the moſt refulgent ſplendor in the darkeſt night, as S^t *Auſtin* (*lib. 2. de doctrina Chriſtiana, cap. 16.*) out of ancient Lapidaries hath affirmed, and *Bernhard. Caſius* (*de mineral. p. 556.*) on the teſtimonies of many modern Mineralogiſts, aſſerted. This the *Orator* glanced at, when in deriſion of their ignorant Malice, who had attempted to blaſt the Laurel on *Cato's* front; he ſmiles out this character of a well-ordered Mind: *At etiam eo negotio M. Catonis ſplendorem maculare voluerunt, ignari quid gravitas, quid integritas, quid magnitudo animi, quid denique Virtus valeret; quæ in tempeſtate ſæva quieta eſt, & lucet in tenebris, & pulſa loco manet tamen, atque hæret in patria, ſplendetque per ſe ſemper, neque alienis unquam ſordibus obſoleſcit.* (*orat. pro P. Sextio.*)

Article 10. The *Senſe*, no competent *Criterion* of the Good or Evil of the mind.

I ſayd, *thoſe things which the deluſion of Senſuality call's Evils*; for tis no Kenodox or novelty of my own, that the *palate* of the *body* is no competent judge of the *ſweets* of the *Soul*; that the bittereſt *Potions*, are the moſt magiſterial Julebs to extinguiſh the fevers of *Luſt*; and the abſtinence of *Poverty*, the ſureſt prophylactick to prevent the *Tumors* and *Inflammations* of the mind; that a wiſe man is ſenſible of more true delight, in one *Affliction*, then *Nero* or *Lucullus* ever felt in all the pompous and ſtudied *luxury* of their lives; and that the tears of *ſorrow* are not half ſo Salt, nor corroding, as thoſe expreſſed by immoderate *Laughter*. This thoſe *Heroes* well experimented, who even in the Calmes of their ſtate, have voluntarily caſt all the *Goods of Fortune* over board; as unneceſſary luggage, that might hazard

hazard ſinking of their veſſels, in a ſtorme, but could never paſs for currant merchandiſe on the exchange of Happineſs. What a voluminous *Legend* could a good *Collector* make of thoſe *Princes*, who have gladly reſigned their imperial *Scepters*, for a more portable and ſmoother *Shepheards ſtaff*? of thoſe *Potentates*, who have with ſmiles quitted the noyſe and tumult of their magnificent *Palaces*, for the ſoft murmurs of a *Wilderneſs*? of thoſe *Craſſuſſes*, who have cut off the ponderous bunches of Wealth from their own wearied backs, and reduced their ſpacious *Treaſuries* to a *ſcrip* and *bottle*? of thoſe holy *Prelates*, who have relinquiſhed their *Epiſcopia*, or ample *Sees*, and retired themſelves to ſome coole and ſilent *Hermitage*? How many victorious *Generals* have thrown down their leading ſtaves, in the heads of their mighty and obedient *Armies*, and withdrawn into obſcure *Cottages*, there to learn a nobler militia of conquering their rebellious *Paſſions*? How many *Noble Perſons*, as high in Honour and Power, as Ambition it ſelf could wiſh, have chearfully torn off their venerable *Purple*, and diſguiſed themſelves in contemptible *raggs*; changed their auguſt and Dithyrambick *Titles* into a vulgar and eaſy *Moneſyllable*; and left their *native ſoyle* for a contemplative receſs in ſome empty *Iſland*? in fine, of thoſe *Worthies*, who in their ſpring of life, their canicular days of pleaſure, the Jubile of unphyſick't *Health*, the Zenith of *Riches* and *Honour*; have contentedly ſhook hands with all this *vexatious Vanity*, and fervently courted not only the loathſome ſolitude of *Priſon*, but even that affrighting Sceleton, *Death*: as thoſe things which promiſed more real content, then all their former enjoyments? And ſince they did all this upon no neceſſity, but that compulſion of their own rectified *Wills*: what reaſon have we to account *Poverty*, *Exile*, *Sorrow*, *obſcurity*, *ſickneſs*, *Impriſonment*, nay *Death* it ſelf, ſuch abſolute *Evils* of themſelves, as never to be alienated from their malignity, and converted into *Goods*, by the Chymiſtry of a Virtuous mind? What reaſon have we to conceive, that thoſe *Generous Spirits* would have complained of the injuſtice of Gods Providence; if he had bin pleaſed to have allotted them the ſame apparent Evils, and conſigned them to the ſame ſufferings?

The *Wiseman* considers, that if the rapine of his Enemies, the oppression of Tyranny, the devouring jaws of Fire, or other sinister Accident deprive him of his *estate*; yet notwithstanding he loseth nothing, that was *properly his own*: if he be tormented in his *body*; that his raggs of *Flesh* are torn off, his mud-walled Cottage shattered, but that impatible Tenant, his *Soul*, remains whole and invulnerable. In a word, as the tall *Olympus* advanceth his intemerated head above the clouds, and with a smooth front looks down upon the pageantry of Thunder, and other vaporing Meteors of the Aer: so doth the head of a *Virtuous Person* stand above the Clouds of Misfortunes, and with a magnanimous bravery bid defiance to Adversity, in all the Foggs of trouble still conserving the serenity of his mind imperturbed. *Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest. Non miscentur Contraria. Quemadmodum tot amnes tantum supernè dejectorum imbrium, tanta medicatorum vis fontium, non mutant saporem maris, nec remittunt quidem: ita adversarum rerum impetus vbi fortis non vertit animum, manet in statu, & quicquid evenit, in suum colorem trahit. Est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit, & alioquin quietus placidusque contra incurrentia attollitur: Omnia adversa, exercitationes putat, &c.* sayth the grave *Seneca* (*lib. de Providentia.*) Who having tuned his meditations to this heigh Key, falls not only into a profuse Encomium of that saying of his admired Cynick, *Demetrius*; *Nihil mihi videtur infelicius eo, cui nil unquam evenit adversi*, nothing in my judgement can be more unhappy, then he who never tasted of Adversity: but into this *Parodox* also, that the condition of *Regulus*, in his nayled barrel, was as far from real *Infelicity*, as that of the great *Mecanas* solacing his pamperd limbs on a couch of down. For weighing the constant and invincible *Patience* of the one, against the perpetual *Anxiety* or civil war in the breast of the other, he concludes, *quod dubium sit, an electione Fati data, plures Reguli nasci, quàm Mecanates velint*; that it may be disputed whether or no, if men might elect their own Fates, the greater number would not rather choose to be born under the angry starrs of the *former*, then the flattering constellation of the *latter*:

Ἔλεγε ἀλυχῆι, τὸν ἀλυχίαν μὴ φέρονλα. Plut.

so

so indifferent are those things to a Wise man, which the judgement of the *Sense* hath denominated *Good* and *Evil.*

Article 11. The Atheists objection, that God ought, in justice, always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil, expunged.

This magnanimous temper of a Virtuous Mind, those Ideots never so much as heard of, who have objected; *that it would have him more consistent with the justice* of Divine Providence, *rather constantly to have preserved* Good men *from affliction, then to subject them to the malice and oppression of Evil* men, *and afterward seem to vindicate their integrity, and compensate their sufferings, by a late remuneration of* happiness, and *the punishment of their* Oppressors.

For even Good men themselves esteem those acute *Afflictions*, as a *Diploma* or Testimonial of their genuine Education in the Academy of *Virtue*, and, like Veteran Souldiers, produce the scars of their wounds, as so many indeleble characters of *Valour*, and consequently of *Honour*. They look upon their smartest stripes, as the faire impresses of Gods *paternal Affection*; and return him a patient submission to his frequent chastisements, as the most gratefull sacrifice of Gratitude, their frail and indigent condition can afford. They account their temporal *Dejections*, not only an undeniable *Symbol* of his *Special Favour*, in this military state; since they manifest them to be elected by him, *non ad mollitiem, sed ad tolerantiam*, not to dull and inglorious effeminacy, but honourable hardship, and masculine atchievments: but also as an Ἀρραβὼν, or *Earnest* of their eternal advancement, in the Jubile, when he shall distribute his triumphant wreaths of Laurel, such whose Verdure shall know no decay, till the impossible period of Eternity. Thus the *Valiant*, with noble emulation, contend for priority in enterprises of the highest difficulty and most eminent danger; and then think themselves in most grace and reputation with their General, when he vouchsafes them the honour of the Forlorn Hope, and consignes them to encounter a whole Host of Deaths. Thus the *Lacedemonian* yongsters measured the affection of their *Parents*, and *Tutors*, not by their *indulgence*; but the severity of their *chastisements*: and embraced their smartest flagellations as welcome opportunities to experiment their *Constancy*. And thus the *Wives* of *Russia*

estimate their Husbands love, not by the frequency of their *Conjugall Embraces*, but of their *Castigations*: and then bewaile themselves as more then halfe repudiated, when their matrimonial Lords neglect to afford them the benevolence of the *Lash*. And yet for all this shall man, noble man, who is the *Souldier*, *Sonne*, and *spouse* of *Providence*, so far forget his *courage*, *constancy*, and *duety*, as to repine against those things as *Evil*; which are, by the *Supreme Wisdome*, intended for his *Good*, nay which a mind, imbued with the soveraigne Tincture of *Virtue*, hath a power, were they real Evils, to convert into inestimable *Benefits*?

Article 12. The *Summum bonum* of this life, consistent in a full conformity of our wills to the Divine will.

I doe not only assent unto, but gratefully applaud their judgements, who have defined the essence of *Good* and *Evil*, in this life, by the *Truth* or *Falshood* of *Opinion*; experience informing me, that the *Sensual Appetite* of some apprehendeth many things under the title of absolute and transcendent *Goods*, which the *Rational Appetites* of others abhorr, as positive and detestable Evils.

And therefore, when the soul sits in consult upon the Election of *Good*, she ought first to wipe her eyes from all the dust of *Sensual Prejudice*, and resolve that the Vote of *Temporal interest* shall goe for nothing, but disturbance and seduction; fixing her Cogitations only upon that pathognomonick, or proper and inseparable, and therefore infallible signe, by which the Wisdome of God hath described what's really Good; and that is, an *indifferency to all objects but himself*, or *a free and totall resignation of our Wills to his*, or more precisely, *if he hath appointed it*.

Article 13. An excellent meditation of *Marcus Antoninus*, concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life.

This most excellent lesson, that Stoical Emperor, *Marcus Antoninus* had often read by the meer *light of Nature*, and endevouring to reduce it into practice, whispers this maxime to himself: Τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν, ἢ ὡς περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, μὴ προστιθέτω τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ; *opinioni autem mali aut boni adsentire mens*

non

non debet (*lib. de ſeipſo 5. numer.* 18.) and in one ſhort meditation ſtates the whole Controverſie concerning the good and evill occurrences to man; which for that reaſon, I heer preſent to the Reader. *Dicit aliquis: infelicem me, cui hoc acciderit! quinimo, felicem me, qui hunc caſum ſine dolore perferam, & nec præſentibus frangar, nec futura extimeſcam! Nam unicuique tale quid potuit accidere: at non cujuſvis erat, ſine dolore eum caſum excipere. Cur igitur illud potius infortunio, quàm hoc felicitati adſcribis? Aut cur id infelicitatem hominis appellas, in quo nihil mali paſſa eſt hominis natura? An verò tibi humanæ naturæ damnum videri poteſt id, quod non eſt contra propoſitum naturæ ejus? Quod ergo naturæ propoſitum eſſe didiciſti? Num caſus iſte efficere poterit, quo minus ſis juſtus, magnanimus, temperans, prudens, circumſpectus, tutus ab errore, verecundus, liber? aut adimere omnino quicquam eorum, quæ hominis natura ſunt propria? Proinde quoties inciderit quicquam quod ad dolorem te provocet; recordare hujus præcepti: non illud quod accidit infortunium verè eſſe, ſed quòd fortiter illud feras, id felicitati tribuendum eſſe.* (*lib. 4. numero* 31.)

« Some man [perchance] ſays, that I am unhappy, to « whom this infortune hath hapned! Nay, rather may he ſay, « that I am happy, who can endure this misfortune without grief; « and am neither dejected with the preſent, nor afraid of future « Accidents. For the like might have befalne any other man: « but 'twas not in the power of every one to ſuſtain that mis- « fortune without grief. Why, therefore, doe you aſcribe that « rather to misfortune, then this to Felicity? or why account « that to be an infelicity of man, wherein the Nature of man « hath ſuffered nothing of Evil? Can that ſeem to you to be an « Injury to Humane Nature, which is not contrary to the in- « tention thereof? What, therefore, haſt thou learned the « Intention of Nature to be? Can this misfortune effect, that « thou mayeſt be leſs juſt, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, « circumſpect, ſuperior to error, modeſt, free? Or can it take « from thee any of thoſe things, which are proper to the Nature « of man? So often, therefore, as any Accident ſhalll occur,

« which may provoke thee to grief ; remember this Precept: « that what happens, is not truely Misfortune ; but that thou « canst bear it nobly, is a Happiness.

More then this, I can not, need not say, in order to the refutation of this Objection : and therefore I remit the *unsatisfied* to the more profound, elegant, and ample discourse of the learned *Morneus Du Plessis* (*lib. de veritate Christiana Religionis, cap.* 12.) on the same subject ; and leave the *satisfied* to the calme enjoyment of their perswasion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The Mobility of the Terme of Mans Life, asserted.

SECT. I.

HAving thus by Apodictical and uncontrollable Reasons made it manifest, that all things in the Universe, as well Generals, as Particulars, Contingents as Necessaries, are in the means, manner, opportunity and finality of their Operations, precisely predetermined, disposed, and procured by the General Providence of God; that all Occurrences of every individual mans life, are the prescripts and consignations or allotments of his Special and Paternal Providence; and by the meer Light of Nature dispelled all those clouds, which either ancient Ethnicisme, or modern Atheisme hath exhaled from the abyss of Hell, to obscure the splendor of both those excellent truths: it remains only, that we deduce the influence of Divine Providence down to the *Catastrophe*, or *Exit* of life, or prove the extension of it to the point of *Death*; and endevour a compendious and plain decision of that tedious and enigmatical Controversie, *An terminus Vitæ humanæ sit immobilis? Whether the period of every individual mans life be so immoveably fixt by the Special Providence of God, that it can be neither by any negligence, immoderate and inordinate*

Article 1. The Affinity of this Theorem to the precedent, intimated: and the necessary division thereof into a *specifical* and *individual* consideration.

inordinate use of those things Physicians call the Six Nonnaturals, or suddain Casualities, anticipated or abbreviated; nor by prudence, temperance, convenient Medicaments, or cantion, prolated or prolonged?

For the first; viz.

Article 2. The reasons of the Authors concise tractation of the first part.

That God is the sole *Moderator*, though not the *Author* of *Death* (for reason will not endure that we conceive him to have created a *Privation*;) or, more plainly, that the hand of his Providence guides the dart of that inevitable and victorious Enemy to life; this is a position so frequently and amply illustrated by the pens of many the most learned and judicious men of all ages, religions, and professions; and so genuinely and directly inferible from the Context and importance of those Arguments formerly introduced, in order to the Demonstration of the interest of Providence, even in the smallest interludes of Nature, and most apparently fortuitous effects of all subordinate Causes: that, should we run out into any profuse probation thereof, in this place, the most patient and candid Reader could not but frown at the attempt, and justly censure it, non only as unnecessary and supererogatory, but also as scandalous and derogatory to his own Dialectical and Collective habilities. And therefore humbly referring him as well to his own easy recognition of notions formerly collected from the lecture of other more mature and nervous Discourses on the same Theorem; as his familiar Inductions upon many propositions insperst upon the leaves of this our cold and dull Decembers Exercise: I shall, in avoydance of an undecent Chasme, or Vacuity, insert only two concise and obvious Arguments, as *Corollaries*, or annexes inservient to the same perswasion.

Article 3. The moderatiō of Death by *Special Providence Divine*, argued from the impossibility of the moderation thereof by any other power.

Argument 1.

The life, and consequently the Death of every man necessarily depends upon the absolute *Will* of the *Creator*, and so upon the *Decrees* or resolves of his *Providence*; or upon some other *Principle* extraneous, alien, and superior to the nature of man;

or

or upon *man himself.* Not upon any *Third* or *Neutral Principle*; for that must be either the Epicureans *Fortune*; or the Stoicks *Anus Fatidica* or Fate; or *Homers Lottery*; or *Pythagoras* his Συζυγιάσεις, mentioned by *Plutarch* (*de placit.* 1.) or the Jews *Angelus mortis*, or their terrible she Devil *Zilith* described by our many-tongued *Gregory* (*in tract. de Episcopo puerorum*, out of the *Gloss. Talmud. in Nidda, fol.* 24.) and erroneously conceived, by *Gaffarel* (*Unheard of Curiosities, pag.* 317.) to be the same with *Lucina* of the Romans, for the one was thought propitious to parturient women, the other so hostile and malignant, that the Hebrew Wives, so soon as they fell in travel, caused this proscription to be written on the doore of their bed-chamber, *Adim, Chavah, chouts Lilith*; *Adam, Eve*, keep out *Lilith*; or the Astrologers *Helec* and *Alcocoden*, and the like χάσεις & διαθέσεις of the Planets called χρονοκαλοφίαι or *Fridariæ*, derided by *Archangelus a Burgo novo* (*in Comment. in dogmat. Cabalist.*) and *Scaliger* (*in Comment. in Manilium*) or the *Numbers, Ideas*, or *grand Revolution* of *Plato*; or the *Malus Deus* of the Manachees; or *Helena*, alias *Selene*, of *Simon Magus*; or Hesiods *Pandora*; or the great Beldam *Mylitta*, alias *Alytta*, of the Ethnicks; or the Turks *Nassub*, alias *Ctusura*, which signifies the Goddess *Fortune*; or *Paracelsus* his *Anima mundi Platonica*, or rather the Macrocosmical Harmony of the Universe, and the Microcosmical Concordance with the invisible signatures of the Ascendent; or that *Hermetico-magical Lamp of life and death*, lately invented and cryed up by *Ernestus Burchgravius*, but most judiciously extinguisht by *Sennertus* (*de Consensu Chymicorum cum Galen. cap.* 18.) or that Internal man of *Paracelsus*, named *Ens sydereum, Olympicum, Gabalim, &c.* by that vaine admirer and promoter of Hermetical Follies, *Oswaldus Crollius* (*in Basil. Chym. præfat. admonit. p.* 6. 4. & 65.) or the implacable *Strix*, or *Erinnys* of the Gentiles; or, finally, some such fantastique Hob-goblin, that hath no more of reality, then what it borrows from the confused and obscure idea of it self, conceived in the luxuriant womb of a perturbed or deluded Imagination: but every sober man already knows, that all these are absolute *Chimæra's*,

mara's, hatched in the addled brains of mad men, Poets, and idolatrous Pagans; and so below our laughter, much more our serious Confutation. Not upon *Man himself*, or any domestick Conservatory essentially inherent to his Nature. For that absurdity once conceded, entangles our reason in two the highest Impossibilities imaginable; (1) it confounds the Relative Maximes of Nature, breaks her chain of Dependence, and inferrs a second *Self-existence* beside Divinity; for, dreaming that a Principiate Entity actually existent, gave to it self existence; that a Future something derives its μελλουσίαν, or *Futurition* immediately and solely from it self; and that nothing can, by its own power, attaine to be something, *i. e.* that which is neither *Potentia*, nor *Actus*, can endow it self with the perfection of both *Power* and *Act*; we must be carried upon this rock, that there is in the World a second something ἄναρχον, ἀναίτιον καὶ ἀνάλυτον, *Non principiate*, *Causeless*, and *Self-sufficient*, besides *God*; which is a falshood far beyond the *two Principles of all things* imagined by the *Manichees*, and more ridiculous then the Devils promise to make our *Saviour* Monarch of the World. (2) It imports an absolute power in man to make himself *immortal*; a Delusion that never found entertainement in the brain of the most desperate Hypochondriack, nor durst the Father of lies ever suggest it to his most credulous vassals. It follows therefore of pure necessity, that as *God* is the *Author of life*; so also can he alone *dispose of the issues of Death*, and that the *end*, as well as the *beginning* and *mutations* of all things are subject to the moderation of his *Providence*.

Article 4. The same demonstrated, from the necessary dependence of all natural motion in its beginning, continuation, and period, on the will of the *First Mover*.

Argument 2.

A confest Verity it is, that all *Natural Motion* must proceed from one *First Motor*, which can be no other but *God*, until we can find out something coequal to him in *Eternity*; and a position never yet disputed, that the *life* of man is a *Natural Motion*, to which the *Apostle* seemes to allude in his sacred axiome, ἐν θεῷ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμὲν, *in God we live, move and have our being* (*Act.* 17. *ver.* 28.) and of parallel certainty

it is, that every motion hath its determinate *beginning*, *duration*, and *period*, dependent on the *Will* of the *First Mover*: therefore must the end as necessarily as the beginning and continuation of mans *life*, his *Death* as well as his conception, nativity, and maturity be certainly commensurated, defined, and limited by the *Special Providence of God.* Frequent glimpses of this Argument have I perceived in the monuments of the most *Ethnical Philosophers*; nor shall our thoughts want the patronage of great probability, if we conjecture, that our Patriarch, *Galen* (in most other things, but weakly armed against their censure, who have assaulted his memory with the detestable Epithite, Ἀθεολογώτατος, an Atheist of the highest Classis) had his mind touched with the same Magnet, at that time, when he wheeled about from his old position of a meer *Naturalist*, and pointed directly at the pole of *Divine Providence*, in these words, δρᾶσαι πάντα ὅσα προείλετο (2. *de usu part.*) *God hath done all things, that he had formerly decreed to doe.*

Sect. II.

For the second;

Article 1. A transient discovery of the almost insuperable *Difficulties* to be encountred in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem, *whether the Term of mans life be Moveable, or Fatal*; premised by way of Apology for the Authors unequal judgement: and his purpose of taking a middle way between the absolute *Fatality* of the *Stoick*, and the meer *Fortune* of the *Epicurean*.

More then sufficient reason had I, to call it a *Tedious* and *Ænigmatical* Controversie. For, first, the obscurity of the Subject (being such whose clear imperceptibility hath worthily listed it among the θαυμασὰ, or secrets of Gods Counce, proposed rather to excite and entertain our reverential *Wonder*, then exercise our sawcy *Curiosity*) hath unhinged the brains of most, who have essayd to explain it, and lost their judgements in a wilderness of various opinions, discrepant ὅσον ὐρανὸς ἐς ἀπὸ γαίης, as far as heaven and earth each from other, and left future enquiry instructed rather what to *avoyd*, then what to *follow*: insomuch that the learned and profound *Joh. Beverovicius*, whose flame of scrutiny had kindled the most erudite and heroical Wits, on this side the line, into a desire and attempt to afford him satisfaction in this particular; when he had received, perused and indifferently perpended their severall *Epistolical responses*, found himself still perplex't with his former tremor of Scepticisme, and therefore confessed; *super hac re nuper plures consului, qui an sibi ipsis satisfecerint nescio, mihi certè penitùs satisfacere non potuerunt; in tanta itaque opinionum varietate equidem ferè dixerim cum* Xenophonte *apud* Varronem, *Hominis est hæc opinari, Dei scire.* And again, whosoever deserves the Laurel at this Olympick exercise, by deciding the quæstion on the side of Truth; must first reconcile those inveterate Antipathies between *absolute Fate* and mans *Freewill*: must clearly distinguish between the certain *Prescience*, and immutable *Predestination*, or *Predetermination*, of the *Divine Intellect* and *Will*, (a task not to be undertaken after dinner, nor performed upon one legg; as must soon

soon appear to him, who sufficiently excogitates, how hardly the blunt edge of mans understanding can divide betwixt the *Providence* of *God*, and his positive *Decrees* setled from all eternity: since *Cognition*, *Election*, *Volition*, and *Decretion* make but one simple and entire act in his *Intellect*; nor can reason make out, how God can *Foresee* meer *Contingents*, while they are yet in the nothing of *Futurity*, unless because he hath preordained the means, place, time, and other circumstantial requisites to their respective Contingencies) must determine that troublesome Doubt of the Schoolemen, whether any of Gods *Decrees* are *Hypothetical* or *Conditionate*, and so subject to mutation upon mans observation, or non-observation of the Condition, or proviso on his part to be performed? and, lastly, must solve that Scruple, *An Scientia conditionata certam ponit futurorum scientiam*, or, *An conditionata Dei voluntas ullum faciat decretum de futurorum eventu?* Whether the hypothetical or conditionate Will of God (if any such there be) doth import an absolute and immutable Decree, concerning the event of things to come? *Problems*, about which not only the graveſt *Philosophers* have stretched the membranes of their brains, and with great anxiety hack't and slash't for many ages together; but even the *Church* her self hath disputed so hotly, that she hath rent her seamless coate of *Faith* into such numerous and wide *Schismes*, that we her sonnes may sooner expect the conversion of the *Jews*, then a full reconciliation and reunion of all her Sects. Nor am I subject to so uncurable a Phrensy of Vanity, as not to know how immense a disproportion lyeth between the utmost extent of my short judgement, and the center of the neerest of these Abstrusities; but acknowledging the decision of any one of them as far above my *Presumption*, as *Capacity*, I think it both honour and satisfaction enough for me, to have collected so much light from the beams of *Mersennus*, *Episcopius* and others, as may serve to conduct the mind of the ingenious Reader into a midle way betwixt the *Absolute Fatality* of the *Stoicks*, on one extreme; and the absolute *Fortune* of the *Epicureans*, on the other. The *First* whereof strains the cord of *Predestination* up to the height of *inevitable Necessity*; and so

leaves nothing in the power either of Mans *Free-will*, or the conspiracies of *Second Causes*; nay chain's up the hands of the *First Cause* in fetters of Adamant, according to that of the *Poet*.

Fatis agimur, cedite fatis.
Non sollicita possunt cura
Mutare rati stamina fusi.
Quicquid patimur mortale genus,
Quicquid agimus, venit ex alto.
Non illa Deo vertisse licet
Quæ nexa suis currunt Causis.

By *Fate* we are impell'd; submit
To what the *Destinies* think fit.
That thread, by 'th *Fatal Damsels* spun,
By our *Cares* can nere b' undone.
What we *act*, what *undergoe*,
From their fixt *Decrees* doth flow.
Jove himself cannot controll
What doe's from linked *Causes* rowl.

As also that of *Seneca* (*de providentia*, where he had the reason to speak it:) *Quicquid est, quod nos sic vivere jussit, sic mori: eadem necessitate & Deos alligat. irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit, ille ipse omnium Conditor ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. semper paret: semel jussit.* The *Others* cut it quite asunder, and so relaxing the ligaments of *Providence Divine*, leave all Events to the loose and undetermined results or hits of meer *Chance:* but both concurring in the most bloody Error of *Irreligion*. But the concernement of our present Theme will lead us into a more particular, express, and ample enquiry, how that long Civil war betwixt these three different *Notions* of *Fate*, *Fortune*, and *Free-will*, may be conciliated and brought to a full Combination and Consistence with *Divine Providence*.

In

In the meane time, that we may, both with more decent Method, and perspicuity, attain to some verisimilous (at least) solution of our present Problem, viz. *Whether the Term of mans life (in individuo) be so immoveably prefixt by the Decrees of Divine Providence, as that neither temperance or care on mans part can extend, nor the violence of second Causes, situate without the orb of his moderation, accelerate it?* Necessary it is, that we seriously examine and search into the marrow of two things conductive to the right stating, and consequently the right understanding of the Question: (1) *What we are to understand by the Term of Life:* (2) *In what sense we are to understand this Term to be fixt, or moveable.*

Article 2. Two prævious considerable, necessary to the right understanding and consequent discussion of the question.

What we are to understand by the Term of Life.

Concerning the *First*; obvious it is, that all things, or causes inservient both to the Conservation of life and the adduction of its period, Death, fall under the contents of *three General heads*; for either they must refer to those that are *Necessary*, or such as, by the ordinary course of Nature, no man can subsist without, to which classis belong our Aliment, Aer, sleep, &c. or (2) *Non necessary* or *Fortuitous*, which no way conduce to the Fomentation or fewel of our Vital Flame, but point blank to the Extinction of it; and therefore the instinct of nature perswades every man to avoyd them; such are Shipwracks, stabbs, shots, precipices, halters, &c. causes of immature, suddain and violent deaths: or (3) *Meerely Supernatural*, or the Will of God, which as it is impossible (without Special Divine Revelation) for us to foreknow, so also to alter, or prevent. Upon these three pillars was it, that *Laurentius Joubertus* erected his *triple Difference* of the *Term of mans life*; making one *Supernatural*, such as the Breath of our nostrils was pleased to assign to most of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, or Seminaries of Humanity, either in order to the more expedite multiplication of mankind, to the more advantageous invention and propagation of Arts and Sciences, or for some other considerable respect, at which our ignorance

Article 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three Generall heads, viz. *Necessary, Fortuitous, Supernatural*; supports the discrimination of the *Term* of life into *Supernatural, Natural, & Accidentary*: & the impertinency of the consideration of the *Supernatural Term*, to the present scope.

ignorance can only ſquint by conjecture: which being long ſince cancelled, Art ſits down in a contented deſpaire to renovate, nor can the records of the world afford us the ſtory of any impudence, that durſt rant ſo high, as to promiſe it, except that of a certain Mountebanck *Greek*, derided by *Galen*, and our late Nugipolyloquides, *Paracelſus*; both which experimentally confuted their own unpardonable Arrogance, before their ſands had run out 50 years. Another *Natural*, which Phyſiologie defines by that ſpace of time, during which our radical Balſam, or the oleaginous Fewel of our vital Lamp, maintains the innate Heate, or Flame of life, untill the total exhauſtion of the one, cauſeth a total privation of the other; or, more plainly, that circle of time, which comprehends the *ſeven* Segments or *Ages* of man; which, though preſtitute and limited, by the Governour of Nature, according to the compute of the *Pſalmiſt*, to 80. years, of *Plato* to 81. of the *Ægyptians* to 100. (*Cælius Rodiginus*, 19. *antiq. Lect. cap.* 21. *&* *Ioh. Langius*, *lib.* 1. *Epiſt. Medicinal.* 79.) of the beſt of the *Sibylls* to a 100. as is expreſt in thoſe 2. verſes corrected by the incomparable *Salmaſius* (*Pliniarum obſervat. pag.* 77.)

Ἀλλ ὁπόταν μήκιστος ἐν χρόνος ἀνθρώποισι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἑπτὰν ἐκλονίᾶδα κύκλον ὀδεύσας;

And of the ancient *Jews*, to 120. (*Ioſeph. Antiq. Iudaic. lib.* 1.) is yet left to ſome conſiderable latitude, and hath more or leſs of Duration, reſpective to the more or leſs durability of the Principles of life, *i. e.* the *Eucraſy*, or *Dyſcraſy* of the body, in every individual; provided that neither the oyle be inquinated by crude, or putrid Supplies, nor prodigally depredated by immoderate intenſion of its conſumer, the Flame, nor that immaturely either ſuffocated, or waſted by Diſeaſes, or ſuddainly extinguiſhed by violent *Accidents*; which make the third *Difference*, or *Accidentary Term of life.*

But as for the firſt branch of this Ternary, the *Metaphyſical, or Supernatural Term of mans life*, dependent on the *Divine Will* immediately; ſince according to the doctrine of *Nicholaus Florentinus* (*in Serm.*) the *Conciliator* (*in different. Medicin.*) and

and *Joubertus* (*in Errorib. popular.*) it concerns only the *first Age* of the World: this place may very conveniently want any farther consideration thereof; nor can it much avail to the atchievement of our design, to insist upon more then the *two last*.

Article 4. The proper import of the *Natural* Term of mans life: and also of the *Accidental*.

By the *Term of life*, therefore, we ought to understand either (1) that period of every individual mans days, which is caused by a sensible decay, and total dissolution of the ligaments, which chain the Soul to the Body; or, more expresly, by an extinction of his *Vital Flame*, naturally succeeding upon a consumption of its *Pabulum*, or fewel, the *Radical Moysture*, when both those Principles of life are permitted to their natural and proper tenor, *i. e.* when no *Preternatural Cause* intervenes, and by Corruption anticipates the dissolution of that Disposition or Temperament of the Elements of the body, upon which the subsistence of life doth necessarily depend: or (2) the end of every mans life, in general, whensoever, and by what means soever, either Diseases, or violent and unexpected Accidents, introduced; without any respect to the gradual and successive declination, and consequent cessation of the Natural Temperament, in the *marasmus* of old age.

Now from the acceptation of the Term of Life, in the *First* signification, there genuinly emerge *Two Questions:*

Article 5. The result of our acceptation of the *Term* of life, in the *first* signification.

First, Whether this Term of life, which is circumscribed, *per ipsius temperamenti defluxum & decursum*, by the natural *Defluxe*, or wearing out of the requisite Temperament of the body, and which we may, without impropriety, call a kind of *mature*, easy and spontaneous falling asunder of the Ligaments of life; be absolutely and definitely fixt, so that *God* hath constituted to leave the nature of every Individual to its own moderation, not by any means to interrupt or alter its course prescribed: *i. e.* not by any means to procure, that this Defluxe of the Temperament should have more or less duration, then what may naturally be expected from the more or less durability thereof, dependent on the more or less perfect proportion, that the *Passive*

and Active Principles hold each to other; or, more plainly, that the *Renitency* or *Resistence* of the *Oyle* holds to the depredatory and consumptive *Activity* of the *Flame*.

Secondly, if this Term of life be thus Fixt, and that God indeed hath decreed not to intend or prolong that Defluxe of the Temperament, beyond the point of its natural Durability; whether yet notwithstanding, without alteration of his Decree of committing Nature to its own establish't course, he may not, being thereunto moved by our repentance, prayers, and piety, correct those depravities, and repaire those violent decays of that our temperamental Constitution, occasioned by intemperance, diseases, extraneous Accidents, or other means whatever; and so hinder the otherwise impendent immature Collabascence, and precipitous Dissolution thereof? In a word; Whether, though God hath predetermined, that no man shall exceed that Term of life, to which the Durability of his individual Temperament, or the strength of his particular Constitution may, in probability, be extended; his Special Providence doth not yet suffer, that, by reason of putrefactive and destructive Preter-natural Causes occurrent, the temperament may be vitiated, impaired, and ruined: and so not hold out to that point of time, to which otherwise, in respect of its primigenious and native condition, it might have lasted?

Article 6. The consequence of our understanding the *Term* of life, in the *second* signification.

But if we understand the Term of life in the *second signification*; then the *Question* must be: Whether the immature or *preternatural Period* of every individual mans life, by what means soever, either disease, famine, war, wounds, naufrage, decollation, suspension, suffocation, luxury, drunkenes, solicitude, grief, &c. occasioned, be so precisely fixt by Destiny; that no prudence or caution on his part can transpose, nor danger of fortuitous Accidents invading, accelerate or pervert it? In short; Whether the Catastrophe of every mans life be prescribed in the book of Fate.

In what sense we are to understand the Term of Mans Life to be Fixt *or* Moveable.

Article 7. The *Fixation* of the Term of life, acceptable in a double interest; *viz.* (1) in respect to some *Absolute* Divine Decree, precedent even to Gods Prescience of al Secondary or Instrumental Causes; (2) to some *Hypothetical* Divine Decree, whose mutability is suspended on the liberty of mans Will. And the *indifference* of either branch of the distinction to our instant designe.

As for the Second *Preconsiderable*; the Term of life may be sayd to be *Fixt* in a *twofold sense*: (1) in respect to some *positive Divine Decree*, antegredient or precedent not only to all conspiracies, but also the Prescience of all Secondary or Instrumental Causes; whereby God hath so precisely fixt and limited a certain space, or time of life to every single man, together with all relative Circumstances, as place, manner, or kind, and cause of Death: that it is absolutely impossible to man, what means soever he shall use to the contrary, in order to his preservation, or what dangers soever he shall have formerly exposed himself unto, notwithstanding, either to prolong his life beyond, or to fall before that Fatal Term. (2) In respect not to some Absolute, but *Hypothetical*, or *Conditionate Decree* of God: *i. e.* such whose mutation or accomplishment is suspended on the liberty, or *Free Election* of mans Will, according as that, either being conducted by the manuduction of Light Supernatural, or *Divine Grace*, shall pursue the real and true Good; or being seduced by the delusion of its own sensual judgements, shall wander in the devious tracts of Error, and so hunt after only apparent and false Good. Now whether we understand this *Conditionate Decree* to be made and grounded upon a certain and infallible *prenotion* of all concomitant things, circumstances, manners, causes, and finally of mans election of and adherence unto *Good*, or *Evil* objects, and his consequent *Virtuous* or *vicious* course of life: or whether we understand it to be made without any such certain *Prenotion*, or *Volition* of Prenotion at all; but yet with a deliberate and positive *Sentence* certainly to be pronounced and executed in the fulness of time, or opportunity, when the right use, or abuse of this Prerogative or *Freedome* of the *Will*, shall be in actual determination, *i. e.* shall ripen the *Suppositionality* of the decree into *Absolutenes*, and reduce the *Possibility* thereof into actual *Necessity*: the distinction is not Material. For it can be of no considerable advantage to our

present attempt, whether of these two *Notions* we prefer; and that the reason is, why we here omit to enquire, whether holds the neerest Cognation to truth.

Article 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction.

From these premises hath the judgement of man extracted three different opinions.

The *First*, of those, who hold it as point of faith, that the Term of every mans life, together with all means or Causes, immediate, mediate, remote, circumstantial and corollary, or in any relation whatever pertinent thereto, is absolutely immoveable and Fatal; being precisely decreed by the immutable and irresistible law of the Divine Will

The *Second*, of those, who averre the absolute *Fatality*, or *Fixation* of every individual mans Term of life, *à Posteriori*: but decline it *à Priori*, *i.e.* they concede, that in truth the term of every mans life is appointed by the irrevocable decree of Fate, in this respect, that it can never be *extended* or spun out to the duration of one moment beyond that, to which the natural condition of his particular Temperament promises him to attain: but not in this respect, that it admits no possibility of *Contraction* or *Abbreviation*.

The *Third*, of those, who allow the Term of life to be *Fatal* indeed; yet upon no higher a *Necessity*, then that of Gods meer *Prenotion*, or *hypothetical determination*, respective to mans right use, or abuse of the Liberty of his Will: and therefore not so fixt, but that it may be not only *abbreviated* but also *prolonged*; *non præsuppositâ istâ aut prænotione, aut hypothesi citra prænotionem.*

Article 9. The convenient reduction of them to *Two* only.

And this is the most passant Division of mens dissenting opinions concerning this intricate Subject; but if we come with naked minds to examine the state of the difference between the *last* and the *second*, we shall find them concentral in the point of *Mutability* or *Mobility*: and therefore both perspicuity and brevity perswade, that we gratefully adhere to that more convenient reduction of all opinions concerning this Theorem, to *two only*, offered by *Joh. Beverovicius* (*Epist. ad Simon. Episcopium*)

scopium) in words of this importance: Some maintain the Term of mans life to be fixt by the eternal and immutable law of Destiny; and on the contrary, others contend that it is not so fixt, but that it remains moveable as well forwards as backwards, not only obnoxious to *Decurtation* or *Anticipation*, by depravities and exorbitances of the *Six Non-naturals*, by Epidemical Diseases, or by a thousand unexpected Knocks of unconstant Fortune; but also capable of *Production* or *Postposition* by a temperate, anticachectical and cautious course of life.

Article 10. The *First* opinion declared; and the principal *Abettors* thereof mentioned.

Now as for the *First* of these Opinions; 'tis generally known to have bin Canonical among the *Stoicks*, who bound up the efficiency of all things in the Universe, in the iron chaines of Fate; beleiving all events subject to so uncontrollable a necessity, that their prevention, suspension, or alteration is not only above the hopes of man (whose virtuous endeavours, piety, and prayers must therefore prove as fruitless and ineffectual towards the Aversion; as vitiosities, impiety and profaneness towards the Attraction or Acceleration of any misfortune predecreed) but even of God himself: whom though they allow to have bin the Author of that sempiternal and irrepealable law of Destiny, yet they deny him to have reserved to himself the prerogative of exemption from the obligation thereof. This was the Creed of *Philetas*, when he sayd

Ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ ἐπίκρατκῖ ἀνδρὸς ἀνάγκη,
Ἤρ' οὐδ' ἄθανατους ὑποδείδειν, ὅιτ' ἐν ὀλύμπῳ
Ἔκτοσθεν χαλεπῶν ἀχέων ὄικους ἐκάμοντο.

——*Mortales superat quodcunque necesse est,*
Vi solida; quia nec superos reveretur, in almis
Qui Cœli spatiis degunt sine luctibus ævum.

Of that old *Poet*, quoted by *Cicero* (*de Fato*) who sayd, *quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem*: and of that renowned Captain, *Hector*, when being importuned by his wife not to hazard himself in a salley upon the Græcian trenches, he

conjured her fond fears into a resolved confidence, that no sword could reach his heart, but that of Fate, by this spell;

Parce, precor, nimio miseræ indulgere dolori;
Nam quis me, Fatis invitis, mittet ad Orcum?
Nullum equidem vitasse hominum dico ultima Fata.

Prithee, forbeare thy needless grief; and know,
No hand can send me to the shades below,
Without the *Fates* assent. I hold it true,
What Fate hath destin'd, no man can eschew.

As also of those *Military* men, mentioned by *P. Gregorius Tholosanus* (*lib.* 21. *de republ. cap.* 8.) whose minds being seasoned with the same perswasion, that the manner and moment of every mans Death is appointed by the immutable law of Fate, and his lot inscribed in invisible Characters on his forehead; became of so hard a temper, as to be wholly insensible of the threats of that terrible Giant, Danger: nor did they account it other then a vanity, resulting from the cowardize of Ignorance, to provide against the blows of War either by caution, or defensive armes; urging the examples of many valiant Soldiers, who have bin observed to have confronted whole showers of levelled bullets, shot from the neer engines of the advancing Foe, without a wound; and yet at last have fallen by some petite and unexpected peble thrown from the sure sling of Destiny, even then, when they seemed immured in the secure Cittadel of Peace, and thought their triumphant Lawrels armour of proof even against thunder.

Occidis, Argiva quem non potuere phalanges
Sternere, nec Priami regnorum everſor Achilles.
Hic tibi mortis erant meta, &c. Virg. 12. *Æneid.*

But, alas! 'tis not the Academy of the *Stoicks* alone, that affords patronage to this Error of *Absolute Fatality*; nor the *Camp* that only contends for the propagation thereof; nor the politick

politick institutions of that Secretary of Hell, *Mahomet*, in his absurd *Alcoran* (*cap.* 6.) that only countenance the diffusion thereof in these our days: for even the *Schools* of *Christianity*, in some parts, have advanced the reputation thereof to so unreasonable and dangerous a height, as to make it an Article of Faith, if not absolutely necessary, yet at least collaterally conductive to Salvation; and this by Auctority of the *Councel* of *Dort*, which ratified the doctrine of their Apostle, *Calvin*, concerning *Absolute Predestination*, and enjoyned the publick Assertion thereof to most of their Divines of the last reformation.

Article 11. The *Stoical* Fate; and the *Calvinists* Predestination, fully defined.

I sayd, the *Doctrine of Calvin concerning Absolute Predestination*; thereby, though tacitly, intimating my knowledge of the no small *Disparity* between the *Fate* of *the Stoicks*, and that propugned by many *Christian Divines*. The *one* being, as *Chrysippus* hath defined it, *Sempiterna & indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena, qua seipsam volvit, & perpetuò implicat, per aternos consequentiæ ordines, ex quibus connexa est*; A sempiternal and indeclinable series, syntax, or chaine of Causes, whose turnings, convolutions and perpetual implications are dependent on it self, by those eternal orders of consequence, of which it is made up and connected: the *other*, as the best of School men hath defined it, *Pendens à Divino Consilio series, ordoque causarum*; a series, or successive complexion and order of Causes, dependent on the Will of God. From the just Collation of which two Definitions, our first thoughts may collect, that the *Difference* between the *Stoical* and *Theological Fate*, may be thus stated.

Article 12. A full and clear discrimination of the *Stoical*, from the *Theological* Fate.

The *Former*, in some things, excludes *Divinity* from that round or Circle of Causes, referring all events, as well general, as particular, to the meer subsequence of Naturall Actives operating upon capable Passives, subordinately connected unto, and so by successive influx necessarily disposing each other to the production of those particular Effects, to the Causation whereof their Natural Faculties were at first determinately accommodated: and, in others, includes Divinity within it, *i. e.* confines his Power

Power and Will to that rigid and infringible Law of Necessity, excogitated by his Wisdom from all eternity, and established by his Decree, at the inauguration of Nature to Existence. The *Later* makes the Will of God to be the first link in the chain of Causes, and so superior to the restriction of natural necessity dependent thereon. The *Stoick*, being a declared Enemy to the *Arbitrary Prerogative* of *God*, adligeth the Energie of the *First* and *Infinite* Cause to the capacity of *Secondary* and *Finite*; and, upon consequence, doth acknowledge neither the *Liberty* of his *Will*, nor the *Absoluteness* of his *Power*, or *Omnipotency*. But, on the Contrary, the *Christian* look's up to heaven, as the Councel-house, where the Instruments, opportunity, place and success of every Action receive their Specification to this or that determinate purpose; to the *Arbitrary Resolve* of *God*, as the *Definite Sentence* or *Injunction*; and on all *Second Causes*, but as subordinate, and subalternally instrumental to the punctual execution and accomplishment of the same: and, upon legal consequence, concludes, that the *Divine* Will is absolutely *Free*, knowing no circumscription, but that of the *Divine Wisdome*; that the meer *Fiat* of that Councel, is the *Director*, and *Spring* in the Engine of the World; and that the *Author of Nature* hath reserved to himself the *Privilege* of adding unto, detracting from, intending, remitting, inverting, transcending, or adnulling the fundamental Constitutions of Nature, and so breaking that Concatenation of Causalities, or the *Chain of Fate*, at pleasure. The *Heathen* absurdly dream't that all effects are inevitably produced by the conspiracy and coefficiency of natural Causes, respectively qualified; or that all Accidents spring up from the proper tendency of their particular Efficients, without the influence, direction, or moderation of any other Virtue, besides their own native and Congenial Faculties. The more intelligent *Christian* proves, that all natural Causes doe not produce their respective Effects κατ' ἀναμφίσσητον, *ex inevitabili necessitate*, by the absolute and never-failing power of their Essential Qualities, or inherent endowments; but κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, *quatenus fieri licuit*, or according to the possibility of their Contingency: and therefore, though he confesseth

feſſeth that all Events are foreknown and preordained in the eternal Councel of God; yet he ſtands aſſured, as well upon the ground of Reaſon, as Faith, that the preciſe and opportune contingency of every individual Event proceeds from the influence of this *Providence*, which diſpoſeth and conjoyneth ſome certain convenient Cauſes to the production of this or that determinate Effect, in ſome ſort reſpecting the laſt of Ends, his own *Glory*. To conclude, the *Stoick* hath clip't the immenſe and towering wings of *mans Will*, and allows it no wider range, then what the line of *Fate* affords: while the ſublimer *Chriſtian* ſcornes to ſtoop to the Lure of any *Neceſſity*, beſides the ſpecial *Decrees* of the Divine Councel; not conceiving his will ſubject to the *inclination*, much leſs the *compulſion*, of any force below that of him, who conferred that infinite liberty upon it. For *he*, indeed, holds the rains of our *Wills*, and can bend them: yet *non coactione violenta, ſed leni ſuavique influxu*, not by violent *Coaction*, but gentle and ſweet *Invitation*, as the *Schoolmen* diſtinguiſh.

Article 13. A liſt of the execrable *Abſurdities* impendent on the opinion of *Allute Fatality*; ſo accepted, as the *Stoick* propoſeth it.

Now if we conſider *Fate* in the notion of the *Stoicks*; 'twill be no eaſy wonder, if any man, though his reaſon be never ſo much hoodwinckt with the veile of Prejudice, ſhall not at firſt glance diſcover it to be an opinion *Blaſphemous in reſpect to God*; inſomuch as it ſtrikes at no leſs then the cardinal and inſeparable Attribute of his Nature, *Omnipotence*, by coercing his infinite and arbitrary Activity with the definite laws of ſecond Cauſes, and denying him the prerogative of abſolute ſuperiority to his mechanique Vicegerent, or (rather) Inſtrument, Nature: and, *inreſpect of man*, *intolerably Abſurd*; ſince it ſubverts the Liberty of all humane actions, and leaves nothing in the power of mans Will either to elect, or avoide. For whoever conced's that the mind of man is ſubject to the compulſive regiment of Fatal Neceſſity, and ſo that all the actions of our lives are but the accompliſhments of ſo many ineluctable, immoveable, and inevitable Decrees, from the birth of time enrolled in the Ephimerides of Deſtiny; muſt alſo concede, upon clear inference, that our Creator endowed us with the Semi-divine

Faculty of Rationality, either to no purpose at all, or at best to facilitate our betraying our selves into the snares of ruine and misery beyond possibility of reparation or redemption; Must induce, that the Will being deposed from her arbitrary throne, the judgement seate of Reason must fall to the ground; nor can there be any room left for *Consultation* to sit and determine the debates of the Soul concerning the good or Evil of her objects: since notwithstanding all our most profound, serious, and prudent *Deliberation*, the success of our actions, as well as the results of our councels, would then be no other, but what hath been resolved on and predecreed by Fate; and then, to conceive our selves obnoxious to punishment, for incurring those sins, which are imposed upon our wills by a necessity beyond our controll, is an open derogation to the equity and *Justice* of the Divine Nature, and to ascribe our *Evil* to that, which is by essence *superlatively Good*. That *Prudence*, is miserable *Folly*; the study of *Wisdome*, laborious *Vanity*; and all our ancient *Lawmakers*, either ridiculous *Fools*, or detestable *Tyrants*: since they prescribe and enjoyne those things, which either we must have done, had not they injoyned them, or are restrained from doing, in spite of our own conformable inclinations, by the contrary impulsion or seduction of Destiny. And, finally, that all Divine and Human *Exhortation* to Good, and *Dehortation* from evil, are unnecessary and superfluous. Thus shall *Virtue* and *Vice* vanish into meer and empty notions; and *Religion* become, what Libertines would have it, a mysterious and well contrived invention to support temporall Greatness, and fright vulgar mind into a tame submission to the arbitrary dictates of their imperious Lords: nor shall there be a *Heaven* to compensate suffering *Piety*, or a *Hell* for the punition of *Villainy*; because as the Good man could not but live honestly and religiously, whether he would or no; so must it not be in the power of the Wicked man, to abstain from doing Evil. Thus shall *Love* and *Hatred*, the two most usefull Affections of our Souls, be robbed of their proper Objects, *Amiable* and *Detestable*: nor shall *Justice* find convenient subjects, whereon to place *Laudation* and *Vituperation*; since Praise only belongs to those, who have cho-

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sen to do Good, when 'twas in their power to have done Evil and Dispraise is the due guerdon of those, who choose to do Evil, when twas in their power to have done Good. And thus shall all our *Prayers* be fruitless, our *vowes* hopeless, our *Sacrifices* unprofitable, and all other acts of *Devotion* desperate Vanity. The least of which and of a myriade of other equivalent Absurdities, Incongruities, and oblique, or appendent and inferible Blasphemies, shooting up from this one poysonous root of Absolute Fatality; is more then enough inconsistent to the fundamentals both of Reason and Religion, to deterr even Heathens from approaching, much more embracing and defending it.

But as for *Theological Fate*, or *Predestination*; if accepted in the legitimate sense of the *Primitive Church*, and not in that rigorous and inflexible notion of the *German Calvinist*: I conceive it fully concordant not only to many *Texts* of Sacred writ, but even conciliable to mans *Free will*, notwithstanding the apparent repugnancy betwixt them; as I shall endevour to prove ingularly in an ensuing chapter.

Sect. III.

Article 1. The Authors adhesion to the *Second* opinion, justified by two important reasons.

AS for the *Second Opinion*, viz. that the Term of mans Life is not fixt beyond possibility of either *Anticipation*, or *Postposition*; this, I profess, my judgement inclines me to prefer, as that which seem's to be drawn in the directest line from the point of Truth; and that for two mighty Reasons.

1. *First*, because there are very few places, or testimonies of Scripture, which may be thought to advantage the doctrine of *Absolute Fatality*; but, on the contrary, very many allegable in defence of this.

2. *Secondly*, because those *Texts*, which make for this, have their importance so perpendicular, that nothing but a violent

perversion can wrest, so perspicuous, that nothing but obscure interpretations can darken, so soft and easy, that nothing but over nice and unnatural Exceptions can harden it. And Justice will frown on that stupid partiality, that shall prefer paucity to multitude, obscurity to clarity, and difficult to genuine and familiar solutions.

Article 2. The great obscurity, & small validity of some *Texts* of holy writ, alleged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion, detected.

To explain and justify this by *Instance*; the *Hercules*, or most champion Text usually brought into the field to assert the opinion of *Absolute Fatality*, in the precise manner and time of every mans *Dissolution* into his first matter, is that of *Job*; *Definiti sunt dies ejus, & numerus mensium ejus tecum est; statuta ejus fecisti, & non præteribit:* His days are determined, "the number of his moneths are with thee; thou hast appointed his bounds, that he cannot pass. (*chap.* 14. *vers.* 5.)

Now this place hath much of *obscurity*, and little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, more then ours. (1) *Much of obscurity*; since, though racked to the highest extension of its importance, no Logique can extort any other Conclusion from it, but this, that the Term of mans Life is fixt by God, so that impossible it is for man to remove it forwards to a greater *longitude*; the concession whereof no way infringeth our assertion. For hence it follows not, that tis impossible for man, by intemperance, by the temerarious obtrusion of himself upon the jaws of danger, or other means whatever, to *Anticipate* that Term, or remove it backwards to a greater *Brevity*. Again, I have yet met with no substantial reason, that may countermand our construction of these words, *in πλάτει*, or in the latitude of Generality; and therefore may safely understand them, as an expression of the brevity of mans life, *in specie*, not *in individuo*; their whole Mass weighing no more then this: that the life of man, being included within a certain Circle, or round of days and moneths, and circumscribed by a short succession of minutes flowing into a stream of Time, cannot possibly be extended to a longer duration then what our Creator hath prefixt to all mankind: *i. e.* then that moment to which he hath determined and adapted the durability of mans specifical Temperament, or Principles

Principles of Vitality. And thus interpreted, this place runs parallel to that of *Moses* (*Psalm.* 90. *vers.* 10.) *Dies nostræ vitæ septuaginta anni, & si in fortudinibus sit, octoginta anni, & fortitudo eorum molestia ac labor, quoniam recedit citò & avolamus*: as also that of *David* (*Psalm.* 39. *vers.* 5.) *Ecce, ut palmos posuisti dies meos, & ævum meum tanquam nihil coram te; profectò universa Vanitas est omnis homo stans*; Behold, thou hast made my days as a hands breadth, and mine age is nothing before thee: every man, verily, at his best state is altogether Vanity.

Article 3. The *Natural* Causes (proxime) of the *Longitude* and *Brevity* of mans life: and the Authors private conjecture of the cause of *Longevity* in the first age of the world.

True it is (nor have I heard many, besides *Helmont*, and a Fanatique Brother or two of the mystical Order of the *Rosy Cross*, impugne it) that the *Life* of Man doth consist in a *Peacefull Discord* maintained between the 4 *First Qualities* (I understand them, according to the Physiology of *Epicurus*, and *Carteſius*, as certain *Modifications of Matter*, or *Quantity*) arising from the commixture of them in a proportionate *Dose*, or commensurate symmetry, respective to the *Activity* of some and *Patability* of others; and proximly, in a requisite harmony, of the *Primigenious Heat* and *Radical Moysture*: which harmony being more or less durable according to the more or less exquisite temperament of body assigned to each single person, by the free dispensation of the *Divine Will*; it follows, unavoidably, that the *Longitude* or *Brevity* of every mans life must naturally depend upon the *perfection*, or *imperfection* of his *Idiosyncrasy*, or individual Constitution.

Nor doth it carry less semblance of truth, that by the decrees of that Councel, which is all *Wisdome*, and can therefore *will* nothing but what is superlatively *Good*, it was enacted, that the ordinary Duration of this Humane Temperament should be circumscribed and limited to some certain general, though not precisely adstrict, term or space of years, conceive of 70. 80. 90. or 100. over or under: and that our *ingenerated Protogenitors*, even before the depravation of their Vital Principles by their παράπτωμα or precipitous Fall, held their lives by the same common lease; for manifest it is, that the *Tree of Life* was

planted in Paradise to this purpose, that the fruit thereof being frequently eaten might *instaurate* the *vital Balsam* of man as fast as it suffered *exhaustion* from the depredatory operation of his *Implantate Spirit*, and by a continual refocillation of impaired nature keep her up fresh and vigorous to longevity. To which I ask leave, with due submission to the correction of maturer judgements, to tender my private conception; that the like *extraordinary* means of making the sands of life run slowly and long in the glass of Time, was by the special indulgence of the great *Preserver* of men, permitted to *Methusalem* and other μακρόβιοι of the worlds youth; whose registers amounted to more *Centuries* of years, then ours usually to *Decads*, and who outlived all the titles of *Consanguinity*.

Article 4. The injustice of our Adversaries title of patronage from the forementioned text of *Job*, further manifested.

(2) *Little of strength* for the supportation of their opinion, more then of ours; for though we should concede, what these eager Patrons of Fatality principally insist upon, viz. that the sense of these words of *Job* is restrained only to that precise Term, or prestitute Date appointed by God to the life of every *individual* man: yet notwithstanding can they not from this concession extort more advantage to their plea, then what doth naturally result from thence towards the justification of ours. For *Job* doth not so much as tacidly insinuate, by what kind of *Decree*, manner of institution, or computation that Definition or Circumscription of daies and moneths was made by God: nor is there ought to hinder us from affirming, that the tenor of his words remains sincere and inviolate, when we understand that kind of statute, concerning the circumscription of mans life to belong to that Classis of Decrees, which God, either upon his own infallible *Previdence* of the future demeanour of every man, or upon the *Hypothesis* of mans good or evil use of the liberty of his will, hath made, or may occasionally make. Besides all this our equitable conference of many other *Texts* of Scripture, which we shall have occasion, in the remaining dilucidation of this Theorem, to alleadge, with this of *Job*; will plainly, and almost unavoydably ascertain us, that his words are to be interpreted in our sense, *de specie*, and not *de individuo*.

But,

But, in the preſent, it is ſufficient for us to have declared, that from that place of ſuch reputed validity amongſt the Defendants of Deſtiny, no firme Argument can be extracted to protect them, or impugne us.

Article 5. Seven teſtimonies, out of holy writ, ſupporting the mobility of the Term of mans life, *in individuo.*

And therefore I find my ſelf at liberty to diſcharge my proper duty, viz. the Confeſſion of thoſe *Reaſons*, which charmed my judgement to an adherence to their perſwaſion, who contend for the *Mobility* of the Term of mans Life.

The *Firſt* of thoſe is deſumed from the *Teſtimonies* of the Oracle of Truth, the *Book of God*; and in our liſt of thoſe Teſtimonies, thoſe deſerve to ſtand in the front, which in ample, elegant, and expreſs terms warrant our Aſſertion, *that the life of man hath bin, and may be, both Abbreviated and Prolonged.*

The Coryphæus, or leading Text is that of the Wiſe King (*Proverb.* 10. *verſ.* 27.) *Timor Domini apponit (aut prolongat) dies; anni vero impiorum abbreviantur*: *the Fear of the Lord prolongeth daies; but the years of the wicked ſhall be ſhortned.* Then which nothing can be more expreſs, perſpicuous, and poſitive; and ſo nothing leſs ſubject to detorſion or altercation.

The Lievtenant, or ſecond to that, is the gracious encouragement to filial reverence and obedience annexed to the 5th. *Precept* in the *Decalogue*; *Honora Patrem tuum, & matrem tuam, ut prolongentur dies tui ſuper terram quam Jehovah Deus tuus dat tibi*: which the Apoſtle of the Gentiles (*in Epiſt. ad Epheſ.* 6. *ver.* 2.) calls the firſt (underſtand it of the ſecond table) Commandement with promiſe, viz. of a ſingular reward; or the firſt with a peculiar promiſe, and ſuch as hath ever bin held diſtinct from the promiſe made in the ſecond Precept of the Decalogue, inſomuch as that is common and univerſal, comprehending all kinds of Bleſſings, but this only peculiar and determined to that of diuturnous ſubſiſtence, or Longevity. In *Exhod.* 24. *ver.* 25. and many other places, the Pen-man of God earneſtly inculcates the benefit of the Fear of God, by this forcible impulſive; that he would crown them with length, health, and ſerenity of days, who ſhould revere his moſt ſacred name and conſcientiouſly obſerve.

observe his laws. *Si colatis Deum vestrum, benedicet panivestro, & aquis vestris, auferetque infirmitatem è medio vestri, non erit abortiens aut sterilis in terra vestra: numerum dierum in terra vestra complebo.* Which importune incitement to piety, those Commentators have no way enlarged, who have extended it to this just height of intention; that to those happy Sonnes of Israel, who subjugated their Wills to the written Will of God, and cherished no desires so much, as those of cordial obedience to the rules of his Law, demeaning themselves reverently towards their Maker, and righteously toward their Neighbour; to these God would vouchsafe, not only that they should accomplish that lease of life, which they held by the grant of Nature, or the condition of each mans *Idiosyncrasy*; but even that their Temperament should be meliorated, made more symmetrical, compact, tenacious and consequently more durable, as well by the soveraign, balsamical and restorative Faculties of their Aliment, impregnated or inriched by the tincture of his continual Benediction, as by the benigne and salutiferous disposition of the Aer, and propitious influences of the Host of Heaven, which otherwise are wont to induce sensible Exorbitances and Anomalies upon the blood, spirits, and solid parts of mans body, and from those seeds of morbosities produce various both Acute and Chronique Diseases, which either consume, or corrupt the Vital Nectar, and accelerate the execution of that Sentence, *Pulvis es, & Pulvis eris.* So that of infirme, languid, and valetudinarious persons, they should be made robust, athletical, and longevous; no less then the *Barren* should be made *Fertil*: the one by the *Conservatory*, the other by the *Prolifical* virtue of *Gods special Grace.* The same promise we read frequently repeated by God, in most of his Embassies delivered by his Secretary, *Moses*, to his People; and more particularly in *Deuteron. 4. vers. 40. and chap. 30. vers. 20.* And as he proposeth *length of days* for the desiderable *reward* of obedience: so, on the contrary, he makes *Immaturity of Death*, the affrighting *penalty* of Disobedience. For (*Deuteron. 30. vers. 19. and 28. vers. 20.*) contain a large Catalogue of infirmities, diseases, and corporal calamities feirecly comminated

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to the immorigerous and disobedient: and *in vers.* 62. tis emphatically sayd of *Transgressors, ye shall be left few in number, whereas you were as the starrs of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldst not obey the voyce of the Lord, thy God.*

A Third egregious text, is that where God, gratefully resenting *Salomons* Election of Wisdome before all other Accomplishments temporal set before him, supererogates to his vote, by the additional concession of long life (2 *Kings* 3. 14.) *And if thou wilt walk in my wayes, to keep my Statutes and commandements, as thy Father David did; then will I lengthen thy days.*

A fourth, is that definitive sentence of *David* (*Psalm.* 55. *vers. ult.*) *Bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days.*

A Fifth, that of the same *Author* (*Psalm.* 102. *vers.* 25.) *O my God take me not away in the midst of my days:* and in like manner, (*Psalm.* 6. *and* 30. *and* 88. *and* 111.) he with fervent importunity supplicates, that God would be pleased not to cut off the thread of his life, while he was then in the spring and vigour of his age, but restore him from that languor and marcid Consumption, introduced by his grievous disease, to his pristine sanity, that he might thereby be enabled to chant his praises in the Sanctuary, and do good to the children of Sion.

A Sixth, that remarkable Precedent of the prolongation of life beyond the term prefixt, King *Ezechias* (*Esai.* 38. *vers.* 10.) who being infested with the most mortiferous of diseases, the Plague, and convulst with the horror of death, denounced by the thundering Prophet; in the intervalls betwixt the showers of heavy tears, he sighes out this lamentation: *in the cutting off my days I shall go to the gates of death; I am deprived of the residue of my years. Mine age is departed, and is removed from me as a shephards tent: I have cut off like a weaver my life* (*vitam meam veluti textoris telam præcidi*, as some read it) *he will cut me off with pining sickness.* Which signifies as much as this, that he was adjudged to dye before his time. But this night of sorrow was dispelled by a comfortable morn, caused by the light of that Sun, which riseth with healing in his wings;

for immediately after, his contrition, sincere resipiscence, and earnest supplications obtaining a repreive from the mercifull hands of him, who desireth not the death of a sinner, the execution of that fatal sentence was suspended, and a paroll lease of 15. years supernumerary annexed to that old one of his life, fully, to some few anxious minutes, expired. And can any Prejudice be so inflexible, as not to stoop to the conversion of this pregnant Example, which on one side, testifies the possibility of the *Decurtation* of the Term of mans Life, by any mortal disease; and, on the other, manifesteth the possibility of the *Prolongation* of the same, by the seasonable and right use of the means conductive thereunto, viz. remorse of Conscience, repentance, supplication, and medical remedies. For, prescribed it was by *Isaiah*, thus: *Let them take a Bunch of Figgs, and lay it for a plaister upon the boyle* (or Carbuncle) *and he shall recover.*

And, to bring up the reare of these Sacred Arguments, militant on our side, let us instance in the semblably pertinent story of the *Ninivites*; who, by the counter-violence of those holy spells, *Penitence*, severe *Humiliation* as well of the outward, as of the inward man, and *Prayer* distracted with nought but tears and groans, seem to have abrogated the Decree of Destiny. For the Bowels of *Divinity* yearning with paternal compassion towards so populous a City; wherein though all were guilty, yet many millions must have bin blended in the chaos of common ruine, who were yet too young to share in the *actual* Depravities; smoothed the brow of his *Justice*, and prevailed with him to interpret their universal mortification of *Impiety*, as an Allegorical accompletion of his resolve concerning the general devastation and mortality denounced against their *Persons* and *Habitations*; to accept the flames of their thick *sacrifices* as Expiatory and preventive to the impendent Combustion of their City; and heighten the wholsome virtue of their *Abstinence*, observed in the strict Fast, to a generous *Prophylactique* or Preservative against the *Pestilence* now ready to be kindled by the breath of his Indignation.

Nor are we destitute of *Instances*, in holy Chronicles, to testify

rectify the *Reverse* part of our assertion, viz. That the Term of mans life hath bin *Abbreviated*. For who can read the story of the *General Deluge*, and not observe, that the whole stock of Humanity (except 8. beleivers, who committed themselves prisoners to the Ark of Preservation) was immaturely extinguished, and by the most proper and expedite way of corruption, resolved into its *Hyle*, or Watery Principle? Who can rehearse *Moses* his relation of those many thousands of incredulous and murmuring *Israelites*, buried in the wilderness, to whom God had promised, nay sworn to give them possession of the land of Canaan; and not be satisfied, that their Rebellion and Infidelity anticipated their funerals? and who examine the fate of those *Cowards*, who being sent to explore the fertility of the promised Land, and the forces of the *Amalekites*, returned a discouraging answer to their brethren, and were therefore cut down by the revenging sword of the Lord of Hosts, in the noon of their lives; and not be convicted, that the *Wages of Sin is Death*, and may be paied as justly, though not so naturally, in the morn, or noon, as evening of life?

Article 6. A full vindication of the *Fourth Testimony*, from the several *Exceptions* made against the appropriation thereof to our scope, by the patrons of Fatality.

Now so fiduciary are these *Testimonies*, that whoever shall fully compute their *Number*, perpend their *Gravity*, and clearly discern their *Perspicuity*; must confess it no less then open injustice to all the Inducements of beleife, to debase them so much as to a Competition for the priority of perswasion, with those *Few*, *Light*, and *Obscure* Allegations, upon whose Credit the Factors of *Immoveable Destiny* have adventured to take up their opinion. However, that we may add a brighter polish to this our Gold, by scouring off the rust of all *Exceptions* made against it: it deserves our time, and sweat to dispossess our Adversaries of all their pretended interest in the importance of *Three*, the chiefest of our *Testimonies*.

First they attempt to infirme our title to that definitive and emphatical sentence of the *Psalmist*, *The bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days*; and this under the pretext of several perverse *Interpretations*: as (a) by understanding the place thus; *Impii & sanguinarii non dimidiabunt*

negotia sua, they shall not accomplish half their *Designes*, or, contrary to their expectation they shall fall before they have brought their evil Purposes to pass.

To this unlawfull Construction we reply, that this subterfuge was contrived by that profest Libertine of Christianity, *Luther*, to the end he might support his doctrine of *Absolute Fate*, which with so much Ardor and Pertinacy he had once maintained against that ornament not only of *Germany*, but of *Europe* also, *Erasmus*. But the Connexion of these with the former words, manifestly prohibite any such Comment. *Thou, O God* (sayth *David*) *shalt bring them down into the pit of destruction*, i. e. thou shalt irreciate or insnare them, and suddainly precipitate them into the same pit, which they have digged for me, thy servant; or thou shalt, according to the concernment of the *Hebrew* phrase, destroy them *subita præmatura morte*, by a suddain premature death; that from the experiment of their unexpected ruine, the world may learn thy justice, and be satisfied of thy favour and indulgence to the pious, and thy hatred and indignation to the impious. For if we accommodate this text meerly to the Natural expiration of the term of life, which is appointed as well to the Righteous as to the Reprobate, and generally to all men: pray, what *Energy* or *Emphasis* can remain to that saying of *David*, *Tu facies eos descendere in puteum foveæ*; for then we shall reduce all the meaning only to this, *illi morientur statuto suo tempore, sicut mortales alii omnes*; they shall dye in their appointed time, as all other mortal men: and if so, who might not have justly made this retort upon *David*; *& te etiam tuo tempore, sive cum finis vitæ tuæ præstitutus aderit, Deus faciet descendere in puteum foveæ*, and thee also, when thy appointed time shall come, or when the temperamental lease of thy life shall be worn out, shall God bring into the pit of destruction.

Again, if we exchange *Negotia* for *Dies*; then must we renounce the appropriation of the sense to the Wicked, and make it common also to the Godly. For, who ever lived to accomplish all his purposes? But the expression sufficiently illustrates the intention; for it exactly responds to many other phrases used by

by the Holy Spirit to the same scope, as, *They shall not fulfill the number of their days, their days shall be abbreviated &c.*

(2) By Translating the Text thus; *Non dimidiabunt dies suos*, (i. e.) *peribunt antequàm sperent*: they shall perish in the immaturity of their *Hopes*, not of their *Lives*. For the sensuall *Affections* of their earthly minds having determined their judgements only to the expectation of enjoying blessings inservient to the satisfaction of their domineering Concupiscence, make them promise to themselves long subsistence in this their paradise; nay extend their vain projects as far as the impossible period of Eternity: so though they survive even life it self, by dwindling out their bedrid days, till the *marasmus* of extream old age hath embalmed them before-hand, pined them into perfect Skeletons, and so defrauded their hungry Creditors, the Wormes; yet since they drop away full of youthfull and green hopes, their departure is premature and inopine; and so they may be sayd, not to dimidiate their days.

We return that this illegitimate *Defeant* ought to be rejected for 4 considerable *Causes*. (1) Because it cannot be justly charged upon the words, no not in the greatest latitude of Construction. For tis not there sayd, the Wicked shall dye sooner then they expect; but positively and expresly, they shall not dimidiate their days: now every Ideot can tell, that it is one thing, not to live out half their days, and another, not to beleive they shall live out half their days. (2) because it argues the sacred *Psalmist* of a manifest *Palsity*. For when the ungodly expire, they do not only *Dimidiate* their days, but *Accomplish* them, *Death* being at any time the *December* of life. (3) Because it imports a double repugnancy to Truth. For first, now there are, and in all ages, since the first experiment of death, have bin millions of *Vicious* men, who even in the wildest paroxysme of their Vanity, and highest orgasme of their Pride and Ambition, have still cooled themselves with Εἷς μόρος, οἷς θάνατος πᾶσιν ἐπεχόμενος, and felt a dejecting horror from within, at the remembrance of that Motto, *Statutum est omnibus semel mori*; so far is our Nature from entertaining any hopes of Immortality, though but in a dreame, or melancholy depravation of Phansy.

And, again, no Chronicle is barren in the stories of prosperous Libertines, who have wanted nothing but some *Crasis* to indeare the Felicity of their lives, have unravelled their vital web in the highest blandishments of Sense, attained to miraculous Longevity, and being fated with the profuse treatments of Fortune, have outlived their own large stock of Hopes; so that a Poet might take the Liberty to say of them, they dyed for grief, that they had nothing left to wish for, which they had not already succeeded in the fruition of. (4) Because the admission thereof loseth the *Singularity* or *Determination* of *Davids* speech to *Sanguinary* and *Nefarious* Persons. For, if to *Dimidiate* their days, import no more then to dye by the same common kind of Death, and at the same period of their Temperamental Leafe, when, by the inelectable laws of Destiny, it is enacted that all men shall revert to Dust; certainly, there can remain no reason why Impious men, so dying, should be thought more unhappy, because they were Cruent and Unjust, then others. To conclude; of all those just Persons mentioned in the old Testament, who were translated from this Vale of tears to the Celestial Hill of permanent delight, by early and premature deaths (amongst whom the *Apostle* (*Heb.* 11. *vers.* 38.) hath accounted some so excellent above the common rate of humanity, that *the world was not worthy of them*) of such, I say, 'twas true, according to this erroneous paraphrase, that they did not *Dimidiate* their days, because they dyed sooner then they expected. For they did not only hope, but upon the faithfull promise of God even assure themselves of a longer continuation heer below to do him further service. And confidently to expect, nay by a lively hope to anticipate the fruition of a promised blessing; is a privilege peculiar only to those, to whom the promise doth properly and solely belong: but the blessing of Longevity was only then promised to the pious observers of the Divine laws; as is manifest from the places formerly cited.

(3) By fixing the scope of the Text only upon that *mature Term* of life, to which many ordinarily attain, viz. to 60. 70. 80. 90. years, more or less, according to the respective Duration of every individual Constitution; and so concluding the verity

of Davids speech only in this respect. For (say they) the Annales of *Impious* men seldome arise to so large an account; because either the sword of war, or justice, or some Accident occasioned by their Villanies takes them off, before the completion of their natural Term of years.

But this sinister *Detorsion* of the Text ought also to be repudiated for *two Reasons.*

(1) In regard tis manifestly *heterodox, and dissimilar to the expresse sense of the words*; since they say not, Wicked men shall not live out half the days of *Others*, but their *own*. Now the days of their lives amount not to so many years, as are requisite to the commensuration of the natural space betwixt the Animation and Disanimation of the posterity of *Adam*, prefixt by the decree of him, who is the *Breath of our nostrils*: and therefore, when they fully and wholly accomplish that common compute, with what semblance of truth can they be sayd to *Dimidiate* their days? Moreover, if those *Sanguinary Miscreants*, against whom *David* directly denounceth this judgement of *Immature Mortality*, be sayd not to dimidiate their days, only in this respect, that they seldome arrive at that provect and silver-headed Age, wherein the Tapor of life, by the ordinary decree of Nature, burns dim and languid, and at last, for want of oyle, winks out into perpetual night: then with equal right may it be affirmed also of many *Holy and Just* persons, that they do not dimidiate theirs; nay tis a question not easily answered, whether the same may not be asserted of *these*, with more justice then of *those*. For, how rarely doe we observe the pulse of *Pious* men to beate, till their Arteries grow hard from the Hectick distemper of old age? How small a manual would the Legends of all those Saints, whose names and stories yet survive, make, who have lived till the Almond tree hath budded and flourished: and how vast a volume would theirs make, who have bin gathered green into the Granary of God, and never lived to see one revolution of Saturn about the solary Orbe? and how frequently have we occasion to comfort our selves, after the transplantation of *Junior Virtue*, with that adage, ὃν οἱ θεοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀποθνήσκει νέος? Nor hath *Piety* always proved a Coat of maile against

against the danger of *Malice*; or the *Panoplie* of a Christian, defence against the sword of war; or perfect *Charity*, an Antidote to *Poyson*; or *Temperance*, an Alexipharmacon against the *Pestilence*; or religious *Abstinence*, a Preservative against *Famine*; or *Innocence* awarded the stroke of the *Executioner*: in short, as to the time of Death, in this concernement, *there is one event to the Righteous, and to the Wicked, to the clean, and to the unclean, to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as dies the Good, so dies the Sinner, and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.*

(2) In respect it *disarmes the Text of all its Force and Purpose*. For to what end could *David* say, they should not dimidiate their days, if thereby he intended no more then this, that they should not run over half their stage of life, or subsist untill grey haires; unless the *ground* or *reason* thereof be also subjoyned, viz. because of their *impious and bloody Inclinations and Practises*: and so consequently our present opinion be admitted. For if he beleived it constituted by the immutable law of *Fate*, that such should then, and at no other time be taken off; without any relation at all to the contracting and anticipating merit of their *Impiety*: what makes it to the principal scope, that he sayd, they shall not dimidiate their days? since, according to this inconvenient interpretation, they do not only not Dimidiate their days, but fully Accomplish them, as any the most mortified and conscientious observers of Gods sacred laws: and so neither *Piety* shall retain its attribute of having the power to *prolong*, nor its *Contrary* longer weare the just imputation of having the power to *abbreviate* the Term of Life. To which we may add, that *David* could not, without *special Revelation* from that *omniscient Light*, that penetrates the darkness of *Futurity*, deliver this certain Prognostick concerning the non-dimidiation of their days. For since he could not but have observed that many the most accursed Vassals of Satan, (the *Providence* of God so permitting, for considerations privy onely to his Wisdome) attained to extreme old age: whence could he acquire that prophetique knowledge, that those particular Villaines, whom he levelled at, should be taken in their own snares,

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and perish immaturely in the nonage of their lives? Undoubtedly, he could desume that prediction from no oracle less prescient, then that *Spirit*, whose Essence is Truth, and to whose cognition all things are actually present: but who can, though but with a specious or verisimilous argument, prove that *David* received any such special Revelation? Wherefore Reason adviseth that we acquiesce in the judgement of most of the *Fathers*, who unanimously resolve, that *David* reflected his thoughts upon that positive sentence in the *Levitical Law*, which (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον) for the major part, comminates a short and calamitous life, and a repentine and miserable death to the Ungodly; but, on the contrary, promiseth longevous and peaceable days, to those, who should revere the sacred Majesty, and observe the wholsome ordinances of *Jehovah*: and upon the general infallibility of that Sentence, erected his particular prediction; that those *Sanguinary* traytors who had with so much detestable policy prepared stratagems to ensnare his feet walking in the ways of innocence and charity, should be entangled in their own mischievous wiles, and stumble into their graves in the midle of their race. To which we may accommodate that of *Juvenal*;

Ad Generum Cereris, sine cæde ac sanguine pauci
Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.

Few *Tyrants* goe late to th' infernal flood;
But sink betimes in Cataracts of *blood*.

Article 7. The *second Testimony* vindicated from several *Exceptions*.

The *second place* they endeavour to betray out of our possession, is that promission of *Longevity*, whereby the *Father of all things* was pleased to invite *Children* to a due *Veneration* of their *Parents*: which they corrupt with this dangerous glose. This (say they) was spoken *Anthropopathically*, or *ad captum hominis*, by the *Holy Spirit*, who frequently hath descended to discourse in the stammering and imperfect dialect of mortality; so that the days of obsequious children are said to be prolonged, then when they are blessed with diuturnity, tranquillity and sanity of life, which as it immediately depends on the immutable decree

of God, so cannot one moment be superadded thereunto beyond the term prefixt, unless we infer a manifest *Inconstancy* upon that immutable *Essence*, παρ᾽ ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγὴ, ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα, *with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning*. But that the *Ancient of days* had determined, that such should live to wear the honourable badge of Antiquity, who should constantly beare a venerable regard toward those, from whom, under God, they had derived their being: yet so, that if any obedient Child should chance to be snatched away by the talons of that sarcophagous Vulcur, Death, before time had reduced his haires to the same colour with his skull; which is no rarity; yet notwithstanding doth God in no respect decline from the point of his generall determination, but persevere in the accomplishment of his promise, no less then a Prince, who bestows a million of crowns upon that servant, to whom he had promised only a hundred. For this life is no *Mansion*, but a narrow and incommodious *Inne*, standing in the way to a better, whose *Term is Eternity*: and therfore, *ter felix ille, cui ante lassitudinem peregrinationis iter*, thrice happy he, who arrives at his journies end, before he is weary of travell. And our Grandfathers tell us, that old Age is but the magazine of sorrows, the sowre Dreggs of life, the Portal to the Nosocomie or Hospital of Diseases, and indeed a kind of living Death, wherein men only *Breath* and *Doate*; which though all men wish for, yet no man delights in when it comes: *optima cum expectatur, cum advenit, onerosa sibi, aliis molesta*; good only when expected, evil when enjoyed, because burdensome to it self, and troublesome to others. So that those Saturnine minds, which were most ambitious to wear the silver Crown of old Age; when they had obtained it, found it to gall their feeble temples, and enervate all their limbs: nor did they appear other then weatherbeaten and mouldring statues of their former selves, Human Grashoppers, or Ghosts walking in Skeletons. In fine, that the whole concernment of this encouragement to Filial Duty, doth consist only in this; that *Vivacity* in this transitory World is promised unto morigerous Children, only in this capacity, that it is a *Benediction* of God: and a Benediction only in this respect

spect, that it is a *Document of Divine Grace*, or an Evidence of Gods singular love toward them; which he doth infinitely more testify unto them by a timous and early delivery of them from this calamitous prison of Mortality into the glorious Liberty of the Sonnes of God.

We reply, that this plea of Exception against our lawfull right to the place, is not only frivolous and dilute; but even derogatory as well to the Sanction, as *Excellence* of the *Promise*. For, to transmute the *serious and faithfull promise of* him, whose words are *yea and amen*, into an *Anthropopathical Sophisme*, or affected expression in the stammering Dialect of Humanity; is frivolous, and not only to stagger, but subvert the *Fidelity* thereof, and so demolish the comfortable hopes of *Filial Piety*, nay, what's a degree of *Blasphemy*, to insimulate *Truth* it self of *Imposture*. For, to promise *Longevity* to morigerous Children, when formerly and without any respect to their prevised obedience, God hath prefixt unto them an *Intransible Term* of life: what els can it be, but to make him promise that, which cannot be promised *Hypothetically*, or upon condition; unless that which was *Absolutely* decreed long before the promise was made, be violently cancelled and altered. And so much the more intolerable indignity to the sacred majesty of God, doth this absurd Exception infer; by how much the more both of *Imprudence* and *Inconstancy* it must import, to play the uncircumspect Sophister with those, who (as our Adversaries themselves affirme) stood possessed with a full perswasion, that the Term of every mans life was absolutely, and without any respect to his future piety, or Impiety, predetermined. I profess sincerely, I am yet to be perswaded, that any Credulity can be so pedantique and slavish, as to entertain a beleif; that even *Man* (I forbear to say, God) can thus openly and detectibly dissimulate with any the most stupid and indiscreet person alive; unless he be first resolved to expose himself to the just scorn and derision of all men, and by this loose and childish jugling forfeit that reputation, which he had acquired by his former grave and oraculous treaties, and the just performance of all Articles, to which he had subscribed. 'Tis *one thing* to admit, that the *Holy*

Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man, when he is pleased to hint unto us those Ἄρρητα, or *ineffable Mysteries*, which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh, and are notions reserved to entertain the Soul, when enfranchized from the bonds of Corporeity; such are those glances, whereby he affords us a dark landskip of the *New Jerusalem*, and allegorical description of the joyes and glories of the *Eternal Life*, an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible *Essence*, and three distinct *Subsistences* in one indivisible *Existence*, &c. and a *far different*, nay contrary, to say, that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequall capacities, when he promiseth those things, which do not only not transcend our faculties of comprehension; but are familiar to our knowledg, nay such as the nearest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know. And such is the quality of those *Blessings*, which the Bounty of *Providence* hath by promise assured unto the *Virtuous*, in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life; and particularly that of *longevous subsistence* upon earth. To conclude; the *Spirit* or *Form* of a *Promise* doth consist in this, that they, to whom the promise is made, do understand the good therein specified, to be *really*, *bona fide*, & *in specie*, intended to be performed by him, who made the promise. Now, if there arise any doubt, whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared; then doth the force and sanction, together with the Dignity thereof, totally vanish and become voyd.

Our *Adversaries* have rejoyned, that God doth therefore promise *Longevity* to obsequious Children, because he hath formerly decreed to qualifie their particular Constitutions with respective *Durability*.

But, alas! this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty, nor prevents the Doubt. For if his Decree, concerning their Longevity, be *Absolute*, devoyd of all Suppositionality, and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience: no reason can discover what *Force* or *Energy* the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the *Condition* required. Again, how can that

that Promise, by way of *invitation* or allurement, affect those, who are already confirmed, that what the promise imports, is formerly, by the *positive* and non-conditionate *Will* of *God*, made *inevitable*, and hath the *Possibility* of its *Futurition* determined to precise *Necessity*? In fine, the *Postulation* of that Condition can neither consist with the Eternal *Identity* of God that promises; nor effectually move those, to whom he makes the promise, to endeavour the Consequution of that ample reward of filial obedience: for his *Decree*, concerning the Term of their life, doth and shall forever stand firm and immote, whether the Condition be performed, or not.

Article 8. The *sixth Testimony* cleared from 4. *Exceptions.*

The last *Testimony* they have essayed to extort from us, is the *Instance of Ezekiah*; and this by a *Fourfold* Cavillation.

(1) By this Excuse, *Singulare aliquod Exemplum non evertere regulam*, that one single enormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law; or one swallow makes no summer.

This Exception, I confess, might have had some colour, or slender pretext of Validity; had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it, by asserting that the immutable law of Destiny was *equally extended to all* and every individual person from *Adam* down to us. For most certain it is, that *God* never limited his free *Omnipotence*, by any fixt law, or bound up his own hands with the same setled Constitutions, whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Creatures: it being the Prerogative of his Nature, *to know no Impossibility*, but to be able to act either above, or against the statutes of his Deputy, whensoever, and upon what subject, and to what end soever he pleases. But I have no warrant to beleive, that among the Propugnators of Fate, any one hath deviated into so remote an *Alogie*, as to opinion, that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urne; but that the Decrees concerning the Destinies of some particular persons, are not so definitive, precise, and immoveable, as those of all others in generall.

(2) By this Response, that under the seeming *Absolutness* of the Prophets Sentence, *Morieris, Thou shalt dye*; there lay concealed a tacite *Hypothesis*, which was this: *Nisi seria pœnitudine te ad Deum convertas*, unless by serious and profound repentance thou shalt mortify the old man of sin, and apply thy self wholly to the Mercies of God.

Against this mistaken plea our defence shall be, that it wants the principal inducement to belief, and so can afford no satisfaction at all. For, (besides this, that it quadrates neither to their *First Exception*, nor their *Thesis* concerning the *Immobility* of *Destiny*) what Logick can tolerate the induction of an *Hypothetical* upon a *Categorical* Proposition? or, more expressly, how can any *Condition* be comprehended under that message, which by a *definitive and peremptory decree*, and such as carried no respect to the performance, or non-performance of any condition whatever, tels the K. in down right terms, that the date of his life was now expired, and that the severe Publican, Death, stood ready at the door of his chamber, within some few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature? *Subordinata non pugnant*, is an Axiome I well know, and am ready to receive a challenge from any singularity, that dares question the universality of its truth; but, *that a conditional Decree can be subordinate to an Absolute*, I am bold to deny, nor need I goe far for an Argument to prove the impossibility thereof; the very *Antithesis* of those notions, *Absolute* and *Conditional* sufficiently declaring as much. To take the just dimensions of this Cloud; every Condition is moveable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Uncertainty, as being suspended upon an uncertain and mutable Cause, viz. the Arbitrary Election of mans Free will: insomuch, that the Event thereof cannot be known, nay not unto the Omniscience of God, who is the only *Cardiognostes*, and sees beyond our very Essences, so long as it hangs in suspence or indecision, by reason of the Indifferency, or non-determination of its Cause, *i. e.* while it is not determined to either part by the Actual Volition of mans will. But as for an *Absolute decree*; that cannot but be *Certain* and *Immutable*; as being constitute without, and antecedent to any *Prevision* of a *Condition*, that is to be, or

or hath bin performed, or is not to be, or hath not bin performed.

(3) By insinuating, that God made use of this sharp *Commination*, in order to the more Expedite and effectual reduction of the K. to *Penitence*.

But, alas! this also is a broken reed, and he shall fall into the ditch of Error, who relies thereon. For who can be perswaded, that this *Commination* could be *serious* and in earnest, that must not at the same time dissolve the rigour and *immutability* of Gods decree concerning the fatal Term of the K'. life? or how could it be serious, if it were fully constituted from all Eternity that the K. should not die, till full 15. years after the Sentence? This is a pure ἀκατάληπτον, and something that no man can comprehend. For, to comminate suddain death to him, whom our Adversaries acknowledge reserved by the law of Destiny till the complete expiration of his prefixt Term of life: is not to comminate in *earnest*, but in *jest*, and argue the *God of Truth*, of *Dissimulation*. Again, what *Efficacy* or inforcing Virtue could that Commination have over the *Affections* of *Ezekiah*, if he firmly beleived, that he should not, could not dye before the precise term of his life constituted and made intransible from Eternity? Assuredly, if so; he had no just cause either to *complain* of, or *fear* the abscission of his days.

(4) By recurring to this their last refuge, *Deum hac ratione palam facere voluisse, quam Regi ab æterno designarat* μακροβιότητα, that God was pleased to take this course for the promulgation of that *Longevity*, which he had from eternity designed to *Ezekiah*.

This is more impertinent, and less satisfactory then any of the precedent Exceptions. For extremely ridiculous it is, to opinion, that God would by a Commination suspended on a condition, or by a hypothetical decree, make that known; which long before he had, by an Absolute Decree, without any condition, or prevision of any condition, constituted firme and immoveable. Unworthy and disparaging thoughts both of the *Wisdome* and *Justice* of the *Supreme Being* doth that unhappy man entertain, who ascribes unto it the making of *Decrees subordi-*

subordinate, *disparate*, and *irreconcileable*. That Sacred, omniscient, omnipotent Agent, as himself makes nothing in vaine; so would he have us make him our Exemplar, and doe no action, but what points at some certain end, and conduces both to our benefit, and the last of ends, his Glory. But *in vain* had he promised, in vain threatned, had he either promised or threatned those things, which his own irrevocable Decree had formerly made immutable, which must of necessity, had they never bin promised or threatned, have come to pass in their predetermined opportunity: or such, to whose Existence it was wholly and absolutely necessary, that that very thing, under which the promise or commination was made, should be effected by such a power, to which no other power can resist.

And this (we hope at least) is sufficient to the ample justification of our opinions right to those *Three appropriate and Convincing Testimonies*, of the Mobility of the Term of mans life, desumed from *holy Writ*. ¶.

Sect. IV.

Article 1. The necessity of our enquiry into the mystery of *Predestination*, in order to the solution of the present difficulty: and the Fatists grand Argument.

IT remains only that we endeavour to wind our reason out of that profound abyss of *Predestination* (of which the *Apostle*, though he had the advantage of all other men in this; that he had the eye of his Soul illuminated by beams deradiated immediately from the Soul of Light: did yet excuse himself for his non-comprehension, with Ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ, ὡς ἀνεξιχνίαστα τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ.) into which the solution of this grand difficulty hath unavoidably precipitated it: for the strongest hold, which the Defendants of *Absolute Fatality* have left them to retreat unto, is erected upon this Foundation.

It makes no materiall difference (say they) *whether the Prescience of God be conceived precedent to his Preordination of any future Event, and so Predestination be founded upon Prevision; or,*

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on the contrary, this Præordination precedent to his Præscience, and so Prædestination be the basis of Prævision: for, from the concession of either, it follows of absolute necessity that the Term of mans life (in individuo) must be fixt and intransible.

We answer,

Article 2. The refutation thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of Gods *Præ-notion*, to the indeterminati-on of mans *free will* to the actu-al election of Good or Evil.

That the *Consequence*, indeed, ought to be admitted as firme and impregnable. For this *Præscience*, whether it præced, or succed *Divine Prædestination*, is and must be ever certain, præ-cise, and infallible; or so supposed to be, at least: and therefore must the *Term* of mans life be constituted certain, precise, and immutable, *ex necessitate si non consequentis, saltem consequen-tiæ*, by necessity if not of the *Consequent*, yet of the *consequence*; *i.e.* if not from the *Virtue* or *Efficiency*, yet from the *Hypothesis*, or *Conditionality* of that *Præscience*. For no Sceptick can disal-low of this Consequence; if God doth infallibly foreknow, that this and no other shall be the Term of my life: *ergo* this and no other shall be the Term of my life.

But this is not the point, at which our inquiry is levelled. Manifest it is, aswell from our precedent discourse, as from the Condition of the subject, that these two Propositions are not repugnant each to other; viz. The Term of mans life is fixt and immutable in respect to the infallibility of Gods Præscience: and the Term of mans life is moveable in respect to our right use, or abuse of the Liberty of our Will. Though, I confess, with the great *Mersennus*, that the apparent discord betwixt the infalli-bility of Gods Prenotion, and the indetermination of mans Free Will to the actual election of good or evil; hath bin the rock, against which many the greatest wits of all Ages and Religions have bin shipwrackt, in their perswasions of the irresistible en-forcement of Destiny.

To extricate our judgements out of this maze, let us remember and adhære unto that excellent Axiome of the most and most learned of the School-men; *Prævisionem Dei nihil influere in nostras actiones*, that the Prævision of God hath no influence upon the actions of man, nor upon the operation of the remedies applyed by the Physician to the cure of diseases: but presup-

poseth both the one and the other. For, in truth, God cannot foreknow the future actions of man, or the effects of remedies administred, otherwise then because of their necessary Futurity. Since, if we take away the *Futurition* of events, we necessarily destroy the *Prenotion* of God.

Which *Abstrusity* that we may the better comprehend, let us begg the liberty, to suppose some *Momenta rationis*, or *successive minutes in Eternity* (which, though in reality impossible, *Eternity* being one permanent τὸ νῦν, or *instance*, as uncapable of *division*, as *cessation*; may yet serve, as an excellent Perspective, to our weak-sighted reason in its inspection of many sublime *Phænomena* in *Theology*,) and humbly conceive; that in the *First Moment* of Eternity, God saw, and only saw, without any relation at all to his future decrees, all things to come, as well Ἐνδεχόμενα, or such whose futurity is necessary from the condition of their Nature, or impuls of their proper Causes; as Μέλλοντα, or *Futura Contingentia*, which hang suspended *in æquilibrio* upon the Free Will of their Efficients, so that they may, or may not succeed, whether they be Absolute, or Conditionate: in which First moment had God acquiesced, and proceeded no farther, then only to foresee the Necessity and Possibility of their Futurition; then nothing should have bin to come. That in the *Second Moment*, God saw, and only saw, that this or that event was in *Possibility* of Futurition, in the life of this or that particular man, if such or such things were done, in this or that time, with this or that Temperament of body, and other respective Circumstances: but yet did neither determine any thing to absolute *Necessity* of Futurition, and therefore nothing could be said to depend upon the Præordination of God, though all things should come to pass in the same manner, as he foresaw them, whensoever the *Fiat* of his *Will* should bring them into *actual existence*, or educe them *extra suas causas*; nor did he see, that they would so and no otherwise come to pass, from hence that he would they should so and no otherwise come to pass; since this *Provision* anteceds all *Volition*. That, therefore, in the *Third Moment* of Eternity, God decreed, that he would make *Future* not all those *Possible* Effects, whether

whether Absolute or Conditionate, but only some particulars, as, for example, that he would make *Alexander*, or *Plato*, of this or that individual temperament of body, in this or that climate and country, of this or that particular cours of life, with all conspiring Circumstances; to whom all things should happen according to the *possibility* of their Futurition, wherein God beheld them before the conception or pronunciation of his *Decree*; so that by this influence of God's *definitive Will*, those Events are no more then deduced into *actual existence*, which formerly were only in *δυνάμει*, or in the womb of their *Causes*.

Now, upon this *Hypothesis* our understanding is advanced to this manifest *Conclusion*, *That the Prescience of God doth nothing conduce ad rem existentem*, nor to the *Actions* or *Passions* thereof; since it is not the cause of their *Inference*: nor doe his *Decrees*, that are subsequent unto, and in a manner grounded upon his *Prevision*, work any the least mutation at all in the natures of his Creatures, or by violence pervert their Virtues to the production of any Effects, to which, by their primitive Constitution and individuation, they were not precisely adapted and accommodated. Since, in so doing, he must take away from his Creatures those peculiar Faculties, which he at their creation freely conferred upon their severall natures; and innovate the fundamental laws of Nature.

Article 3. The diametral Disparity between that *Divine Prænotion* which is *antecedent* to *Divine Prædordination*; and that which is *subsequent*; amply declared.

Now this dark shadow of that darker mystery of Predestination, how obscurely soever presented, doth yet sufficiently commonstrate how vast and diametral a *disparity* is between that *Divine Prenotion*, which is *Antecedent*; and that which is *subsequent* to *Divine Prædordination*. For that *Præscience*, which hath for its object a thing to come, without any prævious and prædeterminant Decree; supposeth that particular thing to come, together with the whole *series* or concatenation of its proper *Causes*, and method or manner of its Futurition: the *Modus Futuritionis* being, as the Schoolemen well define, *Id quod futurum est, sive quod ad rei, quæ futura præscitur, futuritionem quolibet modo pertinet*. This that Rabbin *Isac bar Sesat*, quoted by *Menasseh Ben Israel* (*de termino vitæ. pag.* 226.) seems

well to have understood, when he said; *Deus ab æterno disposuit totius mundi negotia, & divina sua sapientia, ac perspicacia, vidit omnes effectus, qui in tempore futuri essent: qui licet pendeant (loquor enim de actionibus humanis) a libero hominis arbitrio, ut fiant aut non fiant; nihilominus tamen Deus certò & infallibiliter eos prævidit, ac præscivit. Neque tamen ideo quicquam in tempore facit homo, quia Deus ea facturum præscivit: sed è contrà, quia homo in tempore hoc vel illud facit, aut operatur, ideo Deus ab æterno illud scivit.*

But on the Contrary, that *Præscience*, which follows upon the *Predetermination of* the *Divine Will*, hath, indeed, for its object a thing to come, and also presupposeth it as fully as the former; but so that it comprehends the order and manner of its futurition as fixt and *immutable*, being so constituted by vertue of the antecedent *Prædestination*.

For the further inculcation of this *Distinction*, let us make use of an *Example* most familiar, and pertinent to the difficulty in hand.

Article 4. A second illustration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or exemplification.

That *Divine Præscience*, which hath no dependence on a predeterminant decree, let us suppose it to be a *Præscience* of the *life* and *death*, of the health and sickness, of the good or evil use of the Free will, of *Peter*, *John*, and every individual man in the world: and is twofold.

First *Conditionate*; if *Peter*, or *John*, being born of a sound and durable constitution, shall choose such a course of life, as that he shall observe the wholsome Aphorismes of Temperance in his use of the Six nonnaturals, shall opportunely, in all distempers introduced by the inclemency of the aer, the malignant impressions of the Stars, epidemick contagions, or other undeclinable Accidents, recur to the use of such convenient remedies, as both reason and experience prescribe for the preservation or restauration of health; then I foreknow that he shall live healthy and long: but if, on the contrary; then I foreknow, that he shall be infested with frequent diseases, and die immaturely.

Second *Absolute*; I foreknow that *Peter* or *John* shall choose a prudent course of life, convenient both to his Genius, and tempera-

temperament; shall sedulously endevour the preservation of his health, by moderation in diet and other nonnaturals, and the restauration of the same, when impaired by any distemper, by rational and approved medicaments; and shall therefore enjoy health, and attain to longævity. On the *Contrary*, I foreknow, that he shall lead a disorderly and luxurious course of life, accelerate the dissolution of his temperament, by the immoderate, prematute, or unseasonable use of Wine, Women, Passions &c. and when assaulted by any disease, chronique or acute, shall either omit to consult learned, judicious and experienced Physitians, or disobey their pharmaceutical or dietetical præscripts, drinke wine in a Fever, cold water in a Critical sweat, salt, sharp, acid or corroding liquors in a Dysentery, eate Astringents in obstructions, frigid, crude and dyspeptical fruits in an imbecillity of the stomach, &c. and shall therefore ruine his health and drop into the grave before hee's ripe.

Now take which *Præscience* you please, and either hath for its object, the præcise Term of *Peter* or *Johns* life, as a thing to come; and fully and punctually presupposeth the same: but so, that together with that fixt Term it comprehends also all the *order* and *manner* of its *Futurition*, or all the antecedent and conspiring causes; amongst which the principal and most energetical is the right *use* or *abuse* of his own *Free will*, in whose power it was to move that Term either forwards or backwards, (*i. e.*) either to *adduce*, or *produce* it.

So far, therefore, is this *Prævision* of God from *excluding* the necessity of *Medical Remedies*, as the Defendants of Fate would impose, according to that of *Solon* in *Stobæus*

——*Fato quacunque manet sors;*
Non hanc averret victima, sed nec aves,
Nec qui Pæonias ægris mortalibus herbas
Sæpe erraturam ferre laborat opem.

That it totally *includes*, may presupposeth it so necessarily, that if we take away from man the *Liberty* of his *Will*, and the opportunity of using either prophylactical, or therapeutical means, in order to the prolongation of his life; we must also submove

the *Certainty* of *Gods Præscience*: since that determineth nothing, but only præsupposeth all things; nor doth God, by a decree subsequent to that Prescience, prædain that this or that individual man shall recover of such or such a disease, unless by virtue of such or such appropriate remedies, which the Physician shall in the opportunity præscribe.

Nor is it a more justifiable plea at the bar of reason, to argue thus; if the Term of mans life be certainly and precisely foreknown to God, then must it, together with the order and manner of its Futurition, be fixt and immutable: then to argue thus; if God hath a certain and precise cognition of any thing *already past*, as of the Creation of the world; therefore could that thing have come to pass no otherwise, nor at any other time, then it did; therefore was the world created by God, *non liberè sed necessariò*, not by an *Arbitrary*, but *Necessary* and restrained activity. For, as *Science*, having for its *object* a thing *Præterite*, doth infer no necessity upon that thing præterite, that it should have bin so and no otherwise effected: so doth *Præscience*, having for its object a thing *Future*, infer no necessity upon its futurition; each being an *Immanent Action* in God, *& extra rem*, or having no compulsive influence at all upon that particular thing, or its Causes: and *Futurum esse* imports no other thing, but an *object* of *Præscience*; nor *Præteritum esse*, any thing but an *object* of *Science*, or *Memoria*. *Science* is the *perfection* of the *Subject*, or thing knowing; not of the *object*, or thing known: much less the *destruction* of the thing known. For necessary it is to *perfect Science*, that it agree in all points with the nature of its object.

But wholly Antarctical to this, is that *Præscience* which is grounded upon *Divine Prædestination*, whereby not only the Term of every individuals life, together with the whole order and manner of its Futurition, is præfixt; but also all those Causes, whose *refractary* or *counter-activity* might in any respect hinder the precise accompletion of that prefixt Term, are prævented or prædetermined to invalidity, lest the Præscience become uncertain or dubious: whether that *Prædetermination* dispose *per medium Causæ Efficientis*, by a certain *Physical* and really effective

effective action, or impression upon the will of man, enforcing it to the election of such a course of life, as may conduce to his punctual pervention to that præstitute Term; or *per modum Causæ Deficientis* by nonconcurrent, but only *permissive* influence (by some called *Permissio simplex*, Simple Permission: by others, *Permissio efficax*, efficacious permission,) since that rule amongst Philosophers *Causa Deficiens in necessariis reducitur ad Efficientem*, doth warrant the *Indifferency*. For this *Decretory Præscience*, though it agree with the precedent *simple Præscience* in this, that it hath for its object *rem futuram*, includeth in its circle the whole order and manner of its Futurition, and presupposeth both the end, and respective means fully and absolutely; yet it clearly and irreconcilably differs from it in this, that the precedent *Prescience* presupposeth the *liberty* of mans *Will*, and the use thereof not only incoacted, and without irrefragable impuls, but absolutely free and arbitrary: but this wholly destroys the arbitrary monarchy of the Will, by importing that the influence of the *Decree* not only inclineth by soft and gentle flexure or perswasion, but by an irresistible violence forceth it upon the election and pursuit of those means, which in a direct and natural line lead to the accomplishment thereof; and this left the *Certitude* or Infallibility of the *Divine Præscience* be infirmed and staggered.

Article 5. A third illustration of the same Difference, by conceiving the *Divine Decrees*, in the same *subordinate series*, which the *Fatists* have imagined.

To discriminate this *Later* from that *Former* Præscience yet more fully: and so insinuate the result of the Distinction, by the most intelligible and concise way of argumentation: it will be necessary for us to conceive the *Decrees* of God in the same method of *subordination*, wherein they, who found the infallibility of his Prævision upon the necessity of his Prædestination and Prædetermination, have bin, by the obscurity of the Subject, compelled to range their thoughts, in the declarement of their opinion.

The *first Decree* of God runs thus; I will, that *Peter* live till the expiration of the natural or temperamental lease of his life; conceive it to be till his glass hath run 50. 60. 70. or 80. year: but that *John* wither before hee's ripe, and fall in the June

June of his age; conceive it to be in the 20. 30. or 40. year from his birth.

The *Second* thus; I will præserve *Peter* from this or that sickness, defend him from this or that knock of misfortune, conserve him in, or restore him from this or that dangerous disease; lest he expire before the præstitute Term of his life: but for *John*, he shall be invaded by such or such a mortal disease, receive such or such a wound incurable, or perish by this or that fatal Accident; so that he may verify my prognostick in dying at the hour appointed.

The *Third* thus; lest *Peter* laps into such or such a mortal disease, I will that he be provided of an industrious and prudent Physician to prescribe unto him rational, generous, and effectual prophylactical means; or, if surprised therewith, that he use convenient and victorious therapeutical medicaments, in order to the expulsion of the same; that so the number of his days be not shortned: but, on the contrary, that *John* shall fall into such or such a dangerous sickness, and want Physicians, medicaments, and all other Conservatives whatever; lest he survive beyond the moment præfixt.

The *Fourth* thus; that *Peter* may not, by the abuse of his Arbitrary prerogative, become insensible, incurious, or negligent of the means ordained to conserve health, and run into the perpetration of such sins, as may be injurious to the temperment of his body, as well as the peace of his mind; I will, by the powerfull influence of my Special Grace, so prepare and dispose his Will, that he shall lead a temperate, circumspect and virtuous life, and so subsist till the period of his days præfix. On the contrary, that *John* may not, by the right use of that Elective Liberty conferred upon his Will, and by a desire of attaining to longævity, endevour the conservation of his health, by diætetical or pharmaceutical observations; I will, that he want that ingenuity, that prudence, that advice, and those prescripts, conducible to the prolongation of his life, and finally that assistance of *Divine Grace*, without which it is not only probable, but necessary, that he should resign up the rains of his Will to Sensuality, and so either by the prodigal effusion of his Vital

Vital oyle in the immodest and destructive rites of Venus, or the extinction of his implantate heat by the frantique sacrifices of Bacchus, or other exorbitances, decurtate the temperamental lease of his life; and so confess Corruption in the moment prefixt.

Or, in a higher key of Fatality, thus; though *Peter*, by the abuse of his Will, rashly expose himself to the fury of the most dangerous Enemies to life, and by gluttony, ebriosity, vindictive anger, salacity, &c. render himself both unfit, and unworthy longer to inspire the common aer; I will notwithstanding all this again repaire the breaches of his constitution, protect him from the malice of danger, and conserve him till the moment predestined, nor shall he be taken off by any other means, but what my Will hath predetermined. Contrary; though *John*, by the right use of the liberty of his will, shall constantly and severely practise all the hard lessons of Virtue, subdue the impetuous and forcible Temptations of Sensuality, lead a life more impassionate then the most rigid of the Stoicks ever professed, more chast then aged Hermits, more abstinent then *Lessius*, more peaceable then Charity her self, and so deserve to become the greatest Example of Longevity: I will notwithstanding, that the appointed Term of his life remain fixt and intransible beyond that point, which my will hath from all Eternity decreed to be the *Ne Ultra* of his subsistence.

On these, or the like Decrees, must the *Certitude* and infallibility of the *Divine Prescience* be erected by any; who subordinate Gods *Prescience* to his *Predestination* of the end, and *predetermination* of the means.

Now, to use all this; so many, so great, and so intolerable are the *Incongruities*, and *Inconveniences*, which necessarily depend on this *Decretory Prescience*; that we need no other argument to evince the weakness of their judgements, who have laboured in its defence, but only to select and consider the *chiefest* and most *obvious* of them.

Article 6. The first *Absurdity* impendent on the opinion of a *Decretory Prescience* of God, as to the Actions of man.

First, this opinion, *that, all the actions of man, and their Events, are Fatally predetermined by the Decretory Prescience of God*; doth not only enervate and scandal, nay destroy the *sincerity*

of those many *Divine Precepts*, enjoyning man to endevour, to the utmost of his knowledg and power, the conservation of his health, and the prolongation of his life, by temperance and all other lawfull means; of those many *Promises* made to encourage him to a strict observance; of those many *Comminations* annexed, to deter him from the neglect of those Precepts; but also, upon inference, dissolves the *obligation* to all serious study and sollicitude to explore, procure, prepare, and use all convenient remedies, in order to the expulsion of diseases, and the revocation of health, on the part of the *Sick man*; and on the part of the *Physician*, to be industrious, carefull, vigilant, and conscientious, in the exercise of his Profession.

That the *Patient* is hereby disobliged from the duty of Self-conservation, may be thus manifested. If it be, *ex Decreto Divino*, fixt and immutable, that such a man shall lead a peaceable, healthfull, and blisfull life, and do all things that are either necessary or conductive to the procurement and continuation of that happy estate; or on the *Contrary*, that such a man shall eate the bread of sorrow, drink the bitter waters of Affliction, and untravell his tedious days in poverty, contention, valetude, or crazines of body, anxiety of mind, &c. and therefore take no care at all to do those actions, which might be necessary or conductive to the amendment of his miserable condition, by reason he wants the assistance, counsel, and manuduction of *Divine Grace*: then doth it unavoidably follow, that the *labour* and *sollicitude* of the one is *superfluous*, and of the other *unsuccessfull*, nay *impossible*. For whatever the one, or the other shall do, and however live, yet still the success shall be no other, but what God hath predestined, and though the intention of either be levelled at an end quite contrary to what is designed by the Volition of the *Predestinant*; yet shall the *Force* of the *Decree* either pervert, or render it ineffectual: and if we grant, that the *Happy* man did take care to conserve his health and life; we must also grant, that he could not but take that care; and that the *Miserable* man did take none to preserve either, because it was not in the power of his *will* to determine on that care. And thus, what either shall do, can be neither *Care*, nor *Negligence*, strictly

strictly and properly so called: but a meer *Necessity* of Caring, or not Caring.

On the part of the *Physician*, the Reason is the same; for, if this doctrine of Fatality be true, well may he be excused, nay thought the wiser man, if he shut up his books, forget his Aphorisms, deliver out his Prescripts *per Sortilegium* (a course, as I have bin ascertained by the testimony of a judicious and faithfull observer thereof, not long since taken up and constantly practised by a Devout Impostor, whose counterfeit zeal to the Cause had advanced him to the trust of a Physician in that Army, which gathered the first flowers of its triumphant wreath in Nase by Feild) and supinely give Coloquyntida, or Scammony in a Dysentery, Antimony in the Iliaca Passio, Opium in a Crisis, Aqua Fortis for a Julep &c. since no Art can supersede, nor Poyson accelerate his departure, whose time of transition to the invisible world Destiny hath limited to a moment; *Et cum Fata volunt, bina Venena juvant.* Nor can it be rightly esteemed a *Virtue* in the Physician, to be studious and solicitous; or a *Vice* to be debaucht, ignorant, and negligent of the safety of his Client: if it be only the irresistible *Impulse* of *Fate*, which forceth his *Will* to the election of either, in order to the precise accomplishment of its Decree: or, more plainly, if the Care or Negligence of the Physician be but the *Medium*, whereby Fate brings about its end concerning the dissolution of the Patient. And if so, what *Moral* obligation remains upon the conscience of the Physician? Assuredly none at all. Which every moderate judgement will soon detect to import so manifest, dangerous, and detestable an *Absurdity*; that of it self tis able not only to discredit the opinion of Fatality, but also to accuse and convict the Abettors thereof of unpardonable Inconsideration, Stupidity, and Irreligion.

Article 7. A Second *Absurdity* connected to the same.

The *Second Inconvenience*, or rather *Absurdity*, inseparably conjoyned to this opinion of a *Decretory Prescience* in God; is this: Whoever shall grant, that all the means or remedies, and so the sedulity or negligence as well of the Sick, as the Physician, are subordinately predetermined by the Decree of

Fate; must also, by the necessity of natural consequence, be compelled to grant, that to allow the merit of *Praise* or *Dispraise*, *Commendation* or *Reprehension* unto either, is open *Injustice*. For by what pretext of Equity can a Sick man challenge to himself the honor of having done a praise-worthy action, in endevouring to preserve himself both by observing a course of Diet contrary to his disease, and seasonable consulting with and strictly conforming unto the advice of a learned and judicious Physician; or the Physician for the full discharge of his duty in regulating the sick according to the most profound and salutiferous maximes of his Art: if the obedience of the one, and the care of the other be not Arbitrary, but coacted or necessitated by the Force of the complex Decree of Fate, as instrumental to the subsistence of the sick man till the predestined term of his life? *Ubi mera necessitas locum habet, ibi laudem exulare necesse est*: where meer *Necessity* is admitted, there all *Laudation* is excluded. And with what justice can we reprehend the sick man, for being incurious in the disquisition, or irregular in, and averse from the use of the means prescribed for his restauration: if that his supinity, irregularity, and aversion be imposed upon his Will by the impuls of Destiny, and predetermined as a necessary Medium to accomplish the Decree of his immature death? or the Physician either for his neglect, or ignorant and inartificial tractation of his Client; if twere decreed he should be so, to the end the client might expire according to the decree? *Persuasum est omnibus* (saith *Menasseh Ben Israel, de Termino Vitæ. pag.* 205.) *nec laudandum, nec arguendum quemquam, nisi qui libero arbitrio & consulto benè agit, aut delinquit; adeo ut nullus suasionis, consilii, redargutioni, præmio aut pœnæ locus sit, si homo non & liber in actionibus suis.*

Article 8. Two *Subterfuges* of the *Fatists*, precluded.

From this distress our *Opponents* have promised themselves an easy evasion, by replying; that both *Patient and Physician are wholly ignorant of the Decree*, the Opticks of Mortality being too weak and remote to read the lines in the Book of Fate without the perspicill of *Divine Revelation*.

But

But this way of *Subterfuge* may be blockt up, by rejoyning; that though the *Decree* be known to neither, yet tis sufficiently manifest to both, from the Hypothesis of this opinion, that not only their *Actions*, but also the *Successes* thereof are the prescripts and consignations of Fate; and so can be no other then what is included in, and necessitated by the Decree: and consequently that there can remain no just Cause of *reprehension* on either side.

Should they insist yet further upon the same plea, and urge; that tis part of the Decree, that either the Physician, or Patient, or both should be negligent, and so become *Culpable*: we may soon exped this obstruction only by demanding, what *reason* or *equity* can be found to justify such an accusation and respective punition, where the Will of the delinquent is controlled, inflected, nay impelled upon the commission of a crime, or omission of a duty, by a power infinitely superior to his reluctancy; and not only the act, but time, place, instruments, means, &c. conspiring circumstances, precisely preordained by a decree of that *Will*, which is *Omnipotence*? *Reprehension* imports not only an *Act* of the *Reprehendent*, but also the *Guilt* or *Culpability* of the *Reprehended*: otherwise it cannot be *just*. To the legality, therefore, of a reprehension it is undeniably necessary, that the ground or cause thereof be a *real* and *proper Guilt* in the person reprehended. Now *Guilt* can have no place, where that which is impeached cannot be a *Voluntary Agent*, but a *Medium*, or *Instrument* ordained, and actuated by an irresistible Power to the execution of an infallible Decree.

Article 9. A third *Absurdity* inseparable from the hypothesis of a *Decretory Prescience Divine*.

The *Third* and last *Absurdity* imports no less then the subversion of the very fundamental *Principle*, or basis of all *Moral Virtues*, and *Christian Graces*; by inferring a deniall of *Justice* in the *reward* of *Good*, and *punishment* of *Evil*, either before, or after death. For, tis the *Liberty of the Will* only that supports the *Equity* of *Compensation*: and therefore he, who doth a good action, when twas not in the election of his Will to have omitted that good action, or to have done it otherwise then he did; hath but a weak claim to a *reward*; nor hath he, who

commits a sin, which is not in his power to leave uncommitted, more reason to feare a *punishment* from the even hand of *Divine Justice*.

To conclude, therefore; since these are the *Absurdities*, which every mans Logick may perceive necessarily and immediately to flow from the doctrine of *Decretory Prescience*, or such as is subsequent to *Divine Predetermination*; and since the same, nor any others of equal danger to the Principles of our Knowledge, and Articles of the Christian Faith, can ever be deduced from the hypothesis of that *Simple Prevision* or *unactive Prescience*, which we have allowed of as consistent to the *justice* of God, because consistent to the *Arbitrary freedome* of mans *Will*: tis no hard task to determine, in which opinion our judgements may with more safety and permanent satisfaction aquiesce.

Article 10. The reduction of the whole dissertation to 4 *Conclusions*, genuinely extracted from the Premises.

Now, that we may relieve the Memory of our patient Reader, from the oppression of our (not well to be avoyded) precedent prolixity; we conceive our selves in gratitude obliged, to tender him a Recapitulation, or reducement of all this tedious discourse, concerning the Mobility of mans term of life, in *Fower Conclusions*, naturally resulting from the Premises.

The First Conclusion.

That God hath circumscribed the duration of mans life, with a certain Circle or round of time, conceive it to be of 70. 80. 90. or 100. years, more or less: but yet hath reserved to himself, as *jus suprema Majestatis*, the prerogative power of extending the term of any individual mans life beyond the limits of that sphear, so far as it shall seem convenient to the Wisdome of his Will. ¶.

The Second Conclusion.

That God, who loves justice more then man, and man only for Justice sake; and hates Injustice more then man, and man only

only for Injustice sake (for *Sin*, unravelled to the botome, will be found to be nothing but *Injustice*) is willing, in respect of the object of his Love, or in consideration of mans justice, to prolong; or, on the contrary, in respect of the object of his Hate, or in consideration of mans Injustice, to abbreviate the term of mans life, included within that determinate Circle of time: reserving still to himself an arbitrary power of acting the quite contrary; (*i. e.*) of abbreviating the life of the just, and prolonging the life of the unjust, upon the perswasion of reasons either manifest to us, or private to himself. ¶.

The Third Conclusion.

That God, when he is pleased to condescend to the prolongation of the life of a Just person, doth procure the same, either by means conforme to the ordinary and setled Constitutions, or Canons of Nature; or by means Supernatural. The *Former*, when bearing a respect to the native Durability of his individual Temperament, he assists to the duration thereof untill the natural Period, or last moment of this sphear of time; wherewith the life of man (*in specie*) is circumscribed: and this either by conserving his Temperament in its decent tenor, and requisite Vigor; or by prohibiting and preventing the invasion of those known Enemies to longevity, which might any way conduce to the denormation, and consequently the premature dissolution of its harmony. The *Later*, when bearing no respect to the native durability of his individual Temperament, he meliorateth, enableth, and by the secret immission of some special *Athanasia*, or Antidote against early death, corroborateth the same, so that it doth last longer, then otherwise, *pro vi sua nativa*, it could possibly have lasted, had it never bin impaired by any distemper. And this when God doth, then is he properly sayd, *to prolong the life, or fulfill the number of the years of the Just.* But the Contrary effect he procures by contrary Causes; (*i. e.*) he abbreviates the life of an unjust Person, either by an immature turbation and dissolution of his temperament, by its native disposition sufficiently tenacious and durable to extreme old age: or by not prohibiting, (*i. e.*) permitting and so procuring the violent

lent and preternatural dissolution thereof by the destructive surprisall of any Accident whatever. And in this case, properly are the Unjust sayd, *not to Dimidiate their days.* ¶.

The Fourth Conclusion.

That a just Person, who, so much as in him lies, fixeth all the Affections of his Soul upon the Fear of God, and the avoydance of Evil; if he chance, through the frailty of his nature, or the force of temptation, to fall into some Capital Sin, which according to the penalty annexed to its prohibition, deserves to be punished by the *Abbreviation* of his life: may notwithstanding *sometimes*, his remorse of Conscience, profound sorrow, fervent prayer, religious fasting, and other duties requisite to true and perfect repentance, effectually exciting the Mercies of God, obtain from him a full and absolute remission not only of the sin, but also of the temporal punishment due thereunto; and moreover a restauration of his Temperament to its native vigor, from which it was alienated by former infirmities, or corrupted by the dyscratical or distempering contagion of sin. And *sometimes not*; and this chiefly, when it hath seemed convenient to the most wise and just God to pronounce the fatal and irrepealable sentence of Death upon him: for in such a case, I beleive the sin committed, to belong to that black order of *Sins unto Death*; by contradistinction thereof from that Sin, which is *not* unto Death, or upon which the irrevocable Sentence of Death is not yet pronounced; which no man can certainly know without special revelation. ¶.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Liberty Elective of Mans Will.

Sect. I.

IN our enumeration of the Venenate *Abſurdities*, which naturaly grow upon that inflexible ſtock of *Abſolute Fatality*, or, more expreſly, upon that execrable *Hypotheſis* of the *Stoicks* (that we may be charitable in forgetting there are any *Chriſtians* of that irreligious perſwaſion) that all the Actions of every individual man are prædeſtined, and the whole order and manner of their Futurition præciſely præordained by the invariable decrees of that *Supreme Power*, againſt which the coacted and limited *Will* of man can make no effectual reſiſtance; we well remember, we ſpecified the total ſublation of all *Virtue* and *Vice*; the abnegation of *Juſtice* either *Divine* or *Human*, in the compenſation of *Piety* and *Impiety*; the adnihilation of the uſe and efficacy of *Lawes* to coerce from Evil, of *Præcepts* and *Adhortations* to elect and proſecute good; in a word, the ſubverſion of all *Religion* and *Morality*, and conſequently the neceſſary reſignation and rendition of the minde of man to receive all the deſtructive *Impreſſions* of *Hell*. And no leſs, nor fewer *Abſurdities* may the reaſon of every man diſcover emergent from the *Antitheſis* or contrary Aſſertion, that all the Actions of man, and their particular Events or Succeſſes, are

Article 1. The Parity of Abſurdities reſulting from thoſe two Antagoniſtical Hypotheſes, of *Abſolute Fatality*, and meer *Contingency*; as to the Actions of man.

neither the prædeterminations of Fate, nor the occasional designations of Providence Divine, nor fully the arbitrary elections of mans will, but the meer unpraemeditate, and temerarious *Hits* of *Chance:* since, in pure Justice, those actions onely are *Laudable*, or *Vituperable*, which are done *Deliberato & libere ratione Agentis*, upon a deliberation of the *Intellect*, and an arbitrary election of the *Will* subsequent to that deliberation; and not those which are meerly *Fortuitous*, and result from the indeliberate or blind activity of *Fortune*.

Article 2. Those 2 contrarie streams found to have bin derived from one and the same poysonous Fountain; *viz.* a subterfuge of man to evade *Culpability*.

When first I tasted the odious bitterness of these two streams, whereof most of the ancient *Greeks*, many of the noblest *Romans*, and (I fear at least) not a few of the professors of *Christianity* have drank too liberally, even to the infatuation of their *reason*; I must confess, I conceived them to have bin derived from two *different fountains*, or *interests* as irreconcileable as *Light* to *Darkness*: but when I had, by the continued travail of my thoughts, traced them up to their original, I found them to be effused from *one and the same vein*; viz. *the propensity of Human nature depraved, to attempt by all means imaginable the Excusation or Extenuation of the Guilt of its defections from its proper object real good, by charging it wholly, or in part, upon some external influence prevalent over mans Will.* For man, having from the *Light of Nature* learned this as an Axiome; that the *Justice* of *Reprehension* and *Punition* is radically consistent in the intire *Freedome* of the Delinquents Will; or, more plainly, in this, that the Delinquent chose to do ill, when 'twas absolutely in his power to have done well; not in this, that either his Will was enforced by a *Necessity* that admits of no repugnancy, first to the *Volition* and after to the actual *prosecution* of that ill; or that he was onely a meer *illiberal, incogitant, & fortuitous Agent*: 'twas obvious for him to conclude, that if he could incriminate either upon an ineluctable *Necessity*, or simple and meer *Chance*, then he might with equal facility, discharge himself of the *Culpability*, or *Guilt*, and consequently of the *punishment* due thereunto.

Now,

Article 3. The Authors Incitements, here to enquire profoundly into the Natures of *Free-will*, *Fortune*, and *Fate*

Now, though our pen hath drop't, on the præcedent leaves, frequent and curſary Detections of the groſs and ruinous Abſurdities of both theſe *ſubterfuges*, ſo that a rational conſideration may, from thoſe tranſient glances or hints, collect Arguments more then enough for the total *Demolition* of them: yet, ſince thoſe notions of *Fate*, *Fortune* and *Free-will* are ſubject to *Æquivocation*, ſome men underſtanding them as *poſitive Cauſes*, others as *Modi agendi Cauſarum*, certain manners of Cauſes operating, and others as *Vana Nomina*, meer *Terms*, which in Logical verity reſpond by way of adæquation to no real Entities; and ſince the difficulty of the ſubject encouraged us to promiſe a full *Reconciliation* of all their apparent *Antipathies*, or *Inconſiſtencies*, and alſo a perfect *Accommodation* of them all to the *Special Providence* of God (the onely cauſe of their continuity and connexion to the preſent clue of our thoughts) we eſteemed it not onely a pardonable, but a laudable deſign to attempt by a ſingular diſcourſe the manifeſtation of their *particular Natures*, or, more plainly, what we are to underſtand by *Fate*, what by *Fortune*, and what by *Free Will*. Which that we may atchieve with the more familiarity to common Apprehenſion, both method and perſpicuity command us to conſider the *laſt* in the firſt place.

Article 4. What is intended properly by the *Liberty* of mans Will.

By the *Liberty* or *Freedome* of mans Will (that we may maturely prævent all Logomachy or Sophiſtical contention impendent from the ambiguous ſenſe of that term) we intend not that Freedome, which being called by the Græcian Ἐλευθερία, defined by *Cicero*, *Poteſtas vivendi ut velit quilibet*, and by the Civil Law Ἐξουσία ἀυτοπραγίας, the Power of leading the life of a *Freeman*, is the contrary to *Servitude*; ſince that concernes onely the *Civil* or *Political* ſtate of Man; but that which by a proper elegancy the Græcian defines τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, the Latines *Id quod in nobis ſeu penes nos*, *noſtróve in arbitrio*, *poteſtatéque ſitum eſt*, and the Divines commonly name *Liberum Arbitrium* an Abſolute power of electing what objects we pleaſe, Good or Evil, whereon to fix our Affections;

since that concernes only the *natural* state of man, and is that alone which can justify the *Equity* of the reward of Piety or Virtue, and the punishment of Impiety or Vice, by God, or Man.

Article 5. The several subordinate Actions of the Mind, exercised about its objects: and the respective scholastick *Terms*, by which Philosophers have adæquately expressed them.

For more then one respect did the Ancients select and fix on this word *Arbitrium*; For, whether we would intimate that *Action* of the Rational Faculty, whereby man gives judgement in any matter that seemed dubious; as we use to say, that for the Decision of any case, whose obscure æquity either our own imprudence, or interest makes us unfit to determine, we ought to referre our selves to the *Arbitration* of some judicious and impartial person, who is thence most accommodately called an *Arbiter*: or the *Rational Faculty* it self existent within us, from which the action of Judication or Arbitration it self doth proceed, the word signifying the *Action* being transferred upon the *Agent*; we can hardly be furnished with a more adæquate and significant Appellation. But, to trace the thoughts of the first Imponents up to the original, in respect the *rational faculty*, being the same with the *Mind* or *Intellect*, is conversant and exercised about not onely things that belong meerly to *speculation*, but also such as are reducible into *Action* or *Practise*; therefore doth the term *Arbitrium* seem to be appropriated to the *Faculty*, chiefly in respect of things to be *done*, inasmuch as it is occupied in the expension or dijudication of the consequent good of those actions, and sits as it were an absolute Arbiter to determine, whether they shall be done, or no.

And hence is it that when the rational faculty having perpended the convenience and inconvenience, or good and evil of its objects, and ended its act of *Deliberation*, adhæres unto, or fixes upon one as more convenient then the others; this second act or *Adhæsion* may be in the general (*i. e.* in respect of things both speculable and practical) called Συγκατάθεσις, an *Assent* or *Approbation*; but in particular (*i. e.* in respect only to those things that fall under action) προαίρεσις, an *Election* or Choice: since it supposeth the prælation of that particular thing to be put in execution, to all others objected. And in this distinct

diſtinct relation was it that *Ariſtotle* (*Ethicor. 3. cap. 3. in fine*) ſtyles the object elected, τὸ προαιρετὸν, *id quod cæteris propoſitis, & poſtpoſitis, amplectendum nobis proponimus*, or, *id quod ſub delectum cadit*. This the *Latines* moſt frequently render *Conſilium*, as in thoſe phraſes, *capere conſilium*, *ſequi rationis conſilium*, *neſcire quid ſit alicujus conſilium*, &c. and *Propoſitum*, as in thoſe, *adhærere*, *ſtare*, *manere in propoſito*, *à propoſito revocare*, *propoſiti eſſe tenacem*, &c. and we tranſlate into *Reſolution*, or *Determination*.

Again, ſo ſoon as the *Mind*, its act of *Conſultation* or *Deliberation* being finiſhed, hath præferred one thing to all others, in the præſent, and determined it for the greater good, or more convenient; then immediately ſuperveneth the *function* of the *Appetite*, whereby the mind is carried on towards the *Amplectence*, or *fruition* of the Good apparent therein: and this third action the Greeks call Βούλησις, the Latines *Voluntas* and *Volitio* indifferently, and the Engliſh the *Will* or Act of *Volition*. Which we glance at *per tranſennam*, becauſe vulgarly, by the word *Voluntas*, men underſtand rather the *Appetite* (rational and proper only to Man) it ſelf, then the *Function* or operation thereof: for which conſideration, we ſhall in all our ſubſequent diſcourſe conforme to cuſtome, in uſing the terms *Will* and *Appetite indiſcriminatim*, as Synonymas implying one and the ſame thing.

Moreover, in regard, that upon the Appetition of the Will, which is properly the actual proſecution of the good apparent in the object, there immediately ſucceeds the action of the *Motive Faculty*, therefore is the action conſequent to that appetition juſtly called *Voluntary*, as having bin deliberated and undertaken *ex conſilio*, upon conſultation and election, and reſpondent to that which the Græcian calls πρᾶξις. For that is it, whoſe beginning *Ariſtotle* hath decreed to be Election, in his Aphoriſme, πρᾶξις δ' οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, which was the ground of *Ciceros* Paradox, *non eſſe actionem in rebus inanimis*, that there could be no action in Inanimate things, ſince they are devoid of the power of *Election*, *Aſſent*, or *Approbation*: and of *Ariſtotles* alſo, when he contended that this kind of πρᾶξις

or action, could not rightly, and in distinct truth, be attributed to *Brute Animals*, nay higher yet, not to *children*, for the same reason, though he willingly conceded to both τὸ ἑκούσιον, *spontaneous motion*. Not but that by τὸ ἑκούσιον, he sometimes signifies *motionem appetitus spontaneam*, the spontaneous motion of the *Appetite Rational*, or the *Will* it self, as (*in* 3. *Ethic. cap.* 4.) where he constitutes this difference betwixt *Volition* and *Election*; that Βούλησις, or *Voluntas*, is chiefly the *end*, and προαίρεσις the Election of the *means* conducing to that end. as in this instance, We *will* health, and then *elect* the means which in probability may officiate either to the conservation or restitution thereof. But when he draws his thoughts into a sharper angle, and speaks more præcisely, he allowes not every *appetition*, to be the *Will*, but only that which follows a serious deliberation, approbation and election, and is grounded upon reason, which therefore he most judiciously defines to be μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, *boni cum ratione appetitio*, an Appetition of Good with Reason.

Nor doth he always restrain the word πρᾶξις to that Action which proceeds from the *Will*, or election of the *Rational Appetite*: but many times lets it loose to the expression of those inconsiderate actions, which result from the impulse of the Sensual; as in these words (1. *Rhetor. cap.* 10.) *Omnia quæ homines agunt, aut per se agunt, aut non per se: ac per se quidem, aut consuetudine, aut appetitione, & ipsa quidem aut rationali, quæ sit Voluntas, aut irrationali, quæ sit Cupiditas & Ira; non verò per se trifariam, quatenus aut natura, aut vi, aut ex necessitate agunt.* And thus much by way of Introduction concerning the several *Terms*, by which both ancient and modern Philosophers have most properly denoted the several successive or subordinate actions of the Mind exercised about its objects. We now convert our thoughts to explore the *Quiddity* or *Essence* of that we call *Liberum Arbitrium*, and wherein it doth radically and principally consist.

Sect.

Sect. II.

Article 1. The Essence of mans Liberty Elective, consistent primarily in the *Indifferency* of the *Intellect*; and in the *will* only dependently.

FAmiliar it is to the Apprehension of every one, that Man is affirmed to posses a *Free-Will*, for this reason; that amongst many divers objects occurring to, and falling under the deliberation of the *Cognoscens Faculty*, or *Intellect*, he is not obliged to make his election of any one more then the others, nor doth he so elect any one, as that it doth not still remain in his power to refuse that again and elect the contrary. *This Liberty* of election some men have founded only in the *Will*, and others in the *Rational Faculty*; to whose opinion reason adviseth us to adhære. For doubtless the *Will*, considered *per se* is a blind and undiscerning *Faculty*, or *Power*, which can make no progress, nor find the way towards convenient objects without the manuduction of the *Intellect*, which as it were lights the torch unto, and as a knowing guide conducts the Will: so that since it is the proper office of the Intellect to informe and conduct the Will, and the proper office of the Will to follow the direction and guidance of the Intellect; it is not only manifest, that the Will cannot deflect from the right way, towards the amplectence and fruition of Good, unless by the mistaking Intellect it be seduced into the devious paths of Evil; but also, that the *Liberty* of election is consistent in the *Intellect primarily*, and in the *Will* onely at the *second hand*, or by way of *dependence*. To speak yet more expressly, the nature of this Liberty Elective seems radically to consist in that *Indifferency*, in respect whereof the Faculty called free, may or may not be carried on towards any particular object, which the Schoolmen call the Liberty of *Contradiction*; or be so carried on towards one object, as that it may at pleasure renege that Election, and make a new one of the quite contrary, which they call the Liberty of *Contrariety*. Assuredly, since no man can understand

understand how there can be a Liberty, without a Faculty of Election; it is evident that the Election can be only there, where is the *Indifferency*: in regard that either where one single object is proposed, or the faculty restrained and determined to the election and prosecution of any one single object; there can be no free election, since election præsuppoleth a variety of objects, and is nothing but the præferring one to all the rest, or, if there be but two, the choyce of one and the refusal of the other.

Article 2. An egregious Error of some Divines, that the *Liberty* of the Will doth consummate ly consist in its immoveable *Fixation* on real Good.

Some there have bin, and those no mean *Clerks*, who have affirmed the Will to be then most free, when it is so determined to, and fixt upon one object, grant it to be the *Summum bonum* or chiefest Good, that it cannot be deflected to its contrary Evil; and the reason they give is this; that since the Dilection, prosecution and fruition of that Good is highly *Voluntary*, it ought therefore to be accounted highly *free*.

Article 3. Their inadvertency of the real Difference betwixt a *Spontaneous*, & *Arbitrary* action; the occasion of that Error.

But we have just ground to doubt, that the Authors of this Paradox did not either clearly understand, or at least sufficiently consider the real difference betwixt a *Spontaneous* and an *Arbitrary* action; while they contended that because either may be said to be Voluntary, therfore they are one and the same originally. For indeed a Spontaneous action, though when men discourse at randome and in the general, it may seem to comprehend an Arbitrary one, yet in præcise and distinct reasoning, it sounds no more then a certain blind impulse of nature grounded upon no præcedent ratiocination; when an Arbitrary action properly so called, depends upon a prævious ratiocination, examination, dijudication, and election.

Article 4. That a *Spontaneous* action, and an indeliberate *Impulse* of Nature, are homologous or identical.

That a Spontaneous action is no more then an indiscreet impulse of nature, devoid of all deliberation, is manifest from hence; that not onely Infants and Brutes (to neither of which a Philosopher will allow either use of Reason, or Liberty of Will) may do many things spontaneously, but even Inanimates have their Spontaneous motions, as Fire ascends spontaneously, and all

all bodies endowed with gravity deſcend ſpontaneouſly: ſo that in truth, to act by the impulſe of nature, and to act ſpontaneouſly appear to be one and the ſame thing diverſly phraſed. And this makes it the leſs wonder, if ſince every appetite be *ex ſuâ naturâ* by the tendency of its own nature, carried on towards Good, it may be ſaid to be carried on towards Good of its own accord or ſpontaneouſly; and ſo indeed that as a ſtone becauſe by naturall tendency it falls downward, cannot again change that tendency and aſcend upward, ſo likewiſe the Appetite becauſe it is determined only to Good, wants an Indifferency of tending towards Evil: and as a ſtone by reaſon of its want of Indifferency to upward and downward, is ſaid to be moved downward Spontaneouſly, but not Arbitrarily, ſo the Appetite by reaſon of its defect of Indifferency to Good and Evil may be ſaid to tend towards Good in general Spontaneouſly, but not Arbitrarily. And hence comes it, that if you pleaſe to ſuppoſe the Will to be determined to any one particular Good, grant it to be the *Summum Bonum*, ſo that it cannot relinquiſh that, and with æqual appetition proſecute any other Good, real, or only apparent, then indeed you may juſtly enough affirm the Will to tend towards that *Summum Bonum ſpontaneouſly*, ſince 'tis moſt natural to the Will to proſecute that which is the chiefeſt of Goods (for it would not proſecute the ſame above all others, if it were dimoved to the proſecution of leſs Good) but not *Arbitrarily*, ſince it wants an Indifferency of tending to another Good as well as that, or to ſpeak more plainly, ſince it is not in its power at pleaſure to deſert that chiefeſt Good, and addreſs it ſelf to the purſuit of a leſs Good.

Article 5. The Divines objection, that the Tendency of the Will is *Volent*, and therefore *Free*; prævented, by a diſtinction of *Libency* and *Liberty*.

Nor can this truth be ſtaggered by that objection, that this tendency of the Will is *Volent*, ſince that *Volency* (I ask leave to uſe that word untill I can find another more adæquate to my notion) imports not a Liberty but a meer *Libency*, that is a Complacency, or Collubeſcence, and ſo an excluſion of all coaction, violence, renitence, or impoſition: and from hence that the Dilection, Proſecution, and Fruition of ſuch a Good may be properly enough accounted Voluntary; no man can

rightly inferre that tis therefore highly *Arbitrary*, but only that tis highly *Libent* or Complacent; for there may be a *Libency* we confess, and yet no *Liberty*, because no *Indifferency*.

Article 6. Their Superstructure, that the *Perfection* of the Wills Liberty, is its constant Adhæsion to, and inseparability from real Good demolished by two reasons: (1) that this Perfection imagined is not of the Liberty, but the Will it self; (2) that it belongs only to separated Souls, in the state of *Glorification*.

Again, whereas they have added, that the *Perfection* of the Liberty of the Will doth consist in this, *so to adhare to Good as not to be capable of dimotion or diversion from it*; we may not unjustly suspect them of inadvertency in that they did not discover this Perfection which they so much magnify to be not of the Liberty it selfe, but of the *Will* or *Appetite*, which being *Imperfect* only in this respect, that at pleasure it may desert and abandon real and true Good, and convert to the Affectation and prosecution of specious and counterfeit; must acquire its *perfection* from hence, that quitting that native Indifferency or Liberty, it so firmely and inseparably adhære to real and true Good, that nothing can divorce it from thence and alienate it to the prosecution of counterfeit. Besides, we conceive such a perfection of the Will to be above the sober hopes of mortality, as being reserved to make no small part of the Souls Beatitude in her state of Glorification, when she shall have no other object but the real *Summum Bonum*, and no other Appetite but a fixt dilection thereof. For, had flesh and blood bin capable of so great and divine an Excellency, as the devesting the Will of that Indifferency to Good and Evil, and the constant determination of it only to real Good; doubtless St *Paul*, a man of the most mortified affections to the specious Goods of this life, and of the most fervent desires towards the substantial and eternal of the next, had never with so many tears lamented his being subject to that inevitable and implacable *Psychomachy* and civil war betwixt his Rational and Sensual Appetites, not in the height of despaire to conquer those rebellious inclinations to evil, cried out, Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος, τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; *Miserable man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death?*

But

But this miſtake hath proved of no ſmall advantage to the inveſtigation of the truth, for from this which they concede, *viz.* it is impoſſible for the Will, which is once fixt upon the dilection and fruition of the *Chiefeſt Good*, really and clearly ſo underſtood (which is the prerogative only of thoſe *Sainted Minds*, which the kindneſs of Death hath made ſuperior to the ſeducements of Senſe) ever to revolt from it, and deflect to the queſt of a leſs Good: we may receive ſome aſſiſtance to our meditations, and the more eaſily underſtand what kind of *Indifferency* that is, wherein the nature of this *Liberty Elective* doth conſiſt, during our ſouls obligations to corporeity. In our præcedent lines we affirmed, that the *Intellect* is guide, and doth hold the torch, or give light to the Will; and manifeſt it is that this *Light* which the Intellect holds forth to the Will, is no other but that *Judgement*, which the Intellect delivers concerning the Good and evil of objects, *i. e.* that this object is good, and that evil; or among ſeveral different goods, that this is more, and that leſs good: ſo that when the Will is ſaid to be averted from one object and converted to another, that mutation proceeds from hence, that the Judgement of the Intellect is now for one thing and anon for another, and the inflexion of the Will is dependent on the inflexion of the Intellect. Since, therefore, the *Flexility* of the Will is ſubſequent and conform to the Flexility of the Intellect, which conſiſts in the mutability of its Judgements: we are upon that conſideration to obſerve, that the Intellect makes uſe of certain *Notions*, or as common Phyſiology calls them, *Simple Apprehenſions* of things, in order to its own information, and ſucceeding pronunciation of Judgement concerning their natures. For neceſſary it is, that the Mind have a *Prænotion* what the Sun is and what *Light* is, that ſo it may judge afterwards that Light is in the Sun, or that the Sun is a Lucid Body; as alſo what Hony and what Sweetneſs is, that it may afterwards pronounce Hony to be Sweet. But in reſpect that in objects which fall under *Speculation*, the Intellect doth acquieſce in ſuch a ſimple Judgement, nor can inferre any thing further by neceſſity of conſequence: therefore in objects reducible to *action*, it hath a certain compound Notion

Article 7. What kind of *Indifferency* that is, wherein the Liberty Elective is eſſenced.

called a *Propoſition* or *Enunciation*, which by reaſon of another common Notion congenial and implantate in the mind of every Man from its firſt exiſtence, is immediately annexed to the former ſimple notion, and ſuperadded thereunto as a Concluſion, which is really that which we call *Judicium Practicum*, Practical Judgement. For inſtance, the Intellect having judged that the Sun is a Lucid Body, may therein acquieſce and proceed to no further inference; but ſo ſoon as it judgeth hony to be ſweet, becauſe it holds as implantate a ſecond complex notion, that what is ſweet is to be taſted, therefore it inſtantly pronounceth this concluſion, that Hony is to be taſted. And becauſe practicable objects are not *Vniverſals*, but *Singulars*; and for inſtance, the Intellect doth not give judgement concerning Hony in general, but of this objected Hony that it is ſweet; therefore to this judgement, this Hony is ſweet, inſtantly coheres and is ſuperadded that ſecond judgement, this Hony is to be taſted. Nor that only, but ſuch is the nature of this judgement, that without any delay, if nothing countermand, ſucceeds the *Execution* thereof, as in this caſe the actual Deguſtation of Hony. And upon the conſideration of the immediate ſupervention of the Execution upon a practical judgement, was it that *Ariſtotle* (*de Animalium motu cap.* 7.) would allow no diſtinction between an *Action* and a *Concluſion*, for ſaith he, ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται πρᾶξις, *that Concluſion which follows upon two propoſitions, is the very action it ſelf:* which he moſt conveniently illuſtrateth by ſeveral *Examples*, the præſent omiſſion whereof we hope either the memory or lecture of our competent Reader will ſupply. And this juſtifies their knowledge, who firſt denominated ſuch a concluſion which is the Action it ſelf (or to which at leaſt the Execution doth individually cohære) a *Practical Judgement*.

Article 8. That to every *Judgement* of the *Intellect*, is immediately and neceſſarily conjoyned an *Appetition* or *Averſation* of the *will*; reſpective to the Good, or Evil nunciated.

We are moreover to obſerve, that ſince the action or Execution of a Judgement cannot ſucceed, unleſs the function of the *Appetite* or *Will* intervene between the Judgement and Execution; therefore muſt every Judgement or Notion of Good have adjoyned unto it an *Appetition* of that Good, as every Judge-

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ment of Evil hath adjoyned unto it an *Averſion* from that Evil: ſo that the Intellect cannot pronounce this judgement, that what is ſweet is to be taſted, but inſtantly riſeth up the *Appetite* and wills the taſting of the Sweet; nor (to deſcend to ſingulars) enunciate this ſweet is to be taſted, but immediately the Will is on edge to taſt this Sweet. And hence it comes, that no concluſion can be extracted, nor Execution thereof ſucceed; but onely becauſe together with the Judgement the function of the Appetite hath præceded. For the reaſon why the Concluſion of a *Practical* Syllogiſme hath always the Execution or action coherent to it, but the Concluſion of a *Speculative* hath not; is no other then this, that the function of the Will or Appetite is always aſſociated to the præmiſes or judgements of the Intellect in one, and not in the other. And therefore ſo often as the Intellect gives Judgement of Good; which is the proper object of the Will; as often is the Will excited ſo neceſſarily, that its function or deſire of fruition follows upon the heeles of the Judgement. as cloſely as a ſhadow attends a body in Sunſhine; ſo that if the Intellect judge any thing to be good, the Will immediately deſires that good; as on the contrary, if the Intellect judge any thing to be evil, the Will immediately abhors that evil.

Article 9. The *Inſtability* of the Will, in its *Appetitions*; neceſſarily cauſed by the *Inſtability* of the Intellect, in its *Judgements*.

This is an excellent Axiome, *that one truth can never be clearely underſtood, but it leads on to the diſcovery of another*; and here we have experience of it: for from the præmiſes it reſults a perſpicuous verity, that becauſe the Intellect is for the moſt part fickle and inconſtant in its *judgements*; therefore muſt the Will be as wavering and unſtable in its *Appetitions*: and when the Intellect to day judges any object to be good, but to morrow judges it to be evil; then doth this Pædantique faculty the Will affect that object to day, and hate it again to morrow: and when the Intellect to day declares that ſuch an object is to be affected and proſecuted becauſe 'tis good, but to morrow faceth about to a ſecond object, and apprehending it to be better then the firſt, judges that to be proſecuted rather of the two; then is the Will to day carried on to the firſt object, and to morrow

averted from it to the Second. In a word, the *Profecution* and *Averſion* of the Will is dependent on, and conforme to thoſe Notions and Judgements which the Intellect delivers concerning the more or leſs good, or good and evil of objects.

Article 10. The *Deluſion* of the Intellect in its *Judgements*, neceſſitateth the *Deluſion* of the Will in its dependent *Appetitions*.

Further, in reſpect that amonſt good objects, one is *really and truly good*, another only *apparent and counterfeit*; and likewiſe among evil objects (for too frequently good is diſguiſed under the uncomely vizard of evil, and evil again guilded over with the ſpecious and alluring hatchment of Good, and then what is realy good ſeems either to be abſolute evil, or a leſs good comparatively, and what is really evil ſeems either to be abſolute good, or a leſs evil comparatively) hence comes it we ſay, that as the Intellect is frequently *deluded* in its *judgements*, as being invited by the *Apparence* of Good, it judgeth a guilded evil to be a real good, or offended at the Apparence of evil, judgeth that diſguiſed good to be a real evil; ſo muſt the Will of neceſſity be *deluded* in its dependent *Appetitions*, and proſecuting an apparent good, obtain a real evil, and avoyding a ſeeming evil, be fruſtrated of a real good; or certainly as the Intellect enunciates a leſs good to be a greater, or a leſs evil to be a greater; ſo muſt the Will, proſecuting a greater good, obtain a leſs, and avoyding a leſs evil, fall upon a greater.

Article 11. That the *Indifferency* of the Will, is but the ſhadow, or repreſentative of that Indifferency in the Intellect: and the *Determination* of this, neceſſitates the Determination of that.

On the demonſtration of this grand-father Truth, *viz.* that the Will is but the *Needle*, and the Intellect the *Magnet*, by whoſe verticity it is impregnated with an affectation of lying parallel to the point of good, real or apparent, (for evil as evil, *i. e.* preſented naked and without diſguiſe, is not the proper object of either) or, more conſimilar, that the Will is the *Mariner*, and the Intellect the *Compaſs* by which he ſteeres; depends alſo the diſcovery of another Abſtruſity, *viz.* that the *Indifferency* found in the Will is but the *Counterfeit* or *Repreſentative* of that Indifferency which is congenial to the Intellect, and conſequently, that the *determination* of that Indifferency in the *Miſtreſs* cauſeth the determination of the like Indifferency in the *Handmayd*, to this or that particular object. Now the Indifferency

Indifferency of the Intellect ſeems eſſentially to conſiſt in this, that it is not ſo adliged to adhærence, to its own judgement concerning the good of any thing objected, as that it may not alter its judgement, and if the apparence of good ſeems greater in another object, apoſtate from the firſt, and as vigorouſly, and confidently convert to the ſecond. For the Intellect is not of the Number of thoſe faculties, which by theſe fundamental conſtitutions of their Eſſence are determined only to *one* certain motion, as Gravity in bodies devoid of animation, the Generative virtue in Animals, &c. but is by nature ſo *Flexile*, that having truth or good for its object, it may one while judge this and another while that, and perhaps the quite contrary of one and the ſame, and now affect an object under the notion of true and good, and within an houre, nay poſſibly in a moment, revoke that judgement, and again diſlike it under the notion of falſe or evil, or at leaſt, of leſs true, or leſs good.

Article 12. The Analogie betwixt the Intellect, and a Balance.

This conſtant Inconſtancy of the Intellect, the moſt happy Wit of *Cicero* deſcanting upon, moſt conveniently compares it to a *Balance* (4 *Academic*:) for, in troth, no *ſimile* in the world, at leaſt, that ever paſſed our obſervation, can be more quadrant, or hold a neerer reſemblance, in all points: ſince, as a Balance, if geometrically adjuſted by dimidiation, is of it ſelf indifferent to be depreſſed at either extreme, and is ſo forced from its æquipondium, or depreſſed at that end, on which the greater weight is ſuſpended; as that the contrary end may be immediately depreſſed, if a greater weight then the former be ſuſpended thereon: exactly ſo is the Intellect of its ſelf indifferent, as to inclinations, and is ſo inflected to that object, whereto the greatet apparence of truth or good (which is the weight that ſways it down to determination from Indifferency) is adhærent, that it can upon the appenſion of a greater apparence of good be reflected to a ſecond object.

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Article 13. That the Intellect doth naturally conform to the attraction of the greater *Verisimility*: and the reason of its *Fluctuation*.

For it is not much below Uncontrollable Necessity, that the Intellect should thither convert, and there fix, where is the greatest *semblance* of *good*: and therefore its native *Indifferency* is not such, as that abandoning an object, whose good is more perspicuous, it can affect another, whose good is less perspicuous; or, rejecting a judgement which appeares more true, court and embrace another which appeares less true: because, as the beam of a balance, being depressed on one extreme by a greater weight imposed, is never elevated by the imposition of a less weight on the contrary extreme, but of a greater; so likewise can it not be, that that assent of the Intellect, which is caused by the perspicuity of Experience, or some prævalent reason, should be removed to another object, unless by the attraction of an Experience of greater moment, or a reason whose validity and importance is more perspicuous. And, for the eviction of this natural conformity of the Intellect to the attraction of the more ponderous Verisimility of its objects, we need no other argument but this; that many times we find our minds æquilibrated betwixt two judgements, or wavering in suspence between two objects equally attractive; which *Fluctuation* or Doubting ariseth of necessity from hence, that the moments of verity, or weights of reason are equal on either side, and so exactly counterpoise each other, that the mind can acquiesce in the election of neither; as a paire of scales charged with two equal weights cannot be swayd from an æquilibrium.

Article 14. That the *Determination* of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Apparence of Verity therein, or the minds greater *Attention* to the moments of reason apparent on that side, then to those on the other.

Again, that it seems during this Fluctuation, one while to incline to the one part, and instantly to be counter-inclined to the other, and then again to revert to the former, and so to be agitated by the inquietude of suspence; hath no other reason but this, that one while it is more *attentive* to the perpension of reason in the first object, and anon more Attentive to that in the second; and so long doth it remain inclined to the invitement of the one, as it apprehends the good thereof more apparent then of the other, and no longer; after the same manner as if when a paire of scales are æquilibrated by two æqual weights,

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you ſhall ſuperadd to either end of the balance but a few grains more, that end muſt be depreſſed, and upon the ſhifting of thoſe grains to the other end the former again elevated. So that when the Intellect doth at laſt deflect to one part, this *Determination* muſt proceed from hence; that either the Apparence of verity is ſomewhat more ponderous on that part, or at leaſt that the more conſtant *Attention* to the Veriſimility of that part, conjoyned to the minds *impatience*, (which too frequently helps to turn the Scales, and therefore ought to be allowed for) ſupplying the defect of weight, makes it ſeem ſo.

Article 15. That the *Apparence* of *Truth* is always the cauſe of the Intellects inclination.

Moſt certain it is, we confeſs, that the Intellect frequently doth, retracting that judgement which of its ſelf, *i. e.* in the ſimplicity of its nature, is either more good, or abſolutely good, adhære to a ſecond judgement, which of its ſelf is either leſs good, or abſolutely evil: but yet notwithſtanding that in the object, which affects and inclines the Intellect, is always *ipſa veri ſpecies*, the Apparence of Truth, which it obſerves and is attentive to. And becauſe that ſpecies of Truth may be either real or counterfeit; therefore may that which is in its own nature really true, be preſented under the diſguiſe of an abſolute falſhood or leſs Truth, and that which is in its own nature really falſe, be preſented likewiſe under the diſguiſe of an abſolute truth, or leſs falſhood: and ſo the Intellect becoming ſubject to deception in the point of judicature, may be allected to the proſecution of an abſolute falſhood, or leſs truth, while the object remains obvelated under the deluſive vizard of an abſolute truth or a leſs falſhood, *& è contra*.

Article 16. Three conſiderable *Inferences* from the præmiſes.

This ſeriouſly conſidered ſupports three excellent *Conſequences*; (1) that as often as the Intellect, having adhæred to a true judgement, quits and purſues a falſe one, ſo often of neceſſity doth ſomething intervene which detracts the genuine or natural Apparence from the good object, and impoſes a counterfeit Apparence upon the evil one, and by that means cauſes a mutation of the Intellects aſſent, or judgement: and therefore (2) that the commutation of the ſpecies or Apparence of the object is the ſole

immediate cause of the Commutation of the Intellects judgement and assent: and therefore (3) that since the Will is obliged, by that necessity formerly declared, to conforme to the conduct and directions of its Guide, the Intellect; it is in vain therefore to hope or attempt that the Will should change its Appetition, unless care be first taken, that the Intellect change its judgement, or, that the Will should be constant to its Appetition, unless we provide that the Intellect be constant to its judgement. And, therefore, that Mind, which having discovered the incomparable beauties of virtue is become enamoured on her, and stands resolved to court no other Mistress but her, ought to be exceeding circumspect and cautious in this particular, that it submit to the allurement of no object, untill it hath profoundly examined whether that species of Good therein presented, be really true, or only superficial and counterfeit, that so it may render its self superiour to the delusion of painted *Vice*.

Article 17. *Cartesius* his general Præservative against the excesses of *Passions*.

The admirable *Des Cartes* (*in 3. part. passion. artic.* 212.) presenting a general præservative against all the excesses and exorbitancies of our passions, gives us this excellent advice, that having learned first to distinguish betwixt those motions or Affections which are terminated in the *Soul*, and those which are terminated only in the *Body*, we should, when we feel our blood and spirits agitated by any affection which concernes only the body, reflect upon this as a general Maxime; that all things which offer themselves to the imagination, do tend to no other purpose but to the deception of the Soul, and to perswade the rational and judicative Faculty, that those reasons inservient to the *Commendation* of the object of that passion, are far more solid, firme and worthy our assent then really they are, and, on the contrary, that those reasons inservient to the *Improbation* or disallowance of the object, are far more trivial, infirme and less worthy our assent, then really they are. That when the passion perswades to those things, whose execution may admit suspension or delay; we abstain from passing our verdict too hastily upon them, and divert our cogitations to the serious examen of the inconveniences impendent on their pursuit and execution: or, at least,

least, to some ot her object, till time and sleep shall have calmed the impetuous commotions of the blood and spirits, which the seeming good of the object hath excited. And that when the Passion incites to those actions, whose fleet occasion gives the soul little or no time to consult and deliberate; we always endevour to convert our Understanding to the perpension, and our Will to the prosecution of those reasons, which are contrary to those inferred and urged by that passion; notwithstanding they shall, at the first view, appear less valid and ponderous: for thereby we shall mainly retract and abate the violence of the passion.

Article 18. General Rules præscribed by the Author, how to prævent the *Delusion* of the *Understanding*, and dependent *seduction* of the *Will* by *Evil* disguised under the similitude of Good.

Now, this may be our *Exemplar* in ordering our advice, how to prevent the Delusion of our Understanding, and the seduction of our Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good. First, we ought to learn the discrimination of the goods of the *Mind*, from those pertinent only to the *Body*: and then, when we meet with any object apparently good, abstractly to examine, whether that good concerns either the body alone, or the mind alone, or both body and mind equally, or more the body then the mind, or more the mind then the body. *If only the body*, we are to convert our cogitations upon the reasons which diswade, more intently then upon the reasons which perswade the election of and adherence to it, that so we may, if there be any, detect the Evil couched under that vernish of good, and also conquer the Minds *impatience*, which too often beares a large share in our deceptions. *If only the Mind*, in that case we are to bring it to the touchstone of the *Divine Will*: *i. e.* examine whether those reasons whereby it perswades our Intellect to an Approbation, and consequently our Will to an affectation and prosecution of it, are correspondent to that inseparable or proper sign, or mark of true Good, *Conformity to the Will of God*, or not; for the very Soul, or quintessence of virtue doth radically consist in this; that man without all hæsitancy, murmur, diffidence, and reluctancy, conforme his Will to the indeceptible Divine Will, as being ascertained, that he can will nothing more excellent in its self, nor convenient to him, then what God hath willed before.

If both body, and mind equally, then to abstract those reasons which insinuate the interest of Sense, and insist only upon those which præfer it to the mind: for, if they shall be found worthy of assent, we need the Authority of no other to justify our election of that object. *If more the body then the mind*, then we ought to æstimate the convenience of it by that lesser relation it holds to the mind, and not by that greater it holds to the body. And finally, *if more the mind then the body*, since the interest of the mind is infinitely to be præferred to that of the body, where the reasons are equall on each part: tis manifest, we may safely acquiesce in that judgement, and embrace the object. But, in case the object seem *dubious*, and such whose Verity or Falsity is not easily discoverable, then the only way of avoyding Errour in our judgements, is *cohibere assensum*, to suspend our approbation of, and assent to the Apparences, or species on each part offered. And by this power of withholding our assent does *Des Cartes* endevour to establish the Liberty of the Will. (*Princip. Philosoph. part.* 1. *Sect.* 6.) This in generall, we conceive to be the Art of rectifying the Will by the prævious information of the Intellect; and that thrice happy Soul that hath learned it, hath anticipated one degree of that Perfection, which is one moity of that State of immortal Beatitude, which we are confident that knowing Soul of *Des Cartes* once aimed at, and now enjoyes, without that nothing of measure.

But alas! while we dwell in the Courts of Vanity, walk amongst the snares of Satan, and carry in our very nature whole legions of frailties, the least of which too strongly inclines us to the delusions of Vice, if presented in the colours of Virtue; tis a Province above the power of meer Humanity to acquire such anhabitual *Constancy* of our Intellect to its judgement, and of our Will to its Appetition of real Good, as that neither can be divorced from it, and alienated to the embracements of specious or splendid Evils, and therefore we must indefatigably endevour to conquer part of this inherent Indifferency upon our knees, humbly and fervently imploring the assistance and continual manuduction of *divine Grace*, that supernatural Light; whereby

whereby the Intellect may be illuminated to a clarity, that ſhall transfix and diſpel all the thickeſt clouds of Error and falſhood, wherein the opticks of Senſe are uſually terminated; and modeſtly ſuſpend our hopes of a totall and indiſſoluble union with Verity, untill our Souls ſhall have abandoned this body of ſin to corruption, and entered the new Hieruſalem, where there is no Indifferency, but an eternal determination of the Mind and all its Faculties to the Supreme Good, where nothing ſhall occur to either Intellect, or Will, but that Supreme Good, and (in a word) where that *Libency* of the Will, which ſome Divines calls the *Perfection* of its Liberty, ſhall become a pure and ineluctable *Neceſſity*.

Sect. III.

Article 1. An objection, that *Ignorance* is the mother of ſin.

HAving made it ſufficiently manifeſt, that the *Liberty* of mans *Will* doth radically conſiſt in the *Indifferency* of the *Intellect* to its judicature; and amply explained the nature of that Indifferency: it remains only that we expede that proverbial *objection*, whereby the beſt of us are too prone to palliate our delinquency and excuſe our offences; *viz. Omnis peccans eſt ignorans*, Ignorance is the mother of all Sin. This *Ariſtotle* doubtleſs alluded to when he ſayd, *Quî fieri poſſit, ut qui de rebus rectè æſtimat, incontinens ſit?* and *Socrates* alſo when he ſaid, *Fieri non poſſe, ut in quo ſit Scientia, in eo aliud quid dominetur, atque adeo ut qui de rebus rectè æſtimat, non id quod eſt optimum agat; cum ſi id agat, neceſſe ſit* (δι' ἄγνοιαν) *ob ignorantiam id fieri.*

Article 2. The ſame expeded, by a Diſtinction of *Science* into *Habitual*, and *Actual*.

Out of this Labyrinth we may ſoon extricate our thoughts by making uſe of that Clue of a Diſtinction between Science in *Habit*, and Science in *Act*; For, a man may have a knowledge, and yet neglect to make uſe of it, as when he diverts his mind more

more intently to ſome thing, then to that which he doth know; or hath the clarity of his Underſtanding benighted with ſleep, madneſs, wine, &c. and a man may have a knowledge and reduce it to practiſe, as when he converts his mind unto, and fixes it upon that only which he doth know. Now if a man *Actually* know, or hath not the acies of his mind levelled at any other thing but what he doth know; in this caſe, we confeſs it impoſſible, that he ſhould do an action contrary to his knowledge: and conſequently, that holding a clear and perfect knowledge of the decorum or pulchritude of Virtue, and contrariwiſe of the turpitude or deformity of Vice, he ſhould forſake the former to court the later. But if he know only *Habitually*, or hath his cogitations more attent to another thing, then that of which he hath a clear and indubitate knowledge; ſince his *neglect* to uſe it is æquivalent to the total *want* of that knowledge; we have no reaſon to deny, that he may do what is point-blanck repugnant to his knowledge; and conſequently, though he poſſeſs a clear theory of the lovelineſs of Virtue, and contrariwiſe of the uglineſs of Vice, that he may notwithſtanding abandon the former and embrace the later.

Article 3. A *reply*, that the reluctancy of every Delinquents Conſcience, doth evidence the poſſibility of mans doing an Act repugnant to his *Actual* Science.

To this ſome have inconſiderately replyed; that a man may do a thing repugnant to his *Actual* knowledge; why? becauſe for the moſt part every Delinquent ſo ſoon as he hath acted amiſs, and moſt commonly at the ſame inſtant, feels himſelf ſurpriſed with a certain horror, ſecret regret, reluctancy and conturbation of mind, called by Divines *remorſe of Conſcience*: which muſt of neceſſity proceed from his cognition of the amableneſs of Virtue which he hath repudiated, and of the odiouſneſs of Vice which he hath embraced; ſince if he wanted this, he muſt alſo have wanted that.

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Here *Ariſtotle* hath prævented our *Rejoynder* by retorting; that every ſuch Delinquent acts the ſame part with vinolent *Rhapſodiſts*, who, by the habitual exerciſe of their memory, uſe ex tempore to rehearſe a whole ſheet of *Empedocles* moral verſes, of which they underſtand little, and practiſe leſs; or *Schoolboys*, who diſtinctly read what their underſtanding doth not comprehend; or *Stage-players*, who can gracefully perſonate the moſt magnanimous Heroes; but themſelves ſtill continue moſt abject and ſuperlative Cowards. For in him who commits a vicious Act, there always is excited ſome *Paſſion*, either of Pleaſure, or Anger, or Ambition, or Avarice, which miſeth a tempeſt in his mind, and ſo perturbeth, perverteth, and drowneth that habitual Science; inſomuch, that what ever of good is in virtue, and what ever of evil is in vice, becomes thereby obnubilated, and darkened; and on the contrary, whatever of difficulty ſeems to be in virtue, and what ever of pleaſantneſs in vice, becomes thereby more conſpicuous and illuſtrated: *i. e. Paſſion* is a Perſpective, which repreſenteth as well the difficulty of virtue, as the complacence of vice, in magnified dimenſions; and on the contrary diminiſheth the good of the one, and the evil of the other. And hence comes it, that the real good of virtue attracteth the mind more weakly, and the ſeeming Good of vice more ſtrongly; and on the contrary, the real evil of vice averteth or diſguſteth the mind more weakly, and the ſeeming evil of good more ſtrongly. So he that offends, may, we confeſs, with *Ovid*, ſay, *Video meliora, probóque, deteriora ſequor*, that he knows thoſe things which he rejecteth to be the better, and thoſe things which he electeth to be the worſe; but yet, this muſt be referred unto ſome other time, when he recognizes his habitual Science, and calls to mind, that once he had other judgements of thoſe things: for he cannot juſtly ſay ſo of that time wherein he offended, ſince then he judged thoſe things he purſued to be the better, and thoſe he deſerted to be the worſe.

Article 4. The *Rejoynder*, that the Habitual Science of every Delinquent, is perturbed and obnubilated by ſome *Paſſion*, excited in him: and that the Remors of Conſcience proceeds from the ſenſe of the *Loſs of Good*.

Now as for that internal *regret*, *contriſtation*, and pœnitence, which invades the mind of every Delinquent immediately after, and

and moſt frequently in the ſame moment of the perpetration of his offence; this proceeds from his animadverſion that he ſuffers ſome *loſs of good*. But ſince this his apprehenſion of the loſs of good, and that reluctancy of mind attendant thereupon is but dull and weak, in compariſon of that complacency he is affected withall by the ſeeming good or pleaſure of evil, which ſubdues his judgement to an approbation of it: hence it is maniſeſt, that he conſiders and perpends the impendent omiſſion of Good, and the incurſion of evil, not *ſeriouſly* and *profoundly* as he ought, but only *perfunctorily* and *ſlightly*. For, were the puniſhment, ſorrow, ignominy, and other evils, which he only lightly and confuſedly apprehends, and fears, profoundly examined and lookt into by him, not as abſent, not as future, not as uncertain, and avoidable, but as impendent, preſent, certain, and inevitable; without all doubt the ſmalleſt glimpſe of reaſon would be ſufficient to let him ſee thoſe forcible determents, nor could he be ſo mad as from the rock of knowledge to precipitate himſelf into the moſt horrid gulph of vice. And therefore albeit an offender may ſay that he ſaw and approved the Good, but embraced the Evil, yet is that *Inconſideration* or *Non-advertency*, by reaſon whereof he doth not ſufficiently diſcover all the qualities and circumſtances of the evil object, and what and how great miſchiefs muſt neceſſarily enſue upon his actual proſecution thereof, a kind of Ignorance. And in this ſenſe only can we allow *Ignorance to be the mother of Sin*; for had man ſufficiently underſtood the evil thereof, he had never bin vicious.

Article 5. What kind of *Ignorance* that is, which may, in ſome degree *excuſe* a Delinquent.

To conclude therefore, this Ignorance muſt prove but an invalid and ridiculous plea at the judicious Tribunal of Juſtice, nor ought a Delinquent to flatter himſelf with the vain hopes of impunity by ſuch an excuſe; that he ſinned for want of knowledge, that he proſecuted the apparent Good he ſaw in the object, that it was above his power to prevent the deluſion of his underſtanding by Evil præſented under the ſpecies of Good (τῆς γὰρ φαντασίας ὁ κύριοι, we cannot countermand *Apparences*) that no man is vicious with his own conſent, nor happy againſt his will, according to that Proverb, *Nemo malus ultrò eſt, neque beatus nisi volens*,

volens, and that he wanted an ability of Judgement to do otherwise: this we say cannot extenuate his guilt, and consequently not avert the punishment due thereunto. For, that Ignorance which excuseth, is of another nature; such as we may more properly call *Inscientia mera*, meer *Nescience*, *Ignorantia pura ac invincibilis*, pure and invincible Ignorance; such as that of *Cephalus*, when mistaking her to have bin a wild beast couchant in a brake he discharged his dart at his beloved wife *Procris*, and unfortunately slew her; and that of the constant *Deianira* when she poysoned *Hercules* with a shirt dipt in *Nessus* the Centaures gore, which she intended for a Philtre to revoke his affections from *Iole*; and that also of the fatal handed Gentleman, who shooting at a Deer in New-Forest, killed *William Rufus*: but that Ignorance, of which we here discourse, is in proper truth Ἀμέλεια, *Incuria, vel Negligentia mera*, meer *Negligence*, *Inadvertency*, or *Heedlesness*, and is therefore for distinctions sake denominated *Ignorantia crassa, affectata, supina*, gross, affected, supine ignorance.

To understand the nature of this *Non-excusing Ignorance* the more distinctly, let us observe, that every Delinquent must in justice charge the Ignorance he pretends, upon one of these two Causes; either *that himself was to himself the cause of his ignorance*: or *that he neglected the means and advantages of acquiring knowledge, i. e.* that he did not imploy his *Cognoscent Faculty* on the examination and consideration of the real good or evil of his action, with that care, seriousness, and sedulity, which was requisite.

To the *First* of these Causes belongs the ignorance of a *Drunkard*; for in being the Cause of his *Ebriety*, he is also the Cause of his *Ignorance*; and 'twas in his power to have prævented *this*, by the præcaution of *that*: and therefore his Ignorance is so far short of extenuating, that it naturally aggravates his culpability; and he, if *Aristotle* may be judge, deserves a double punishment, one for making himself drunk, another for the crime committed in his Drunkenness. Hither also we are to refer his Ignorance, who resisteth not the force of a *Passion* or perturbation of his mind in the first motion or beginning thereof,

while 'tis yet but weak, and to be suppreſt by a ſmall oppoſition of reaſon; but permits it to acquire more violence, and gain upon him by degrees, till its impulſe grow impetuous, and more inoppugnable: as alſo his, who ſuffers a vicious *Inclination*, which he might without any conſiderable difficulty have at firſt refracted and totally extinguiſhed, to grow into a ſetled *Habit*, which pleading præſcription and poſſeſſion, is hardly ejected, but plays the abſolute Tyrant ore the mind, and holds the Scepter of both Underſtanding and Will by the ineluctable title of Conqueſt. Thus if a man, who having a rare Bird in his hand, willingly lets it fly, ſhould complain that he cannot recover it again; 'tis not to be expected that any rational perſon ſhould pity him for his loſs, but rather deride his folly, in that he manumitted it when 'twas in his power to have kept it: and if a man contract ſome dangerous diſeaſe by intemperance, who can afford him halfſo much compaſſion, ſince 'twas in his power not to have bin intemperate, as if he had bin invaded by ſome impartial Epidemick Contagion, againſt which none the greateſt temperance is an infallible præſervative? To this purpoſe were theſe words of *Ariſtotle* intended; *Nemo enim cæcitatem, quam natura, morbus, ictus feceris, exprobret, ſed cæci potius miſereatur; at ſi illam aut ebrioſitas, aut intemperantia alia feceris, non id opprobrio ducat?* (*in* 3. *Ethic. cap.* 7.)

Article 6. Four weighty *Reaſons*, convincing, that man hath an *Abſolute Power* in himſelf to controll the temptations of Evil.

To the other belongs his ignorance, who being hurried on to the proſecution of Evil, by the impetuous rapt or ſwindge of *Paſſion*, can yet ſay *Video meliora probóque*: for in this caſe alſo was it in his power to have more ſeriouſly and ſedulouſly examined, ſifted, and præconſidered the evils impendent on that action, and ſo to have avoided it; We ſay, *abſolutely in his power*, for four weighty reſpects. (1) Becauſe we frequently obſerve, that if in the ſame moment, when we are prepared to commit a ſin, and already entered upon the execution, there chance to come in ſome grave and virtuous Perſon, whom we revere, or ſome Magiſtrate, whoſe revenging ſword we fear, intervene: we inſtantly become conſcious of our wicked intentions, and deſiſt from the perpetration of it. (2) Becauſe there

there are many Virtuous Persons, who having learned and practised that noblest militia of conquering themselves, can command themselves even in the highest orgasmus and fervour of their passions; holding it most base and unworthy the dignity of a generous mind, to be surprized with the subtlest Ambushes of Vice, and led captive by the Pygmie armies of sensual Temptations. (3) Because tis not in vain that God, compassionating the frailties and deceptibility of humane nature, hath vouchsafed to accommodate our understanding with those faithful and powerful auxiliaries, *Laws*, *Precepts*, *Exhortations* and pious *Precedents*, to which we may, in the hottest charges of vicious temptations, with safety and assured Conquest recurre; and upon which if with sufficient attention we reflect the eye of our mind, we shall become τῆς φαντασίας κύριοι, *ejus domini, quod res esse apparet*, Lords Comptrollers of *Apparences*, *i. e.* detect the frauds and impostures of Evil, though dresst in all the glorious ornaments of Good. (4) Because no man endevoring to excuse his offence, can truly say *Video meliora probóque*; but he doth manifestly grant the action he doth to be *Deliberate*, and *Praecogitate*; which is as much as this, twas absolutely in my power to have omitted the doing of it, and to have done the contrary good. For none can say so of an indeliberate action, as when he feels a commotion of his blood and spirits at the first touch of Anger; which is the reason of *Seneca* his affirmation (2 *de Ira* 3) *quod primus motus non sit voluntarius*, that the first motion which an object excites in the mind is involuntary, and the ground of that Maxime *Primi motus non sunt in nostra potestate.*

Article 7. What those *First Motions* are, which objects inevitably excite in the Mind: and that the *Consequences* of those motions are præventible.

What these *First Motions*, which objects, their species being by the mediation of the nerves and spirits transmitted to the mind, excite therein, are in the general; though *Epictetus* hath furnished us with a convenient brief description of them, in these words, *Primus motus est quem creant visa animi* (φαντασίας *appellant Philosophi*) *quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei, pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitrariæ, sed vi quadam suâ sese inferunt*

hominibus noſcitanda: yet the moſt appoſite and moſt familiar way of explaining their nature and extent, which our meditations could find out, is to *exemplify* them in ſome one particular beginning *Paſsion*, and chiefly in that of *Anger*, where theſe Impulſes or motions are moſt ſenſible, becauſe moſt forcible. Which that we may the more worthily performe, let us, with *Des Cartes*, concede two diſtinct ſpecies of Anger, (1) one cauſed in a moment, which invading with ſome violence, cannot be concealed; but diſcovers it ſelf for the moſt part by colouring the face with a Vermilion, or Aurora tincture on a ſuddain; but performes little, and is eaſily and ſoon calmed. (2) Another, which invading with leſs violence, is not to be diſcovered, unleſs rarely by inducing paleneſs upon the Countenance, by any ſignes in the beginning; but being of a leſs diffuſive condition, doth more corrode and gall the heart, and conſequently produce more dangerous effects. To the firſt of theſe, they are moſt obnoxious, who have the moſt of Love, Nobleneſs or ſweetneſs of diſpoſition habited in them. For it ariſeth not from any profound *hatred*, but from a ſuddain *Averſation*, repentinely ſurpriſing the Mind: and becauſe loving, good, and Heroick minds are always propenſe to imagine, that all things ought to proceed in that manner or courſe which they judge to be the beſt, therefore ſo ſoon as they diſcover any thing to be carried on in a contrary courſe to Good, they inſtantly make a ſtand in their thoughts, become offended at it, and grow angry; yea many times when the matter concerns not them in ſpecial; for ſince they love much, they take to heart, (as the vulgar phraſe it) reſent, and appropriate the Cauſe of them they love, as neerly as if it were their own, inſomuch as what would have bin no more then matter of *Indignation* to others, proves matter of *Anger* to them. And becauſe that Inclination, whereby they become poſſeſt with a conſtant propenſity to love, doth effect, that they have always much of heat, becauſe much of blood in and about their Heart; therefore that repentine Averſion, which ſuddainly ſurpriſeth them, cannot but propell ſome ſmall quantity of Choler (the Tinder whereon the ſparks of this Paſſion fix and foment) to the Heart; nor that little of Choler

Choler but be accended, and excite, in an inſtant, a great commotion, and efferveſcence of the blood thither propelled. But this Commotion laſteth but a ſmall ſpace of time, becauſe the impulſe or force of the unexpected Averſation is of no continuance; and ſo ſoon as they deprehend the matter for which they were angry, to be of no moment, and ſuch as ought not to have commoved them to that height; they becalme themſelves, conjure down their ſpirits, and become affected with a reluctancy againſt and a pœnitence for that Paſſion, and ſo deſtroy it in the Embryo or ſhell. With the *other*, weak, abject, and ingenerous minds are moſt tranſported. For though it ſeldome diſcover it ſelf in the beginning, unleſs by ſome paleneſs in the face; yet is its force by degrees increaſed by reaſon of that agitation which the fervent deſire of Revenge exciteth in the blood, which being permixed with that Choler propelled to the heart from the inferior part of the Liver and Spleen, kindles therein a ſharp, pungent, and corroding Heat. And as thoſe minds are moſt generous, and noble, which are moſt inclined to *Gratitude*; ſo are thoſe the moſt proud, abject and baſe, which ſuffer themſelves the moſt to be tranſported with this kind of ignoble *Anger*. For by ſo much the greater do Injuries appear to be, by how much the greater value Pride makes a man put upon himſelf, and by how much the greater æſtimation is ſet upon thoſe Goods which are taken away by that Injury: and by ſo much a higher rate are thoſe goods prized at, by how much the more weak, abject, and ignoble the mind of him is that æſtimates them, becauſe in truth they are dependent upon others pleaſure; nor doth a well ordered mind loſe any part of its happineſs by being deprived of them. Now, having duly præconſidered all things occurrent in this pregnant example, we may not only without difficulty underſtand what thoſe *firſt motions* or *incitements* are, which objects exciting in the mind thereby obtrude themſelves upon the Intellect, or rather compell the Intellect to apprehend them under that ſpecies in which they præſent themſelves; but alſo that, though thoſe motions are not in our power, yet the *Conſequents* or *Actions* to which they provoke us, are ſubject to our *Deliberation*, Examination, and Arbitrary *Election*, or

Rejection; since every Action, is the Concluſion of a Practical Syllogiſme, and every Concluſion præſuppoſeth two præcedent Propoſitions, and theſe again præſuppoſe Deliberation, and conſequently that who ever committing an Evil Action, doth yet ſay *Videóque meliora probóque*, doth in that confeſs his Action to be *Deliberate* and *Arbitrary*, which is as much as to confeſs that twas abſolutely in his own power not to have done it.

And as for that proverbiall ſubterfuge οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς, οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος, *Nemo malus ultro eſt, neque beatus non volens*; *Ariſtotle* hath long ſince ſubverted it by anſwering, That though it be *true* in the *later* part, inſomuch as *no man can be happy, becauſe not virtuous, againſt his will*, yet tis *falſe* in the *former*, inſomuch *as vice, whereby man becomes Evil, is voluntary* (οὐδὲ μοχθηρία ἑκάσιον) whereupon *M. Anton.* ſaid τὸν δὲ τοῖς τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς κινήμασι μὴ παρακολουθοῦντας, ἀνάγκη κακοδαιμονεῖν: *qui verò ſui ipſius animi motus certa ratione conſilióque non gubernat, neceſſariò miſer eſt.* (*lib.* 2. *num.* 5.) And therefore though many have thought to palliate their vitioſities, by affirming that no man doth commit a ſin *voluntarily*, but being compelled thereunto by the impulſe of ſome *perturbation*: yet tis manifeſt, ſince every Delinquent gives either occaſion or way to that perturbation, and ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported by the impulſe thereof, beyond the ſphære of reaſon, that no *coaction* can intevene.

Article 8. *Neceſſity*, and *Fear* conceded to be, in ſome meaſure, Excuſes: and what are the *objects* of Excuſing Fear.

To conclude, we are ready to confeſs, that among thoſe many excuſes, which the Sophiſtry of the Advocates of vice hath alledged for the extenuation of its Culpability, the moſt weighty and conſiderable is the violence of *Neceſſity* and *Fear*. But, all *violence* muſt proceed from an *external* Principle, and is not admitted without ſome *Renitency* in the thing that ſuffers it; and that *Neceſſity*, whereby any man is coacted, muſt proceed from an *external* and *preſent* Cauſe; and *fear* is an internal Paſſion, though excited by an external Cauſe, *viz.* a future Evill; and differeth from *Cupidity* in this, that this, though it be excited by an external cauſe alſo, *viz.* a future Good, yet it

it is joyned always with a *Libency* or *Willingneſs*, but Fear with a *Renitency* or *Unwillingneſs*. Upon which conſideration was it, that *Ariſtotle* concluded him exceeding ſtupid and ridiculous, who, having vitiated his friends wife, ſhould for excuſe pretend, that he was conſtrained to that perfidious and immodeſt action by the violent temptation of *pleaſure*; but holds him excuſable who is compelled to omit an office of friendſhip by the prævention of ſome more conſiderable incommodity impendent upon himſelf, ſince the Neceſſity of the one is more violent and urgent, then the obligation of the other. For the more eaſy deciſion of all diſputes concerning the more or leſs preſſure of theſe kinds of Neceſſity, *Cicero* puts this Caſe. *Si conſtituerit te cuipiam advocatum in rem præſentem eſſe venturum; atque interim graviter ægrotare filius cœperit, non ſit contra officium non facere quod dixeris; magiſque ille cui promiſſum ſit, ab officio diſcedat ſi ſe deſtitutum queratur.*

This præmiſed, we may ſafely conclude, that a *ſmall* and *light fear* is not to be accounted ſufficient to excuſe a malefaction; becauſe it cannot uſurp upon and countermand the Liberty of the Mind; nay not a *great and ſtrong fear* (which is therefore allowed by ſome great Clerks for an excuſe, becauſe it may ſometimes invade and ſtagger a mind in other things conſtant and generous) ſince it cannot ſo oppoſe the Liberty Elective, as not to leave the mind poſſeſt with ſome *Libency*. And this is to be underſtood, not in reſpect to that Evil, which is ſuſtained or undergone in the præſent, but to that far greater one, which is avoided, and in compariſon of which the leſs Evil hath indeed the reaſon of Good; becauſe it is as it were the *means* whereby the greater Evil is averted or prevented, as when Merchants throw their treaſure overboard, for fear of drowning, and a Traveller delivers his purſe to Robbers for fear of having his throate cut. Now, how far this kind of fear, which ſeems to neceſſitate the commiſſion of a ſmall Evil for the probable prævention of a greater, may be extended by way of Excuſation; as alſo of what ſorts thoſe evils muſt be which juſtify this fear; the exacteſt and profoundeſt of *Moraliſts* have found it no eaſy matter præciſely to determine; chiefly becauſe according to the

variety

variety of mens Temperaments, ages, ſexes, Educations, Habits &c. what is but a weak and light fear to one, may be great and potent to another; but all conſent that we are to underſtand it to be a fear of no leſs then Death, Mutilation, torment, ſervitude, long exile, tædious impriſonment, æternal diſhonour or ignominy, privation of all, or the greateſt part of ones eſtate, or livelyhood (and in this particular, not in reſpect of a mans ſelf only, but alſo for thoſe who depend upon him for temporal ſubſiſtence, as wife, children, parents &c.) as alſo that kind of fear which is a ſpecies of *Reverence*, and ſuch as may be in a ſubject, in reſpect of his Prince, in a child in reſpect of his Father, in a wife in reſpect of her husband &c. We ſaid that fear which *ſeems* to neceſſitate the commiſſion of a ſmall evil &c. thereby inſinuating, that it only *ſeems* ſo to do. For, *Truth* its ſelf hath taught us, that we ought not to do evil, though never ſo ſmall, for prevention of another evil, though ne'r ſo great; and every man knows that *Fear* (unleſs of doing Evil) is wholly excluded the ſociety of *virtue*. Which our late *Salomon* (whom we can hardly think upon, without a devout *Adoration* of his *deified* part) reflected upon, when he affirmed for a Maxime of general truth, *That a Coward can hardly be an honeſt man*. And this we deſire our Reader candidly to accept, as a ſufficient enquiry into the nature of mans *Free-Will*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Fortune.

THat this *Phantſme*, though of no great antiquity (comparatively) hath under the diſguiſe of a *Reality*, ſo long and ſo univerſally poſſeſſed the heads not only of the *Vulgar* (whoſe rank and muddy brains are ever more fertile in the production, and more favourable to the conſervation of *Monſters*, then *Nilus* and all *Affrica*) but even of ſome of thoſe more cultivated *Explorators* of truth, who well knew the abſurdity of *Multiplying Entities*, and pretended to examine every *Idea* occurring to the mind, whether it had an exemplar, or prototype in real Exiſtence; that ſo, though they could not attain to a full cognition of the diſtinct *Eſſences*, or ſimple *Forms* of Objects, they might at liſt acquire an aſſurance of their *Reality*, or *Being in rerum natura*: this, we ſay, ſeems to us no contemptible Argument, that the Venome of the Forbidden Fruit hath a ſtronger and more infatuating operation upon the poſterity of *Adam*, in the old age of the world, then it had in its youth and midle age; and that the *ſun* in the *Microcoſme* hath ſufferd a greater and more demonſtrable decay of Splendor, Clarity, and Influence, then *Bodin* (*method. Hiſtor. cap.* 8.) out of *Copernicus*, *Reinaldus*, and *Stadius*, hath affirmed that in the *Macrocoſme* to have ſuſtained, and confeſſed by its neerer approach to the Earth, and more Southerly inclination, ſince the daies of *Ptolomie*. For (firſt) though *Simplicius* (2. *phyſic. comment.* 39.) hath a certain obſcure tradition, that *Orpheus* ingaged in the expedition of the Argonauts, compoſed a votive Hymne to this Fairy Queen, which was afterward inſerted into the idolatrous Liturgie of the

Article 1. The Antiquity and Genealogy of Fortune.

Delphian *Apollo*, together with whom she was solemnly invocated: yet hath, *Macrobius*, much the better Antiquary of the two, faithfully observed (5. *Saturn. ib.*) that she was, if not unborn, yet unnamed in *Homer's* time; subjoyning as a reason thereof, *quod priscis illis temporibus omnia, quæ fierent, referri ad Deos Authores solerent*; that more simple and intelligent Antiquity used to referre all events to the wise procuration of the Gods. Which is evidence sufficient, that *Fortune* could not mount up to an *Apotheosis*, till the world grew into its *Dotage*, and man sunk a whole sphear below that of his Ancestors simplicity and knowledge. And (2) that, whenever she was borne, and whoever was her Father, yet *Ignorance was her Mother*; besides the convincing Authority of our own *Reason*, we have that of the impartial *Cicero*, in these words: *Stultitia, Error, Cæcitas & Ignoratio rerum atque causarum, Fortunæ nomen primò induxisse, certum est.* And so much the more of weight may this Argument bear, by how much the more manifest a Contradiction they incurr, who have either defended, or advanced her reputation; for though no one among those many Writers, who have professedly treated of her Nature and Power, hath denyed her extraction from, and necessary dependence upon that accursed Beldam, *Ignorance:* yet have most agreed, that she is somthing more then *Nomen inane*, a meer and empty *Name*, or *Chimæra*; and some allowed her the dignity of a considerable *Influence* upon the actions of Man; nay, others have gon so farr as to exalt her virtue to a competition with *Providence Divine*, and consigned her a throne among the *Cœlestial Deities*, as is intimated in that verse of *Juvenal* (*Satyr.* 14.)

——————*sed te*

Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, cœloque locamus. And this briefly concerning the *Antiquity* and *Genealogie* of this *Nothing*.

As

Article 2. *Plato* and *Arist.* their Deſcriptions of Fortune, examined, and illuſtrated: and 3 Concluſions inferred thereupon.

As for the full deſcription of her *Nature*, or more properly, what Kind of *Activity* the chiefeſt *Philoſophers* have allowed her, and to what order of *Cauſes* referred her; this we cannot ſo ſatisfactorily preſent by any other way, as by a ſhort Commemoration, and æquitable Collation of their ſeveral *Definitions* of her.

Plutarch (1. *placit.* 29.) makes *Plato* to have defined her thus; *Fortuna eſt cauſa ex accidenti, & conſequens inopinatò in iis, quæ conſilio fiunt*, Fortune is a Cauſe by Accident, and unexpectedly ſupervenient in thoſe actions, which are deliberately and upon conſultation performed: and *Ariſtotle* thus; *Fortuna eſt cauſſa per accidens in iis, quæ rei alicujus gratiâ, appetitu movente, fiunt, eáque incerta & inſtabilis*; Fortune is an Accidental (yea and an uncertain and inſtable) cauſe, intereſting it ſelf in thoſe actions, which are done by an Agent, upon the incitement of its Appetite, in order to its conſequution of an object. Which words, indeed, ſeem to comprehend, in Epitomy, all that the *Philoſopher* (*in* 2. *phyſic. cap.* 5.) intended in his more prolix deſcription of Fortune; abating only this, that he there confines her concernment only τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, *rebus Contingentibus*, to Effects purely *Contingent*, i.e. ſuch as may, or may not come to paſs, and are therefore of dubious or uncertain event. To explain this, they *exemplify* in him, who digging in the earth, with no other deſigne, but to plant a tree, found a great Treaſure, of which he never thought: for (ſay they) the Invention of the Treaſure is an effect by Accident, i.e. evenient above the hopes and beſides the intention of him that digged; and ſo the Digger inſomuch as he is *Cauſa per ſe* of the digging, is alſo *Cauſa per accidens* of the invention of the Treaſure. Such an *Accidental Cauſe*, therefore, doe our Philoſophers call *Fortune*: and the *Event* it ſelf, viz. the invention of the treaſure, they call *Rem fortuitam*, a *Fortuitous Effect*. But whereas *Ariſt.* hath frequently advertiſed, that *Fortune* (ἡ τύχη) and *Chance* (τὸ αὐτόματον) are different each from other in this, that *Fortune* is proper only to things done by Cauſes, whoſe activity is *Arbitrary*; and *Chance* common both to ſuch, and alſo *Inanimate* or meer

Spontaneous Cauſes (as when a ſtool falls, and breaks a Glaſs.) & conſequently that all Fortune is Chance, but not every Chance Fortune: hence may we obſerve, that he would have aſwell Fortune, as Chance to belong to the claſſis of *Contingents*, and that all Contingents belong to the claſſis of *Poſſibles*. More expreſsly, that ſince among *Poſſibles* ſome are ſuch, as that their Event cannot be interdicted, impeded, or countermanded, as this, *the ſun cannot be hindred from riſing again to morrow morn*; and others ſuch, whoſe event is not neceſſary, as this, *tis not neceſſary, though poſſible, that it ſhould raine to morrow at ſun riſing*; therfore is it manifeſt, that a *Poſſible* of the *firſt* ſort, is the ſame with that which is called *Neceſſarium*, abſolutely Neceſſary, or ſuch whoſe Contrary is purely Impoſſible; and of the *ſecond* ſort, the ſame with that which is called *Contingens*, meerly Contingent, or of an uncertain event, ſuch whoſe Contrary is æqually poſſible. Further, in reſpect that the meer *Contingency*, or *Ambiguity* of any Event muſt be founded on this, that either ſome *Liberty* interveneth, by reaſon whereof that which otherwiſe would come to paſs, doth not; or that which otherwiſe would not have come to paſs, doth; or ſome *other Cauſe* interpoſeth, which beſides its proper deſtination and the unpræmeditated concurſe of certain other things, effecteth that ſome event, which, otherwiſe would, doth not come to paſs, or that ſome event, which otherwiſe would not, doth come to paſs: hence is it manifeſt, that this *Poſterior* kind of Contingency, is in the general that, wch men call *Chance*; and if it be eſpecially in *Man*, beſides or beyond whoſe intention any Effect eveneth, then is it what they call *Fortune*: unleſs that ſomtimes they confound both theſe, and then 'tis indifferent whether the event be referred either to Fortune, or Chance.

However, we perceive (reflecting upon the former Example) ſince the Double Effect, viz. the digging of the earth, and the invention of the treaſure, had but one ſingle Cauſe, viz. the man that digged: that, for this reaſon, the Digger may juſtly enough be ſayd to be *Cauſa per ſe*, in reſpect of the one, and *per accidens* in reſpect of the other. To which we may add this, that ſince in Effects meerly Natural, one and the ſame thing may be both

Fortune

Fortune and *Nature*, or a Natural Cauſe: therefore *Gaſſendus* had very good reaſon to juſtifie *Epicurus* in this particular, that he made Fortune and Nature no more then *ſynonoma's*, ſignifying one and the ſame thing in Reality.

Article 3. Their Anatomy of her *Nature*, deficient: & a more perfect one præſented.

Now though common Enquirie may goe away ſatisfied with this pauſible *Adumbration* of Fortune; yet cannot a profound and more ocular Scrutiny be terminated therein: for the *Example* introduced to explain it, comes largely ſhort of a requiſite *Adequation*; inſomuch as no rational man can appoſitely enough accept either *him* that digged, or his *Action* of digging, for all that's comprehended under that obſcure notion of Fortune. Wherefore, omitting the conſideration of *Res Fortuita*, or the Event, which is moſt frequently apprehended for Fortune it ſelf, or the cauſe of that inſperate event; let us underſtand Fortune to be, *ſuch a concurſe of various Cauſes, made without all mutual conſultation, or præcogitate conſpiracy betwixt them, as that from thence doth follow an Event, or fortuitous Effect, which neither all the Cauſes concurrent, nor ſome of them, nor eſpecially he to whom the Event happens, ever in the leaſt meaſure intended, or could expect.* Now, according to the tenor of this Definition, in regard to the fortuitous Invention of a treaſure, is required not only the Perſon, who digg's and finds it; but alſo he, who firſt digg'd and hid it: it is no obſcure nor controvertible truth, that Fortune, or the Cauſe by Accident of the invention of the treaſure, is the Concurſe both of the Occultation and Effoſſion thereof, in that particular place. We ſayd, *without mutual Conſultation, and beſides the intention of any or all the Cauſes concurrent*; thereby intimating, that though one or more of the Cauſes may have haply intended that event: yet nevertheleſs tis properly and abſolutely Fortune, in relation to that Cauſe, which intended it not. Thus if any man, who foreknowes, or at leaſt conjectures, that ſuch a Perſon will come and digg in ſuch a place, doth there hide treaſure, to the end that the other may find it: in this caſe, in reſpect to him that hid it, the Invention of the treaſure is not a Fortuitous Effect; but in reſpect to him, who unexpectedly finds it, it is. Thus was it not altogether *For-*

tuitons in respect of *Nitocris*, what hapned at the Violation of his Tomb; in regard he presumed that, in process of time, there would be some King or other, who invited by this promising Inscription [*If any of my Successors, the Kings of Babylon, shall want mony, let him break open this Sepulchre, and thence take what may supply his wants; but on no condition, unless his wants be real, let him attempt it: for it shall redound to his no swale detriment.*] would open it: but yet, in respect to *Darius*, that in stead of mony he therein found this deriding Engravement [*Had'st not thou bin insatiable with riches, and covetous of sordid lucre; thou would'st not have thus prophaned the Ashes of thy Predecessors, and ransack't the sacred Dormitory of the Dead,*] this was meerly *Fortuitous*. And thus also, though *Democritus* hath pleaded hard to free Fortune from having any hand in the incomparable Death of good old *Æschylus*; why because his bald pate, being mistaken by a volant Eagle for a white stone in the field, was the cause why the Eagle drop't a Tortois perpendicular thereupon: yet, had we bin of the Jury, we should have found her guilty of the Murder; (1) in respect of the *Poet*, since that sad event was besides his intention, he at the same time having withdrawn himself from the Town, for fear of being destroyed (according to the tenor of the Astrologers prædiction) by the fall of an house, nor could he possibly foresee that prodigious mischance impendent: (2) in respect of the Eagle, who drop't not the Tortois with purpose to brain the Poet, but to break its shell, that so he might come at his prey, the flesh thereof. However, we are willing, because, in truth, we ought to acknowledge, that if we regard the height or punctilio of her *Propriety*, *Fortune is* chiefly, *when among all those several Causes, which concurr, no one either principally, or collaterally intends or aimes at that Event, which unexpectedly succeeds upon that their concurse:* of which we have a most illustrious and competent *Example* in the Dilatation of the death of *Socrates*, a day beyond the time præfixt by his Judges, for the Execution of their Sentence upon him; as *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) hath præcisely observed.

We

We have it from the pen of that oraculous Secretary of Nature, Dr *Harvey*, that he never dissected any Animal, but he always discoverd somthing or other more then he expected, nay then ever be thought on before; so useful & infinite in variety is the *Magna Charta* of *Nature*: and perhaps some of our Readers may here have occasion to say as much of this our Dissection of *Fortune*; for while we have exercised our thoughts in the exploration of her Nature, we have unexpectedly found that, if considered *per se & reverà*, she hath no nature at all, i.e. that *in Reality she is nothing*. For, when we have abstracted all those Causes in the Concurse, which act *per se*, or by natural virtue; there remains no more but a meer *Privation* or *Negation* of all Prænotion in the concurrent Causes of that particular Concurse, and also of the intention and expectation of the subsequent Event: nor can that unpræmeditate Concurse of Causes be rightly accounted the Cause of the Fortuitous Event, by any neerer relation then that which Philosophers have termed *Conditio sine qua non*. Since, as the *Admotion* of any combustible body to Fire, may be sayd to be the Cause of its combustion, in this respect only, that it was *Conditio sine qua non*, or, if that Admotion had not præceded, the combustion had not succeded: so also cannot that Concurse of Causes, from which any Fortuitous Event doth result unexpectedly, be sayd to be the Cause thereof, in any other respect but this, that it was *Conditio sine qua non*, i. e. if that Concurse of Causes had not præceded, that Event had not succeded, though not one of those Causes in the single energy of its nature, nor all in confederacy ever any way intended it; the Analogy betwixt these two cases standing faire and full in all points.

Article 4. Fortune, nothing but a meer *Negation* of all Prænotion in a Concurse of natural Causes, respective to a fortuitous Event.

Again, forasmuch as this indeliberate Syndrome or Combination of Causes, is always *uncertain* and various, the Causes being neither elected, nor connected, nor managed by any Providence of their own: we cannot in justice but applaud the wary judgment of *Epicurus* in this, that he called Fortune, ἀσύστατον αἰτίαν προσώποις, χρόνοις, τρόποις· *a Cause instable in Persons, Times, and Manners*; which is æquivalent to this, that since she is

Article 5. *Epicurus* commended, for illustrating the *instability* and *uncertainty* of Fortune.

is a Cauſe of uncertain and indeterminate influence, none but Fools can hope that this Chamæleon ſhould conſtantly appear in the ſame colours, or wear the ſame Countenance.

Article 6. Her *Indivinity* manifeſted: & how ſhe came by her *Deification.*

Nor is he leſs to be commended for his, Ἀ ϑ τύχῃ ὕστ Θεὸν, *Cave ne habeas Fortunam Deam (apud Diogen. Laert. Epiſt. 3. Epicuro conſcripta.)* endeavours to degrade Fortune from her imaginary *Divinity*, and deride the egregious folly of her ſolemne Worſhip; for ſo great is the imbecillity of vulgar minds, that what they doe not well comprehend, they not only immoderately admire, but ſuperſtitiouſly revere, as ſomthing wholly Divine, and as farr above Nature, as it ſeems above their Capacity: and undoubtedly mans *Ignorance* of the prævious Conſpiracy of Accidentaly concurrent Cauſes, from which any Event extraordinary and ſuperintentional doth emerge; firſt prævailed upon him to inveſt Fortune in ſuch a ſpecious diſguiſe, under which he might, with leſs diſhonour to his owne Intellectuals, advance her to the reputation of a *Deity*, and adore her. Tis more then probable, that men did not, at her firſt Canonization, either much care for, or enquire into the condition and extent of her Power; and evident, that when ſhe began to be cryed up for producing ſtrange Effects in the tranſactions of the world, and by a kind of imperveſtigable ſuperintendency to diſpoſe the activity of Natural Cauſes to the induction of Events above or beſide their proper and Cuſtomary Deſtinations: then began the Vulgar to think themſelves concerned in the conciliation of her favour, and early atonement of her diſpleaſure; and ſo by thoſe, to whom ſhe ſeemed friendly and proſperous, was ſhe accounted a *Good* and *Propitious Numen*, and to thoſe, to whom ſhe appeared Inclement and Adverſe, an *Evil* and *Malevolent* one. And hence (the Error, like Rivers, ſtill enlarging) were ſtately and magnificent *Temples* erected for her popular and ſolemne Adoration, and ſeveral *Inſcriptions* reſpective to that particular *Attribute*, which her fond Votaries conceived moſt eminent in her, or moſt advantagious to themſelves, ingraven in capital letters on their Porches; ſuch as Ἀγαθὴ τύχη (one of which I have ſeen at the houſe of that ingenious Benefactor to Antiquaries, Mr *Vernon*, in *Eſſex*

in *Eſſex*, with no ſmall coſt and difficulty digged up in a field neer Smyrna, and together with many other very antique Monuments brought by him into England) *Mala Fortuna, Averruncа, Blandа, Calvа, Vitreа, Equeſtri, Fallaci, Aureа, &c.* a large catalogue of which Appellations we may read in *Pliny* (*lib.* 2 *cap.* 7.) *Plutarch* (*lib. de Fortuna Romanorum.*) and *Natalis Comes* (*lib.* 4. *Mythолog. cap.* 9.) This *Pliny*, with ſome indignation at the ridiculous delirium of the world in the Deification of this *Non-entity*, takes ample notice of in theſe words: *Toto mundo, & locis omnibus, omnibuſque horis, omnium vocibus Fortuna ſola invocatur, una nominatur, una accuſatur, una cogitatur, ſola laudatur, ſola arguitur, & cum convitiis colitur; volubilis, à pleriſque verò & cæca etiam exiſtimata; vaga, inconſtans, incerta, varia, indignorum fautrix: huic omnia expenſa, huic omnia feruntur accepta; & in tota ratione mortalium ſola utramque paginam facit; adeoque obnoxia ſumus ſortis, ut Sors ipſa pro Deo ſit, qua Deus probatur incertus.*

Article 7. All ſober Philoſophers vindicated from the guilt of aſcribing *Divinity* to Fortune.

We are not ignorant (nor, in duety to the præſervation of their memories from ingratefull Detraction, ought we to conceal) how difficult it is for any man to impeach any one *Philoſopher*, among thoſe many, whoſe Names or Writings have hitherto eſcaped the jawes of Oblivion, of this abſurd Deluſion of aſcribing *Divinity* to Fortune. For though *Plato* (*de legibus. lib.* 4.) hath this ſaying; *Deum omnia, ac ſecundum Deum Fortunam & Tempus omnia gubernare; & Ariſtotle* (2 *Phyſ.* 4. affirmes that ſome there were, who held, *Fortunam eſſe cauſam quidem, ſed humanæ menti obſcuram; & Stobæus* (*Eccleſ. Phyſic.*) tells us of others, *Qui partem aliquam Fortunæ, ex eo eſſe Divinam cenſerent, quo quidam temere agentes optatum finem conſequerentur, cæteros verò prudentia utentes optata deſtituerent*; who opinioned, that Fortune was in ſome part *Divine*, for this reaſon, that ſome men, who enterprized their deſignes raſhly and inconſiderately, did notwithſtanding accompliſh them ſucceſsfully, and happily attain their ends, while others who grounded theirs upon the moſt apparent probability, and managed the means conducing to their procuration, with

great prudence and circumspection, were however fooled in their attempts, croſt in their hopes, and fruſtrated of their purpoſes, by the ſuddain intervention of ſome occult impediment, which as no Forecaſt could diſcover, ſo no Caution prævent: yet cannot all this be juſtly interpreted any other then their wary and tacite Confeſſion of their Ignorance of the cryptick ways, and imperceptible Ends of *Providence Divine*; nor did theſe great Book-men ſpeak other then the Dialect of the Illiterate, and conforme their Expreſſions to the cuſtomary notion of the Multitude, when they referred to Fortune thoſe *Contingents*, which to the jndgement of Reaſon ſeemed to wane a Natural Series of Cauſes proper for their induction, being as it were obtruded upon man by a power *Supernatural*, i. e. ſo far above the præcaution of his *Prudence*, as the inveſtigation of his *Sapience*. And though ſome few perhaps, whoſe Curioſity was weak, but Superſtition ſtrong, may be found to have contributed toward the propagation of this Error; yet cannot that in reaſon be extended to the attainder of the major and more judicious number of Philoſophers: who upon the ſtricteſt examination of their Reliques, muſt be found guilty of no more then the continuation of that laudable cuſtome of their Prædeceſſors, in tranſmitting the moſt abſtruſe and difficult myſteries of Science, in the more comprehenſible Allay of *Symbolical* and *Emblematical* traditions; and in this particular, what the Multitude could not well underſtand under the Metaphyſical notion of *Providence Divine*, diſpoſing the confederations of Natural Cauſes to the production of Events either above or beſides their native and proper virtues, or, at leaſt, above the inveſtigation of Reaſon; this they accommodated to weaker Capacities, in the eaſe *Repraſentation* of *Fortune*.

Article 8. The Neceſſity and uſe of *Allegorical*, *Symbolical*, and *Emblematical* Traditions, invented by the Ancients.

We ſayd, *the more comprehenſible diſguiſe of Symbolical & Emblematical Traditions*; becauſe, though it be commonly conceived, that primævous Antiquity uſed to invent Parables and Emblems rather to invellope the *Arcana* of Philoſophy and ſo conceal them from the prophaning eyes of Ignorance, then to render them more intelligible: yet Paraboliçal and Poetical Fictions conduce

duce *tam ad lumen & illuſtrationem, quàm ad involucrum & velum*, as well to the illuſtration of darker, as the involution of more evident peices of Truth; as the Oedipus of this laſt Century, the *Lo. S^t. Alban* (*in præfat. ad lib. de Sapient. Veterum*) hath acutely obſerved.

Nor ought we to be ſo vainly credulous as to admit, that the Ancients, being better acquainted with Simplicity and Benevolence, then Fraud and Envy, would expoſe their names to infamy, and the juſt execration of ſucceeding Ages, by drawing a curtain of *Allegories, Symboliſms*, and *Similitudes*, betwixt the eyes of Poſterity, and the naked glories of Verity; thereby to detain them in the moſt horrid darkneſs of Ignorance: eſpecially while tis manifeſt, that ſuch was the rudeneſs of the Illiterate in thoſe blinder times, when *Contemplation* was accounted inglorious Idleneſs, and *Action* the only end of life, that moſt were either incapable of, or impatient of the ſtudy requiſite to learn any thing, which was not reduced down to a familiarity with *Senſe*; and conſequently, that the profeſſors of Science had no other way left to inſinuate the Maximes, and ſecret Concluſions in phyſiology, into the narrow minds of their Scholars, but by the mediation of their Senſes affected with *Corporeal Repreſentations*. Which is alſo the reaſon, why *Hieroglyphicks* were much more ancient then *Letters*; and *Parables* then *Arguments*.

Article 9. Their Deſcriptions of Fortune, only *Emblematical*.

Now, that the Philoſophers Deſcription of Fortune was only *Emblematical*; needs no other remonſtrance, but this of *Pacuvius* (*apud Anth. lib. 2. ad Herennium*)

Fortunam inſanam eſſe, & cæcam, & brutam perhibent Philoſophi; Saxoque illam inſtare globoſo prædicant volubilem; Ideo, quòd ſaxum impulerit Fors, cadere eò Fortunam autumant. Cæcam, ob eam rem eſſe iterant, quod nihil cernat, quò ſeſe applicet: Inſanam autem aiunt, quia atrox; incerta, inſtabiliſq; ſit: Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum negat internoſcere.

Philoſophers paint *Fortune*, mad and blind,
Fix't on a Globe revolv'd by every wind

Of *Caſualty*: importing her to fall,
Where *Chance* converts her whirling pedeſtall.
Her eyes vaild over with the skarf of Night;
'Cauſe ſhe doth ne're diſtinguiſh *wrong* from *right*.
Frantique, becauſe Unconſtant, Giddy, Cruel
To him, at night, who was, at morn, her Jewel.
Irrational, 'cauſe ſhe doth ne're elect,
By *merit*, whom to grace, whom diſreſpect.

Article 10. As alſo the Images of Fortune framed by *Painters*, and *Statuaries*.

Nor had thoſe ingenious *Painters* and *Statuaries*, whoſe happy Fancies invented an Alphabet of *Things*, and compoſed a ſilent language of *Figures*, intelligible by the eye, to expreſs the ſeveral attributes of *Fortune*; any other deſign, then by a pleaſant affectation of the *Senſe* (the only *Criterion* of illiterate Heads) to offer a gentle violence to the mind, and by a moſt familiar way of information, conduct the captived thoughts through the labyrinth of the myſtery, to an eaſy and durable perception of the *Deuteroſcope*, or *Mythological* intention. Thus the *Scythians*, as *Piccolomineus* (*in 8. gradu Philoſoph. Moral.*) relateth, had an Image of Fortune without feet; ſenſibly intimating, that the Goods of Fortune muſt be beholding to the leggs of *Virtue*, to ſupport them in the conſtant benignity of their nature; *i.e.* they fall to the ground, and periſh in a depraved uſe, unleſs they be managed by *Prudence*. Thus the *Smyrnæans*, as *Pauſanias* (*lib. 4. Meſſenicorum, pag.* 178.) hath recorded, had a ſtatue of Fortune, like *Atlas*, ſupporting the Pole with one hand, and holding in the other the Amalthæan Horn, or *Copia Cornu*: intuitively importing the Univerſality of her Empire, and that Riches are rather ſhowred down on the heads of Mortals, by the free bounty of *Providence Divine*, then collected by the hands of *Human Induſtry*; which had I beheld, I ſhould inſtantly have reflected upon that obſervation of *Salomon* (*Eccleſ. 9. verſ.* 11.) *That the race is not to the ſwift, nor the battell to the ſtrong, neither yet bread to the wiſe, nor yet riches to men of Underſtanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but Time, and Chance happeneth alike to all.* Thus others, pourtraying her

her beſtriding a *Serpent*; would have the Spectator intuitively underſtand from the theory of that Expreſs; that Fortune holds the bridle to Human *Prudence*, and can at pleaſure countermand the profoundeſt Policy. And others, by repreſenting her riding on a running Horſe, laſh't on by Fate, which treads upon his heeles; tacitely inſtruct the beholder, that Fortune muſt at laſt be overtaken, and vanquiſht by *Deſtiny*. To conclude, a copious liſt of many the like Emblematical and Symbolical Idols of Fortune, together with their ſeveral Significations and Mythologies; the ranging pen of *Bernhardus Caſius* (*de Mineral. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 12.*) hath collected, and exhibited together in one ſheet: and therefore we ſhould defraud the Curioſity of our Reader, not to remit him thither for more ample ſatisfaction.

Article 11. The review, tolerating the name of Fortune, in reſpect to man: but deteſting it, in reſpect to God.

Now, from a review of this diſquiſition into the nature of Fortune, tis obvious to the meaneſt capacity that if we reſpect only the *Prænotion* and *Expectation* of *human Reaſon*; then none the moſt præciſe in Chriſtianity can juſtly quarrel at the cuſtomary uſe of the Notion: but if we reſpect the influence and diſpoſition of *Providence Divine* extended to all occurences in the world; then none but the moſt barbarous, or Atheiſtical Ignorance dare defend it. Which diſtinction the learned *Spondanus* (*in Comment. in Homeri Iliados libr. 7. pag. 123.*) hath more fully and elegantly delivered thus; *Minime audiendi ſunt, qui ſortium diſpenſationem fortuitam eſſe dicunt. Quod Ego tamen admitto, ſi Homines tantum ſpectaveris: ſed illa etiam ex Providentia Dei omninò pendent. Eo ſenſu etiam accipiendum eſt nomen Fortunæ; quæ enim conſilio humano non fiunt, cauſam quoad nos non habent: ſed illa omnino Deus regit & moderatur.*

CHAP. IX.

Of Fate.

SECT. I.

Article 1. The convenient reduction of all opinions, concerning the essence of Fate, to 2. *General Heads.*

THIS not unknown to the meanest in the Commonweale of Learning, that no less then an Age can suffice to the observant lecture of that Vatican of Books composed by Philosophers of all times, concerning this perplexing *Theorem*; there being more Discourses (abating those, which the kindness of Time hath substracted) now extant thereupon, then any other subject, that ever exercised the cogitations and pens of Scholars: as must be acknowledged by any, who hath surveyd the singular Iatrophilological Treatise of that judicious Parisian, *Gabriel Naudæus, de Fato & Vita Termino.* But yet, such hath bin the singular fortune of Fate, that it hath obtained an exemption from that general Experiment, *Tot sententiæ, quot Authores*: there being found, upon a just audit of them all, fewer Opinions then Books concerning it; nay, what is one degree of wonder higher, a diligent scrutiny may soon explore, that they all fall under the comprehension of only *Two* Catholique Heads; some understanding *Fate* to be *Aliquid Divinum*; a certain power *Divine*, and the rest, *Aliquid merè Naturale*, a certain Constitution merely *Natural.*

In the Classis of those, who have conceived Fate to be a *Divine Power*, the highest seat belongs to the *Platonist* and *Stoick*; according to whose doctrine, methodized and summaried

maried by *Plutarch* (*lib. de Fato*) we may consider it in a *twofold Notion.*

Article 2. What the *Platonist* and *Stoick* meant by Fate, considered (ὡς οὐσία) as a *substance.*

First, ὡς οὐσία, *ut Substantia*, as a *Substance.* In which sense it is accepted for *God Himself*, or that sempiternal Reason, or establish't method, according to whose tenor He hath prædordained and disposed All things in the World, and so connected Causes to Causes, that all Events whatever, Arbitrary and Fortuitous, individually depend upon, and indeclinably result from that subalternate Series, or Complication of Efficients. For thus *Plato* (*in Timæo*) one while affirmes that Fate is *ipsa Anima Mundi*, the very Soul of the Universe; and another while, *Naturæ Universi æternaratio ac lex*, the eternal reason and law of Nature: and thus also both *Zeno* and *Chrysippus* are cited by *Plutarch* (*in* 1. *placit.* 28.) as defining Fate to be, *Vis spiritualis, ac Ratio ordinis universa gubernans*, a Spiritual Power, and constitution governing All things according to an order eternally præcogitate and prædecreed. And all the rest of the Stoical Family, as well generally quoted by *Diogenes Laertius*, as *Panetius* and *Possidonius* (at least, if He be the true Father of that Book, *de Mundo*, vulgarly conscribed to *Aristotle*, out of which the text is extracted) quoted by *Stobæus* (*Ecl. Physic.*) have unanimously held, that *Fate* was the same with *God*, *Jupiter*, and the *Universal Mens*. To whom we may justly associate *Seneca* also, who, (*in* 4. *de Benefic. &* 2. *Natural. Quæst.* 45.) sayth, in downright terms; *si Fatum, Jovem dixeris, non mentieris*: if you please to assert that Jupiter and Fate are one and the same thing, you shall speak the truth. Hence comes it, that though *Poets* sometimes refer all events to the procuration of *Jupiter*; and sometimes again to *Fate*: yet may not the nicest Critick impeach them of Inconstancy or Contradiction; since those Terms differ only in the sound, not in the notion; as signifying one and the same *Eternal Principle*, disposing the virtues and conspirations of all second Causes to the opportune effecting of Events, designed by it self, and so made indeclinable. Thus *Homer*, introducing *Agamemnon* as pleading his excuse for being instrumental

instrumental to a misfortune, makes him incriminate upon *Fate* and *Jupiter* at once, in these words:

——Ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἄιτιός εἰμι,
Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ Μοῖρα,——

Non Ego Causa,
Verum Jupiter & Fatum.

Article 3. And, what (ὡς Ἐνέργεια) as an *Energy* or *Act*: together with the etymological reasons of those sundry *Appellations*, the *Stoicks* have imposed upon it.

Secondly, ὡς Ἐνέργεια, *ut Actus*, as an *Act*; according to which Acceptation, we may understand Fate, partly to be *ipsum Dei decretum*, the very Decree or absolute Command of God, whereby He hath determined all Events to Necessity of Futurition; from whence the Latin word, *Fatum*, importing a Decree *pronounced*, is by Grammarians derived: and partly, *ipsum ordinem, seriem, vel concatenationem Causarum, in natura statutam*; the order, series, or subalternate concatenation of Causes, according to whose præscript tenor all Events prædestined come to pass, in respect to the Decree pronounced. For thus much may be collected from that Definition of Fate ascribed to *Plato* by *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) *viz. est lex Adrastæa*, the law of Divine Justice, consigning to every thing, what is convenient to its nature, and which no man can elude, or infringe: but more perspicuously from that notorious one of *Chrysippus*, *Fatum est sempiterna quadam ac indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsam, & implicans per æternos consequentiæ ordines, ex quibus adapta, connexaque est*; which we have formerly introduced, and interpreted, in our Chap. concerning the *Mobility of the term of mans life*. To which, for more assurance, we may annex the respective signification and importance of each of those various *Appellatives*, which the Stoicks have accommodated to Fate. For they have named it (1) Εἱμαρμένη, because 'tis a connected series, or subalternately-dependent syntax of Causes and Effects: (2) Περιμένη, because it involves and contains All things in that definite and invariable concatenation: (3) Ἀνάγκη, because all Events are the Necessary designations thereof; or, because it self is also under the same restraint of an immutable definition:

(4)

(4) Ἀδράστια, becauſe no attempt can prævail to an alteration infringement of its tenor: (5) Αἶσα, becauſe it is a Conſtitution Eternal: (6) Νέμεσις, becauſe it is a diſtribution made to every Individual: (7) χρεὼν, becauſe it comprehends whatever is, by Conſignation, due to every man: (8) Κὴρ, becauſe as the original, ſo alſo the Diſſolution of all things is ſubject to its appointment: Μοῖρα, *Parca*, becauſe it is the peculiar Lot or Portion deſtined to every man. But as for this æquivocal Denominative, *Parca*; inſomuch as it not onely determineth the ſtate of all other things in general, but alſo the Life of man in ſpecial, *quaſi Nendo*, as it were by ſpinning out a thread of commenſurate longitude: thereupon did *Heſiod* (*in Theogn.*) dichotomize it into three diſtinct ſpecies; *viz.* (1) Ἄτροπος, in reſpect to the Irrevocability of time *paſt*, which exactly reſembleth a thread already ſpun, and wound upon the reel or ſuze; (2) Κλωθὼ, in reſpect to the Decurrent, or *Præſent* time, which reſponds to a thread now in twiſting, in the hand of the Spinſter; (3) Λάχεσις, in reſpect to the *Future*, or Lot yet remaining behind to every man, which holds an analogie to Flax not yet ſpun off the diſtaff. Which is the Summarie of *Poſſidonius* (*de mundo*) and *Apuleius* (10. *de repub.*) their Mythologie of the ingenious Figment of the *Three Fatal Siſters*.

Sect. II.

Article 1. The ſecond *Claſsis* of Philoſophers, who underſtood Fate to be a Conſtitution meerly *Natural* ſubdivided into 2 diſtinct *Sects*: *viz.* (1) thoſe who aſſert the *Immutability* & *Inevitability* of Fate; (2) thoſe who defend the poſſibilty of its *Alteration* & *Evaſion*.

IN the other *Claſſis* of Philoſophers, who have apprehended *Fate* to be *Res purè Naturalis*, a Conſtitution meerly *Natural*, devoyd of all Divinity, nor dependent upon any eternal Decree; we find a ſubdiviſion of two different Sects. For,

(1) *Some* have propoſed to themſelves a Series of Natural Cauſes, ſo harmoniouſly adapted and linked together by mutual revinction, that the poſterior being continually ſuſpended on and moved by the præcedent, performe their operations *compulſively*, *i. e.* they cannot but do, what they do: ſo that thereby is inferred a *Neceſſity* ſo abſolute, that it admits of nei-

ther Evasion, nor opposition; such a necessity, as would be no whit inferior to the Stoicks *Lex Adamantina*, or *Adrastea*, formerly mentioned; if this only difference be allowed, that according to that, Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by *God*; but according to this, a subalternate series of Causes, whose Constitution, reciprocal concatenation, and eternal duration are made by, and dependent upon *it self*, and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable then the other. And

(2) *Others* have, indeed, likewise allowed a Series of natural Causes mutually complicated; but yet have they reputed, that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon, nor commoved by the Superior, but that they may be *impeded* from doing those things, which by the impulse of their inherent Efficiency, and without the intervention of any impediment, otherwise they would have done. *Impeded*, we say, by things purely *Contingent*, or Counter Agents endowed with, and using the *Arbitrary* Liberty of their Will.

Article 2. The Leaders of the First Sect, *Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides*, and chiefly *Democritus*.

The *Coryphæi*, or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers, were *Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides*, and (who took the right hand of all the others) *Democritus*; as we have found upon the list of *Cicero* (*de Fato*.) For, albeit the Foundation of his Physiologie was the same with that of *Epicurus*, *Fortuito factum esse mundum*, that the Universe was made by *Chance*; which Hypothesis we have formerly explained, examined, and exploded: yet did He strenuously endevour to impose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure, *Fato omnia fieri*, that all things are effected by *Fate*; confounding two most contrary Notions, meer *Contingency*, and ineluctable *Necessity*.

Article 3. *Democritus* justly charged with the patronage of *Inevitable Fate*: and his doctrine concerning it, concisely rehearsed.

If any demand, how we can justify this our Accusation of *Democritus*; we answer, that it may be genuinely collected from hence: that it was his opinion, that *Fortune* is nothing else in reality but *Nature*, and that Nature is bound, by her own adamantine laws, to do what she doth, in all particulars. For the *First* of these positions, that *Nature and Fortune are Identical*; we cannot much dispute: since all the Attributes of Fortune

tune are but ſurreptitious and uſurped from Nature; nor doth Fortune, in a meer philoſophical Senſe, import more then Mans *Ignorance* in the *Dubii* of many Effects, which Nature produceth, or are at leaſt produced by natural means. For the *Second*, that *Nature is its own Fate*, or, more expreſly, that Nature being only a conſtitution of Cauſalities reſulting from Chance, or from a fortuitous diſpoſition and ſetlement of the Univerſal Matter, in that Figure the adſpectable World now beareth; doth neceſſitate her ſelf to the cauſation of all things: this He hath conceived inferrible from this proceſs of reaſon. Atoms (ſaith He, *apud Magnenum*) being the Catholique Principle, of which all things conſiſt, have an ingenite or connatural Motive Faculty eſſentially inhærent; by the unceſſant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved: and all things, by coaleſcence compoſed of Atoms, cannot but conforme to the ſame motions, by which their principles are commoved. And ſithence ſome Atoms tending one way, are by the occurſe and juſtling of others diverted to another courſe; both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency, cannot but obſerve, continue and purſue thoſe neceſſary motions. By the ſame reaſon, ſome bodies, compoſed of concreted Atoms, as they are præcipitated one way, by the impulſe of their own coeſſential Faculty, may, by the occurſation and arietation of others ſteering a different courſe, be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial, to ſome other tranſverſe, oblique, rectilinear, &c. ſo that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but obſerve, continue, and purſue thoſe compulſive motions. And this, in General, is that Fate, or *Neceſsity*, whereby *Democritus* would have all things effected, and by which the World was at firſt compoſed, in the ſame Figure, we ſpeculate at this day; for, as the Univerſal Principle, Atoms, concurring, crowding, rebounding reciprocally, in an infinite ſpace, by the agitation of their own inexiſtent Faculty, could not but convene, coaleſce, and cohære into any other Forme, but what they did: ſo now having acquired that forme by Chance, can they not either change it, or not obſerve and execute thoſe motions begun, and by the mediation or interceſſion

whereof all Events are brought to paſs. For, in *Plutarch*, (1. *placit.* 26.) He ſayth plainly, *Neceſſitatem nihil eſſe aliud, ἢ τὴν φορὰν, καὶ τὴν πλαγὴν, καὶ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν τῆς ὕλης, quam lationem, percuſſionem, repercuſſionem Materiæ*; that Neceſſity is nothing elſe but the Lation, Percuſſion, Repercuſſion of the material Principle of all things, *i. e.* of *Atoms*. From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that paſſage in *Simplicius* (2. *phyſic. comment.* 59.) that ſome of the Ancients held an opinion, that Ἀνάγκη ὑλικὴ, *Material Neceſsity* was the ſole Cauſatrix of all Effects; in reſpect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive, as moſt have dreamt, but unceſſantly operative; and that, not by impreſſion, but *Inherency*, as being to it ſelf the *Principium à quo* of all its motions. And this we here touch upon, opportunely to diſcriminate this Doctrin from that of others, who conſtituted a meer *Formal*, or *Agent* Neceſſity, diſtinct from the material principle of the world; whether that Agent be ſimply *Natural*, according to the Phyſiology of *Ariſtotle*; or *Primus Opifex*, the Firſt Operator, according to the hypotheſis of *Plato*, and the *Stoicks*, who alſo ſometimes radicated that Neceſſity, whereby Evils are continually exiſtent in the world, in the *Matter* thereof, as *Seneca* (*de Provid.* 5.) excuſing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator, ſayth poſitively, *Non poteſt Artifex mutare materiam*, it was not in his power to Abſtract it, becauſe not to alter the *Matter*. But, not to leave our Explanation of *Democritus Fatum Materiale* imperfect; we may, from what hath præceded, perceive at what mark theſe words of his were directed; *Neceſsitatem, quâ omnia fiunt, eſſe & Fatum, & Iuſtitiam, & Providentiam, & opificem mundi* (*apud Plutarch.* 1. *placit.* 45.) that the *Neceſsity*, whereby all things are effected, is both *Fate*, *Juſtice*, *Providence*, and *Maker* of the World: *viz.* this, that the Series of things, in which the reaſon or eſſence of Fate doth conſiſt, could not have bin otherwiſe conſtituted; that upon this Series it depends, why one thing is accounted Juſt, and another Unjuſt; why the world is governed thus, and all things proceed according to the præſent method, and no other; and why the adſpectable form of the Univerſe was made in all points reſponſible

reſponſible to what it now holds, &c. For, He referred the Cauſation of all things to thoſe newly explicated congenial motions of Atoms; and ſo conceived that even the *Soul*, or Mind of man (which He alſo fancied to be a certain *Contexture of ſpherical or orbicular Atoms*) is variouſly agitated, not only by thoſe *internal* motions of its own inſenſible particles, which vary according to its individual Complexion (*i. e.* the Atoms compoſing the Soul of a Melancholy man, are of one ſort, at leaſt of one contexture; thoſe of a Cholerick, of another; thoſe of a Phlegmatick, of a third, &c.) but alſo by thoſe *Extradvenient* motions cauſed by Objects; by whoſe *Species*, or Images incurrent (which Atoms alſo conſtitute) the Mind cannot but be *Attracted*, if they be conſentaneous and allective, or gratefull; nor not be *Averted*, if they be diſſentaneous and repulſive, or ingratefull. That, if the Mind be not alwaies allected by Attractive Species; the reaſon is, becauſe at the ſame inſtant there occur unto it the more potent ſollicitations of their Contrary, *Averting* Species: and if it be not alwaies Averted by Repellent; the reaſon is equal, *viz.* becauſe at the ſame inſtant it is more ſtrongly ſollicited by their Contrary, *Attractive* Species. That therefore, the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good, or that which is gratefull and allective, ſo long as it diſcovers no Evil admixt thereto: nor not be averted from Evil, or what is ingratefull and averſant, ſo long as it perceives no Good to be commixt therewith. That therefore, the Mind cannot, when two Goods are objected, but purſue the greater Good; as that which attracteth more potently: nor, when two Evils are objected, but avoyd the greater; as that whereby it is averted more potently. That, when two objects, the one Good, the other Evil, at the ſame time præſent their Species; it cannot but neglect the Good, ſo long as the Evil averts more potently then the Good attracts: nor not be carried towards the Good, while the Evil averts more weakly, and the Good attracts more ſtrongly. Finally, that ſince, by reaſon of the Ignorance, or Dimneſs of the Mind, it doth frequently not perceive the Evil conſequent upon its proſecution of ſome Good; therefore is it ſubject to *Deception* in ſome caſes, and is often carried

carried on to that, from which it ought to have bin averted: nor perceive the Good that is consequent upon its prosecution of some Evil, and is therefore, as often averted from that object, to which it ought to have bin converted. But notwithstanding, insomuch as all objects, by this and no other way, occur unto, and affect the Mind; still it cannot but *Necessarily* be carried whither it is carried; nor but be averted from that, from which it is averted: and consequently, that there remains to it only *a Desire of Truth, i.e.* that no *Counterfeit Species* may occur, but that all objects may appear such as in reality they are, nor Good be concealed under the disgusting vizard of Evil, nor Evil gilded o're with the splendid semblance of Good. For this is the summe of what *Empiricus* (2. *advers. Physic.*) makes *Democritus* to have desiderated, when He sayd; Εὔχετ' εὐλόγων εἰδώλων τυγχάνειν, *Exoptat rerum imagines consentaneas posse nancisci.* Now, by this complex Argumentation, *Democritus* may be understood to have inferred; that though some Actions seem situate within the præcincts of our own jurisdiction, or that it is absolutely in our power to *Elect*, or *Reject* this or that object; insomuch as every mans experience doth demonstrate to him, that he doth and can consult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects, and actually electing the one, refuseth the other; and that, not by Compulsion, but *Freely:* yet notwithstanding is nothing really in our power, because not only the *occasion* of our Consultation, but also the *Consultation* it self is imposed upon us by inevitable *Necessity*. *First*, that the *Occasion* of Consultation (or the *Exhibition* of many objects, which almost equally affecting the Mind, and by reason of the æquipondium of their Verisimility, or moments of Good, holding it suspended in æquilibrio, of necessity ingage it to a *Deliberation*) cannot but be imposed upon us; we conceive it not obscure to him, who shall deduce the conducing Series of things from a due Epoche, or height, and analytically undoe the chain of Causes: and *Secondly*, that also the act of *Consultation* is a *Necessary* Effect, is manifest from hence; that when two objects occur to the mind, so equally Attractive, that their Apparencies of Vtility, or

Præsentations

Præſentations of Good, are æquilibrated, and reciprocally counterpoiſe each other; the mind muſt of neceſſity be agitated by a kind of *Fluctuation*, and detained in the ſuſpence of *Indifferency*, or *Indetermination*, or *Conſultation*, untill it acquieſce in its *Election* of that Object, whoſe præſentation of Vtility ſeems to præponderate the others. Which, æquitably audited, amounts to no more then this; that *Election* is nothing but the proſecution of an Object which either really is, or at leſt ſeems more Good; and that a ſpontaneous one, without all coaction or renitency: in reſpect that man doth both ſpontaneouſly affect, and willingly proſecute Good. And that you may not admire this bold aſſertion, *viz.* that both the Occaſion and Conſultation, and free, or rather libent Election of Objects, are all links in the Chain of Fate, and ſo comprehended under this Natural Neceſſity, propugned by *Democritus*: the *Stoicks* intercept your wonder, by obtruding another as ſtrange, *viz.* that it depends on the ſame Concatenation of things, *that you now read this our diſcourſe of Fate*; as *Manilius* (*lib.* 2.) *Hoc quoque fatale eſt, ſic ipſum expendere Fatum.* And this, becauſe whatever Action of any man you ſhall ſuppoſe; it can be no difficulty, according to this Hypotheſis, to find out the proxime Cauſe exciting him thereunto, and to refer that Cauſe to the permotion of another remote one, and that third to the permotion of a fourth, that fourth, to the induction of a fifth, &c. unravelling the ſeries of Cauſes, ſo that it muſt at length be inferred, that that ſuppoſed action could not but follow upon thoſe other actions ſubalternately præcedent, and conſequently, that it muſt be, as *Democritus* would have it, *Fatal*, or *Neceſſary*. Which opinion *Ariſtotle* ardently impugneth (*in lib. de Interpre. cap.* 8.) when diſcuſſing the verity and neceſſity of Propoſitions, He contends to evince; that though of two oppoſite ſingular propoſitions, which concern a thing either *Præterite*, or *Preſent*, one muſt be true, the other falſe: yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary ſingular propoſitions, which concern a thing *Future*; the Verity of the one not neceſſitating the Falſity of the other. For, as He there argues, if every *Affirmation*, or *Negation* concerning a thing to come, were true or falſe, *ex Neceſſitate*: then would the

the Futurity of any thing include a Neceſſity of its Futurition, *i.e.* whatever is *Future* would be *Neceſſary*, and on the contrary, whatever is not Future, would be Not-neceſſary: and upon juſt inference, nothing could remain either *Fortuitous*, or *Arbitrary*; which to admit, is an *Incongruity* ſo manifeſt, that the repugnancy of every mans Experience detects it; an *Incommodity* ſo intolerable, that it not only diſparageth, but confuteth it ſelf. And this, if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory, is the *Summary* of their Theory, who have apprehended and aſſerted *Fate to be a meer Natural Conſtitution of Cauſes, ſubalternately connected; as not dependent on any thing Divine, nor any Eternal Decree; ſo not capable of any mutation or interruption, by the intervention of any Impediment, purely Fortuitous, or Counter-activity of any Arbitrary Agent.*

Sect. III.

Article 1. The Principal of the *Second* Sect, *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus*.

IN the other *Diviſion* of *Philoſophers*, who alſo conceded Fate to be a meer Natural Conſtitution of Cauſes ſubalternately dependent, &c. but yet denied the inevitable or neceſſary inſequution of all Effects upon that concatenation; allowing the poſſibility of its mutation, or interruption by either Chance, or mans Free will: the Principal are *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus*.

Article 2. The Grounds of the *Authors* imputing the opinion both of Fates *Identity* with Nature, and the poſſibility of its *Mutation* & *Declination*, by either *Fortuitous* or *Arbitrary* Antagoniſts, to *Ariſtotle*.

Firſt, as for *Ariſtotle*; that He held Fate, or fatal Neceſſity to be nothing but very Nature, or (if you like it better) every particular Cauſe acting *ſecundum ſuam naturam, naturalémve ductum*, according to its proper or natural Virtue; is manifeſt from his own words, in ſundry places of his Writings. To particular; (1) He ſayth (*in 2. phyſ. cap. 6.*) *Eas generationes, accretiones, & alterationes, quæ violentæ ſunt (ut dum ex arte, & ob delicias, cogimus plantas aliquas præmaturè pubeſcere,*

pubescere, adolescereque) *esse in εἱμαρμέναις, non Fatales, hoc est non Naturales*; making *Fatal* Effects to be meerly *Natural*. And (2) He sayth (1 *Meteorol. cap. ultim.*) *χρόνοι εἱμαρμένοι, Fatalibus temporibus magnas quasdam hyemes, imbriumque excessus, quibus creentur diluvia, contingere; eo modo, quo & contingit hyems statis anni temporibus*: which rightly paraphrased, imports thus much; that as Winter, the Sun receding from our climate, at some certain period of the yeer, according to the Ecliptick progress consigned unto it by Nature, is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger distance; even so are hard Winters, and immoderate rains, the regular effects of some periodal Conjunctions of the Planets, proceeding in their motions according to the setled Constitutions of Nature. From whence we have an advantage to observe, that though *Stobaus* (*Ecl. Phys.*) tells us; *Aristotelem non tam existimasse Fatum esse Causam, quàm modum Causæ advenientem rebus ex necessitate statutis*; that *Arist.* conceived not Fate to be so much a Cause, as the manner of a Cause, advenient to things determined by Necessity: yet nevertheless are we so to comment upon this his nice descant, as that we understand, Fate not to be any new kind of Cause, but Nature her self, which, in respect to her *Agency*, is called a *Cause*, and in respect to the certain, proper, and necessary *manner* or way of her acting, is called *Fate*. And, that He impugned the former Error, *viz.* that all Agents, included in this Universal Subalternation, act *ex inevitabili necessitate*, or cannot but doe, what they doe; is not obscurely intimated in this, that He defined Fate to be pure *Nature*. Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inoppugnable *necessity*; as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation, which is commonly impeded, by the intervention of any indisposition or impatibility of Matter, and other resisting Accidents; but also in Generous and virtuous Minds, which easily subdue and countermand those strong inclinations, or propensities to Avarice, Luxury, Audacity, Incontinency &c. which may not unjustly be esteemed the genuine Effects of their very constitutive Principles, and branches that shoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament. Upon which reason,

we may conjecture, that *Arist.* reflected, when He sayd of *Socrates, præter naturam, ac fatum suum, continens evasit:* He acquired an Habit of *Continency*, even in spite of the contrary sollicitation of his individual *Nature*, and particular *Fate*.

Article 3. *Epicurus* unanimous to *Arist.* in the point of *Physical* and *Eluctable* Necessity.

Secondly, as for *Epicurus*; that his thoughts made an Unison with those of *Aristotle*, in the key of a *Non-ineluctable Fate*, is sufficiently constant from hence; that having admitted a certain *Necessity Natural* in this sentence, *Naturam à rebus, ipsarúmve serie*, (διδαχθέναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθέναι) *doceri, cogíque, sive necessitate agi* (*in Epist. ad Herodotum:*) He yet denied the *Inevitability*, or *Absoluteness* thereof, in another Fragment of his revived by *Stobæus* (*in Ecl. Phys.*) where He delivers as a general Canon, *Omnia fieri trium modorum aliquo*, (κατ' ἀνάγκην, κατὰ προαίρεσιν, κατὰ τύχην) *Necessitate, Consilio, Fortuna.* For, in that he makes *Fortune*, and *Consultation*, or mans Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with *Necessity* Natural, He manifestly excludes it from being πάντων δεσπότης, sole *Despot* or Monarch, and reserves to the two others an equal dominion. Which assurance may duely be augmented by the superaddition of this also; that *Cicero* (*de Fato*) introducing *Epicurus* disputing about the verity of Future Events, makes him deny, with *Aristotle*, that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come, the one must be true, and the other false: subnecting this reason; *Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas.*

Article 4. The scope of *Epicurus* his Figment of the *Declination* of *Atoms* in the human Soul: and his Accommodation thereof to the tuition of mans *Liberty*, epitomized.

And, certainly, as He stood equal with *Aristotle*, in the denial; so hath He outdone him, by many degrees, in his endevours for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute Necessity: insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the Declination of Atoms (illustrated in the incomparable Commentary of *Gassendus*) as a motion, which once conceded, doth totally infringe the indispensable rigor of Fate, and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man. This *Plutarch* taught us, in two perspicuous texts: (1) when He sayth (*de Anim. Solert.*) that the motion of the Declination of

of Atoms in the Human Soul, was subtilly invented by *Epicurus*, ὅπως εἰς τὴν ζωὴν ἡ τύχη παρεισέλθῃ, καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὴ ἀπολῆται, that *Fortune* might be brought on the theatre of the world, there to act her part, and the *Arbitrary* power of man might not be abrogated: (2) when He declares (*de Stoic. repub.*) that the same *Epicurus* (*sese in omnem partem versare, ingeniúmque contendere, in id incumbendo, ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium, ac pravitatem esse inculpabilem non patiatur;*) rack't all the nerves of his wit, to find out a way for the protection of mans *Free will*, and so that evil might not prætend to *inculpability*.

Now, though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader, out of the direct tract of our præsent Theme, into a wide Digression concerning *Epicurus* his whole Romance of the *Declination of Atoms* in the Soul; especially having lately remitted him to *Gassendus* his accomplisht Comment thereupon: yet can we not impede his progress along the streight line of method, here to arrest him, while we informe him briefly, How he accommodated that fiction to the vindication of mans *Liberty* from the inexorable Coaction of Fate. We conceive, that *Epicurus*, having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals, but principally in Man, *viz. Natural*, *Violent*, and *Voluntary*; took it for granted, that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from *Atoms*, the *Principium à quo* of all motion: and hereupon concluded, that the spring of all *Natural* motion, was the primary motion congenial or inhærent to Atoms, *viz.* that whi h physiology calls the motion of *Gravity*, whereby an Atom is præcipitated *ad lineam rectam*, to a perpendicular; that the spring of all *Violent* motion, was the motion of *Reflexion*, or that which ariseth from occursation, arietation, or repercussion of one Atom by another, whereby the Atom reflected, is carried *ad lineam obliquam*; and lastly, that the spring of all *Voluntary* motion was the motion of *Declination*, to which no region is determined, nor time præfixt.

Article 5. An *Exception*, in the name of *Democritus*, against *Epicurus* Inference.

But might not *Democritus*, and other *Defendants* of *Absolute Necessity natural*, have excepted against this, as insufficient to the protection of mans *Evasory Freedome*, by returning; that because this motion of *Declination* is no less *Natural* (for it is derived from no other principle, but Atoms themselves) then that of *Gravity*; therefore doth it still remain, that All things are effected by Fate, as well when *Epicurus* his Hypothesis is conceded, as before. Insomuch as all things, which were to come to pass, by reason of those various motions of Arietation, Repuls, Declination &c. by an eternal series, and kind of subalternate Concatenation, are consequent one upon the heels of another; and particularly that event of *Cognition* and *Appetition*, to which mans *Liberty* appertains; and so are brought to pass by an equal *Necessity*. For, that the Mind of man may display, or execute that *Liberty Elective*, whereby it affects and prosecutes any object, conceive it to be an *Apple*; necessary it is, that the *Image* or Species of that Apple be first emitted from it, and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight, invade, pereell, and commove the Mind to know, or apprehend it. Necessary to the Apple, before it can transfuse its visible Species to the eye, that it be put in some place convenient for adspect, by him, who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere. Necessary, that the Tree, which bore that apple, be first generated by a seed, and nourished by the moisture of the earth, concocted by the heat of the Sun. Necessary, that that Seed be derived from a former apple, and that from a former tree, planted in this or that determinate place, at this or that determinate time: and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world, when both the Earth, and all its Vegetable seeds had their origination from the Concursions and Complexions of Atoms; which could not (being agitated by the impulse of their own inhærent Faculty Motive) but convene and coalesce, and acquiesce in those Figures, those situations, at that time. Again, if the *Soul*, or Mind be also a Contexture of orbicular Atoms; those Atoms must have bin contained in the Sperm of the Parents; must have confluxed thither from certain meats and drinks, as also from the Aer and beams

beams of the Sun; thoſe meats muſt have bin ſuch and no other: and ſo ſubalternately ſucceſſive from eternity, the Event will be found to come to paſs by the ſame Adamantine Neceſſity, whatever of the Cauſes, lateral or concurrent (which muſt run up to an account beyond all Logarithms) you ſhall pleaſe to begin at. Becauſe from Eternity Cauſes have ſo cohæred to Cauſes, that the laſt cauſes could not but concurr; which being deduced into act, the Mind could not but know, and knowing affect, or deſire that particular object, *viz.* the Apple. And what is here ſaid of *Cauſes*, the ſame in all points is to be underſtood alſo of *Atoms*, which conſtitute thoſe cauſes, and from whoſe congenial motions the Cauſes derive thoſe their *Motions*, by which they attain to be Cauſes.

Article 6. The juſtification thereof, by a *Reſpons* conforme to the Phyſiology of *Epicurus*.

To this *Exception*, that we may compoſe ſome *Reſponſe*, ſuch as may ſeem Conſentaneous to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, and to contain ſomewhat of Probability, at leaſt; we muſt uſurp the liberty to aſſume: that ſuch is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul, or Mind, its *Declinant Atoms* can break that *Rigidity* ariſing from other Atoms, and ſo make its nature *Flexile* to any part; in which *Flexility*, the root of *Liberty* doth conſiſt. And therefore, the mind, being affected by the Species of any object, is indeed carried towards that object; but ſo, that if another object ſhall inſtantly occurr, whoſe Attraction is æquivalent, it may again be invited by, and carried towards that object alſo: ſo that, deflecting from the firſt, it may become æquilibrated or indifferent to either part; which, doubtleſs, is to be Free, or Arbitrary. And that the Mind, being thus conſtituted *Flexile* and Indifferent, doth at length determine it ſelf rather to one then the other part; this ariſeth from hence: that the *impreſſion* of one *Species* is more violent then of the other; and conſequently that the *Election* ſucceeds, upon the *Apprehenſion* of that object, whoſe ſpecies appears either poſitively good, or comparatively more good. Finally, that the Mind, when it electeth or willeth any object, is as it were the principal Machine, or main Spring, by whoſe motions all the Faculties, and the members deſtinate to execution are excited, and carried thither,

whither the Mind tendeth: and this by mediation of the *Spirits* discurrent, or rather transmitted through all parts of the body. All which *Lucretius* fully expresseth in these Verses:

Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo,
Nec regione loci certa; sed ubi ipsa tulit Mens:
Nam dubio procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas
Principium dat; & hinc motus per membra vagantur. *lib. 2.*

Again, perhaps *Epicurus* will not gainsay, but that the motion of *Declination* is as much *Natural* as the motion of *Gravity*; But yet will He by no perswasions yeeld, that the Mind, being contemperate of Declinatory Atoms, is so affected and attracted by Necessity toward one object, that it cannot instantly be deflected to another. For, as a mixt Nature is made, so is the Mobility of its insensible parts varied: and from various Natural motions refused or refracted, ariseth a Third Nature, according to which its motions may be sayd to be Voluntary and Natural both; insomuch as they proceed *à Natura libera*, from Nature free and uncoacted. Nor will He deny, supposing the Occursation and Arietation of Atoms, that it is pure Necessity, that Percussions, Repulses, and either Reflexions or Cohæsions should succeed among them: but yet may He refuse to allow a Necessity of such Occursations, as if they could not be impeded, nor their Consequents be diverted. Hence, concerning that eternal series of the Causes of the Apple, and the Mind; *Epicurus* will grant, that when things are already effected, a kind of Necessity may be attributed thereunto, such in respect whereof those things cannot be uneffected, since *non datur jus in præterita*, there is no countermanding things Præterite: but before those things were peracted, there was no such Necessity; since both Fortune, or Contingency, and the opposing Liberty of mans Will might have interrupted, inverted, and changed it. For few are ignorant of the wide disparity between these two Affirmations, *viz.* What is once done, cannot be not done: and what is done, might not have bin done. Since, in the *Former*, a thing is considered as already *past*; and in the *Later*, as yet *to come*:

come: and as according to the *Former* it is *Neceſſary*; ſo according to the *Later*, it; may be or *Contingent*, or *Voluntary*. By which reaſon, was it poſſible, that the *Apple* might not have bin præſented to the eye; poſſible, that the Tree which bare it might firſt have withered; that the Seed, of which that tree was generated, might either have proved abortive and ſteril, or elſe have bin ſowed in ſome other place; that other of its Cauſes might have bin divers ways præpeded: which alſo may be affirmed of the Mind, and its Cauſes; and conſequently none of the many Cauſes, which did antecede the Appetition of the Apple, can be conceived to have bin Neceſſary, as they might if the Cauſes were of themſelves uncapable of Impediment, or if there were one Cauſe Paramont to all others in the Concatenation, which by an abſolute ſoveraignty, or deſpotique power, had directed and coacted them. Allbeit we concede, that the *Appetition* of the Apple by the mind, is the Conſequent of the Minds *Cognition* thereof, and that Cognition the conſequent of its *Occurſation* to the eye, and that the Conſequent of its *Poſition* in a place convenient for ſight, and that the conſequent of its *Exiſtence*, and ſo from link to link retrograde up to eternity: yet notwithſtanding can no man juſtify this Inference, that therefore the *Mind is Neceſſitated to that Appetition*; becauſe ſtill there remains a *Poſſe* to the Mind of being *Averted* from the Affectation and Proſecution thereof, in caſe either the Species of a better object, or a ſuſpicion of poyſon therein concealed, ſhall intervene, or a refrigeration of the Stomach by the dyſpeptical and flatulent juice thereof be feared, or any other Cauſe of moment ſufficient to perſwade the mind to abſtain from the uſe thereof, ſhall be interpoſed,

Article 7. The moſt weighty *Rejoynder*, (of the connexion of thoſe Cauſes, which *Avert* the Mind from, ſo found too light

Nor is this *Rejoynder* diſſwaſive; that, when the Mind is averted from the Appetition of the Apple, the *Cauſes Antecedent* were not ſuch as might induce the mind to an Appetition, but ſuch as induced it to an *Averſation*; and that theſe *Averting*, not thoſe Attracting Cauſes were ſo connected to the ſeries of Fate, that the mind could not but be averted from it.

well as of thoſe, which *Attract* it to an object, to the eternal *Series* of *Fate*) to overbalance *Epicurus* his defence of mans *Liberty*.

For,

For, though the Mind be contemperate of such a Contexture of Atoms, as that it may be *Commoved* by the irruent Species of external Objects; yet is the nature of its contexture such also, as that it can derive from it self some motions distinct from, nay contrary to those motions excited by Extradvenient Images; which motions being instituted by no other Principle but it self, are manifestly *Spontaneous* and *Voluntary*, and by which it is empower'd to resist *External* motions, and therefore may not so be carried to one Object, as not to be, upon advantage, deflected to another: And hence we may *Conclude*, that the Mind is not obliged to a necessity of any one Object; but stands *Free* to refuse that, and elect another: and that the Reason of a thing to *come*, is not a little different from that of a thing already *past*; since, in respect to a thing *Future*, there remains an *Indifferency* to the Mind of electing either of two Objects, but in respect to a thing *Praterite*, there is a *Necessity* of its election of one. If this *Solution* be thought too light, we can superadd another of weight sufficient to counterpoyse the Doubt; *viz.* that which *Carneades* in *Cicero* insinuated, when he taught, that the *Epicureans* might have defended the Liberty of mans Mind, without their commentitious *Declination* of Atoms. For having once declared, that the Mind hath Voluntary motions of its own institution, they needed no other Argument to confute *Chrysippus*: to whom when they had conceded, that no motion can be without a Cause *Movent*; there remained no reason why they should have granted, that all Effects have their *Antecedent* Causes; since to the will of man no Causes are Antecedent, it being to it self the *Principium à quo* of all its motions Voluntary.

And this is the faithfull Abridgement of *Epicurus* his Doctrin concerning Fate, as a Constitution meerly Natural, and capable of interruption, alteration, opposition, by either of the Two other in his Triumvirate, *viz.* *Fortune* or pure Contingency, and the *Liberty* of mans mind, which He conceived Copartners in the Empire of the World. ¶.

SECT.

Sect. IV.

Article 1. *Mathematical* Fate briefly described.

THere is yet another *Species* of Fate, retaining to our Second *Genus* (ὡς Ἐνέργεια) whose exceeding vanity and inconsiderableness had well-nigh occasioned our total Inconsideration thereof, in this place; and that is *Fatum Mathematicum sive Astrologicum*, the *Mathematicians* and *Astrologers Fate*; being a certain imaginary Necessity Natural, imposed upon all Sublunary Agents, and more especially upon Man, as the most analogous Recipient, by the inoppugnable Influence of Celestial Bodies, respective to their Motions, Positions, Connexions, Aspects.

Article 2. The gross *Vanity* thereof concealed from many *Philosophers*, only by the cloud of *Transcriptive Adhæsion to Antique Traditions*.

Tis no wonder, we confess, that the *Chaldæans*, a Mercurial and volatile Nation generally infatuated with *Astral Idolatry*, were the *Inventors* of this *Planetary Destiny*; since they Deified all they understood not, and advanced their observations of the circumvolutions of the Sphears, together with their Orbs of light, to such a height of insolence, that they fancied the Hebrew Alphabet represented in the Figures of the Asterisms, and prætending to the skill of reading the Celestial Ephimerides, by spelling those Characters, which the Planets in their Conjunctions, Oppositions, and other Apparitions seemed to make, into words and sentences perfectly signifying, to the exact and intelligent observer, the intent of God concerning not only the subversion of Monarchies, mutation of States, religions, &c. general Events, but also the prosperity or adversity, the health or sickness, life or death of particular persons: as *Rabbi ben Ezra*, and out of him *Gaffarel* (without the concealment of his strong inclination to the same superstitious Arrogance) hath observed, and by several experiments alleaged endevour'd to patronize, in *the* 13. *Chap. of his Unheard of Curiosities.*

Curioſities. Nor is it a wonder, that the *Hebrew*, and after them the *Græcian Aſtrologers*, with great oſtentation of tranſcendent knowledge, and no leſs then privacy with the three Fatal Siſters, ſedulouſly promoted the ſame ſplendid Error, of aſcribing the Empire of the world to a Heptarchy of Erratique Starrs: ſince, upon the teſtimony of the greateſt *Antiquaries*, * we may juſtly affirme, that the Hebrews added to the vanities and abſurdities of the Chaldæan, and the Græcians to the wild Romances of the Hebrew Aſtrology; the ſtream thereof, by long running in the channel of time, contracting more and greater Impurities. Which is a chief reaſon, why we inhærite ſo dark and imperfect a knowledge of the great *Aſtronomical Sagacity* of the more ſimple and upright times of *Abraham* and *Moſes*. Though this be no wonder, we ſay, yet tis a conſiderable one, that even many *Phyſiologiſts*, who prætended the indagation and tradition of nothing but Verity, of veriſimility at leaſt, have liberally contributed towards the diffuſion and propagation of the ſame Deluſion. Witneſs that peremptory ſpeech of *Pliny* (1 *nat. Hiſtor.*) *ſingulis ſydera tributa ſunt, clara divitibus, minora pauperibus, obſcura defunctis, & pro cujuſque ſorte lucentia ad munera mortalibus.* Nor can we conjecture, what ſhould occaſion the Deception of ſo many and ſo great judgements, in this eaſy particular; unleſs that grand Cauſe of Popular miſtakes, *viz. Tranſcriptive Adherence* to all, that ſeems præſented in the reverend habit of *Antiquity*, eſpecially if guilded over with the Eſtimation of *Rare* and *Sublime:* the Wit of man being naturally prone to Affect and Admire, rather then Indubitate and Examine thoſe Tranſmiſſions, which concern the remoteſt Difficulties in Nature, and above all, the Energy and Configurations of Celeſtial Bodies. *Prodigia cum narrantur, excipi ſolent favore mirantium, & quanquam non ad verum exacti ſint, poſtquam ſemel Scriptorem invenerunt, pluribus placent, veneratione creſcunt, vetuſtate commendantur*; was *Nicopompus* his ſaying, *in Joh. Barclaii Argenis, lib. 2.* For, had they deveſted their minds of all traditional Præjudice, and but reflected their thoughts, either upon the *Hypothetical Neceſſity* of the *Matter*, or Subject, whereon the Starrs are ſuppoſed

* *Rabbi ben Ezra, in ductore dubiorum.*

ſuppoſed to diſcharge and fix their uncontrollable influence; or upon the extremely *different Fortunes of Twins*, conceived and borne under the ſame Conſtellation; or upon the *double Impiety* of aſcribing to remote, weak, and perhaps unconcerned Cauſes, thoſe Effects, which proclaim their deſignment by an *Infinite Wiſedome*, and their Præordination to Ends above the ſagacity of Human Providence; and of charging all the moſt nefarious Villanies of ſinfull man upon the innocuous and exceeding both uſefull and comfortable Creatures of God: had they, we ſay, but pondered any one of theſe Reaſons, that ſufficiently demonſtrate the Abſurdity of Planetary Neceſſity; doubtleſs, they had ſoon reclaimed their belief from this diſhonorable ſeduction, and would no longer have abuſed themſelves with an opinion, that all the Occurrences of every Individuall mans life, together with the time and manner of his death, are the inevitable Effects of thoſe Starrs, which were Lords of the Horoſcope, either at his Conception, or Nativity, or both.

Article 3. The Abſurdity of *Sydereal Neceſſity* evicted (1) by an Argument deſumed from the *Hypothetical Neceſſity* of the *Matter* on which Celeſtial Impreſſions are to operate.

The *Firſt* Reaſon, whereby this *Chaldæan Fate* may be demonſtratively redargued of extreme *vanity*, we deſumed from the *Hypothetical Neceſſity of the Matter*, whereon the Planets exerciſe their power. For, according to their own Conceſſion, *Omnis receptio eſt ad modum recipientis*, All bodies ought to be *Analogous*, *i. e.* prædiſpoſed to admit either the benigne, or maligne influences of the Heavens; for *Alteration* is of neceſſity prævious to *Production*, and before a body be configurate, neceſſary it is that the Matter, whereof it is compoſed, be altered and variouſly præpared; and præpared it is by *Second* Cauſes, but perfected by *Firſt*. Thus the Geniture of the *Male*, though perfect and prolifical in its ſelf, muſt yet be fruſtrated of its end, unleſs it meet with convenient and patible Materials whereon to actuate its Plaſtick virtue, *viz.* the Blood and ſeminal infuſion of the *Femal*, proportioned both in quantity and quality to its Efficiency. Thus the Aer of Ægypt, becauſe *Nilus* (being ἄνυδρος) doth yeeld no Evaporations ſufficient to the generation of Clouds, continues ſtill ſerene and unobnubilated; notwithſtanding the potent Attraction of the Sun,

Moon, and other Sydereal Magnets: and though all the Planets ſhould convene in the watery ſigne of Piſces, as before the catholique Deluge *, and threaten an *Apertio portarum* to that Climate; yet, becauſe the material Cauſe of rain, *Evaporations*, is there wanting, muſt their conſpiracies be defeated, and their Influences become languid and ineffectual. And therefore, by equal reaſon, unleſs the Planet, which is Lord of the Geniture, ſhall find a Subject qualified in all points for the admiſſion and promotion of this Celeſtial Fate, which our effronted *Genethliacks* have conceived it to immit into Embryons and Births, all its magnified Influx muſt miſcarry, and be loſt in an invalidity as abſolute, as the labour of that Statuary, who ſhould attempt to melt Marble with Fire, or mould ſand into an Image, without a convenient Cement. If this be, as it muſt be true; that the *Præparation* of the Matter, on which the Impreſſions of Superlunary Bodies are to operate, doth depend upon *Sublunary* and *determinate Cauſes*: then may we, with more honour, recurr to that excellent ſentence of the *Poet*;

Libera ſit at nobis mens, nulli ſubdita cœlo.

* *Reſpice pag.* 143.

Article 4. (2) By the common Experiment of the unæqual Fortunes of *Twins.*

The *Second* prægnant Argument, wherewith the more ſober ſort of Book-men uſually deride the Arrogance of our *Genethliacks* (who bluſh not to promiſe to the world exact Copies of the Rolls of Deſtiny, and divine as confidently as if they had bin of the Cabal with all the Aſteriſms) we derived from the common *Experiment of Twinns*: who, though procreated of the ſame Seminalities, fæcundate in the ſame Ovarie or bed of nature, and (for ought even our moſt perſpicacious *Harvey* knows to the contrary) conceived in the ſame moment, and ſo under the ſame *Aſcendent*; are notwithſtanding many times obſerved to differ in Sex, phyſiognomy, genius, condition of life, and moſtly in the manner and time of their death. Thus *Eſau* and *Jacob*, who may, without the diſpenſation of a Figure, be ſayd to have bin but one and the ſame Birth, the younger Midwifing himſelf into the world by holding faſt his brothers heel, and ſo if not indubitating the right of Primogeniture, yet at leaſt portending his future purchaſe and uſurpation thereof: were yet ſo diſparate

in

n their Complexions, Diſpoſitions, Fortunes, courſe of life, Age, and diſſolution; that our Secretaries of Heaven muſt either demonſtrate that the face of the Heavens was varied in that ſhort moment that intervened betwixt their neer Nativities; or confeſs it to be the hand of *Providence Divine*, which diſtributed to each his peculiar Lot, not the irrational Starrs that cauſed that vaſt diſproportion. And thus *Proclus* and *Euriſthenes*, Gemini not only in their production, but in the Crown of *Lacedæmonia*, and ſo æqually diſpoſed by their Fortunes alſo to the promotion of that Influence, which the then paramont Conjunction of the Planets had impreſſed upon them: did neither live in equal glory, nor periſh by equal and ſynchronical Fates. On the *Reverſe*; how many Myriads have proved Twinns, in their Deceaſe, who were utter Aliens in their blood, nativity, conſtitutions, profeſſions, inclinations, fortunes? Dare our Judicial Aſtrologers affirme, that All, who fall in battle at once, had one and the ſame ſydereal Fate, which neceſſitated that their Copartnerſhip in the grave? unfainedly, nothing acquainted with letters can be ſo contradictorily impudent. What excuſe have they then left them, for ſtopping their ears againſt that grave Admonition of the oraculous *Zoroaſter*; μὴ σὺ γ' ἄυξανε τὴν εἱμαρμένην, *Ne tu augeas fatum*, Beware thou doſt not aggravate thy Fate. which ſignifies no leſs then this; in thy power it is, either to promote, or fruſtrate the virtues of Celeſtial Influxes: to promote them by Cooperation, to infirme and defeat them by Counter-inclination or repugnancy. To which we may accommodate alſo that memorable Aphoriſme of the Prince of Aſtrologers, *Ptolemy*; *Poteſt is, qui ſciens eſt, multos ſtellarum effectus avertere, quando naturam earum noverit, ac ſeipſum ante illorum eventum præparaverit.*

Our *laſt* Argument to confound Chaldæan Fate, is the *Double Impiety* inferrible thereupon. (1) If the Infelicity of every man be the indeclinable Effect of that malicious Tincture, which the unfriendly Complexion of the Heavens at his Nativity infuſed into his nature; as our *æthereal Mercuries* affirme: then

Article 5. (3) By the double *Impiety*, inſeparable from the belief thereof.

then must it follow, that those glorious orbs were created by God more for the *harme* and *ruine*, then benefit and comfort of mankind; for whose sake only, subordinate to his own Glory, the whole Creation was intended. And (2) if all the regicides, parricides, homicides, incests, rapes, rapines, blasphemies, sacrilegies, rebellions, proditions, &c. nefarious acts of Miscreants (the very naming whereof will blister the most innocent lips) be the executions of those designes, which the malevolent starrs in their Confœderations have determined to accomplish by such and such unhappy Instruments: then must it be conceded, that no Malefactor ought to be accountable to justice, because he can plead, *Non equidem vellem, sed me mea Fata trahebant*; as also, that *God is the Author of Evil*, by giving to the starrs such noxious power, and such unlimited Commissions, as doe autorize them to operate to the Destruction of his *Masterpiece*.

To these 3 Redargutions of *Astrological Necessity*, we might have annexed as many score, borrowed from *Picus Mirandulanus*, *Bradwardine* B. of Canterbury, *Sixtus Senensis*, *Mersennus*, *Gassendus*, All which heroical Champions of truth and Providence Divine, have drawn their victorious swords, in this quarrel, against the Host of Heaven: but, remembring that proverbial axiome, *Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri possit per pauciora*, we found our selves obliged to decline supererogation, and referr the unsatisfied to these incomparable Authors. However, we ask leave to insert the memorable and not commonly quoted Confession of *Hillarius Altobellus Senior* (*in præfatione ad Tabulas Regias Divisionum* 12. *partium Cœli*) in these words. *Cum igitur per tot secula fluctuarit Astronomia, & mendax tanto tempore peragrarit totum orbem, quot modis, quot locis, quot viribus, quot cum temerariis vel ignavis auctoribus, inverecunda, fronte perfricta, fornicata est? nunquam, nullibi, nullis* (*ante Tychonem, & à Ptolemæo post aliqua secula*) *annuam veracem revolutionem dedit, neque eventuum verum tempus consignavit, non ipsa, non dilectissima filia Astrologia. Utraque enim pavit curiosos mendaciis & adulationibus. Si autem interdum mendaces non fuere, sors favit, vel casus, vel*

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per accidens congruentia ſyderum ad illa puncta, & non docta ac naturalis conjectatio. By which ingenuous Confeſſion of a *Perſon*, whoſe aſſiduous inqueſt into the moſt recondite myſteries of Aſtronomy, non only by indefatigate lecture of the choyceſt of Urania's Secretaries, but alſo by the moſt exact uſe of Inſtruments and Tables, and frequent tempeſtive Experiments, had enabled him to detect all thoſe pernicious Frauds, which either the *Ignorance*, or *oſtentation* of ſucceeding Ages had foiſted in upon the ſimple and demonſtrable *Uranometrical obſervations and Axioms* of Antiquity; not only to the *Corruption*, but eternal *Defamation* and contempt of that noble *Science*: how much of juſt *Diſparagement* is inferred upon *Judicial Aſtrology*, which the *Avarice* of Divining Impoſtors, on one hand, and the ſuperſtitious *Curioſity* of abject minds, on the other, have exalted to the height of *Deſtiny*; we ſhould rudely derogate from our *Readers* Capacity, not wholly to entruſt to his own immediate judgement. To ratifie and terminate this our reprobation of our *Genethliacal Schematiſts*, we have the like cenſure of them from *S. Ambroſe* (*in Hexaemero*) *Nonnulli tentaverunt exprimere Nativitatum qualitates, qualis futurus unuſquiſque, qui natus ſit, eſſet; cum hoc non ſolum vanum ſit & inutile quarentibus, ſed impoſſibile pollicentibus.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The Liberty of Mans Will, Fortune, and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine.

SECT. I.

Article 1. The intent of the chapter.

THus long have we exercised the Candor and Patience of our Reader, with the prolix *Recitation*, and necessary *Explanation* of the Ancients opinions concerning *Fate:* and the residue of our province is to gratify him with the concise *Declaremeut* of our own, both concerning the legitimate Admission of this notion of Fate, and the *Conciliation* thereof to mans *Free-will*, *Fortune*, and *Providence Divine*; which we have formerly invited him to expect, as the grand scope at which all our prævious Meditations were directed, and the point in which all these lines of this small matter of Book are concentred.

Article 2. *Democritus* Fate, inconsistent both to the Fundamentals of *Religion*, and the *Liberty* of mans Will: and therefore detested.

First, we are to abominate the execrable Opinion of *Democritus*; not only because it is uncapable of due Consistence with the sacred and indubitable Principles of Religious *Faith*, which ascertain that the Creation, Molition, Conservation, and constant Administration of all things, are impossible rightly to be ascribed to any Cause but the *Supreme Being* alone: but also because it is *è diametro* repugnant to the evidence of that infallible Criterion, the *Light of Nature*; which demonstrateth the Soul of man to be an *Arbitrary* and uncoacted Agent. For, that man hath in himself a power of inhibiting, or suspending his *Assent* unto, and *Approbation* of any object, the Verity

Verity of whose Species is not sufficiently clear and distinct, but *Dubious*; is a perfect Demonstration of the Indifferency, or *Liberty* of his Intellect, and so also of its charge, the Will, or *Faculty Elective*: as *Cartesius* excellently observes, *in Princip. Philosoph. part.* 1. *sect.* 6.

Article 3. *Aristotle* and *Epicurus* their Fate admitted, in that it is Identical to *Nature*: but abominated, in that it clasheth with the *Certitude* of Divine Præscience.

Secondly, that opinion of *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, may, indeed, be defended so far forth as it makes *Fate* and *Nature*, or the Concatenation of natural Causes, to be one and the same thing in reality, though expressed by different Terms: but ought to be exploded, insomuch as it not only denies the *Verity* of Future Events, and so substracts from God the proper Attribute of his most perfect Essence, *Omniscience*, by not conceding to him an infallible Science of all things to come; but also supposeth no Creation of natural Causes, no disposition, no moderation of their Efficiencies by *Providence Divine*.

Article 4. The *Platonick* and *Stoick* Fate embraced, so far as it is conceded to be a *Constitution* of the *Divine Wisdome*: but abandoned, in that it detracts from *Divine Omnipotence*.

And thirdly, as for that more specious opinion of the *Platonist* and *Stoick*; we can discover no danger in our adhæsion to it, so far as it affirmes the primitive *Constitution*, and continual *Gubernation* of all things in the Universe by God; by defining *Fate* to be that Method, series, or systeme of Causes, which the *Divine Nature* at first constituted, and established, in order to the præcise, and opportune effecting all things prædecreed by his infinite *Wisdome*: But yet we must cautiously abandon it in this, that it not only blasphemously invades the cardinal Prærogative of Divinity, *Omnipotence*, by denying him a reserved power, of infringing, or altering any one of those Laws, which Himself ordained, and enacted, and chaining up his armes in the adamantine fetters of Destiny; but also, in great part, excludes the mind of man from acting any voluntary part on the theatre of the world, and leaves no room for the intervention of *Contingents*.

Article 5. In what qualified sense *Christianisme* may tolerate the use of the term, *Fate*.

Nor is there any substantial reason to deterr the most scrupulous *Christian* from admitting the use of this term, *Fate*, in a rectified sense; *i. e.* provided that He thereby understand, not

any blind and unpræmeditate *Neceſsity*; but a provident and well ordered Concatenation of Cauſes, which (like the *Magnetick Chain*, where all the inferior links are dependent on the imprægnating or invigorating Emanations of the Firſt,) was conſtituted by the *Fiat* of the *Eternal Wiſdome*, and may be varied, or inverted by the occaſional Determinations of the ſame; and this without incurring the Imperfection either of *Inconſtancy* or *Improviſion*. For our warrant in this we have no leſs a Præcedent, then *St. Auſtin*; whoſe words are theſe: *Qui omnium connexionem ſeriemque Cauſarum, quâ fit omne, quod fit, Fati nomine appellant; non multum cum iis de verbi controverſia certandum eſt: quandoquidem ipſum cauſarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem ſummi Dei tribuunt Voluntati; ac proinde Fati voce qui voluerit uti, ſententiam teneat, linguam corrigat.* (*in* 5. *de Civit. Dei. cap.* 8.) ¶.

Sect. II.

Article 1. *Fate* and *Fortune* conciliated, in the point of *Providence Divine.*

NOw, as for the Abolition of the ſeeming *Enmitie* between *Fate* and *Fortune*; tis not obſcure, that the Conceſſion of the one is very far from adnihilating the other. For, if we admit *Fate* to be a Law, by the Divine Will impoſed upon Natural Cauſes, according to the tenor whereof all things are done, that are done; and *Fortune* to be an Event reſulting from a concurſe of Natural Cauſes, beſides, above, or contrary to the expectation, conjecture, and forecaſt of man, though præciſely præordained by the Providence of God, and connexed to the ſeries of Cauſes, or Chain of Fate: we cannot but ſoon perceive their Convention, Concentration, and Identity in the point of *Providence Divine*; nor is there any veil of *Diſcrepancy* betwixt them, in their naked and ſimple Realities, but that light and thin one, which either the *Ignorance* or *Sophiſtry* of man hath rudely, and perhaps profanely drawn. When a *Prince* diſpatcheth two Poſts to the ſame place, by ſeveral waies, neither knowing of the others miſſion; and they meet each other in one

one moment at their journeys end: though we may rightly call it Fortune, in reſpect to them, who never thought of that Convention; yet ſtill is it providence, in reſpect to the Prince, who ſent them; and limited their time of travell to ſuch an houre. And undoubtedly, by the authority of no leſs reaſon are we bound to acknowledge, that though many Events hourly occurring to us, which the higheſt Human Prudence could never ſo much as ſuſpect, may without derogation to the ſacred Monarchy of God, be ſtyled meerly Fortuitous, in relation to our Improviſion: yet ſtill are they the wiſe and convenient Prædeterminations of his Special Providence. Our Memory may rehearſe, that the Terme, Fortune, hath a double importance; (1) a Concurſe of Cauſes; (2) mans prævious Ignoration of the Event reſulting from that Concurſe: and our Reaſon cannot but hence inferr, that according to the Firſt, Fortune may be admitted in reſpect to man, though not of God; and according to the Laſt, nothing can interdict our aſſertion, that *Fortune* is a part, not only of *Fate*, but alſo of *Providence Divine*, which, as hath bin profuſely demonſtrated, comprehends all occurrences, as well thoſe which are, as thoſe which are not prævised by Man. And in this ſenſe only are we to interpret that ſentence of *Plato* (*Epiſt. 6.*) *Deum apparare Fortunam*; as alſo that other, (*in 4. de Legibus*) *Deum, & cum Deo Fortunam humana omnia gubernare.* This duely conſidered, we cannot but conclude; that Fortune is conſiſtent with Fate, by the ſame intereſt, that a Species doth conſiſt with its Genus: for that the Analogie is conſimilar, is manifeſt from what immediately præcedes.

Article 2. *Plutarchs* ingenious Aſſimilation of Fate to the *Civil Law*: and his deſign therein.

Plutarch, when deſcanting upon *Plato* his Diſtinction of *Providence* into *Supreme*, *Planetary*, and *Sublunary*; judiciouſly interpreteth the ſupreme, to be *Intelligentia & benefica Dei voluntas*, the Intelligence and benefical Will of God: and this for two reſpects; (1) that He might with greater reaſon enunciate, that Fate is to be reputed ſubordinate to the *Divine Will*; (2) that He might with greater auctority contradict that proverbial error, *Omnia Fato fieri*; though he conceded,

ceded, *Omnia Fato complecti*, that all things are comprehended in Fate. We say *All* things, not only meerly *Fortuitous*, and more General *Contingents*; but also τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, such whose Event is ambiguous, and suspended on the Election or Aversation of Mans Free-will. And the scope at which He aimed this Distinction; was to insinuate and commend the *Analogie betwixt Fate and the Civil Law*. For (sayth He) as all actions are not *Legitimate*, *i. e.* are not done according to the rule of the Law, which are under the comprehension of the Law (for the Law comprehends Prodition, Desertion, and many offences of the same kind, which yet no man can justify to be Legitimate: since that only is Legitimate, which is præscribed by the Law; and therefore He, who kills a Tyrant, doth not a Lawfull, (though a Commendable, at least not a punishable Act) but only those, which are enjoyned and expresly præscribed by the Law: even so, though Fate doth comprehend all Events, yet are not all Events therein comprehended, *Fatal*, or the *Designations* and *Effects* of Fate; but only those, which follow upon *Causes* (ἐν τῇ θείᾳ διατάξει) in the *Divine Disposition Antecedent*, or *Necessary*; such as are the motions of the Planets, upon which their Rising and Setting follow of Necessity.

Sect. III.

Article 1. *Fate* concentrical to mans *Elective Liberty*, in the point of *Prædestination*.

AND finally, concerning the Enodation of that more then Gordian Knot, (about which many Ancient *Philosophers* have broken the teeth of their *Reason*; and as many *Christian Theologists* bin driven to make use of the sword of *Faith*, to cut it asunder) *viz. the Conciliation of Fate to its apparent Contrary, Mans Free-will*; we conceive the most hopefull way of dissolving the mighty Difficulty to be, with the most penetrating *Thom. Aquinas*, to understand *Fate*, in respect to man, to be

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no more but that part of Providence Divine, which Theologists intend by the Term, *Predestination*. For the vulgarly conceived Antipraxis between Providence Divine and Liberty Human, being once removed: the Repugnancy between Fate and Liberty will also vanish of consequence. This that we have, in the 4. *Sect.* of our *Chapter concerning the Mobility of the Term of mans life*, to more then a small part performed; the Memory of our Reader is a sufficient record. However, that we may leave no stone unturned, under which any the most minute particle of Truth, to whose Explanation the concernment of our præsent Theme doth adlige us, may be thought to lye neglected: we shall, with permission from, and due submission unto the Censure of the *Church* (from whose Fundamentals we humbly beseech the *God of Truth* we may never recede in the least) make a second attempt to expound the mysterious Riddle of *Predestination*; that so we may with more perspicuity evidence the Conciliability thereof to mans *Arbitrary Agency*.

Article 2. The Concord betwixt *Theology* and *Philosophy*, in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural, *viz. Necessary*, and *Free*; the ground of the *Affinity* both betwixt the *Difficulties*, and and *Solutions*, on either part: as to the Abolition of the seeming *Repugnancy* between *Fate* and mans *Free-will*.

In order hereunto, we are to observe, that as *Theology* holds it for a maxime, that God created two distinct orders of Causes, in the General, *viz. Necessary*, and *Free*; and that both of these constantly and faithfully execute the commission of their Natures, respectively, *i.e.* the *Necessary* operate by *Necessity*, and the *Free* by *Liberty*: so also doth *Philosophy* admit it for Canonical, that both the Necessary and Free æqually acknowledge God for their Author, and are so comprehended in the episcopacy of Fate; that the Necessary operate Necessarily, or Fatally, and the Free not Fatally, but Freely. And from this *Consent* comes it to pass, that as the *Difficulties*, which perplex both Divines and Philosophers, are of great *Affinity*, if not *Identical*, in the main: so also are the *Responses* thereto of æqual moment: Wherefore it must commend our studies, to select only those *Two Cardinal Doubts*, to which all others may, in some relation, either direct, or collateral, be referred: and, to the perspicuous *solution* of each, accommodate such prægnant Reasons, as may be of correspondent extent in their importance.

Article 3. The *First* capital *Difficulty*, desumed from *Divine Præscience*; as stated by *Divines*.

The *Former*, being desumed from *Divine Prænotion*, is by the *Theologist* propoſed thus. *Either God knew definitely and certainly, that* Peter *would deny Christ: or He did not know it. That he did not know it, cannot be affirmed; first, because He præciſely prædicted his Abnegation; ſecondly, becauſe Truth it ſelf cannot lye: and if He had not known it, He not bin Omniſcient, and conſequently not God. Therefore He knew it definitely and certainly: and upon inference; it was impoſſible to* Peter, *not to deny. For had it bin left to his Election, and he uſing that Liberty had not denyed: then might the Prænotion of God have bin argued of Fallacity, and his Prædiction of Falſity. But if it was not in* Peters *power, not to have denyed; 'tis manifeſt, that he wanted the Liberty of Election.*

Article 4. The ſame, as ſtated by *Philoſophers*.

And by the *Philoſophers* thus. *Either the Gods have a definite and infallible præſcience of the future events of Contingents* (*i. e.* whether of 2. contrary Events, in poſſibility, ſhall be deduced *extra Cauſas*, or actually ſucceed) *or they have no knowledge at all of future things; or they have an indefinite, and only conjectural cognition, ſuch as even Man may juſtly pretend to: but neither the* 2. *nor* 3. *propoſition can be endured, without the joynt toleration of moſt horrid* Abſurdities, *and inevitable præcipitation upon that dangerous rock*, the Commenſuration of the Infinite Science of the Gods, by the Finite extent of mans capacity; *and therefore the First remains only to be aſſerted. If therefore the Gods have a certain Prænotion, which of* 2. *Contraries, whoſe Event is equally poſſible, as to the virtues of their Cauſes, ſhall come to be effected: manifeſt it is, that that particular Event, whoſe Ambiguity is determined to Certainty of Futurition, and is actually brought to paſs, is Fatal or* Neceſſary, *i. e.* could not but come to paſs. *For, otherwiſe, the Gods muſt be confeſt ſubject to* Mendacity. *One of the two therefore, muſt be granted,* viz. *that all things come to paſs,* Neceſſarily, *as they are foreknown and Prædicted by the Gods*; and *ſo that the word,* Contingens, *is excluded, as importing no* Reality, *but a meer* Chimæra; *or, that the Affairs or Occurrences*

Occurrences of man, are neither præcognite, nor procured by the Gods; the Impoſsibility of which aſſertion, doth alſo fully exclude all Contingency.

Article 5. The full ſolution of the ſame, by virtue of the *Divines* Diſcrimination of *Neceſsity* into *Abſolute* and *Hypothetical.*

To the Solution of this Difficulty, tis well known, the Divines have moſt judiciouſly accommodated their Diſtinction of *Neceſsity* into *Abſolute* and *Suppoſitional.* For inſtance; that 2. and 3. make 5. or that yeſterday is præterlapſed, is Abſolutely Neceſſary: but, that I ſhould to morrow take a journey into the Country, or write a Conſult for ſuch or ſuch a Patient, is not abſolutely Neceſſary; yet if I ſuppoſe, that I ſhall travel; or write; then there ariſeth a Neceſſity of my travelling, or writing, *ex Suppoſitione*, from that my Suppoſition. Now, in reſpect tis manifeſt from this Diſtinction, that the Neceſſity *Abſolute* of any Action doth deſtroy the *Liberty* of the Agent; but the *Suppoſitional* doth not (for though I journy, or write, according to my Suppoſition, yet was it poſſible to me to have done neither) thereupon doe they moſt excellently reaſon thus: that *Peters* Abnegation was foreſeen and prædicted by God, as an Event to come of *Neceſsity*, not Abſolute, but *Suppoſitional*, by which nothing was detracted from *Peters* Liberty of not denying. For, as now in the *præſent*, if He be interrogated concerning his Maſter, he is intirely *Free* or to avouch, or diſavow his knowledge of him; ſo alſo will He be in the *Future*, when He ſhall be interrogated. Wherefore, as, if He now determine himſelf rather to deny, then affirme, and according to that determination actually deny; He doth that *Freely*, notwithſtanding from the moment he denied, his denial is Neceſſary, inſomuch as it is ſuppoſed that he hath actually denied: ſo alſo in the Future, when He ſhall determine himſelf rather to deny, then affirme, and according to that determination ſhall actually deny, ſhall his denial be Free, or Arbitrary; however it cannot but be granted Neceſſary that He hath denyed; becauſe he hath already actually denied. Nor is it paradoxical, or difficult to affirme, that this *Suppoſitional Neceſsity*, and *Peters Liberty* are not Ἀσύστατα, *Diſcordant*, or *Inconſiſtent*, in any reſpect; becauſe the Neceſſity is ſubſequent,

subsequent, not antecedent to the Determination of his Liberty; and because it doth not consist so much in *Re, vel Actione,* in the Thing or Action it self, as *in Temporis Circumstantia,* the Circumstance of Time when 'tis done. Since, when we say, tis Necessary that *Peter* hath denyed; that Necessity is not understood to have bin any thing Antecedently in him, which compelled him to deny: but that it is radicated now in *Time* it self, which as it is really past, and cannot be not past; so the Action done in that past time, however it was done, cannot be not done. And hence it is evident, though no man can justly assert, that twas Necessary to *Peter* to deny, because according to that assertion, there must be understood some Antecedent Cause, by which he was coacted to deny: yet justified it may be that Now tis Necessary that he hath denyed; because the Action being once done, and so impossible to be not done, all the Necessity falls upon the *Preterition* of the Time. Now, in respect that God is *Omniscient*, He cannot but *Foresee* that *Peter* will deny; yet that *Divine Prænotion* of *Peters* Abnegation, is subsequent to the *Divine Prævision* of *Peters* Free Determination: and therefore God Foresees that *Peter* will deny, only because He Foresees, that *Peter*, abusing his Liberty, will freely determine himself to a denial. And hence comes it to be embraced amongst the most judicious School-men, as a truth indisputable; *That* Peter *will deny, not because God hath prævised and prædicted that he will deny:* but that, *because* Peter *will deny, when he shall be examined, therefore and for no other reason doth God Foresee and Foretell that he will deny.* For, *uti Scientia, præteritam rem pro objecto habens, nullam rei præteritæ, ut ita & non aliter fieret, necessitatem infert: ita Præscientia, rem futuram pro suo objecto habens, rei futuræ, sive Futuritioni nullam potest inferre necessitatem: utraque enim est extra rem, & in Deo actio Immanens;* that as *Science* having for its object a thing *Præterite*, doth induce no necessity thereupon, that it should have bin so, and no otherwise, so also doth *Præscience*, having for its object a thing *Future*, inferr no necessity upon its *Futurition*, that it shall so and no otherwise come to pass; for both *Science* and *Præscience* are distinct from, and

and alien to their Objects, and Actions *Immanent* in God, *i. e.* not at all effluxed to the object, to the destruction, or alteration of its Nature: this, we say, is a Verity which demonstrateth it self, and which we have more præcisely insisted upon, *in the 4. Articl. 4. Sect. of our discourse of the Mobility of the term of mans life.* And that all *Cognition* is a thing really distinct from, and extraneous to its Object; and that a thing comes to be actually, what it is, not from the Cognition thereof by an Idea in all points consimilar, but from it self, or its Efficient Cause: needs no other probation, but the conviction of this instance; that *Snow* is white, not because tis known to be white, but contrary, that it is known to be white, because really it is so. To speak a profound truth plainly, in few words; herein consists the *Disparity* between *Divine* and *Human* Cognition, *viz.* that *Human* can be extended only to *Present* and *Preterite*: but *Divine* doth extend it self, with equal Certitude, to *Future* Contingents also. Now, insomuch as *Preterite* Contingents were sometimes Future, and in the same condition with those, which are yet Future; and again, those which are yet *Future* may be understood to be præterite in time to come, and in the same condition with those, which are already Præterite: manifest it is, that as neither Divine, nor Human Cognition is the Cause, why Contingents already Præterite, are præterite; but, *è contrà*, they are known as Præterite, because really they are so: in like manner, that those which are Future, are not therefore Future, because God holds an exact prænotion of them, as Future; but, *è contrà*, because they really are Future, therefore doth God hold an exact prænotion of their Futurition. And upon this Basis was it, that many Schoolmen erected that *Axiom, Prævisionem Dei nihil influere in humanas actiones*; that the Prævision of God hath no influence (*coactive*) upon the actions of man. Now, what hath bin argued for the Prævision and Prænotion of God, is also to be extended to his *Prædiction*; especially because tis uncontrovertible, that Prædiction is posterior or subsequent to the Prænotion of any Contingent, yet in the womb of Futurity: since what is not exactly *foreknown*, can never be certainly

foretold. For which respect, shall any urge upon us, that the Divine Prænotion and Prædiction cannot be *Fallacious*; we shall most willingly concede their position, as most indubitate, because nothing can be prognosticate by God, as Future, which is not really Future: but, when it shall be thence inferred, that if *Peter* had once the absolute power in his own hands to have not denyed, and rightly using that arbitrary power, had actually not denyed; in that case, the prænotion and prædiction of his denyal by God had proved Fallacious; we must reject the *Illation*, as illegal and absurd, because had not *Peters* denyall bin realy Future, God had neither prævised, nor prædicted the same. For, it is the *Reality* of its *Futurition*, that supports the *Certitude* of the *Prædiction* of any future Contingent. And therefore, in case *Peter* had bin not to deny, God had as certainly prædicted, that He would not deny: since so the *Supposition* had bin quite *contrary*, *viz.* that *Peter*, rightly using his Liberty of Election, would determine it, not to a Negation, but *Affirmation*. Whereupon we may safely conclude (1) that *Peters* Abnegation was Future, and (2) that God both prævised and prædicted the same, upon no other Necessity but only this: that *Peter*, when it should be in his own power to determine himself to either part, would then actually determine himself rather to *Disclaim* and *Abjure*, then own and avow, his Master. Thus the *Divines*.

Article 6. The *Solution* of the same by the *Philosophers* proving that the definite Prænotion of future Contingents, is no Cause of their definite Contingency: but, *è contrà*, the *definity* of their *Futurition*, the cause of their *definite Prænotion*.

And thus the *Philosophers*. *Non quia Dii definitè norunt Contingentia, ideò illa eventura sunt. Neque enim, quia Dii norunt, ideo necessariò eveniunt; sed quia, cum natura sint ancipitis, aut talem, aut talem exhibebunt eventum; norunt Dii necessariò qualem, seu utrum obtinebunt: adeò ut Contingens, ex sua quidem natura indefinitam sit, sed respectu tamen notitiæ Deorum definitum. Quinetiam constat, nostræ quoque notitiæ Contingens definitè cognosci; cum, viz. proprie Contingens deinceps non sit: sed necessariò consequitur antegressas, cur fiat, Causas*: Saith *Ammonius* (*in lib. de interpret.*) The whole importance whereof is this. That the definite prænotion of Contingents by God, is in no relation the cause of their definite Contingency;

Contingency; but, their being of themselves definitely Future, or their *Ambiguity* being to be determined to *Definity* of Futurition, is the Cause of their prænotion by God. For, though a Contingent be *Indefinite*, in respect to its own nature, *i. e.* it is equally determinable, by the Liberty of its Causes, to either of two contrary Events: yet, in respect to the *Prænotion* of God, it is *Definite*; because God hath an infallible prænotion, to which of two contrary Events its Causes will determine it. All which may be confirmed *à Minori*, from the Prænotion of Man; experience assuring, that Physicians frequently prognosticate and prædict the death of their deplored Patients, even to an hour. Not that their Prognosticks have any influence upon the Disease, to determine it to Mortal, when yet it is Dubious: but that the determination of the disease from Dubious to definitely Mortal, by its causes, is the ground of their Prognostick.

Article 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Prænotion.

Here, lest we be misconceived to confound *Divine* and *Human* Præcognition, we advertise; that the Prænotion of God is *Infallible*, because *à Priori*, *i. e.* He foreknows Contingents, while they are yet only in Possibility, and in the womb of their Causes; nor to him, who demands, Why, or How God foreknows Events, while they are yet in the Dark, or Nothing of Futurity? can any other response be given, but this, that He is *Omniscient*, *i. e. God*: but the Prænotion, or (rather) *Præsagition* of man, is *Fallacious*, because desumed *à Posteriori*, from Effects educed *extra Causas*, into actual Existence.

Article 8. The same exemplified.

Which vast Disparity may be most adæquately *Exemplified* thus. *God* certainly Foreknows that *Peter* shall fall sick, and die of such or such a disease, *viz.* a Pestilent Fever. How? because He foreknows, that those Causes, which in respect to the Ambiguity or Indifferency of their event may, or may not generate an intense putrefaction and maligmity in the humors of *Peters* body, shall lose that their Possibility, and determine themselves to the actual production of that particular malignant or pestilential inquinament in his blood, which constituteth the

essence of that disease: and that the disease so generated will be so violent and inoppugnable by the force of Nature, that the Temperament of *Peters* body, being too weak to sustain such a disproportionate Encounter, will thereby be dissolved, and so Death shall inevitably succeed.

But the *Physician* can only *conjecture*, that *Peter may* fall sick of such a malignant Fever; why, because He discovers that *Peters* prævious Intemperance hath prepared the continent Cause, or Fewell for a putrid Fever; and that the access of Malignity, either by Contagion communicated, or from an intense Corruption of humors internally kindled, may, according to the Aptitude of its nature, seise upon that præpared fewell, and Ferment it into a pestilential Fever: but *Definitely* He doth not know, that *Peter shall* fall sick of such a pestilential disease; in regard, it transcends the maximes of his Art, and the Capacity of his limited Reason, to foreknow, whether the Possibility of such an Effect from such Causes, shall be determined to Necessity. Nor can He prædict, that *Peter* being invaded with that disease, shall certainly perish thereby; untill the Dubiosity of the Fever be actually determined to *Lethality*: for then, from Symptoms, that signify the total Succumbency or yeelding of Nature to the victorious fury of the disease, he may, with good warrant and honour, præsage the imminent death of *Peter*. ¶.

Sect. IV.

Article 1. The *Second* Capital *Difficulty*, erected upon a sophism called *Ignava Ratio*; as it respecteth both *Theology*, and *Philosophy*.

THe other Capital Difficulty, being erected upon a certain circumventing Socraticisme, or Interrogatory Sophisme (most adæquately denominated by *Cicero* (*de Fato*) ἀργὸς λόγος, *Ignava Ratio*, an *unactive Argumentation*; because, prævailing upon the mind, it stupefies the same to a perpetual *Restiveness*, or *Supinity*, by charging even the *Thoughts* of every man upon the absolute and inoppugnable prærordination of Destiny; and consequently adnihilating the use of *Piety*, *Prudence*, and *Circum-*

Circumspection in all the actions of our lives) on that side which respecteth *Theology*, beareth this forme.

Either I am, from Eternity, predestined and Elected to immarcescible Glory; or Reprobated to interminable misery. If the Former; then notwithstanding all my Impieties, I cannot be Damned: if the Later; then notwithstanding all my pious endeavours, I cannot be saved. But one of the two must be true: and therefore, since all my Good or Evil actions are of no avail, to what end shall I afflict my self with unnecessary, because fruitless care in any action of my life? Better is it for me, to grant a general Indulgence to my Genius, and provide for nought, but the satisfaction of all my Sensual desires; since that, nor ought else, can neither countermand my Election, nor promove or confirme my Reprobation.

And on the other side, which respecteth *Philosophy*, it is præsented thus. *If the Decree of Fate be, that I shall recover of such a sickness; then, whether I consult the Physician, or not, I shall however recover: but if the decree of Fate be, that I shall not recover; notwithstanding my use, or neglect of the Physician, I shall not recover. And one of the two is necessarily Future: therefore is it vain and needless for me to use the Physician.*

Article 2. Two eminent Opinions of *Divines* touchant the Solution of this Difficulty, recognized: and their judicious Modesty, in duely acknowledging the mystery of *Predestination*, to be *Arcanum Divini imperii*, commended.

In order to our hoped *Solution* of this prodigious *Problem*, we begg leave to be our Readers Remembrancer, that among Divines there are two eminent Opinions, concerning this Δυσπόητον, or almost incomprehensible mysterie; in both which they have expressed so opportune and becoming a Modesty, as must extort from every ingenuous person not only a worthy Acknowledgement, but superlative Commendation. For, being reduced to an admission of some kind of *Necessity*, and considering how inconsistent any the weakest Necessity is with *Liberty*, wherein the *Good* and *Evil*, and so the *Laudability* and *Culpability* of all the Actions of man, must be confessed to be essentially radicated: they thought it the highest point of Wisdome to secure their routed judgements by a mature retreat to the Sanctuary of Ignorance; conceiving it a pitch sublime enough for the most aspiring thoughts of man to mount up to the

Apostles *ô Altitudo!* and soberly becalming the distractions of their Reason, by the Laudanum of Faith. If so, tis no shame for us to confess this Wonder of Prædestination to be *Arcanum Divini Imperii*, not only impervestigable by the acutest and profoundest Speculation of Man, but also too abstruse for the clearer intelligence of *Angels*.

The *Former* opinion states the Abstrusity thus. That God, from all eternity, did Prædestinate, or *Elect*, out of the whole stock, or mass of mankind, a definite number of persons, to whom, *sine ullis eorum meritis, operibusve bonis prævisis, & ex pura sui Bonitate*, without any respect at all to his Prævision of their Good works, but meerly of his own Favour and Benignity, He had decreed eternal Felicity: and the rest He decreed to *Reprobate*, or Damne to eternal Infelicity; yet, *ex prævisis eorum malis operibus*, in respect to his prævision of their Future Evil works.

The *other* thus. That God did as well prædestinate some men to Glory, from his prævision of their Good; as others to misery, from his prævision of their Evil actions. Or thus. God, from Eternity, decreed to create the World, and therein a certain number of men, who should be capable of deserving well, or ill at the hands of his Mercy, or Justice, according to the right use, or abuse of that Liberty of their Understanding and Will, which He was pleased to endow them withall. And, compassionating the Deceptibility of their Nature, He also decreed to diffuse upon the souls of all men, that Supernatural Assistance, which Divines call *Sufficient Grace*; that so they, who should, by the right use of their Elective Liberty, husband their stock or portion of sufficient Grace, to empower them to the performance of Good Actions, should be Elected to Glory: but they, who should abuse both their Liberty, and his Auxiliant Grace, to the doing of Evil Actions, should be Reprobated to misery. And *finally*, because He foresaw, that some would rightly use his Auxiliatory Grace, and constantly persevere in that state of Piety untill death; and that others would neglect, condemn, and abuse it, and never repent perfectly, but die in that horrid state of Impiety: therefore did He decree everlasting Glory to *those*, and as lasting misery to *these*. And this we conceive

ceive to be the most intelligible Adumbration of this more then Ænigmatical Subject.

Article 3. The *First* opinion found totally uncapable of Expedition from the Sophisme, *Iguava Ratio.*

Now, of these two Opinions, the *First* seems as wholly incapable of Expedition from the intricate Entanglings of the precedent *Interrogatory Sophisme*; as the Absolute Decree of Reprobation is of a full Conciliation to the Liberty of mans Will. For what Liberty can remain to those men, who are, by a decree Antecedent to all prævision of their future Good actions, prædestinate to Glory? And were there any Contrapractical Liberty remaining to them, and should their Will, according to that liberty, elect evil, and they do such actions, whose guilt might deserve Damnation Eternal, at the tribunal of Justice Divine: in that case, would the Decree of their Election be eluded and countermanded. Nor is it less Contradictory, to reserve a Liberty to those, who are *Reprobate*; since, for this reason alone, that they are not Elected, it is impossible to them, notwithstanding all their Good inclinations, endevours, and performances, to bring themselves into the number of the *Elect*. And yet damned they shall be, and justly too, for their Evil works: but how is it possible for them to doe Good, and not Evil of Necessity, when the decree of their *Reprobation* is supposed Antecedent to Gods Prævision of the future concurse, or conspiracy of their Will to the tenor of that Decree; and when they are left such deplorable wretches, to whom Damnation, and so the Patration of evil Actions only remain *possible*? To evade this Difficulty of Difficulties, many eminent Doctors of the Chaire as well in Universities, as Synods, have fabricated for themselves as many Sanctuaries of Distinctions. Some adscribing to God a certain Science *Conditionate*, or *Hypothetical* (they unanimously phrase it, *Scientia Media*, and are so immoderately delighted with the Acuteness thereof, that, as the more then generally learned, Dr. *Prideaux* hath satyrically observed (*in prælect. de Scient. Media.*) *de genuino ejus parente, haud segnius ac de Puero vivo inter meretrices, 1 Reg. 3. est decertatum*, there hath bin as passionate and sharp a conflict between *Fonseca, Molina, Leonhardus Lessius Lovaniensis*, &c. Jesuits, for the

the honor of its Invention, as was betwixt the two Harlots about the right to the Living Child) others requiring, if not to the justification of the Decree it self, yet at least to justify the Execution thereof, the concurse of *Good Works*, so necessarily, that no man can ever attain to Glory, but by the scale of *Merits*, at least those of our *Saviour*: and others mincing, or extenuating the Elective Liberty of man into a meer and simple *Libency* (which we have more then once specified, and as often described) and accordingly attempting to salve the *Repugnancy* thus; that the Elect are therefore Free, because they do their Good works *Libently*, or Willingly; and likewise, that the Reprobate are also Free, because they doe their Evil works *Libently*. Hereupon, to him, who shall charge upon them with this *Unactive Argumentation*, they instantly oppose; that there is very great reason, why every man, endowed with this *Libency*, should most strenuously endevour the constant practise of Good, rather then Evil: because, though He be uncertain of the Decree concerning his Election or Reprobation; yet is He certain of this, that no man shall ever be assumed into Glory, unless he shall have done Good, nor any be excluded the Celestial Eden, unless He shall have done Evil. To which they add, that it is the main Duty of every man, to the utmost of his power, to ascertain himself rather of *Election*, by his perseverance in good; then of *Reprobation*, by a debauche and desperate resignation of the sceptre of his Will to all the temptations of Evil: that so he may prævent, or mitigate that *Fear* and *Anxiety*, which must otherwise uncessantly excruciate his mind, during his whole life, by acquiring a setled confidence, that from God, who is infinitely Good and Just, he hath no cause to expect evil, while the scope of all his endeyours is, to deserve well, at least to obtain Mercy at his hand. To conclude, lest man should in the interim either *Glory* in himself, as if He ought, according to justice, to be Elected, for his good works sake; or *Complain* of the rigour of the Decree of his Reprobation, murmuring that it was not his fault, why his name was not inscribed in the Book of life: they check his Glorying with this cooling card of the Apostle, *O Homo! quis te discernit?* and hush his Complaint with, *Tu qui es,*

qui

qui reſpondeas Deo? Nunquid dicet vas Figulo, quare me feciſti ſic? Nunquid facere illi licet aliud vas in honorem, aliud verò in contumeliam? (*Roman. chap. 9. ver. 21.*) And if this ſatisfy not; they here ſet bounds to Curioſity, and lime the wings of thoſe Eagle Wits, who would ſoare higher then the lower region of the myſterie, with that grave advice of the Canonized Doctor: *Quare hunc trahat Deus, illum verò non trahat, noli judicare, ſi non vis errare*; or that modeſt rule of *Cornelius Tacitus*, *Sanctius & reverentius viſum, de actis Deorum credere, quàm ſcire.*

Article 4. The *Second* Opinion, to a great part, extricated from the ſame Labyrinth.

But as for the *Second* Opinion; to our firſt inquiſition, that ſeemes capable of extrication from the forementioned Labyrinth, without much difficulty thus. *I am* (ſays *Adraſtus*, or the Fatiſt) *either Elect to glory, or Reprobate to miſery, by an eternal Decree of God.* This we grant to be moſt true; but with this additional qualification: *that Himſelf is Now the Cauſe, why He was from eternity Elect, or Reprobate.* For, He is now in that very ſtate, in which God foreſaw that he would be, when educed into exiſtence, endowed with reaſon, and aſſiſted with ſufficient Grace, for the clear diſcernment of Good from Evil; and it now depends upon the Liberty of his Will, that God hath præviſed him operating good or evil: ſo that the Decree of his Election, or Reprobation, is ſubſequent or poſterior to the Divine Prævision of his future good, or evil Demerits. To ſpeak yet louder; God therfore *Elected* him to Glory, becauſe He Foreſaw that he would uſe both the Liberty of his Underſtanding and Will, and that Supernaturall Light, or Divine Grace, which the Compaſſion of God vouchſafed for his Aſſiſtance, as he ought, to enable him to lead an honeſt and pious life: and therefore *Reprobated* him to miſery, becauſe He Foreſaw that he would Abuſe the Lights of Nature and Grace, in conſtantly and impenitently doing actions point-blank repugnant to their frequent and importune Adviſoes. This being inferred, the *Fatiſt* cannot but perceive, that it lyes on his part, now to doe well, and with all the nerves of his Mind to *Cooperate* to Divine Grace: that ſo God, from eternity foreſeeing that his Conformity to the dictates of his Grace, may have Elected him.

For if he shall counterinflect his Will to the Inclinations of Divine Grace, and pursue Evil: those Evil works shall be very they, which God from eternity having respect unto, hath Damned him for the Guilt of them, and impœnitence for them.

Article 5. The *Fatists* Subterfuge, of the *Infallibility* of Divine Prænotion, præcluded.

Nor can He elude this truth, by pleading; that God doth from eternity *Foreknow*, whether He shall be Elect, or Reprobate: and that therefore of Necessity he *shall* be, what he *Will* be; since the Divine *Science* is uncapable of *Elusion*, or *Mutability*. Because, though God, indeed, had an infallible Prœcognition, from Eternity, whether he would be Prædestinate, or Reprobate; yet is that Prœcognition grounded upon his own eternal Decree, and that eternal Decree grounded upon his eternal Prævision of the Fatists Good or Evil life. So that the actual Determination of the Will of man to the constant prosecution of Good, is the *Basis*, or first Degree in this mysterious *Climax* of *Prædestination*; the *Prævision* thereof by God, the *second*; the respective *Decree* of God, the *third*; and his indeceptible *Præscience* the *fourth* and last. Not that these *Antecessions* and *Consecutions* are *Temporany*, *i. e.* not that the Præscience of God is posterior to his Decree; and his Decree posterior to his Prævision (for those 3. make but one simple and intire Act in the Divine Intellect and Will: and Eternity is but one permanent *Now*, incapable of Division, because of Cessation) really, but *Anthropopathically*: *i.e.* that narrow and remote Man, when he speculates the nature of his own *Free-Will*, and that of *Divine Justice*, as integrally *Consistent*; is necessitated, for comprehension sake, to suppose some *Momenta Rationis*, or Priority and Posteriority in *Eternity*, as we have singularly enunciated *in the* 2. *Artict.* 4. *Sect.* 6. *chap.* præcedent.

Article 6. A second subterfuge of the Fatist, viz. that *the Subsequence of the Decree to Prænotion, doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability*; prævented.

Again, the Fatist can justly promise to himself no greater protection by this farther objection; *that, if the Divine Decree be subquent to Divine Prævision: therefore is it in his power to stagger the Certitude of the Decree, and dissolve its rigour into an arbitrary Mutability.* Why? because the Decree is not made, *nisi supponendo, quid esset facturus*, but upon a Supposition what the

the future Actions of his life would be: and the *Immutability* thereof is eſtabliſhed upon the *Neceſſity Suppoſitional*, which can diminiſh nothing of the Liberty of man, as we have more then once profeſſedly evinced.

Article 7. A third Concluſion, viz *that the poſteriority of the Decree of Election to Gods prævision of mans future Good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Diſcretion*; detected and redargued.

And as little ſolid reaſon hath He to argue thus. If God did therefore Elect me, only becauſe He eternally prævided thoſe Good works, which I now do: then (*ipſe ero, qui me diſcernam*) *ſhall I my ſelf be to my ſelf the Author of my* Diſcretion. For, tis not man, who by his own ſingle power can make this *Diſcretion*, but the very *Grace of God* alone; without which no man can ever attain ſo high as the foot of Goodneſs.

Article 8. Two *Extracts* from the præmiſes; (1) that the Cooperation of mans Will to ſufficient Grace, may be conceived a Cauſe of his Election: (2) that to render a reaſon, why God did not conſtitute All men ſuch, as that All ſhould cooperate to ſufficient Grace and ſo be Elect; is an impoſſibility to mans underſtanding; other then this, that *ſuch was his eternal Will.*

Conclude we, therefore; though it be not difficult to mans Reaſon, to inveſtigate the *Cauſe*, Why God was pleaſed to ordain this veſſel for Honour, and that for Diſhonour; why He, by the vigorous Magnet of his ſpecial Indulgence, doth Attract this, and not that man; ſtill diſpenſing a ſufficient portion of his illuminating Grace to all men: ſince it is not obſcure, that the *Concurſe*, *Conſpiracy*, and *Cooperation* of this mans Will to that *ſufficient Grace*, may inoffenſively be conceived to be the Cauſe, at leaſt a Cauſe, and ſo *è contra*. Yet is it (and the Acuteſt Wits have, from the Flaws made in them by the more then Adamantine Hardneſs of this Rock, had great reaſon to conjecture it will always continue) the moſt Deſperate Difficulty, that ere perplexed the Cogitations of inquiſitive Mortality, to explore the reaſon, why God made men of ſuch a condition, as that ſome would be deſtinate to Honour, and others to Diſhonour; and not All men ſuch, as that they ſhould willingly ſuffer themſelves to be Allected by the Loadſtone of his Love, or be willing to cooperate to his Grace diffuſed upon them: when, had it ſeemed convenient to his Wiſdome, He might have made All men ſuch, as that they would, with all ardency of Affection, and force of their Wills, have Cooperated to his Grace, and ſo have bin Elected to Honor. And certainly, from hence alone, that our *Delection* of *Virtue*, or *Vice* (conforme to which our Minds are carried on with a kind of infrænable Tendency; and

to which the Prævision of God being extended, He hath either Elected, or Reprobated) is necessarily dependent upon the *Notions*, or *Species* of things objected to our Senses, and traductively to our Cognoscent Faculty: there remains to us more then a great occasion of applauding and admiring the Modesty and judgement of the *Apostles* Exclamation, *ô Altitudo!* especially when the *Exhibition*, or Præsentation of those Notions, and Species doth depend upon that *Concatenate Series*, or subalternate syntax and Disposition of Causes and Effects, which God, when He Created the World, according to the Model of his own imperscrutable Wisdome, thought good to institute. And this we have judged to be a faithfull Summarie of what the *Divines* Respons to this Circæan Charm, or *Sophisme* of *Adrastus* containeth.

The Remnant of our Assumption, is only to contract those voluminous Discourses of *Philosophers*, which perpendicularly point at the Solution of the same most bloody and impious Sophisme, into a few medullary or essential lines.

Article 9. The former Sophisme, (*ignava Ratio*) in part dissolved, by *Plutarchs* Distinction; *that though All effects are comprehended in, yet all are not caused by Fate.*

Plutarch (*de Fato*) as *Platos* Interpreter, insisting upon the prærecited *Adæquation* of *Fate* to the *Civil Law*; hopes to decide the mighty Controversy by distinguishing thus: *Tametsi omnia, quæ fiunt, Fato contineantur; non tamen Fato omnia fieri: ac ejusmodi esse ea, quæ Contingenter, sive Liberè, ac « Fortuito fiunt.* That though all things, which come to pass, « are contained in Fate; yet are not all things effected By Fate: » and particularly those Events, which are meerly Fortuitous, « and those which are effected by Arbitrary Agents. Now, according to this eminent Distinction, we may concede; that it is, indeed, comprehended in Fate, not only that Thou, being cast upon the thorny bed of Sickness, shalt or recover, or perish, but also that thou shalt or Consult, or Neglect the Physician: But positively deny, that therefore either thy Convalescence, or Death is Fatal, since tis *Contingent*; as also, that thy use, or neglect of the Physician, is Fatal, since tis *Arbitrary*.

Notwith-

Notwithſtanding this nice and ſpecious Diſtinction, we confeſs, there remains a *Difficulty*, and ſuch a one as the greateſt *Oedipuſes* of the World may, without diſhonour to their Perſpicacity, deſpair of its ſatisfactory Diſſolution; *viz.* How it can be, ſince there is ſome Cauſe, which conduceth rather to thy Convaleſcence, then Deſtruction; or, *è contrà*, rather to thy Deſtruction, then Convaleſcence; and ſome Cauſe, which induceth, or inclineth thee rather to Conſult, then Neglect the Phyſician, or, *è contrà*, rather to Neglect, then Conſult him: and ſince thoſe Cauſes had others Antecedent to them, and thoſe were connected to others, and thoſe to others, &c. retrograde along the chain of Fate: How it can be, we ſay, that theſe Effects, being admitted to be Contained in Fate, may not be alſo admitted to be Cauſed by Fate. Eſpecially, when we cannot, without paſſion, quarrel at his Conſtruction, who ſhall tell us; that to be Contained in Fate, is as much as to be *connected to the Series of Cauſes*, and that little leſs, then to be Effected by Fate. To palliate, not cure the Itch of Curioſity in this particular; we ask leave, with the ſublimeſt and moſt daring Contemplators of the World, to recurr to that General Aſylum; *Non debet Humana Sapientia ſupra Divinam illam gloriari, juxta quam vetamur ſcrupuloſiùs inquirere, quamobrem Deus ſic ordinarit.* And this the reaſon was of our ſaying, that the ſecond opinion of Divines, to our firſt inſpection, *ſeemed* capable of Extrication from the Labyrinth of the Fatiſts *Unactive Argumentation*: for our ſecond and more profounding meditations have found it far otherwiſe. However, we judge it worthy our Readers Patience, here to acquaint himſelf with the ſubtle *Evaſions* of ſome *Philoſophers*; eſpecially when He ſhall ſurvey them in epitome.

Article 10. The inſufficiency of that Diſtinction, to the total ſolution of the *Difficulty*, duely acknowledged.

Plato (*in* 10. *de Repub.*) ſagely diſcourſing about the future *Infuſion* of *Souls* into Bodies, imagineth ſome certain *Sortes*, or *Lots*; which *Lacheſis* diſtributing to ſouls, as ſhe pleaſes, thus inaugurates them: *Non vos Dæmon excipiet, ſed vos Dæmonem eligetis*; your Genius ſhall not obtrude it ſelf upon you,

Article 11. The moſt promiſing Reſponſes of ſome Philoſophers, conciſely præſented: *viz.* of 1. *Plato.*

but every one ſhall elect his own particular Genius. And ſoon after, as a Comment upon his former Parable, He ſuperaddeth thus much; *Virtus ſola extra omnem ſervitutis noxam eſt; libera plane & ſervire neſcia: quam prout quis vel honorabit, vel negliget; ita plus vel minus ex ea poſſidebit. Culpa omnis eſt penes eligentem; Deus eſt extra omnem culpam.* Virtue « is alone ſuperior to all ſervitude and compulſion, being abſo- « lutely Free, and neſcious of ſubjection: of which every man « ſhall poſſeſs more or leſs, according to his eſtimation, or neg- « lect thereof. All blame is lodged on the *Electors* ſide: and « none can be on *Gods*. In both which parabolical præſenta- tions collated, we need not the opticks of *Sphinx* to diſcover a lively adumbration of the Later opinion of Divines, which is yet warme in our memory; for therein appears a ſhadow or pale deſcription of *Divine Prædeſtination*, joyned hand in hand with the future uſe of mans *Liberty*: and this becomes the more viſible by *Virtue*, which is but the repræſentative, or ſuc- cedaneum of *Divine Grace*.

And as for the mythology of his imaginary *Sortes*, or Lots; *Plotinus* (*Enn. 2. lib. 3. cap. 15.*) unriddleth them to be, not only the Diſpoſition of the Univers, at what time the Soul is immerſed into the body; nor only the individual Temperament of the Body, derived by traduction from the Parents; nor only the condition of the Climate, region and place; but alſo All other Extraneous Influences, by which the Mind may be either Adjuvated, or Impeded, in its right Ratiocination, Judicature, Election, and Proſecution of Good, or Evil.

2. *Seneca.* *Seneca* (*in 2. Nat. Queſt. 35.*) vindicating their Devotion, who fled to the Sanctuary of Prayers, Vowes, and Expiations, as a more certain Præſervative from the Combuſtion of Light- ning, then a Chaplet of Laurel (whoſe caſe holds no remote Analogy to theirs, who in ſickneſs addreſs to the Phyſician) hath this obſervable and pertinent paſſage. *Hoc habent commune nobiſcum, quòd nos quoque exiſtimamus vota proficere, ſalva vi, ac poteſtate Fatorum. Quædam enim à Diis immortalibus ita ſuſpenſa relicta ſunt, ut in bonum vertant, ſi admota Diis pre- ces fuerint, ſi vota ſuſcepta. Ita non eſt hoc contra Fatum, ſed*

ipſum

ipſum quoque in Fato eſt. Aut futurum, inquit, eſt, aut non. Si futurum; etiam ſi non ſuſceperis vota, fiet. Falſa eſt interrogatio; quia illam mediam inter iſta exceptionem prateris. Futurum, inquam, hoc eſt, ſi vota ſuſcepta fuerint. Hoc quoque neceſſe eſt, inquit, Fato comprehenſum ſit; aut ſuſcipiat vota, aut non. Puta me tibi manus dare, & fateri hoc quoque Fato eſſe comprehenſum, ut utique fiant vota; ideo fient. Fatum eſt, ut Hic diſertus ſit; ſed ſi literas didicerit. Ab eodem fato continetur, ut literas diſcat; ideo diſcet. Hic Dives erit: ſed ſi navigaverit. An in illo fati ordine, quo patrimonium illi grande promittitur; hoc quoque protinus fatum eſt, ut naviget, ideo navigabit. Idem dico tibi de Expiationibus; effugiet pericula, ſi expiaverit prædictas Divinitus minas; at hoc quoque fato eſt, ut expiet; ideo expiabit, &c.

3. *Chryſippus.*

And *Chryſippus* (*apud Agellium, lib. 6. cap. 2.*) being preſſed hard by the ſame ponderous Argument of the *neceſſary Exhibition of the Species of objects of the Mind*; is driven to aſſimilate the *Mobility* of the Mind to that of a *Cylindre*, or *Bowle*, which in reſpect to both its Gravity and Figure, is naturally indifferent either to acquieſce, or be agitated, according as it is either permitted to its own quiet, *in plano*, or deturbed from it, by an external impuls. And this upon Deſign, by that familiar Compariſon to illuſtrate the Liberty of the Mind to be of ſuch a conſtitution; that though it cannot but be commoved by the Species of Objects irruent through the gates of the Senſes: yet nevertheleſs is it ſtill in its own power to afford, or deny its aſſent unto them, *i. e.* or to *Elect*, or *Reject* them. Which was our only ſcope, in our præcedent Diſcourſe concerning the *Firſt Motions* of the Mind, and their *Conſequences*. The words of *Chryſippus* are theſe. *Sicut (inquit) lapidem Cylindrum, ſi per ſpatia terra prona atque deruta jacias; cauſam quidem ei, & initium præcipitantiæ facis; mox tamen ille præceps volvitur; non quia tu id jam facis; ſed quoniam ita ſe modus ejus & forma volubilitas habet: ſic ordo, & ratio Neceſſitatis Fati genera ipſa, & principia cauſarum movet; impetus verò conſiliorum, mentiumque noſtrarum, actioneſque ipſas voluntas cujuſque propria, & animorum ingenia moderantur.*

To

4. *Aquinas.* To which we may consarciate the most plausible and promising Resp̃ons of a *School-man*. *Voluit Deus homines deliberare, eligere? Deliberant sine ulla vi, & eligunt per voluntatem. Et tamen hoc ipsum, quod electuri fuerunt, vidit ipse ab æterno: sed vidit, non coegit; scivit, non sanxit; prædixit, non præscripsit. Quid titubant hîc nostri Curiones? Miselli! non alius mihi locus videtur in clariori luce, nisi quod petulca mens ista identidem se scalpit, & exasperat, mala quidem scabie infecta litigandi, & differendi. Quomodo enim (inquiunt) si Deus prævidit me peccaturum, & non potest falli ista prævisio; non peccem necessariò? Certè non necessariò, pro tua mente: liberâ voluntate hîc interveniente. Nempe hoc prævidit Deus, ut eo modo pecces, quo prævidit: providit autem ut liberè; igitur necessariò liberè peccas. Satin' hoc clarum? sed enim Deus ipse in nobis omnis motus Auctor. Communiter Auctor, fateor: sed non nisi boni Fautor. Ad virtutem accingeris? illo sciente & excitante fit. Ad vitium? Sciente, sinente, & sapienter moderante in bonum finem.*

Article 12. These acute *Resp̃ons* æquitably audited, & their import found to be no more then this; *that man hath a Freedom of Assent, but not of Dissent to the will of God.*

But alas! All this is Aer: and Curiosity is no Chamæleon. For though we extend these ductile *Distinctions* to the extreme of their capacity, and rack their importance with all the nerves of the strongest reason: yet will they at length be found so far short of attaining so much as to the outside of the remote Mysterie, as Impossibility is beyond Difficulty, Infinite beyond Finite, Omniscience beyond Nescience; in a word, as the inscrutable Counsels of Divinity are above the comprehension of narrow, crass, and frail Humanity. Had they sayd no more then He, who being assaulted with the same consternating Scruple, returned in short; *Fata volentem ducunt, Nolentem trahunt*: they had contracted (but increased the weight of) their Speculations. For that rich and emphatick Sentence comprehends the substance of all their larger Evasions; and yet for all that the summe there of ariseth to no more then this: Though man hath *a power of Non-resistance, yet he hath no power of Resistance*; *i.e.* though man hath such a Liberty, that he may be drawn *Not-unwillingly*, yet not such as that he may not be drawn

drawn *Unwillingly*; or, more plainly, that man hath a *Freedome* of *Aſſent*, but not of *Diſſent*; *for who hath reſiſted the Will of God?*

Article 13. A *Debortation* from immoderate Curioſity, in Divine Myſteries: and conciſe *Adhortation* to conform unto, and calmly acquieſce in the *Revealed Will* of God.

Nor could it have proved any *Diſparagement*, but contrarywiſe, the higheſt *Honour*, to which the circumſcribed Intellectuals of dark Mortality have any reaſon to aſpire, here to have confeſſed a *Ne ultra*, and humbly acquieſced in a becoming deſpair of other ſatisfaction then this: *Deus, ab æterno, Fati ſyntaxin, cauſarúmve naturalium ſeriem ſubalternatim ſic ordinavit, & ſanxit; quia ſic ordinavit & ſanxit, i.e. quia imperſcrutabili ejus ſapientia ſic viſum eſt.* When the Wit of man, wanting the Ballaſt of Piety, bears too much ſail, it cannot eſcape overſetting: eſpecially when it adventures upon the immens, vertiginous, and bottomleſs ocean of Providence Divine; where All that is diſcoverable, is darkneſs and horror. What greater Prudence did the great *Plato* ever ſhew, which might conſecrate his Memory to the venerable eſteem of inferior Ages, then that in his introduction of *Socrates*, præparing his Auditors, when He was to diſpute about ſome things which concerned the Attributes of the Divine Nature, with this excellent Allay, or ſuppreſſive of immoderate ſcrutiny in ſuch reſerved myſteries: *Æquum eſt, nos meminiſſe, & me qui diſſeram, & vos qui judicabitis, Homines eſſe*; meet it is for us to remember, that both I who am to diſcourſe, and you who are to judge, are but *Men*. The *Arcana* of Gods Decrees are like the meridian Sun; on which the more we gaze, the leſs we perceive: and all we can gain by our audacious inſpection, will be only *Blindneſs* and too late *Repentance*. When the moſt Learned and Acute, whoſe monuments of Perſpicacity are the moſt refulgent Gemms in the embroidered coate of Fame, have found their Diſquiſitions terminated in the ſenſible Mellifice of Bees, the contexture of Spiders, the ſpinſtry of Silkworms (not to advance to thoſe Giant Problems of the reciprocal Afflux and Reflux of the Sea; the ſenſible torrent of the Aer from Weſt to Eaſt under the Tropicks; the Cauſe of Earthquaks; the motions and diſtances of Celeſtial or Quinteſſential bodies; the Circumference and

Diametre of the Globe Terraqueous, and its Libration or ſuſpenſion upon Nothing; the verticity and Allieiency of the Loadſtone; the nature of the Soul, &c.) we ſay, when the moſt Eagle-eyed Indagators have found themſelves diſcouraged, and at a loſs in theſe minute Mechanicks of *Nature*: what a diſtracted Inſolency is it for us to Attach thoſe infinitely more inexplorable Abſtruſities of the Divine Prædordination, which are too intenſe for the ſtronger Opticks of Cherubins? What did grave and modeſt Antiquity deſign, by their erecting of the ſtatue of that Monſter, *Sphinx*, over the doores of their Temples? only this; by the commination of imminent Deſtruction, to deterr the Curious from prying into the recluſe and abſcondite *Sanctum Sanctorum* of the *Deity*. This the profound *Euclid* more then glanced at, when, being interrogated by ſome Philopragmoniſt (who hoped to confound the Mathematicks with the Metaphyſicks) concerning the Nature and Politie of the Gods, He made this incomparable anſwer: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ οἶδα, τοὺς μὲν φιλοπράγμονας ὅτι μισοῦσιν, ἀσφαλῶς οἶδα; as for other things concerning the Gods, I know nought, but this I know full well, that they deteſt and abominate the profanely Curious. And this that reverend *Father* alſo reflected on, when He ſayd; *Ut multò facilius invenit ſyderum Conditorem humilis Pietas, quàm ſyderum ordinem ſuperba Curioſitas; ita firma ſtabilique fide ſciamus omne Dei judicium juſtum eſſe, & ubi inveſtigare non poteris quare ita judicaret, ſufficiet ſcire quis judicaret.* Since therefore it is impoſſible for us to make our ſelves privy to the *Concealed* Will of our Creator; all that remains on our part, is to endevour, with all humility and ſerenity, to conforme and cooperate to his *Revealed*: aſſuring our ſelves, that He, who is All *Wiſdome* and *Goodneſs*, can will nothing but what is Good, nay infinitely better for us, then what our imperfect and deceptible underſtanding can inſtruct our Will to deſire for our ſelves. This was the nobleſt reſolve of the noble *Epictetus*. *Semper magis volo, quod Deus vult, quàm quod Ego: adjungar illi, velut miniſter & aſſecla; cum illo appeto, cum illo deſidero, & quod Deus vult, volo.* And in truth, this is the

the only true Halcyon, that can calme all the diſtracting tempeſts of our Cares; the imperturbed Haven, wherein the Weather-beaten veſſels of our Minds may ſafely Anchor, and bid defiance to all the impetuous Guſts of Adverſity, and Temptations; the Magiſterial Elixir of all *virtue*, and ſo of all real *Delight*; nay, Heaven anticipated; and the Term wherein both my *Cogitations* and *Pen* ſhall acquieſce.

All Glory be to God on high, on earth Peace, and Good Will towards men.

FINIS.